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Third Book: Phenomenology and the Foundations of the Sciences

Volume II  Ideas pertaining to a pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. 
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Analytic Subject Index ................................................................................................................................................ 372
Edmund Husserl's *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophic, Erstes Buch: Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie*, was first published in 1913 in the first volume of *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung*, edited by Edmund Husserl, Adolf Reinach, Max Scheler, Moritz Geiger and Alexander Pfänder (Halle: Max Niemeyer), pp. 1–323. In 1922 the book was reprinted with an "Ausführliches Sachregister" prepared by Gerda Walther. Reprinted again in 1928, the book contained a "Sachregister" prepared by Ludwig Landgrebe replacing that of Gerda Walther. A new edition of the book was published in 1950 by Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague. Edited by Walter Biemel, the title page states that the edition is a "Neu, auf Grund der handschriftlichen Zusätze des Verfassers erweiterte Auflage." This edition, published as Volume III of Edmund Husserl, *Gesammelte Werke (Husserliana)* included additions, insertions and marginal notes of Husserl which were either run into the text itself or printed in a section of "Textkritische Anmerkungen" (pp. 463–483). Much of this supplementary material was taken from three copies of *Ideen* which Husserl annotated between 1913 and 1929. Biemel also included as appendices manuscripts of Husserl in which he either developed further certain ideas in the text or else tried to rewrite existing sections of the book.

In 1976 Biemel's edition was replaced by one edited by Dr. Karl Schuhmann (*Husserliana III, 1 and III, 2*), also published by Martinus Nijhoff. This new edition establishes a corrected text of the three editions printed during Husserl's lifetime and contains, in a second volume, revised and corrected texts of the supplementary material found in Biemel's edition along with material not found in that edition. In addition to reproducing Husserl's annotations in still
another copy of Ideen (the copies are identified as Copies A, B, C, D),\footnote{For a discussion of the nature and dating of Husserl's annotations in these copies, see Schuhmann's account in Husserliana III, 2, pp. 657f., and his "Einleitung des Herausgebers" in III, 1, pp. Lff. According to Schuhmann (III, 2, p. 478), Copy A was annotated from 1913 to 1929; Copy B between 1914 and 1921; Copy C ca. 1921, and Copy D in the Fall of 1929.} this edition prints, among others, all of the manuscripts which Husserl had prepared for W. R. Boyce Gibson but which the latter did not use in his translation.\footnote{Dated from around 1925 to 1929, these manuscripts are printed in III, 2, pp. 627–651, and discussed by Schuhmann in III, 1, pp. XLVIIff. The manuscripts chiefly concern the second chapter of Part II of Ideen, and reflect Husserl's attempt both to reformulate the line of thought in that chapter concerning the psychological and transcendental reductions, and to rewrite the text in such a way that it is brought up to the level of his thought in the late 1920's. An important and detailed study of the various groups of manuscripts involved in the genesis and development of Ideen also can be found in the second volume of Karl Schuhmann's Die Dialektik der Phänomenologie (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973); and a penetrating study of Ideen is given in the same author's Die Fundamentalbetrachtung der Phänomenologie. Zum Weltproblem in der Philosophie Edmund Husserls (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971).}

Every effort has been made to conform the present translation to the text as published by Dr. Schuhmann. Included in footnotes is a representative selection of Husserl's annotations in his four copies of Ideen along with a number of very short appendices. The source of the note is identified according to Dr. Schuhmann's edition (e.g., "Addition in Copy A"), while Husserl's own footnotes in the printed editions during his lifetime are identified by the locution, "AUTHOR'S FOOTNOTE." Numbers of the appendices refer to Dr. Schuhmann's arrangement of them. Unless otherwise stated, the supplementary material is to be applied after the word to which the footnote is affixed. All internal page references, including those of the indices, are to the pages of the first printed edition and which appear in the margins of the pages.

Although all of the supplementary materials published by Dr. Schuhmann is valuable to anyone seeking a thorough scholarly and philosophical understanding of Husserl's great work (Dr. Schuhmann published 38 pages of Husserl's annotations, and 132 pages of appendices), chiefly for reasons of economy I have translated only a selection of this material. As a consequence, the make up of this volume differs from that of Dr. Schuhmann. Taken as a whole, however, the supplementary materials included in the present translation provide what, in my judgment, is a good picture of a significant commentary by Husserl on his own text over a period of about sixteen years and which, I believe, will satisfy the immediate needs of the English-speaking reader.
A basic concern in making this translation has been to preserve Husserl's distinctions in English and to render his ideas by expressions which conform to the things themselves which he sought to describe. Of great help in this connection was the Guide for Translating Husserl by Dorion Cairns. The translation also benefited from a comparison with the following published translations: Idées directrices pour une phénoménologie, traduit de l'allemand par Paul Ricoeur (Paris: Gallimard, 1950); Ideas relativas a una fenomenología pura y una filosofía fenomenológica; con las adiciones, notas marginales y correcciones póstumas, traducido por José Gaos (Mexico-Buenos Aires: Fondo de Cultura Economica, 1962); and Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, translated by W. R. Boyce Gibson (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1931).

A translation is always only that — a translation. While it is possible to make Husserl's philosophy accessible and, hopefully, equally plausible in English, it is also to be hoped that final judgment of the work will be made of the expression of this philosophy in the original, and that the failings of the translator will not be laid to the author.

I dedicate this translation to the memory of my Mother, who thoughtfully gave me my copy of Ideen as a graduation present from college; and to the memory of Dorion Cairns, who patiently helped me learn to read it.

W. R. Boyce Gibson's translation of Ideen was of great help to me in preparing my translation, and I have tried to preserve the high standard he set for the translation of Husserl. I wish to express here my deep gratitude to Professor Q. B. Gibson of the Australian National University for his generous cooperation in permitting the publication of my translation.

I also wish to acknowledge the help and encouragement in prepar-

3 Dorion Cairns, Guide for Translating Husserl (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973). Among the papers left by Dorion Cairns at his death in 1973 was a very early draft of about half of Ideen, some of which, however, underwent extensive revision in later years. However, with but a few exceptions, this draft did not conform at all to Cairn's translations of Cartesian Meditations (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960) and Formal and Transcendental Logic (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969), nor to the material published in the Guide. What Cairns's translation might have looked like had he been able to complete it can be found in his essay, "The many Senses and Denotations of the World Bewußtsein ("Consciousness") in Edmund Husserl's Writings," in Life-World and Consciousness. Essays for Aron Gurwitsch, edited by Lester E. Embree (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1972), pp. 20–27. (I wish to thank Richard Zaner, the owner of Cairns's papers, for allowing me to consult and make use of Cairns's manuscripts, especially the commentary Cairns had prepared on Ideen in the years immediately preceding his death.)
ing my translation from Alexander Schimmelpenninck, Publisher, Martinus Nijhoff; Dr. Karl Schuhmann, editor of the definitive edition of *Ideen*; Dr. Samuel IJsseling, Director of the Husserl-Archives at Louvain; Dr. Lester Embree, Duquesne University; and Dr. Richard Zaner, Southern Methodist University. Andy and Steve Kersten helped prepare the final typescript.

F.K.
IDEAS PERTAINING TO A PURE PHENOMENOLOGY AND TO A
PHENOMENOLOGICAL PHILOSOPHY

INTRODUCTION

Pure phenomenology, the way to which we seek here, the unique position of which relative to all other sciences we shall characterize and show to be the science fundamental to philosophy, is an essentially new science which, in consequence of its most radical essential peculiarity, is remote from natural thinking and therefore only in our days presses toward development. It is called a science of “phenomena”. Other sciences, long known, also concern phenomena. Thus we hear that psychology is designated as a science of psychical “appearances” or phenomena and that natural science is designated as a science of physical “appearances” or phenomena; likewise on occasion historical phenomena are spoken of in the science of history, cultural phenomena in the science of culture; and something similar is true of all other sciences of realities. No matter how varied may be the sense of the word “phenomena” in such locutions, and no matter what further significations it may have, it is certain that phenomenology also relates to all these “phenomena” and does so with respect to all significations of the word “phenomenon.” But phenomenology relates to them in a wholly different attitude whereby any sense of the word “phenomenon” which we find in the long-known sciences becomes modified in a definite way. To understand these modifications or, to speak more precisely, to bring about the phenomenological attitude and, by reflecting, to elevate its specific peculiarity and that of the natural attitudes into the scientific consciousness — this is the first and by no means easy task whose demands we must perfectly satisfy if we are to achieve the realm of phenomenology and scientifically assure ourselves of the essence proper to phenomenology.

During the last decade much has been said in German philosophy and psychology about phenomenology. In supposed agreement with
the *Logische Untersuchungen*,\(^1\) phenomenology has been conceived as a substratum of empirical psychology, as a sphere comprising "immanent" descriptions of psychical mental processes, a sphere comprising descriptions that — so the immanence in question is understood — are strictly confined within the bounds of internal *experience*. It would seem that my protest against this conception\(^2\) has been of little avail; and the added explanations, which sharply pinpointed at least some chief points of difference, either have not been understood or have been heedlessly pushed aside. Thus the replies directed against my criticism of psychological method are also quite negative because they miss the straightforward *sense* of my presentation. My criticism of psychological method did not at all deny the value of modern psychology, did not at all disparage the experimental work done by eminent men. Rather it laid bare certain, in the literal sense, radical defects of method upon the removal of which, in my opinion, must depend an elevation of psychology to a higher scientific level and an extraordinary amplification of its field of work. Later an occasion will be found to say a few words about the unnecessary defences of psychology against my supposed "attacks."\(^3\) I touch on this dispute here so that, in view of the prevailing misinterpretations, ever so rich in consequences, I can sharply emphasize from the start that *pure phenomenology*, access to which we shall prepare in the following essay — the same phenomenology that made a first break-through in the *Logische Untersuchungen*, and the sense of which has opened itself up to me more deeply and richly in the continuing work of the last decade — *is not psychology* and that neither accidental delimitations of its field nor its terminologies, but *most radical essential* grounds, prevent its inclusion in psychology. No matter how great the significance which phenomenology must claim to have for the method of psychology, no


\(^3\) In Copy A, the passage beginning *In supposed agreement and ending with my supposed "attacks" is placed in square brackets.*
matter how essential the "foundations" which it furnishes for it, pure phenomenology (if only because it is a science of ideas) is no more psychology than geometry is natural science. Indeed, the difference proves to be an even more radical one than that in the case compared. The fact that pure phenomenology is not psychology is in no respect altered by the fact that phenomenology has to do with "consciousness," with all sorts of mental processes, acts and act-correlates. What with the prevailing habits of thinking, to achieve an insight into that indeed requires no little effort. That we set aside all hitherto prevailing habits of thinking, that we recognize and tear down the intellectual barrier with which they confine the horizon of our thinking and now, with full freedom of thought, seize upon the genuine philosophical problems to be set completely anew made accessible to us only by the horizon open on all sides: these are hard demands. But nothing less is required. Indeed, what makes so extraordinarily hard the acquisition of the proper essence of phenomenology, the understanding of the peculiar sense of its problems, and of its relationship to all other sciences (in particular to psychology), is that, for all this, a new style of attitude is needed which is entirely altered in contrast to the natural attitude in experiencing and the natural attitude in thinking. To move freely in it without relapsing into the old attitudes, to learn to see, distinguish, and describe what lies within view, require, moreover, peculiar and laborious studies.

It will be the pre-eminent task of this First Book to seek ways by which the excessive difficulties of penetrating into this new world can be overcome, so to speak, piece by piece. We shall start from the natural standpoint, from the world as it confronts us, from consciousness as it offers itself in psychological experience; and we shall lay bare the presuppositions essential to psychological experience. We shall then develop a method of "phenomenological reductions" (of psychological experience), with respect to which we cannot only do away with barriers to cognition that belong to the essence of every natural style of research but which, at the same time, also divert the one-sided direction of regard proper to every natural style of research until we shall have acquired, finally, the free vista of "transcendentally" purified phenomena and, therewith, the field of phenomenology in our peculiar sense.

4 Insertion in Copy D: the Ego and
5 Insertion in Copy D: Ego-
Let us draw the preliminarily indicative lines yet a little more definitely; and let us start from psychology as demanded not only by the prejudices of the times but also by the internal communities of the matter in question.

Psychology is an experiential science. Two things are implied in the usual sense of the word "experience:"

1. It is a science of facts, of matters of fact in David Hume's sense.
2. It is a science of realities. The "phenomena" that it, as psychological "phenomenology," deals with are real occurrences which, as such occurrences, if they have actual existence, find their place with the real subjects to whom they belong in the one spatiotemporal world as the omnitudo realitatis.

In contradistinction to that, pure or transcendental phenomenology will become established, not as a science of matters of fact, but as a science of essences (as an "eidetic" science); it will become established as a science which exclusively seeks to ascertain "cognitions of essences" and no "matters of fact" whatever. The relevant reduction which leads over from the psychological phenomena to the pure "essence" or, in the case of judgmental thinking, from matter-of-fact ("empirical") universality to "eidetic" universality, is the eidetic reduction.⁶

Secondly, the phenomena of transcendental phenomenology will become characterized as irreal [irreal]. Other reductions, the specifically transcendental ones, "purify" psychological phenomena from what confers on them reality and, with that, their place in the real "world."⁷ Our phenomenology is to be an eidetic doctrine, not of phenomena that are real, but of phenomena that are transcendentally reduced.

What all this signifies will become distinct in greater detail only in what follows. In a precursory manner, it designates a schematic framework of the introductory series of investigations. I hold it necessary to add only one remark here. It will strike the reader that in the aforementioned two points, instead of the generally customary single separation of sciences into sciences of realities and sciences of idealities (or into empirical sciences and a priori sciences), two separations of sciences appear to be used which correspond to the two contrasting pairs: matter of fact and essence, real and non-real. In place of the usual contrast between real and ideal, the distinguishing

⁶ Marginal note in Copy D opposite the latter part of this sentence: In advance, separation of the reduction into eidetic and specifically phenomenological.
⁷ Insertion in Copy A: and in any real world whatever.
⁸ Marginal note in Copy D: The manner of expression is dangerous.
of these two contrasts will find a detailed justification in the later course of our investigations (and particularly in the Second Book). It will become apparent that the ordinary concept of reality needs a fundamental limitation according to which a difference between real being and individual being (temporal being simpliciter) must be established. The transition to pure essence yields, on the one side, eidetic cognition of the real; on the other side, with respect to the remaining sphere, it yields eidetic cognition of the irreal. Moreover, it will become apparent that all transcendentally purified "mental processes" ['"Erlebnisse"] are irrealities posited outside any incorporation into the "actual world." Just these irrealities are explored by phenomenology, not, however, as single particulars, but in "essence." To what extent, however, transcendental phenomena as single facts are accessible to an investigation and what relationship such an investigation of matters of fact may have to the idea of metaphysics, can only be considered in the concluding series of investigations.9

In the First Book, however, we shall not only treat the general doctrine of phenomenological reductions, which make transcendentally purified consciousness and its eidetic correlates visible and accessible to us; we shall also attempt to acquire definite ideas of the most general structure of this pure consciousness and, mediated by them, of the most general groups of problems, lines of investigations, and methods which belong to the new science.10

In the Second Book we shall then treat in detail some particularly significant groups of problems, the systematic formulation and characteristic solution of which are the precondition for being able to make actually clear the difficult relationships of phenomenology, on the one hand, to the physical sciences of Nature, to psychology and to the cultural sciences; on the other hand, however, to all the a priori sciences. The projected phenomenological sketches on this occasion offer at the same time welcome means of considerably deepening the understanding of phenomenology gained in the First Book and of acquiring an incomparably richer recognition of its vast areas of problems.

9 Marginal note to this sentence in Copy C: Such sentences have been overlooked again and again. Marginal note in Copy D to the last two sentences of this paragraph: N.B.
10 Marginal note in Copy D: Only a fragment is actually given.
A Third and concluding Book is devoted to the idea of philosophy.¹¹

The insight will be awakened that genuine philosophy, the idea of which is the actualizing of absolute cognition, is rooted in pure phenomenology; and rooted in it in a sense so important that the systematically strict grounding and working out of this first of all genuine philosophies is the incessant precondition for every metaphysics and other philosophy “that will be able to make its appearance as a science.”

Because phenomenology will become established here as a science of essence — as an “a priori” or, as we also say, an eidetic science — it is useful to let all efforts that are to be devoted to phenomenology itself be preceded by a series of basic expositions concerning essences and eidetic science and, in opposition to naturalism, a defense of the original independent legitimacy of eidetic cognition.

We close these introductory words with a brief consideration of terminology. As already was the case in the Logische Untersuchungen, I avoid as much as possible the expressions “a priori” and “a posteriori” because of the confusing obscurities and many significations clinging to them in general use, and also because of the notorious philosophical doctrines that, as an evil heritage from the past, are combined with them. They are to be used only in contexts that confer upon them unambiguousness and only as equivalents of other terms which are joined to them and on which we have conferred clear and univocal significations, particularly where it is a matter of allowing for historical parallels.

With the expressions Idee [idea] and Ideal [ideal], it is perhaps not quite so bad with respect to disconcerting varieties of significations, though, on the whole, still bad enough, a fact to which the frequent misinterpretation of my Logische Untersuchungen have made me sufficiently sensitive. In addition, the need to keep the supremely important Kantian concept of idea cleanly separated from the universal concept of (either formal or material) essence decided me to make a terminological change. I therefore use, as a foreign word, the terminologically unspoiled name “Eidos”; and, as a German word, the name “Wesen” [“essence”] which is infected with harmless but occasionally vexatious equivocations.

¹¹ Marginal note in Copy D: Phenomenology as first philosophy.
Probably I should also have eliminated the badly burdened word \textit{Real [real]}, if only a fitting substitute had offered itself to me.

Generally, the following must be noted. Because it will not do to choose technical expressions that fall entirely outside the frame of historically given philosophical language and, above all, because fundamental philosophical concepts are not to be defined by means of firm concepts identifiable at all times on the basis of immediately accessible intuitions; because, rather, in general long investigations must precede their definitive clarifications and determinations; combined ways of speaking are therefore frequently indispensable which arrange together a \textit{plurality} of expressions of common discourse which are in use in approximately the same sense and which give terminological pre-eminence to single expressions of this sort. One cannot define in philosophy as in mathematics; any imitation of mathematical procedure in this respect is not only unfruitful but wrong, and has most injurious consequences. For the rest, each of the above terminological expressions is to receive its fixed sense by means of a determinate, intrinsically evident validation of that sense in the deliberations to be carried out. Meanwhile, circumstantial critical comparisons with the philosophical tradition in this respect, as in all others, must be renounced if only because of the length of this work.
FIRST BOOK

GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO A PURE
PHENOMENOLOGY
PART ONE

ESSENCE AND EIDETIC COGNITION
§1. Natural Cognition and Experience.

Natural cognition begins with experience and remains within experience. In the theoretical attitude which we call the "natural" theoretical attitude\(^1\) the collective horizon of possible investigations is therefore designated with one word: It is the world. Accordingly, the sciences of this original\(^2\) attitude are, in their entirety, sciences of the world; and, as long as it is the exclusively dominant theoretical attitude, the concepts "true being," "actual being," that is, real being and — since everything real joins together to make up the unity of the world — "being in the world" coincide.

To each science there corresponds an object-province as the domain of its investigations; and to all its cognitions, i.e., here to all its correct statements, there correspond, as primal sources of the grounding which validates their legitimacy, certain intuitions in which objects belonging to the province become themselves-given as existing and, at least some of them, given originarily. The presentive intuition [gebende Anschauung] belonging to the first, the "natural" sphere of cognition and to all sciences of that sphere, is natural experience; and the "natural" experience that is presentive of something originarily is perception, the word being understood in the ordi-

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\(^1\) Marginal note in Copy D: And the natural practical attitude? 
\(^2\)Author's footnote: No stories will be told here. Neither psychological-causal nor historical-developmental genesis need be, or should be, thought of when we speak here of originality. What other sense is meant will not become reflectively and scientifically clear until later. From the start, however, everyone feels that the empirical-concrete cognitions of matters of fact being earlier than every other cognition, e.g., every mathematical-ideal cognition, need not have an Objective temporal sense. Addition to this sentence in first and third printed editions: and is understandable in a non-temporal sense. The word Objective was omitted from the first and third printed editions, but appears in the second printed edition.
To have something real given originarily and "attentively to perceive" and "experience" it in an intuiting simpliciter are one and the same. We have originary experience of concrete physical things in "external perception," but no longer in memory or in forward-regarding expectation; we have originary experience of ourself and of our states of consciousness in so-called internal or self-perception; not, however, of others and of their mental processes in "empathy." As belonging to them, we "view the mental processes of others" on the basis of the perception of their outward manifestation in the organism. This empathic viewing is, more particularly, an intuiting, a presentive act, although no longer an act that is presentive of something originarily. The other and his psychical life are, to be sure, given in consciousness as "themselves there" and in union with his organism; but they are not, like the latter, given in consciousness as originary.

The world is the sum-total of objects of possible experience and experiential cognition, of objects that, on the basis of actual experiences, are cognizable in correct theoretical thinking. This is not the place to discuss how the methods of experiential science look when seen more closely, how that method grounds its right to go beyond the narrow bounds of direct experiential givenness. Sciences of the world, thus sciences in the natural attitude, the sciences of material nature, but also those of animate beings with their psychophysical nature, consequently also physiology, psychology, and so forth, are all so-called natural sciences in the narrower and broader sense. Likewise all the so-called Geisteswissenschaften belong here: the science of history, the sciences of culture, sociological disciplines of every sort. Concerning these we can, for the present, leave it an open question whether they should be treated as like the natural sciences or contrasted with them, whether they should be regarded as themselves natural sciences or as sciences of an essentially novel type.

3Marginal note in Copy D: when one speaks of showing legitimacy without theoretical experience

4In Copy A, the words to attentively to perceive and are crossed out.

5In Copy A, the words ourself and are crossed out and marked for deletion.

6In Copy A, the words others and of are crossed out and marked for deletion.

7In Copy A, an interrogation mark in the margin opposite the second half of this sentence.
Experiential sciences are sciences of "matters of fact." The founding cognitional acts of experiencing posit something real individually; they posit it as something factually existing spatiotemporally, as something that is at this temporal locus, that has this duration of its own and a reality-content which, with respect to its essence, could just as well have been at any other temporal locus. On the other hand, it is posited as something that is at this place, in this physical shape (or else is given in union with something organismal having this shape), whereas the same real something considered with respect to its own essence could just as well be at any other place and have any other shape, could also be changing though it is in fact unchanging, or could be changing otherwise than in the manner in which it is changing in fact. Individual existence of every sort is, quite universally speaking, "contingent." It is thus; in respect of its essence it could be otherwise. Even though definite laws of Nature obtain according to which if such and such real circumstances exist in fact then such and such definite consequences must exist in fact, such laws express only de facto rules which themselves could read quite otherwise. Moreover, they already presuppose, as something pertaining from the start to the essence of objects of possible experience, that objects of possible experience which are governed by them are, considered in themselves, contingent.

But the sense of this contingency, which is called factualness, is limited in that it is correlative to a necessity which does not signify the mere de facto existence of an obtaining rule of coordination among spatiotemporal matters of fact but rather has the character of eidetic necessity and with this a relation to eidetic universality. When we said that any matter of fact, "in respect of its own essence," could be otherwise, we were already saying that it belongs to the sense of anything contingent to have an essence and therefore an Eidos which can be apprehended purely; and this Eidos comes under eidetic truths belonging to different levels of universality. An individual object is not merely an individual object as such, a "This here," an object never repeatable; as qualified "in itself" thus and so, it has its own specific character, its stock of essential predicables which must belong to it (as "an existent such as it is in itself") if other, secondary, relative determinations can belong

*Insertion in Copy D: in the customary sense.

*In Copy D, the word relative is changed to contingent.
to it. Thus, for example, any tone in and of itself has an essence and, highest of all, the universal essence tone as such, or rather sound as such — taken purely as the moment that can be singled out intuitively in the individual tone (alone or else by comparing one tone with others as “something common”). In like manner any material thing has its own essential species and, highest of all, the universal species “any material thing whatever,” with any temporal determinations whatever, any duration, figure, materiality whatever. Everything belonging to the essence of the individuum another individuum can have too; and highest eidetic universalities of the sort just indicated in our examples delimit “regions” or “categories” of individua.10

§3. Eidetic Seeing [Wesenserschauung] and Intuition of Something Individual [individuelle Anschauung]. 11

At first “essence” designated what is to be found in the very own being of an individuum as the What of an individuum. Any such What can, however, be “put into an idea.” Experiencing, or intuition of something individual can become transmuted into eidetic seeing (ideation) — a possibility which is itself to be understood not as empirical, but as eidetic. What is seen when that occurs is the corresponding pure essence, or Eidos, whether it be the highest category or a particularization thereof — down to full concretion.

This seeing which is presentive of the essence12 and, perhaps, presentive of it originally, can be an adequate one such as we can easily obtain in, for example, a seeing of the essence tone. But it can also be a more or less imperfect, “inadequate” seeing, and not only in respect of a greater or lesser clarity and distinctness. The specific character of certain categories of essences is such that essences belonging to them can be given only “onesidedly,” in a sequence “many-sidedly,” yet never “all-sidedly.” Correlatively, the individual singularizations corresponding to such essences can then be experienced and otherwise objectivated only in inadequate, “one-sided” empirical intuitions. This holds good for every essence relating to something physical; and it holds with respect to all the essential components of extension or of

10 Marginal note in Copy A: The extending of the concept of essence to include the logical form is lacking here.
11 Marginal note in Copy C: Cf §143, p. 297.
12 Insertion in Copy C: in a simple separate appearance.
materiality. Indeed, as can be seen on closer inspection (the analyses following later will make this evident), it holds good for all realities without exception, as a result of which the vague expressions one-sidedness and many-sidedness will then take on definite significations and different sorts of inadequateness will become separated.

For the present it is sufficient to point out that it is essentially impossible for even the spatial shape of the physical thing to be given otherwise than in mere one-sided adumbrations and that — regardless of this inadequateness which remains continually, despite all gain, throughout any course of continued intuitions — each physical property draws us into infinities of experience: that every experiential multiplicity, no matter how extensive, still leaves open more precise and novel determinations of the physical thing; and it does so in infinitum.

Of whatever sort intuition of something individual may be, whether it be adequate or inadequate, it can take the turn into seeing an essence; and this seeing, whether it be correspondingly adequate or correspondingly inadequate, has the characteristic of a presentive act. But the following is implicit in this:

*The essence (Eidos) is a new sort of object. Just as the datum of individual or experiencing intuition is an individual object, so the datum of eidetic intuition is a pure essence.*

Not a merely external analogy but a radical community is present here. *Seeing an essence is also precisely intuition,* just as an eidetic object is precisely an object. The universalization of the correlatively interrelated concepts “intuition” and “object” is not an arbitrary conceit but compellingly demanded by the nature of the matters in question.13 Empirical intuition or, specifically, experience, is consciousness of an individual object; and as an intuitive consciousness it “makes this object given,” as perception it makes an individual object given originally in the consciousness of seizing upon this object “originarily,” in its “personal” selfhood. In quite the same manner

13 Author’s footnote: How hard it is in our day for psychological investigators to appropriate this simple and quite fundamental insight is shown in an exemplary manner by Oswald Külpe’s surprising polemic against my doctrine of categorial intuition in his work *Die Realisierung der Realwissenschaften* [The Positing of Realities. Foundation of the Sciences of Reality] (Leipzig: Hirzel, 1912, Vol. I, p. 127, which has just reached my hands. I regret being misunderstood by the distinguished scholar. A critical reply becomes impossible, however, when the misunderstanding is so perfect that nothing remains of the sense of one’s own assertions.
intuition of an essence is consciousness of something, an "object," a
Something to which the intuitional regard is directed and which is
"itself given" in the intuition; it is something which can, however, be
"objectivated" as well in other acts, something that can be thought of
vaguely or distinctly, which can be made the subject of true and
false predications — just like any other "object" in the necessarily
broadened sense proper to formal logic. Any possible object — logically
speaking, "any subject of possible true predications" — has, prior to all
predicative thinking, precisely its modes of becoming the object of an
objectivating, an intuiting regard which perhaps reaches it in its
"personal selfhood," which "seizes upon" it. Seeing an essence is
therefore intuition; and if it is seeing in the pregnant sense and not a
mere and perhaps vague making present, the seeing is an originally
presentive intuition, seizing upon the essence in its "personal" self­
hood. On the other hand, it is an intuition of an essentially peculiar
and novel sort in contrast to the sorts of intuition which correlatively
belong to objectivities of other categories and especially in contrast to
intuition in the usual and narrower sense, that is, intuition of some­
thing individual.

Certainly its own specific character is such that intuition of essence
has as its basis a principal part of intuition of something individual,
namely an appearing, a sightedness of something individual, though
not indeed a seizing upon this nor any sort of positing as an actuality;
certainly, in consequence of that, no intuition of essence is possible
without the free possibility of turning one's regard to a "correspond­
ing" individual and forming a consciousness of an example — just as,
conversely, no intuition of something individual is possible without
the free possibility of bringing about an ideation and, in it, directing
one's regard to the corresponding essence exemplified in what is
individually sighted; but this in no respect alters the fact that the two
sorts of intuition are essentially different; and propositions such as we have
just stated indicate only the essential relations between them. To the
essential differences between the intuitions there correspond the
essential relationships between "existence" (here obviously in the
sense of individual factual existent) and "essence," between matter of

14Author's footnote: In the Logische Untersuchungen I used the word Ideation [ideation] for
the seeing that is originally presentive of an essence and even, in most cases, for adequate
seeing of that kind. But obviously a freer concept is required which encompasses every
consciousness directed simply and immediately to an essence and apprehending it, positing it
— in particular, every "obscure," thus non-intuiting, consciousness of that kind.
fact and Eidos. Following up such interconnections, with insight we seize upon the conceptual essences which correspond to these terms and will be firmly attached to them from now on; and thus all the semi-mystical thoughts clinging particularly to the concepts Eidos (idea) and essence will remain cleanly separated from them.\footnote{Author's footnote: Cf. my article in Logos, Vol. I, 1910/11, No.3, p. 315. "Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft" ["Philosophy as Rigorous Science," pp. 110f.].}


The Eidos, the pure essence, can be exemplified for intuition in experiential data — in data of perception, memory, and so forth; but it can equally well be exemplified in data of mere phantasy. Accordingly, to seize upon an essence itself, and to seize upon it originally, we can start from corresponding experiencing intuitions, but equally well from intuitions which are non-experiencing, which do not seize upon factual existence but which are instead "merely imaginative".

If we produce in free phantasy spatial formations, melodies, social practices, and the like, or if we phantasy acts of experiencing of liking or disliking, of willing, etc., then on that basis by "ideation" we can see various pure essences originally and perhaps even adequately: either the essence of any spatial shape whatever, any melody whatever, any social practice whatever, etc., or the essence of a shape, a melody, etc., of the particular type exemplified. In this connection, it does not matter whether anything of the sort has ever been given in actual experience or not. If, by some psychological miracle or other, free phantasy should lead to the imagination of data (sensuous data, for example) of an essentially novel sort such as never have occurred and never will occur in any experience, that would in no respect alter the originary givenness of the corresponding essences: though imagined Data are never actual Data.

Essentially connected with this is the following: Positing of and, to begin with, intuitive seizing upon, essences implies not the slightest positing of any individual factual existence; pure eidetic truths contain not the slightest assertion about matters of fact. And thus not even the most insignificant matter-of-fact truth can be deduced from pure eidetic truths alone. Just as any thinking, any predicating, which concerns matters of fact needs experience to ground it (in so far as the essence of
well-foundedness peculiar to such thinking necessarily demands this), so thinking about pure essences — unmixed thinking about them which does not connect matters of fact and essences — needs the seeing of essences as its legitimating foundation.

§5. Judgments about Essences and Judgments having Eidetic Universal Validity.

But the following should now be noted, Judging about essences and relationships among essences is not the same as eidetic judging of whatever sort when this concept has the breadth which must be given to it; eidetic cognition does not have, in the case of all its asserted propositions, essences as the “objects about which.” And, closely connected with this: Intuition of essences — taken as it has been up to now — as a consciousness analogous to experience, to seizing upon a factual existence, as a consciousness in which an essence is seized upon as an object just as something individual is seized upon in experience, is not the only consciousness which involves essences while excluding every positing of factual existence. Essences can be an intuitive consciousness of essences, in a certain manner they can also be seized upon, without becoming “objects about which.”

Let us start with judgments. Stated more precisely, it is a matter of the difference between judgments about essences and judgments which, in an indeterminately universal manner and without admixture of posittings of the individual nevertheless judge in the mode Any [Überhaupt] about the individual, though purely as a single particular <subsumed under> essences [Einzelheit der Wesen]. Thus in pure geometry we do not judge, as a rule, about the Eidos straight line, angle, triangle, conic section, or the like, but rather about any straight line

Translation's note: For justification for translating "Einzelheit der Wesen" as “single particular subsumed under an essence,” see below, §13, where Husserl distinguishes between the “subsumption” of an individual under an essence in the sense either of an infima species or a genus, and the subordination of an essence to its higher species or genus. It is clear that here Husserl speaks of an individual in the sense of a single particular with respect to the infima species or genus (depending on the example). Ricoeur translates “Einzelheit der Wesen” as “cas particulier des essences,” p. 26; Gaos as “caso singular de las esencias,” p. 24; and Boyce Gibson as “instance of essential being,” p. 58. None of these translations would seem to express the distinction Husserl makes; there seems to be no reason for translating “Wesen” as “essential being” since Husserl distinguishes essence from being.
whatever, any angle whatever — or about a straight line, an angle, or
"as a straight line," "as an angle," about any individual triangles
whatever, any conic sections whatever. Such universal judgments
have the characteristic of *eidetic universality*, "pure" or, as it is also
called, "strict," absolutely "unconditional" universality.

For the sake of simplicity let us assume that it is a matter of
"axioms," immediately evident judgments to which indeed all the
other judgments in a mediate grounding lead back. Provided that, as
presupposed here, they judge in the above-stated manner about
individual single particulars, such judgments need for their noetic
grounding — i.e., in order to make them matters of insight — a
certain seeing of essences which one could designate also (in a modified
sense) as a seeing upon essences; and this seeing too, like the eidetic
intuition which makes essences objects, is based on sighting but not
on experiencing individual single particulars <subsumed under> the
essences. For such judgments, too, more phantasy-objectivations, or
rather individuals sighted in phantasy, are sufficient. There is consci­
ousness of what is sighted, as sighted; it "appears" but is not seized
upon as factually existent. If, for example, we judge with eidetic
universal ("unconditional" universality, "pure" universality),
"Any color whatever is different from any sound whatever," the
statement just made can be confirmed by examining our judging. A
single <subsumed under> the essence color and a <single subsumed>
under the essence sound are intuitionally "objective" ["vorstellig"] as
singles subsumed under their essences; phantasy-intuition (without a
positing of factual existence) and eidetic intuition are there at the
same time in a certain manner; but the latter intuition is not there as
one which makes the essence an object. It is, however, of the essence of
the situation which we are at all times free to shift to the correspond­
ing Objectivating attitude, that this shifting is precisely an essential
possibility. In accord with the altered attitude, the judgment would
be altered; it would then state: The essence (the "genus") color is
other than the essence (the genus) sound. And so everywhere.

Conversely, any judgment about essences can be converted into an equivalent
unconditionally universal judgment about single particulars <subsumed under>
essences as single particulars subsumed under essences [dieser Wesen als
solches]. In this manner, judgments concerning what is purely essential
(purely eidetic judgments) belong together, no matter what their logical
form may be. What is common to them is that they posit no individual
existence\textsuperscript{17} even when they judge — as they may, namely with purely eidetic universality — about something individual.


It is now apparent that the following ideas belong together: eidetic judging, eidetic judgment or asserted eidetic proposition, eidetic truth (or true proposition); as correlate of the last idea: the eidetic predicatively formed affair-complex simpliciter (as what obtains in eidetic truth); finally, as correlate of the first ideas: the eidetic predicatively formed affair-complex in the modified sense of merely what is meant, in the sense of the judged as judged which can either obtain or not obtain.

Any eidetic particularization and singularization of an eidetically universal predicatively formed affair-complex, in so far as it is that, is called an eidetic necessity. Eidetic universality and eidetic necessity are therefore correlates. But the use of the word "necessity" varies following the interrelated correlations: the corresponding judgments are also called necessary. It is important, however, to heed the distinctions and above all not to designate eidetic universality a necessity (as people usually do). The consciousness of a necessity, more particularly a judging consciousness in which there is consciousness of a predicatively formed affair-complex as a particularization of an eidetic universality, is called an apodictic\textsuperscript{18} consciousness; the judgment itself, the asserted proposition, is called an apodictic (also an apodictically "necessary") consequence of the universal judgment with which it is connected. The stated propositions about the relations among universality, necessity, and apodicticity can be framed more universally so that they hold good for any, and not only for purely eidetic, spheres. Obviously, however, they require a distinctive and particularly important sense within the eidetic limitation.

The combination of an eidetic judging about any individual whatever with a positing of the factual existence of something individual is also very important. The eidetic universality becomes transferred to an individual posited as factually existing, or to an indeterminately universal sphere of individuals (which undergoes positing as factu-

\textsuperscript{17}In Copy D, existence is changed to factual existence.

\textsuperscript{18}Marginal note in Copy B: Cl. p. 285.
ally existent). Every “application” of geometrical truths to cases in Nature (Nature, posited as actual) belongs here. The predicatively formed affair-complex, posited as actual, is then a matter of fact in so far as it is an individual predicatively formed actuality-complex; it is, however, an eidetic necessity in so far as it is a singularization of an eidetic universality.

The unrestricted universality of natural laws must not be mistaken for eidetic universality. To be sure, the proposition, “All bodies are heavy,” posits no definite physical affair as factually existing within the totality of Nature. Still it does not have the unconditional universality of eidetically universal propositions because, according to its sense as a law of Nature, it carries with it a positing of factual existence, that is to say, of Nature itself, of spatiotemporal actuality: All bodies — in Nature, all “actual” bodies — are heavy. In contradistinction, the proposition, “All material things are extended,” has eidetic validity and can be understood as a purely eidetic proposition provided that the positing of factual existence, carried out on the side of the subject, is suspended. It states something that is grounded purely in the essence of a material thing and in the essence of extension and that we can make evident as having “unconditional” universal validity. We do this by making the essence of the material thing something given originarily (perhaps on the basis of a free phantasying of a material thing) in order, then, in this presentive consciousness, to perform the steps of thinking which the “insight,” the originary givenness of the predicatively formed eidetic affair-complex explicitly set down by that proposition, requires. That something actual in space corresponds to truths of that sort is not a mere fact; instead, it is an eidetic necessity as a particularization of eidetic laws. Only the actual thing itself, to which the application is made, is a matter of fact here.

§7. Sciences of Matters of Fact and Eidetic Sciences.

The ground for a corresponding interrelation between sciences of matters of fact and eidetic sciences is the connection (itself eidetic) obtaining between individual object and essence, according to which an essential composition belongs to each individual object as its

19 Insertion in Copy A: and variation.
essence — just as, conversely, to each essence there correspond possible individua which would be its factual singularizations. There are pure eidetic sciences such as pure logic, pure mathematics, and the pure theories of time, space, motion, and so forth. Throughout, in every step of their thinking, they are pure of all posings of matters of fact; or, equivalently: in them no experience, as experience, that is, as a consciousness that seizes upon or posits actuality, factual existence, can assume the function of grounding. Where experience functions in them it does not function as experience. The geometer who draws his figures on the board produces thereby factually existing lines on the factually existing board. But his experiencing of the product, qua experiencing, no more grounds his geometrical seeing of essences and eidetic thinking than does his physical producing. This is why it does not matter whether his experiencing is hallucination or whether, instead of actually drawing his lines and constructions, he imagines them in a world of phantasy. It is quite otherwise in the case of the scientific investigator of Nature. He observes and experiments; that is, he ascertains factual existence according to experience; for him experiencing is a grounding act which can never be substituted by a mere imagining. And this is precisely why science of matters of fact and experiential science are equivalent concepts. But for the geometer who explores not actualities but "ideal possibilities," not predicatively formed actuality-complexes but predicatively formed eidetic affair-complexes, the ultimately grounding act is not experience but rather the seeing of essences.

So it is in all eidetic sciences. Grounded on the predicatively formed eidetic affair-complexes (or the eidetic axioms), seized upon in immediate insight, are the mediate, predicatively formed eidetic affair-complexes which become given in a thinking with mediated insight — a thinking according to principles, all of which are objects of immediate insight. Consequently each step in a mediate grounding is apodictically and eidetically necessary. The essence of purely eidetic science thus consists of proceeding in an exclusively eidetic way; from the start and subsequently, the only predicatively formed affair-complexes are such as have eidetic validity and can therefore be either made originarily given immediately (as grounded immediately in essences originarily seen) or else can become "inferred" from

\[20\text{Marginal note in Copy A opposite the first part of this sentence: Thus essences of essences make their appearance here; and the essence of individuality as individuality.}\]
such “axiomatic” predicatively formed affair-complexes by pure deduction.

Connected with this is the practical ideal of exact eidetic science which, strictly speaking, only recent mathematics has shown how to actualize: it has shown how to bestow on any eidetic science the highest degree of rationality by reducing all of its mediate steps of thinking to mere subsumptions under the axioms of the particular eidetic province, these axioms having been assembled once for all and reinforced with the whole set of axioms belonging to “formal” or “pure” logic (in the broadest sense: *mathesis universalis* — unless, of course, from the very beginning it is a matter of that logic itself.

And in this connection there is also the ideal of “mathematization” which, like the ideal just characterized, has great significance for the cognitive practice of all the “exact” eidetic disciplines whose entire stock of cognitions (as in geometry, for example) is included in the universality of a few axioms with purely deductive necessity. But this is not the place to go into that.


After the foregoing it is clear that the sense of eidetic science necessarily precludes any incorporation of cognitional results yielded by empirical sciences. The positing of actuality that occur in the immediate findings of these sciences obviously extend throughout all of their mediate findings. From matters of fact nothing ever follows but matters of fact.

But although every eidetic science is necessarily independent of every science of matters of fact, the reverse holds, on the other hand, for the latter sciences. There is no science of matters of fact which, were it fully developed as a science, could be pure of eidetic cognitions and therefore could be independent of the formal or the material eidetic sciences. For, in the first place, it is without question that an experiential

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21 *Marginal note in Copy D*: But it becomes apparent that this mathematical ideal cannot be universally valid — in particular, not for phenomenology.

22 *Author's footnote*: On the idea of pure logic as *mathesis universalis*, see *Logische Untersuchungen*, Vol. 1, the closing chapter. [*Logical Investigations*, pp. 225-247.]

23 *Insertion in Copy D*: the deductive (eidetic disciplines)

24 *Author's footnote*: Cf. below, Part III, Chapter One, §72. [Reading §72 with Schuhmann instead of §70 as in all three printed editions.]
science, wherever it brings about mediate grounding of judgments, must proceed according to the \textit{formal} principles treated by formal logic. Since, like any other science, an experiential science is directed to objects, it must be universally bound by the laws that belong to the essence of \textit{anything objective whatever}. It thereby enters into a relation with the complex of \textit{formal-ontological} disciplines which, besides formal logic in the narrower sense, embraces the other disciplines of \textit{"mathesis universalis"} (for example arithmetic, pure analysis, theory of multiplicities). Moreover, in the second place, any matter of fact includes a \textit{material} essential composition; and any eidetic truth belonging to the pure essences comprised in that composition must yield a law by which the given factual singularity, like any other possible singularity, is bound.

\textbf{§9. Region and Regional Eidetics.}

Any concrete empirical objectivity finds its place within a \textit{highest} material genus, a "region," of empirical objects. To the pure regional essence, then, there corresponds a \textit{regional eidetic science} or, as we can also say, a regional ontology. In this connection we assume that the regional essence, or the different genera composing it, are the basis for such abundant and highly ramified cognitions that, with respect to their systematic explication, it is indeed worth speaking of a science or of a whole complex of ontological disciplines corresponding to the single generic components of the region. We shall be able to convince ourselves amply of the great extent to which this presupposition is in fact fulfilled. According to what we were saying, any empirical science belonging to the extension of a region will be essentially related not only to the formal but also to the regional, ontological disciplines. We can also express this as follows: Any science of matters of fact (any experiential science) has essential theoretical foundations in eidetic ontologies. For (in case the assumption made is correct) it is quite obvious that the abundant stock of cognitions relating in a pure, an \textit{unconditionally} valid manner to all possible objects of the region — in so far as these cognitions belong partly to the empty form of any objectivity whatever and partly to the regional Eidos which, as it were, exhibits a \textit{necessary material form} of all the objects in the region — cannot lack significance for the exploration of empirical facts.
In this manner there corresponds, e.g., to all the disciplines comprised in natural science, the eidetic science of any physical Nature whatever (the ontology of Nature), since there corresponds to *de facto* Nature an Eidos that can be apprehended purely, the "essence" Any Nature Whatever, with an infinite abundance of predicatively formed eidetic affair-complexes included in the latter. If we fashion the idea of a perfectly rationalized experiential science of Nature, i.e., one so far advanced in its theorization that every particular included in it has been traced back to that particular's most universal and essential grounds, then it is clear that the realization of that idea essentially depends on the elaboration of the corresponding eidetic sciences; that is to say, it depends not only on the elaboration of formal mathesis, which is related in one and the same manner to all sciences taken universally, but especially on the elaboration of those disciplines of material ontology which explicate with rational purity, i.e., eidetically, the essence of Nature and therefore the essences of all essential sorts of natural objectivities as such. And obviously that holds for any other region.

Also with regard to cognitive practice it is to be expected beforehand that the closer an experiential science comes to the "rational" level, the level of "exact," of nomological science — thus the higher the degree to which an experiential science is provided with developed eidetic disciplines as its fundamentals and utilizes them for its <cognitive> groundings — the greater will become the scope and power of its cognitive-practical performance.

This is confirmed by the development of the rational natural sciences, the physical sciences of Nature. Their great era began in the modern age precisely when the geometry which had already been highly developed as a pure eidetics in antiquity (and chiefly in the Platonic school) was all at once made fruitful in the grand style for the method of physics. People made clear to themselves that the material thing is essentially *res extensa* and that geometry is therefore the ontological discipline relating to an essential moment of material thinghood, namely the spatial form. But, in addition, people also made it clear to themselves that the universal (in our terminology, the regional) essence of the material thing extends much further. This is shown by the fact that the development followed at the same time along the line that led to the elaborating of a series of new disciplines coordinate with geometry and called on to perform the same function, that of rationalizing the empirical. The magnificent flowering of the formal and material mathematical sciences sprang from this aim. With passionate zeal
these sciences were developed, or newly constructed, as purely "rational" sciences (as *eidetic ontologies* in our sense), and indeed (in the beginnings of the modern age and for a long time after) not for their own sake but for the sake of the empirical sciences. They then abundantly bore the hoped-for fruits in the parallel development of that much-admired science, rational physics.


If we put ourselves in the position of an investigator in any *eidetic* science, e.g., the ontology of Nature, we find that (indeed, that is the normal case) we are directed not to essences as objects but to objects subsumed under essences which, in our example, are subordinate to the region Nature. In this connection, we observe, however, that "object" is a name for various formations which nonetheless belong together — for example, "physical thing," "property," "relationship," "predicatively formed affair-complex," "aggregate," "ordered set." Obviously they are not on a par with one another but rather in every case point back to one kind of objectivity that, so to speak, takes precedence as the *primal objectivity*, whereas all the others offer themselves as, in a way, merely its modifications. Naturally in our example the physical thing itself takes this precedence in contradiction to the physical property, the physical relationship, etc. But precisely this is part of that formal structure which must undergo clarification if the terms "object" and "object-region" are not to remain in a state of confusion. From that clarification, to which we devote the following observations, the important concept of category, related to the concept of region, will automatically result.

On the one hand, category is a word which, in the phrase "*category of a region,*" points back precisely to the region in question, e.g., to the region Physical Nature. On the other hand, however, it relates the particular determined *material region* to the *form of any region whatever* or, equivalently, to the *formal essence of any object whatever* and to the "*formal categories*" pertaining to this essence.

Let us begin with a not unimportant remark. At first formal ontology seems to be coordinate with material ontologies provided that the formal essence of any object whatever and the regional essences seem to play like roles (in formal ontology and in the regional...
ontologies respectively. One is therefore inclined to speak not simply of regions, as we have up to now, but instead of material regions and now, in addition, of the "formal region." If we accept this manner of speaking, we must be rather cautious. On the one side stand material essences; and in a certain sense they are the "essences proper." But on the other side there stands something that is indeed eidetic but which, nevertheless, differs in its fundamental essence: a mere essence-form, which is indeed an essence but completely "empty", an essence that, in the manner pertaining to an empty form, fits all possible essences; it is an essence which, with its formal universality, has all material universalities, even the highest of them, under it and prescribes laws for them by virtue of the formal truths pertaining to its formal universality. Therefore the so-called "formal region" is, after all, not something co-ordinate with the material regions (the regions simpliciter); properly it is not a region but the empty form of any region whatever; all the regions, with all their materially filled eidetic particularizations stand, not alongside it, but under it — though only formally. This subordination of the material to the formal is shown by the circumstance that formal ontology contains the forms of all ontologies (scL all ontologies "proper," all "material"ontologies) and prescribes for material ontologies a formal structure common to them all — including that structure which we must now study with a view to the distinction between region and category.

Let us start from formal ontology (always as pure logic in its full extent as mathesis universalis) which, as we know, is the eidetic science of any object whatever. Anything and everything is an object in the sense proper to formal ontology, and an infinity of various truths, distributed among the many disciplines of mathesis, can be established for it. But they all lead back to a small stock of immediate or "fundamental" truths which function as "axioms" in the disciplines of pure logic. We define now as logical categories or categories of the logical region, any object whatever: the fundamental concepts of pure logic which occur in those axioms — the concepts by means of which, in the total set of axioms, the logical essence of any object whatever becomes determined, or the concepts which express the unconditionally necessary and constituent determinations of an object as object, of anything whatever in so far as it can be something at all. Because the purely logical, in the sense delimited by us with absolute exactness, determines that concept of the "analytic," as contrasted with

the "synthetic," which alone is important (but which is important fundamentally) to philosophy, we may also designate these categories as analytic.

Accordingly, concepts such as property, relative determination, predicatively formed affair-complex, relationship, identity, equality, aggregate (collection), cardinal number, whole and part, genus and species, and the like, are examples of logical categories. But the "signification-categories," the fundamental concepts belonging to the essence of the proposition (apophansis) — the fundamental concepts of different kinds of propositions, proposition-members, and propositions-forms — also belong here. They belong here, moreover, according to our definition in view of the eidetic truths that connect "any object whatever" and "any signification whatever" so that, furthermore, pure signification-truths can be converted into pure object-truths. For that very reason "apophantic logic," although it makes statements exclusively about significations, is nevertheless part of formal ontology in the fully comprehensive sense. Still one must set the signification-categories apart as a group by themselves and contrast them with the others as the formal objective categories in the pregnant sense.

It may also be noted that by categories we can understand, on the one hand, the concepts in the sense of significations but, on the other hand the formal essences themselves which find their expression in those significations. For example, the "category" predicatively formed affair-complex, plurality, and the like, understood in the latter sense, is the formal Eidos any predicatively formed affair-complex whatever, any plurality whatever, and the like. The ambiguity is dangerous only as long as one has not learned to separate cleanly the things that must be separated throughout: "signification" and that which can undergo "expression" by signification; and, again, signification and signified objectivity. Terminologically one

26 AUTHOR'S FOOTNOTE: On the division of logical categories into signification-categories and formal-ontological categories, cf. Logische Untersuchungen, Vol. I, §67 [Logical Investigations, pp. 263ff.] The entire "Third Investigation" specifically concerns the categories of whole and part. At that time I did not venture to take over the expression "ontology" which was objectionable on historical grounds; rather I designated this investigation (p. 222 of the first edition) as part of an "apriorische Theorie der Gegenstände als solcher" ["apriori theory of objects as objects"], a phrase contracted by Alexius von Meinong to make the word "Gegenständstheorie" ["object-theory"]. Now that times have changed, however, I consider it more correct to rehabilitate the old expression, "ontology."
can distinguish between *categorial concepts* (as significations) and *categorial essences*.


In the realm of any objectivities whatever there is need now of an important distinction that is mirrored within the theory of the forms of significations by the ("pure-grammatical") distinction between "syntactical forms" and "syntactical substrates" or "stuffs." As a consequence, a separation of the categories of formal ontology into *syntactical categories* and *substrate-categories* makes itself known; and this separation will now be discussed in greater detail.

By *syntactical objectivities* we mean objects derived from other objectivities by means of "syntactical forms." The categories corresponding to these forms we shall call *syntactical categories*. Among them belong, for instance, categories such as predicatively formed affair-complexes, relationship, condition or quality, unit, plurality, cardinal number, ordered set, ordinal number, etc. The eidetic situation obtaining here may be described as follows: Every object, in so far as it can be explicated, related to other objects or, in short, logically determined, takes on various syntactical forms; as correlates of the determining thinking, objectivities of a higher level become constituted; conditions, or qualities, and objects determined by conditions or qualities, relationships between some objects or other, pluralities of units, members of ordered sets, objects as bearers of ordinal numerical determinations, etc. If the thinking is predicative, there accrue, step by step, expressions and relevant apophantic signification-formations which mirror the syntactical objectivities with respect to all the articulations and forms of the latter, in precisely corresponding significational syntaxes. Like any other objectivities, all those "categorial objectivities" can function as substrates of categorial formations which, in turn, can do the same, etc. Conversely, every such formation evidently refers back to *ultimate substrates*, to objects of a first or lowest level; i.e., to objects which are no longer *syntactical-categorial formations*, which no longer contain any of those ontological forms which are mere correlates of the thinking functions.

(predicating, denying a predicate, relating, connecting, countings, etc.). Accordingly the formal region, any objectivity whatever, is divided into ultimate substrates and syntactical objectivities. The latter we shall call syntactical derivatives\(^{28}\) of the corresponding substrates, among which, as we shall soon hear, all "individuals" belong. When we speak of an individual property, an individual relationship, etc., naturally we call these derivative objects \(\langle\text{"individual"}\rangle\) on behalf of the substrates from which they are derived.

The following should also be noted. One reaches the ultimate, syntactically formless substrates likewise from the standpoint of the theory of forms of significations: Any proposition or any possible member of a proposition contains, as the substrates of its apophantic forms, its so-called "terms." These can be terms in a merely relative sense; that is to say, they can themselves contain forms (e.g., the plural form, attributives, etc.\(^{29}\)). But in every case we get back — necessarily — to ultimate terms, ultimate substrates, which contain no syntactical formation at all.\(^{30,31}\)

§ 12. Genus and Species.

We now need a new group of categorial distinctions pertaining to the whole sphere of essences. Each essence, whether materially filled or

\(^{28}\) Marginal note in Copy A: p. 29 speaks of an extension of the concept of derivation so that it comprises generalization. Note to substrates: p. 28 explicitly states that substrates are non-selfsufficient objects.

\(^{29}\) Addition in Copy A: In the sphere of logical significations there can be no unformed terms, as my lectures correctly state; the terms, however, refer back to objects which are not syntactically (formed) but which instead stand [?] in contrast to all syntaxes [Textual glosses are by Schuhmann].

\(^{30}\) Author's footnote: A more detailed exposition of the theory of "syntactical forms" and "syntactical stuffs," which is very important for the theory of forms of significations -- this fundamental part of an "apriori grammar" will be presented when I publish my lectures, of many years' standing, concerning pure logic. On "pure" grammar and the general tasks of a theory of the forms of significations, cf. Logische Untersuchungen, Vol. II, "Fourth Investigation". Marginal note in Copy D added to this footnote; Cf. Formale und transcendente Logik [Formal and Transcendental Logic.]

\(^{31}\) Appendix to §11. 1917. published by Schuhmann as Appendix 32: Materially filled ultimate essence, syntactically uncombined individuum. Abstractum, concretum, tode ti. The non-selfsufficient objects. Objects \(\bowtie\) the differentiated and identical. The individual sensuous Datum -- its duration, its quality, etc. The individualizing temporal determination -- quality as quality-moment -- the quality-moment here and there, now and then. The quality-moment in itself "has no individuality." Is it accordingly an essence?
empty\textsuperscript{32} (thus, purely logical), has its place in a hierarchy of essences, in a hierarchy of \textit{generality} and \textit{specificity}. This series necessarily has two limits which never coincide. Descending, we arrive at the \textit{infimae species} or, as we also say, the \textit{eidetic singularities}; ascending through the specific and generic essences, we arrive at a \textit{highest genus}. Eidetic singularities are essences which necessarily have over them “more universal” essences as their genera, but do not have under them any particularizations in relation to which they would themselves be species (either proximate species or mediate, higher, genera). In like fashion, that genus is the highest which has no genus over it.

In this sense, within the realm of pure logic which is made up of significations, the highest genus is “any signification whatever;” each determinate proposition-form, and each determinate form of a proposition-member, is an eidetic singularity; any proposition whatever is an intermediate genus. In the same fashion, any cardinal number whatever is a highest genus. Two, three, etc. are its \textit{infimae species} or eidetic singularities. In the sphere of materially filled essences we find as examples of highest genera any physical thing whatever and any sensuous quality, any spatial shape, and any mental process whatever; the eidetic compositions belonging to the determinate physical things and to the determinate sensuous qualities, spatial shapes, and mental processes, as qualities, shapes, and processes, are eidetic and accordingly materially filled singularities.

\textit{These} eidetic relationships designated by Genus and Species (not the relationships among classes, i.e., sets) are such that, in the particular essence, the more universal essence is “immediately or mediately \textit{contained}\textsuperscript{33} — in a determined sense, the character of which can be seized upon in eidetic intuition. For that reason many investigators include the relationship of an eidetic genus or species to its eidetic particularization among the relationships of “part” to “whole.” “Whole and part” then expresses the broadest concept of “that which contains and that which is contained,” of which the eidetic species-relationship is a particularity. The eidetically singular essence \textit{[eidetisch Singulare]} thus implies collectively the universals lying above it and which, for their part, level by level, “lie one inside another,” the higher always lying inside the lower.

\textsuperscript{32} In Copy A, \textit{empty} is changed to \textit{formal}, materially empty.

\textsuperscript{33} Insertion in Copy D: in the broadest sense.

One must sharply distinguish the relationships belonging to generalization and specialization from the essentially heterogeneous relationships belonging, on the one hand, to the universalization of something materially filled into the formal in the sense of pure logic and, on the other hand, to the converse: the materialization of something logically formal. In other words: generalization is something totally different from that formalization which plays such a large role in, e.g., mathematical analysis; and specialization is something totally different from de-formalization, from "filling out" an empty logico-mathematical form or a formal truth.

Accordingly, the subordinating of an essence to the formal universality of a pure-logical essence must not be mistaken for the subordinating of an essence to its higher essential genera. Thus, e.g., the essence, triangle, is subordinate to the summum genus, Spatial Shape; and the essence, red, to the summum genus, Sensuous Quality. On the other hand, red, triangle and similarly all other essences, whether homogeneous or heterogeneous, are subordinate to the categorial heading "essence" which, with respect to all of them, by no means has the characteristic of an essential genus; it rather does not have that characteristic relative to any of them. To regard "essence" as the genus of materially filled essences would be just as wrong as to misinterpret any object whatever (the empty Something) as the genus with respect to objects of all sorts and, therefore, naturally as simply the one and only summum genus, the genus of all genera. On the contrary, all the categories of formal ontology must be designated as eidetic singularities that have their summum genus in the essence, "any category whatever of formal ontology."

It is clear, similarly, that any determinate inference, e.g., one ancillary to physics, is a singularization of a determinate purely logical form of inference, that any determinate proposition in physics is a singularization of a propositional form, and the like. The pure forms, however, are not genera relatively to the materially filled propositions or inferences, but are themselves only infimae species, namely of the purely logical genera, proposition, inference, which, like all similar genera, have as their absolutely highest genus "any signification whatever." The filling out of an empty logical form

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34 Substitution in Copy D for signification: syntagma. Marginal note in Copy D: Signification, signification-categories: that is in need of greater precision.
(and mathesis universalis includes nothing but empty forms) is therefore an "operation" entirely different in contrast to genuine specialization down to the infimae species. This can be ascertained throughout; thus, e.g., the transition from space to "Euclidean manifold" is not a generalization but a "formal" universalization.

To verify this radical separation we must, as in all such cases, go back to eidetic intuition which at once teaches us that logical form-essences (e.g., the categories) are not "inherent" in the materially filled singularizations in the same manner in which the universal, red, is "inherent" in the different nuances of red, or in which "color" is inherent in red or blue, and that they are not, in the proper sense, "in" the materially filled singularizations at all — i.e., not in any sense that would have enough in common with the usual narrow sense of a part-relationship to justify speaking of a containedness.

No detailed exposition is needed to show, likewise, that the subsumption of an individual, of any This-here, under an essence (a subsumption whose characteristic varies and depends on whether an infima species or a genus is involved) must not be mistaken for the subordination of an essence to its higher species or to a genus.

In the same way we shall merely indicate the changing use of the word extensions, especially with reference to the function of essences in the universal judgment — a use which obviously must be differentiated in accord with the differences just explained. Any essence which is not an infima species has an35 eidetic extension, an extension made up of specificities and always ultimately of eidetic singularities. Any formal essence has, on the other hand, its formal or "mathematical" extension. Furthermore, any essence whatever has its extension of individual singularizations, an ideal sum-total of possible This-heres to which it can be related in cidctically universal thinking. The phrase, empirical extension, indicates more than that: namely, the restriction to a sphere of factual being by virtue of a combined positing of factual being annulling the pure universality. All this is transferred, naturally, from essences to "concepts" as significations.


We note further the distinction between "full," "materially filled" substrates, with the correspondingly "full," "materially filled" syn-

35Insertion in Copy D: materially filled.
tactical objectivities, and empty substrates with the syntactical objectivities formed out of them, the variants of the empty Something. The latter class is itself by no means empty or poverty-stricken; it is determined, that is to say, as the totality of the predicatively formed affair-complexes belonging to the realm of pure logic as mathesis universalis, with all the categorial objectivities out of which they are constructed. Thus every predicatively formed affair-complex expressed by some syllogistic or arithmetical axiom or theorem, every form of inference, every number, every numerical formation, every function in pure analysis, and every Euclidean or non-Euclidean manifold well-defined, belongs in this class.

If we now concentrate on the class of materially filled objectivities, we arrive at ultimate materially filled substrates as the cores of all syntactical formations. The substrate-categories belong to these cores and find their place under the two disjunctive main headings: "materially filled ultimate essence" and "This here!" or pure, syntactically formless, individual single particular. The term individuum, which suggests itself here, is unsuitable because, no matter how it might be defined, the indivisibility that the word connotes should not be admitted into the concept "This here!" but rather must be reserved for the particular and quite indispensible concept individuum. Consequently, we take over the Aristotelian expression tode ti which, at least according to the wording, does not include that sense.

We have contrasted the formless ultimate essence and the This-here. Now we must ascertain the essential connection obtaining between them, which consists of each This-here having its materially filled essential composition characterized by a substrate-essence that is formless in the sense stated.

§15. Selfsufficient and Non-selfsufficient Objects. Concretum and Individuum.

Yet another basic distinction is needed: that between selfsufficient and non-selfsufficient objects. For example, a categorial form is non-selfsufficient in so far as it necessarily refers back to a substrate whose form it is. Substrate and form are referred to one another and are unthinkable "without each other." In this broadest sense, a purely logical form is thus non-selfsufficient; e.g., the categorial form, object, is non-selfsufficient with respect to all object-materials, the category, essence, is non-selfsufficient with respect to all determinate
essences; and so forth. Let us now set aside these non-self-sufficiencies and relate a pregnant concept of non-self-sufficiency or self-sufficiency to concatenated “contents” proper, to relations of “containedness,” “unity,” and perchance “connectedness” in a more proper sense.

Of particular interest here is the situation with the ultimate substrates and, still more narrowly conceived, with materially filled substrate-essences. Two possibilities arise for them: either one such substrate-essence grounds with another substrate-essence the unity of one essence, or it does not do so. In the first case, we arrive at relationships, to be described more precisely, which are perhaps of unilateral or reciprocal non-self-sufficiency; and with respect to eide tic and individual single particulars falling under united essences, we arrive at the apodictically necessary consequence that single particulars falling under one essence cannot exist without being determined by essences which at least share a generic community with that of the other essences.\textsuperscript{36}\textsuperscript{37} E.g., sensuous quality necessarily refers to some species or other of spread; spread is, again, necessarily the spread of some quality united with it, “covering” it. A moment, “enhancement,” e.g., under the category of intensity, is only possible as immanent in a qualitative content, and a content subsumed under such a \langle qualitative \rangle genus is, in turn, not thinkable without some degree or other of enhancement. As a mental process of a certain generic determinateness, an appearing is impossible except as an appearing of something “apparent, as apparent;” and, likewise, the converse holds. And so forth.

As a result, we arrive at important definitions of the formal categorial concepts of individuum, concretum and abstractum. A non-self-sufficient essence is called an *abstractum*, an absolutely self-sufficient essence a *concretum*. A This-here, the material essence of which is a concretum, is called an *individuum*.\textsuperscript{38}

If we now comprehend the “operation” of generalization under the now broadened concept of logical “variation,”\textsuperscript{39} then we can say


\textsuperscript{37}Marginal note in Copy A to the above footnote: It follows from the text that in the “Third Investigation” I chiefly drew upon the restriction to relationships of inexistence “proper.”

\textsuperscript{38}Marginal note in Copy A: In contrast to those in the *Logische Untersuchungen*’ “Third Investigation” these concepts are somewhat modified.

\textsuperscript{39}In Copy A variation \[Abwandlung\] is crossed out, to which is appended the marginal note: derivation \[Ableitung\] in the definition on p. 24.
that the individuum is the primal object required by pure logic, the absolute of logic back to which all logical variants refer.

A concretum is obviously an eidetic singularity because species and genera (expressions which ordinarily exclude the infima species) are non-selfsufficient on principle. *Eidetic singularities* are divided into abstract and concrete.

Eidetic singularities included discretely [disjunktiv] in a concretum are necessarily “heterogeneous” in view of the formal-ontological law that two eidetic singularities of one and the same genus cannot be combined into the unity of one essence; or, as we also say: the infima species of a genus are mutually “incompatible.” Accordingly, every singularity finding a place in a concretum, seen as an infima species, leads to a separated system of species and genera, thus also to separated summa genera. For instance, in the unity of a phenomenal thing the determinate shape leads to the summum genus of any spatial shape whatever, a determinate color to any visual quality whatever. Nonetheless, the infima species in a concretum, instead of being discrete, can also be so related that one is comprehended in the other. For example, physical properties presuppose and include in themselves spatial determinations. In that case, the summa genera too are not, then, discrete.

As a further consequence, the genera are divided in characteristic and fundamental ways into those genera having concreta, ⟨as infima species,⟩ under them, and into those having abstracta under them. For the sake of convenience we speak of concrete and abstract genera despite the double sense which the adjectives now acquire. Obviously no one would be inclined to take concrete genera themselves for concreta in the original sense. Where precision demands it, however, the unwieldy expression “genera” must be used respectively of concreta and of abstracta. Examples of concrete genera are real thing, visual phantom (sensuously filled appearing visual shape), mental process and the like. In contrast, spatial shape, visual quality and the like are examples of abstract genera.

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40*Insertion in Copy D: pure*
41*In Copy A variations is changed to derivations*
42*Marginal note in Copy A: This law has become doubtful to me. The mixing of the species.*
Moreover, with the concepts individuum and concretum the concept of \textit{region}, fundamental to the theory of science, is defined in a strictly "analytical" way. A region is nothing other than the \textit{total highest generic unity belonging to a concretum}, i.e., the essentially unitary nexus of the summa genera pertaining to the infimae species within the concretum. The eidetic extension of the region comprises the ideal totality of concretely unified complexes of infimae species belonging to these genera; the individual extension comprises the ideal totality of possible individua having such concrete essences.

Each regional essence determines "\textit{synthetical}" eidetic truths, that is to say, truths that are grounded in it as this generic essence, but that are not mere particularizations of truths included in formal ontology. Accordingly, neither the regional concept nor any of its regional specifications is freely variable in these synthetical truths; the substitution of indeterminate terms for the related determinate ones does not yield a law of formal ontology, as it does, in characteristic fashion, in the case of any "analytic" necessity. The set of synthetical truths grounded in the regional essence makes up the content of the regional ontology. The total set of \textit{fundamental} truths among them, the \textit{regional axioms}, delimits — and defines for us — the \textit{set of regional categories}. These concepts do not, like all concepts, merely express particularizations of the categories of pure logic, but rather are distinguished by the fact that they express, by virtue of the regional axioms, that which is \textit{peculiar} to the regional essence or, correlative, express \textit{with eidetic universality that which must belong, "a priori" and "synthetically," to an individual object within the extension of the region}. Though such concepts do not belong to pure logic, their application to given individuals is apodictically and unconditionally necessary; it is governed, moreover, by the regional (synthetical) axioms.

In order to retain the allusions to Kant's critique of reason (in spite of considerable differences in the fundamental conceptions, although the differences do not exclude a basic affinity), one would have to understand by \textit{synthetical cognitions a priori the regional axioms}; and we should have as many irreducible classes of such cognitions as we have regions. The "\textit{synthetical fundamental concepts}," or \textit{categories}, would be the regional fundamental concepts (essentially related to the determinate region and its synthetical fundamental laws or principles);
and we should have as many different groups of categories as there are regions to differentiate.

At the same time formal ontology takes its place outwardly alongside the regional (the proper "material," "synthetical") ontologies. Its regional concept, "object" (cf. §10 above), determines the system of formal axioms and, through them, the set of formal ("analytical") categories. In this fact there indeed lies a justification for regarding (formal ontology and the material ontologies) as parallel in spite of all the essential differences which have been emphasized.

§17. Conclusion of Our Logical Considerations.

Our whole consideration has been a purely logical one; it has not moved in any "material" sphere nor, as we may say equivalently, in any determinate region. It has spoken universally of regions and categories; and this universality, according to the sense of the definitions we have built one upon another, has been a purely logical universality. It has been our purpose to outline, on the basis of pure logic and as part of the fundamental structure of all possible cognition or cognitive objectivities proceeding from pure logic, a schema in conformity with which individua must be determinable under "synthetical principles a priori" according to concepts and laws, or in conformity with which all empirical sciences must be grounded on the regional ontologies which are relevant to them and not merely on the pure logic common to all sciences.

At the same time, from here on the idea of a task arises: Within the circle of our intuitions of individuals, to determine the summa genera of concretions and, in this manner, to effect a distribution of all intuited individual being according to regions of being, each of which marks off an eidetic and empirical science (or group of sciences) that is necessarily distinct from other sciences because it is distinguished from them on the most radical eidetic grounds. The radical distinction, we may add, in no way excludes an interweaving or a partial overlapping of the sciences. Thus, for example, "material thing" and "psyche" are different regions of being, and yet the latter is founded on the former; and out of that fact arises the fact that psychology is founded on somatology.

The problem of a radical "classification" of the sciences is, in the main, the problem of separating regions; and this, in turn, requires antecedent investigations in pure logic like those which were conducted here along some lines. On the other side, to be sure, a phenomenology is also required — of which we still know nothing.
NATURALISTIC MISINTERPRETATIONS

§ 18. Introduction to the Critical Discussions.

In contrast to matters of fact and the science of matters of fact, the universal statements about essence and the science of essences deal in advance with the essential foundations for our construction of the idea of a pure phenomenology (which, according to the "Introduction," should develop as a science of essences) as well as for the understanding of its position relative to all empirical sciences and, therefore, relative to psychology in particular. But much depends on all of our essential determinations being understood in the correct sense. In them, let it be sharply emphasized, we were not arguing from pregiven philosophical standpoints; nor did we use traditional philosophical doctrines, not even those which may be universally acknowledged. Instead, we carried out some essentially necessary clarifications in the strictest sense, i.e., we only gave faithful expression to (eidetic) differences that are directly given to us in intuition. We took the differences precisely as they are given in intuition, without any hypothetical or interpretative explication, without reading into them anything which may be suggested to us by traditional theories of ancient or modern times. The findings thus made are actual "beginnings;" and if, like ours, they have a universality related to the comprehensive regions of being, then they are assuredly essentially necessary in the philosophical sense and themselves belong to philosophy. But this latter, too, is something which we need not presuppose; our previous as well as our future considerations should be free from any relation of dependence on a "science" so contested and suspect as philosophy. In our fundamental findings we have presupposed nothing, not even the concept of philosophy, and thus we shall also proceed in the future. Formulated explicitly, the philosophical
that we are undertaking shall consist of our completely abstaining from any judgment regarding the doctrinal content of any previous philosophy and effecting all of our demonstrations within the limits set by this abstention. On the other hand, therefore, we need not and cannot avoid speaking of philosophy as a historical fact, of *de facto* philosophical lines of thought which have determined, for good and often for ill, the general scientific convictions of mankind and done so particularly with respect to the basic points treated here.

Precisely in this connection we must enter into a controversy with empiricism; but because it involves points that admit of being ascertained immediately, it is a controversy which we can very easily settle while maintaining our ἐποχή. If philosophy has any stock whatever of “essentially necessary” fundamentals in the genuine sense which, according to their essence, can therefore be grounded only by an immediately presentive intuition, then the controversy concerning them is decided not only independently of any philosophical science, but of the idea of such a science and of the latter’s allegedly legitimated theoretical content. The situation forcing the controversy upon us is that “ideas,” “essences,” “cognition of essence,” are denied by empiricism. This is not the place to develop the historical reasons why precisely the triumphant advance of the natural sciences — however much, as “mathematical,” they owe their high scientific level to the laying of eidetic foundations — has favored philosophical empiricism and made it the predominant conviction, indeed, almost the solely dominant one among empirical investigators. In any case, among empirical investigators, and therefore among psychologists, hostility to ideas prevails that eventually must endanger the progress of the experiential sciences themselves because, owing to this hostility, the still uncompleted eidetic founding of these sciences and the perhaps necessary constituting of new eidetic sciences indispensable to their progress have become inhibited. As will be clearly shown later on, what has just been said directly concerns phenomenology which makes up the necessary eidetic foundations of psychology and the cultural sciences. Something must be said, therefore, in defense of our findings.

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1 *Marginal note in Copy D:* Not to be confused with that epoché which, as a method, shapes philosophy itself; cf. phenomenological reduction.

2 *Insertion in Copy A:* in a certain orientation

As we must acknowledge, empiricistic naturalism springs from the most praise worthy motives. In contrast to all “idols,” to the powers of tradition and superstition, of crude and refined prejudices of every sort, it is a radicalism of cognitive practice that aims at enforcing the right of autonomous reason as the sole authority on questions of truth. But to judge rationally or scientifically about things signifies to conform to the things themselves or to go from words and opinions back to the things themselves, to consult them in their self-givenness and to set aside all prejudices alien to them. Only another mode of expression for just this — so the empiricist believes — is that all science must proceed from experience, must ground its mediate cognition on immediate experience. The empiricist therefore takes genuine science and experiential science to be identical. When contrasted with matters of fact, what are “ideas,” “essences,” but Scholastic entities, metaphysical spectres? To have freed mankind from any such philosophical phantom is held to be the chief merit of modern natural science. All science, it is alleged, only deals with experienceable, real actuality. Whatever is not actuality is imagination; and a science based on imaginings is just an imagined science. Naturally, one will allow imaginings as psychical facts; they belong to psychology. But what we tried to show in the preceding chapter was that by virtue of a so-called eidetic seeing based on imaginings there spring from the imaginings new data, “eidetic” data, objects that are irreal [irreal]. But that, so the empiricist will conclude, is just “ideological excess,” a “reversion to Scholasticism” or to those “speculative constructions a priori” in the first half on the nineteenth century by which an idealism, alienated from natural science, so greatly hampered genuine science.

However, everything said here by the empiricist is based on misunderstandings and prejudices — no matter how well meant or how good the motive which originally guided him. The essential fault in empiricistic argumentation consists of identifying or confusing the fundamental demand for a return to the “things themselves” with the demand for legitimation of all cognition by experience. With his comprehensible naturalistic constriction of the limits bounding cognizable “things,” the empiricist simply takes experience³ to be the

³Insertion in Copy A: in the customary sense
only act that is presentive of things themselves. But things are not simply mere things belonging to Nature, nor is actuality in the usual sense simply all of actuality; and that originally presentive act which we \( \text{experience} \) relates only to actuality in Nature. To make identifications here and treat them as supposed truisms is blindly to push aside differences which can be given in the clearest insight. The question therefore is: Which side is prejudiced? Genuine freedom from prejudice only demands a rejection of "judgments alien to experience" when the proper sense of the judgments demands their legitimation by experience. Simply to assert that all judgments admit of, indeed even demand, legitimation by experience without having previously submitted the essence of judgments to a study with respect their fundamentally different species and without having, in so doing, considered whether that assertion is not ultimately counternonsensical: that is a "speculative construction a priori" made no better by the fact that it happens to issue from the empiricistic camp. Genuine science and its own genuine freedom from prejudice require, as the foundation of all proofs, immediately valid judgments which derive their validity from originally presentive intuitions. The latter, however, are of such a character as prescribed by the sense of the judgments, or correlative by the proper essence of the predicatively formed judgment-complex. The fundamental regions of object and, correlative, the regional types of presentive intuitions, the relevant types of judgments, and finally the noetic norms that demand for the establishment of judgments belonging to a particular type just this and no other species of intuition: none of that can be postulated or decreed from on high. One can only ascertain them by insight; and, as before, that signifies disclosing them by originally presentive intuition and fixing them by judgments which are faithfully fitted to what is given in such intuition. It seems to us that that is how the procedure actually free from prejudice, or purely objective, would look.

Immediate "seeing," \(^{6}\) not merely sensuous, experiential seeing, but seeing in the universal sense as an originally presentive consciousness of any kind whatever, is the ultimate legitimizing source of all rational assertions. This source has its legitimizing function only because, and to the extent that, it is an originally presentive source. If we see an object with full clarity, if we have effected an explication and a conceptual

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\(^{4}\text{Insertion in Copy A: customarily}\)
\(^{5}\text{Insertion in Copy A: in modern science}\)
\(^{6}\text{Marginal note in Copy D: noein}\)
apprehension purely on the basis of the seeing and within the limits of
what is actually seized upon in seeing, if we then see (this being a new
mode of "seeing") how the object is, the faithful expressive statement
has, as a consequence, its legitimacy. Not to assign any value to "I see
it" as an answer to the question, "Why?" would be a countersense —
as, yet again, we see. Moreover, as may be added here to prevent
possible misinterpretations, that does not exclude the possibility that,
under some circumstances, one seeing conflicts with another and
likewise that one legitimate assertion conflicts with another. For that,
perhaps, no more implies that seeing is not a legitimizing basis than
the outweighing of one force by another signifies that the outweighed
force is not a force. It does say, however, that perhaps in a certain
category of intuitions (and that is the case precisely with sensuously
experiencing intuitions) seeing is, according to its essence, "imper­
fect," that of essential necessity it can become strengthened or weaken­
ed, that consequently an assertion having an immediate, and there­
fore genuine, legitimizing ground in experience nevertheless may
have to be abandoned in the further course of experience because of a
counter legitimacy outweighing and annulling it.

§20. Empiricism as Skepticism.

For experience we therefore substitute something more universal:
"intuition;" and by so doing we reject the identification of science
taken universally with experiential science. Furthermore, it is easily
recognized that by defending this identification, and by contesting
the validity of purely eidetic thinking, one arrives at a skepticism
which, as genuine skepticism, cancels itself out by a countersense.7
We need only ask the empiricist about the source of the validity of his
universal theses (e.g., "All valid thinking is based upon experience as
the only presentive intuition"), and he becomes involved in a de­
monstrable countersense. After all, direct experience only presents
particular singularities and no universalities; therefore it is
insufficient. He cannot appeal to eidetic insight because he denies it;
but surely he can then appeal to induction and thus generally to the
whole complex of modes of mediate inference by which experiential

7Author's footnote: On the characteristic concept of skepticism, cf. the "Prolegomena zur
science acquires its universal propositions. Now, we ask, what about the truth of mediate inferences, regardless of whether or not they are deductive or inductive? Is this truth\(^8\) (indeed, we could ask, is even the truth of a singular judgment) itself something experienceable and hence ultimately perceivable? And what about those principles of the modes of inference to which one appeals in the case of controversy or doubt? For example, what about the syllogistic principles, the principle "that two things, each of which is equal to a third thing, are equal," etc., to which, as ultimate sources, the justification of all modes of inference in such cases leads back? Are they themselves also empirical universalizations, or is it not the case that such a conception implies a most radical countersense?

Without entering here into more lengthy analyses, in which we would only repeat what has been said elsewhere,\(^9\) we may have made it at least apparent that the fundamental theses of empiricism need a more precise analysis, clarification and grounding; and that this grounding itself must square with the norms that the theses state. At the same time, however, there manifestly exists here at least a serious suspicion that a countersense is hidden in this relation to something antecedent — yet hardly the beginning of a serious attempt to produce actual clarity and a scientific grounding of the fundamental theses can be found in the literature of empiricism. Here, as everywhere else, a scientific, empirical grounding would require that we start from single cases strictly fixed in the manner befitting to theory, and proceed to universal theses employing a method illuminated by eidetic insight. The empiricists have apparently failed to see that the very scientific demands that they, in their theses, present to all cognitions are also addressed to those theses themselves.

As genuine standpoint-philosophers, and in obvious contradistinction to their principle of freedom from prejudice, the empiricists start from unclarified preconceived opinions whose truth has not been grounded. On the other hand, we take our start from what lies prior to all standpoints: from the total realm of whatever is itself given intuitionally and prior to all theorizing, from everything that one can immediately see and seize upon — if only one does not let himself be blinded by prejudices and prevented from taking into consideration...
whole classes of genuine data. If "positivism" is tantamount to an absolutely unprejudiced grounding of all sciences on the "positive," that is to say, on what can be seized upon originaliter, then we are the genuine positivists. In fact, we allow no authority to curtail our right to accept all kinds of intuition as equally valuable legitimating sources of cognition — not even the authority of "modern natural science." When it is actually natural science that speaks, we listen gladly and as disciples. But it is not always natural science that speaks when natural scientists are speaking; and it assuredly is not when they are talking about "philosophy of Nature" and "epistemology as a natural science." And, above all, it is not natural science that speaks when they try to make us believe that general truisms such as all axioms express (propositions such as "a + 1 = 1 + a," "a judgment cannot be colored," "of only two qualitatively different tones, one is lower and the other higher," "a perception is, in itself, a perception of something") are indeed expressions of experiential matters of fact; whereas we know with full insight that propositions such as those give explicative expression to data of eidetic intuition. But this very situation makes it clear to us that the "positivists" sometimes confuse the cardinal differences among kinds of intuition and sometimes indeed see them in contrast but, bound by their prejudices, will to accept only a single one of them as valid or even as existent.


Obscurity in this matter, it is true, also holds sway on the opposite side. More particularly, one assumes a pure, an "a priori" thinking and thus rejects the empiricistic thesis; but reflectively it is not brought to clear consciousness that there is something such as pure intuiting as a kind of givenness in which essences are given originarily as objects entirely in the same way that individual realities are given in experiential intuition; it is not recognized that every judging process of seeing such as, in particular, seeing unconditionally universal truths, likewise falls under the concept of presentive intuition which has many differentiations, above all, those that run parallel to the logical categories. To be sure, they speak of evidence; but instead of bringing it, as an act of

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10 Marginal note in Copy D to entirely: This ought not be misinterpreted.
seeing, into essential relations with ordinary seeing, they speak of a "feeling of evidence" which, as a mystic index veri, bestows an emotional coloring on the judgments. Such conceptions are possible only as long as one has not learned to analyze kinds of consciousness in pure observation and eidetically instead of theorizing about them from on high. These alleged feelings of evidence, of intellectual necessity or whatever else they may be called, are no more than theoretically invented feelings. This will be acknowledged by everyone who has brought any case of evidence to actually seen / schauenden / givenness and has compared it with a case of non-evidence of the same judgment-content. One then immediately notes that the tacit presupposition of the affective theory of evidence, namely that a judging which is the same with respect to the rest of its psychological essence appears on one occasion with affective coloring and on another without it, is fundamentally erroneous; and that, rather, an identical upper stratum, that of an identical stating, as a mere significational expressing, on the one occasion conforms step by step to a "clearly seeing" intuition of an affair-complex, whereas on the other occasion a wholly different phenomenon, a non-intuitive, perhaps a wholly confused and unarticulated consciousness of an affair-complex functions as the lower stratum. With the same justice in the sphere of experience one could conceive the difference between the clear and faithful judgment of perception and any vague judgment of the same affair-complex as consisting merely of the former being endowed with a "feeling of clarity," while the latter is not.


Repeatedly particular offense has been caused by the fact that, as "platonizing realists," we set up ideas or essences as objects and ascribe to them, as to other objects, actual (veritable) being as well as, correlatively with this, the possibility of being seized upon by intuition — just as we do in the case realities. We may disregard here the sort of hasty reader, unfortunately rather frequent, who at-

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12 Author's footnote: Descriptions such as, e.g., Elsenhans gives in his just published Lehrbuch der Psychologie [Textbook of Psychology] (Tübingen, 1912), pp. 289ff., are, in my opinion, psychological fictions without the least foundation in the phenomena.

13 Insertion in Copy D: as categorial intuition

14 Insertion in Copy A: alleged
tributes to the author concepts of his own that are quite foreign to the author and who then does not find it hard to read absurdities into the author’s statements.\textsuperscript{15} If object and something real, actuality and real actuality, have one and the same sense, then the conception of ideas as objects and actualities is indeed a perverse "Platonic hypostatization." But if, as in the \textit{Logische Untersuchungen}, the two are sharply separated, if object is defined as anything at all, e.g., as subject of a true (categorial, affirmative) statement, what offense can remain — except one which stems from obscure prejudices? I did not invent the universal concept of object; I only restored the concept required by all propositions of pure logic and pointed out that it is an essentially indispensible one and therefore that it also determines universal scientific language. And in this sense the tone-quality \( c \), \( \langle 41 \rangle \) which is a numerically unique member of the tonal scale, the number two, in the series of cardinal numbers, the figure in the ideal world of geometrical constructs, and any propositions in the "world" of propositions\textsuperscript{16} — in short, many different ideal affairs — are "objects." Blindness to ideas is a kind of psychical blindness; because of prejudices one becomes incapable of bringing what one has in one’s field of intuition into one’s field of judgment. The truth is that all human beings see "ideas," "essences," and see them, so to speak, continuously; they operate with them in their thinking, they also make eidetic judgments — except that from their epistemological standpoint they interpret them away.\textsuperscript{17} Evident data are patient; they let the theories pass them by, but remain what they are. It is the business of theories to conform to the data, and the business of theories of knowledge to distinguish fundamental kinds of data and describe such kinds with respect to their proper essences.

Prejudices make people remarkably easy to satisfy with respect to theories. There can be no essences and therefore no eidetic intuition (ideation); therefore where ordinary language contradicts this, it must be a matter of "grammatical hypostatization" by which one must not let himself be driven to "metaphysical hypostatizations." What we have to deal with in fact can only be real psychical processes of "abstraction" attached to real experiences or representations. As a

\textsuperscript{15}Author’s footnote: The polemic against the \textit{Logische Untersuchungen}, even when friendly, unfortunately operates, for the most part, at this level.

\textsuperscript{16}Insertion of Copy A before word propositions: mathematical

\textsuperscript{17}Marginal note in Copy A to this sentence: False. Idea and essence are identified here, and significations taken as essence.
consequence, "theories of abstraction" are zealously constructed and psychology, so proud of being empirical, is enriched here, as in all intentional spheres (which, after all, make up the chief themes of psychology) with invented phenomena, with psychological analyses which are no analyses at all. Ideas or essences, it is said, are thus "concepts" and concepts are "mental constructs," "products of abstraction," and, as such, indeed play a large part in our thinking. "Essence," "idea" or Eidos:" these are but elegant "philosophical" names for "sober psychological facts." They are dangerous because of their metaphysical suggestions.

We answer: Certainly essences are "concepts" — if by concepts one understands, in so far as that ambiguous word allows, precisely essences. Only let one make clear to himself that then it is nonsense to talk about them as psychical products and likewise as concept-formations, provided the latter is to be understood strictly and properly. One occasionally reads in a treatise that the series of cardinal numbers is a series of concepts and then, a little further on, that concepts are products of thinking. At first cardinal numbers themselves, the essences, were thus designated as concepts. But are not cardinal numbers, we ask, what they are regardless of whether we "form" or do not form them? Certainly, I frame/vollziehe/ my numbers, form my numerical objectivations in adding "one plus one." These numerical objectivations are now these and when I then form them a second time in an identical way, they are different. In this sense, at one time there are no numerical objectivations of one and the same number, at another time there are many, as many numerical objectivations as we please of one and the same number. But just with that we have made (and how can we avoid making) the distinction; the numerical objectivation is not the number itself, it is not the number two, this single member of the numerical series which, like all members, is an atemporal being. To designate it as a psychical formation is thus countersense, an offence against the sense of arithmetical speech which is perfectly clear, discernible at any time and therefore which precedes all theory. If concepts are psychical formations then those affairs, such as pure numbers, are not concepts. But if they are concepts, then concepts are not psychical formations. As a consequence, one needs new terms if only to resolve ambiguities as dangerous as these.

18 In Copy A this part of the sentence was changed to read: provided they are understood as the product of a psychological event, of a mental state.

19 In Copy A, question marks are placed opposite the last three sentences.

But, one might object, is it not still true and evident that concepts or, if you will, essences, such as Red, House, etc., arise by abstraction from intuitions of something individual? And do we not at will construct concepts out of those already formed? Thus we do indeed deal with psychological products. One might even add that it is similar to the case of arbitrary fictions: The flute-playing centaur we freely imagine is precisely our objectivational formation. — Certainly “concept-formation” and likewise free fiction are carried out spontaneously, and what is spontaneously generated is obviously a product of the mind. But what we arrive at with the flute-playing centaur is objectivation in the sense in which the objectivated is called objectivation, and not the sense in which objectivation is the name of a psychical mental process. Obviously the centaur itself is nothing psychical; it exists neither in the soul nor in consciousness, nor does it exist somewhere else; the centaur is indeed “nothing,” it is wholly “imagination;” stated more precisely: the mental process of imagining is the imagining of a centaur. To that extent the “supposed-centaur,” the centaur-phantasied, certainly belongs to the mental process itself. But one also should not confuse just this mental process of imagining with what is imagined by it as imagined.20 As a consequence, in spontaneous abstracting it is also not the essence which is generated but instead the consciousness of the essence;21 and the situation for this is that, and obviously essentially,22 an originary presentive consciousness of an essence (ideation) is in itself and necessarily spontaneous, whereas spontaneity is extraessential to the sensuously presentive, the experiential consciousness: the individual object can “appear,” can be apprehended by consciousness but without a spontaneous “activity” performed “upon” it. Other than those of confusion, there are, accordingly, no discoverable motives which could demand the identification of consciousness of essence with essence itself and which ultimately therefore demand the latter’s being psychologized.

Nevertheless, the parallel of feigning consciousness might still raise a doubt, namely with respect to the “existence” of essence. Is essence

20Author’s footnote: For this, cf. the phenomenological analyses of later sections of this work.
21In Copy A, opposite this sentence: N.B.??
22Marginal note in Copy A to “essentially:” this can still be improved.
not a fiction as the skeptics would like to have it? Despite that, just as the parallelism of fiction and perception under the more general concept of "intuiting consciousness" prejudices the existence of perceptually given objects, so the parallelism effected above prejudices the "existence" of essence. Things can be perceived and remembered, and therefore there can be consciousness of them as "actual;" or, in modified acts there can be consciousness of things as "doubtful," null (illusory); finally, in entirely different modifications as well, there can be consciousness of things as "simply hovering before us" and hovering before us as quasi-actual, null, etc. The case is wholly similar with essences: like other objects they can at times be intended to [vermeint] correctly, at times falsely, as, e.g., in false geometrical thinking. The seizing upon and intuition of essences is, however, a complex act, specifically seeing essences is an originary presentive act and, as a presentive act, is the analogue of sensuous perceiving and not of imagining.


Enough now of absurd theories. No conceivable theory can make us err with respect to the principle of all principles: that every originary presentive intuition is a legitimizing source of cognition, that everything originally (so to speak, in its "personal" actuality) offered to us in "intuition" is to be accepted simply as what it is presented as being, but also only within the limits in which it is presented there. We see indeed that each theory can only again draw its truth itself from originary data. Every statement which does no more than confer expression on such data by simple explication and by means of significations precisely conforming to them is, as we said at the beginning of this chapter, actually an absolute beginning called upon to serve as a foundation, a principium in the genuine sense of the word. But this holds especially for this kind of generical cognitions of essences to which the word "principle" is commonly limited.

In this sense the scientific investigator of Nature is perfectly right in following the "principle" that we question every assertion bearing upon matters of fact of Nature relative to the experience which grounds it. Because that is a principle, it is an assertion in so far as we make perfectly clear the sense of the expressions used in the principle and make given in purity the essences pertaining to the expressions.
But in the same sense the scientific investigator of essences, and whoever at any time employs and states generical propositions, must follow a parallel principle; and such a principle must be given because the one just granted, the principle of the grounding of all cognition of matters of fact by experience, is not itself given with insight in experience — as is the case with every principle and every cognition of essence without exception.


De facto the positivist rejects eidetic cognitions only when he reflects "philosophically" and allows himself to be deceived by the sophisms of empiricistic philosophers; but he does not do any of this when, as scientific investigator of Nature, he thinks and grounds his thought in the normal, natural scientific attitude. For there he obviously lets himself be guided to a very wide extent by eidetic insights. It is well known that the basic means of natural scientific theorizing are the purely mathematical disciplines such as the material disciplines of geometry or phoronomy, the formal (purely logical) disciplines such as arithmetic, analysis, etc. It is manifestly clear that these disciplines do not proceed empirically, that they are not grounded by observation and experiments on experienced \(^{23}\) figures, movements, and so forth.

Empiricism will certainly not see this. But should one take seriously its argument that far from there being too few grounding experiences, there are, instead, an infinity of experiences at our command? In the collective experience of all generations of man, even in the generations themselves of animals preceding them, an immense treasure of geometrical and arithmetical impressions have been collected and integrated in the form of interpretational habitu-\(\langle 45\rangle\) alities, and from out of this foundation our geometrical insights now are drawn. — But from where does one then know of these alleged collective treasures when no one has observed them scientifically and faithfully documented them? Since when are long forgotten and completely hypothetical experiences the grounds of a science — and, in that connection, of the most exact science — instead of actual

\(^{23}\text{In Copy A the marginal note: improve.}\)
experiences most carefully demonstrated in their genuine experien-
tial function and range? The physicist observes and experiments and
satisfies himself with good grounds, not with prescientific
experiences, not to mention instinctive interpretations and hypo-
theses about alleged hereditary experiences.

Or should one say, as has in fact been said on other sides, that we
owe geometrical insights to "experience in phantasy," that we ought to
effect them as inductions based upon experiments in phantasy? But why, we
ask in contra, does the physicist make no use of such marvelous
experience in phantasy? For no other reason than because experi-
ments in the imagination are imagined experiments, just as figures,
movements, multiplicities in phantasy are not actual but imagined
ones.

However, in contrast to all such interpretations, instead of adopt-
ing and arguing from their basis, we take the most correct course by
referring to the sense proper of mathematical assertions. In order to
know, and to know without doubt, what a mathematical axiom
states, we have to turn not to empiricistic philosophers but rather to
that consciousness in which, in full insight, we mathematizingly seize
upon axiomatic predicatively formed affair-complexes. If we hold
ourselves to this intuition in purity, there is no doubt at all that pure
essential connections are expressed without the slightest correlative
positing of experiential matters of fact.24 One must not philosophize
and psychologize about geometrical thinking and intuiting from
outside instead of livingly carrying it out and determining its imma-

dental sense on the ground of direct analysis. It may be that we have
inherited cognitive dispositions from cognitions of past generations;
but in so far as the question about the sense and value of our
cognitions is concerned, the histories of these heritages are as indiffer-
ent as the history of gold is for the value of our gold.

§26. Sciences of the Dogmatic and Sciences of the Philosophical Attitude.

Scientific investigators of Nature thus speak skeptically of mathematics
and of everything eidetic; but they proceed dogmatically in their eidetic

24Marginal note in Copy D to the first three lines of this paragraph: What is meant is pure,
unconditioned universality whose legitimation lies in seeing, eidetic intuition. It may also be
that mathematics precipitously anticipates eidetic universalities which only allow of being
redeemed in a limited way.
method. This is fortunate for them. Natural science has become great by unhesitatingly setting aside the luxuriant growth of ancient skepticism and refusing to conqueror it. In place of slaving over such puzzling separate questions as how cognition of an “external” Nature is at all possible, or how all the difficulties were to be resolved which the ancients had already found in this possibility, they preferred to busy themselves with the question about the right method of cognition of Nature which can actually be carried out and which is as perfect as possible: cognition in the form of exact natural science. Having this orientation by which it acquired a free avenue for its material research, natural science, however, has taken half a step backwards again whereby it has given room to new skeptical reflections and let itself be limited by skeptical tendencies in its possibilities for work. As a result of being abandoned to empiricistic prejudices, skepticism now remains put out of action only with respect to the sphere of experience, but no longer with respect to the sphere of essence. This is because it is not sufficient to draw the eidetic into its circle of research under false empiricistic colors. Such transformations of value are tolerated only by eidetic disciplines, like the mathematical ones which are grounded in antiquity and protected by the rights of custom; whereas (as we have already indicated) the empiricistic prejudices must function with respect to the grounding of newer disciplines as completely effective obstacles. The right position, dogmatic in a good sense, that is, prephilosophical, sphere of research in which all experiential sciences belong (but not only those sciences) is that position which sets aside with full awareness all skepticism together with all “natural philosophy” and “theory of knowledge,” and takes cognitive objectivities where one actually finds them — no matter what difficulties an epistemological reflection on the possibility of such objectivities may always point out afterwards.

Just here there is an unavoidable and important division to be made in the realm of scientific research. On the one side stand sciences of the dogmatic attitude turned toward things, unconcerned with epistemological or skeptical problems. They start out from the original givenness of their things (and always again return to it in the demonstration of their cognitions); and they ask: As what are the things immediately given, and on that basis, what can be mediately concluded about these things and about any things whatever of the domain? On the other side stands scientific research peculiar to the epistemological, to the specifically philosophical attitude which pur-
sues the skeptical problems of the possibility of knowledge which are directly resolved into the universality of principles so that, by applying the solutions acquired, the consequences for judging about the ultimate sense and cognitive value of the results of the dogmatic sciences can be drawn. In the *present situation*, and as long as there is indeed lacking a highly developed cognitive critique which succeeds in perfect rigor and clarity, it is at the least right to close the boundaries of dogmatic research to "critical" modes of inquiry. In other words, at the moment it appears right to us to take care that epistemological (and, as a rule, skeptical) prejudices — the correctness and incorrectness of which philosophical science has to decide, but which need not concern the dogmatic investigator — are not obstacles to the course of the dogmatic investigator's inquiries. But it is precisely the way of skepticisms that they are susceptible of unfavorable obstacles of that kind.

Just in that connection and at the same time, the relevant situation is designated for the sake of which the theory of knowledge as science needs its own dimension. No matter how satisfied cognition might be which is purely materially directed and borne by insight, as soon as it reflectively turns back upon itself the possibility of validity of all modes of cognition and, under that, even of intuitions and insights, is infected by confusing unclarieties, by sheer, unresolvable difficulties; and this is especially the case with respect to the transcendence which cognitive *Objects* claim over against cognition. Just for this reason there are skepticisms which become prevalent in spite of all intuition, all experience and insight, and which, as a further consequence, can result in being obstacles to the practical cultivation of science. We exclude these obstacles in the form of the natural "dogmatic" science (a term which here, and throughout this book, ought not to express any depreciation) by making clear to ourselves and vividly keeping in mind only the most universal principle of all methods, the principle of the original right of all data, whereas we ignore the substantive and varied problems concerning the possibility of different cognitive modes and correlations.

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25 *Insertion in Copy A: originary*
PART TWO

THE CONSIDERATIONS FUNDAMENTAL TO PHENOMENOLOGY
§27. The World of the Natural Attitude: I and My Surrounding World.

We begin our considerations as human beings who are living naturally, objectivating, judging, feeling, willing "in the natural attitude." What that signifies we shall make clear in simple meditations which can best be carried out in the first person singular.

I am conscious of a world endlessly spread out in space, endlessly becoming and having endlessly become in time. I am conscious of it: that signifies, above all, that intuitively I find it immediately,¹ that I experience it.² By my seeing, touching, hearing, and so forth, and in the different modes of sensuous perception, corporeal physical things with some spatial distribution or other are simply there for me, "on hand" in the literal or the figurative sense, whether or not I am particularly heedful of them and busied with them in my considering, thinking, feeling, or willing. Animate beings too — human beings, let us say — are immediately there for me: I look up; I see them; I hear their approach; I grasp their hands; talking with them I understand immediately what they objectivate and think, what feelings stir within them, what they wish or will. They are also present as actualities in my field of intuition even when I do not heed them. But it is not necessary that they, and likewise that other objects, be found directly in my field of perception.³ Along with the ones now perceived, other actual objects are there for me as determinate, as more or less well known, without being themselves perceived or, indeed, present in any other mode of intuition. I can let my attention wander away

¹ Marginal note in Copy C: as factually existing
² Supplementary note in Copy A: We do not stand now in an eidetic attitude; rather let each say I for himself and state with me what he finds quite individually.
³ Marginal note in Copy D: Perception in an amplified sense, such that attentive, seizing perception is a particular mode of effecting.
from the writing table which was just now seen and noticed, out through the unseen parts of the room which are behind my back, to the verandah, into the garden, to the children in the arbor, etc., to all the Objects I directly "know of" as being there and here in the surroundings of which there is also consciousness — a "knowing of them" which involves no conceptual thinking and which changes into a clear intuiting only with the advertence of attention, and even then only partially and for the most part very imperfectly.

But not even with the domain of this intuitionally clear or obscure, distinct or indistinct, co-present — which makes up a constant halo around the field of actual perception — is the world exhausted which is "on hand" for me in the manner peculiar to consciousness at every waking moment. On the contrary, in the fixed order of its being, it reaches into the unlimited. What is now perceived and what is more or less clearly co-present and determinate (or at least somewhat determinate), are penetrated and surrounded by an obscurely intended horizon of indeterminate actuality. I can send rays of the illuminative regard of attention into this horizon with varying results. Determining presentations, obscure at first and then becoming alive, haul something out for me; a chain of such quasi-memories is linked together; the sphere of determinateness becomes wider and wider, perhaps so wide that connection is made with the field of actual perception as my central surroundings. But generally the result is different: an empty mist of obscure indeterminateness is populated with intuited possibilities or likelihoods; and only the "form" of the world, precisely as "the world," is predelineated. Moreover, my indeterminate surroundings are infinite, the misty and never fully determinable horizon is necessarily there.

What is the case with the world as existing in the order of the spatial present, which I have just been tracing, is also the case with respect to its order in the sequence of time. This world, on hand for me now and manifestly in every waking Now, has its two-sidedly infinite temporal horizon, its known and unknown, immediately living and lifeless past and future. In the free activity of experiencing which makes what is present intuited, I can trace these interrelations of the actuality immediately surrounding me.

*Insertion in Copy D: on the other hand

*Insertion in Copy D: a perceiving, in the sense of a seizing upon, likewise an operative experiencing

*Insertion in Copy D: though always incompletely determinate

*Insertion in Copy D: infinite; that is to say, the
I can change my standpoint in space and time, turn my regard in this or that direction, forwards or backwards in time; I can always obtain new perceptions and presentations, more or less clear and more or less rich in content, or else more or less clear images in which I illustrate to myself intuitionally what is possible or likely within the fixed forms of a spatial and temporal world.

In my waking consciousness I find myself in this manner at all times, and without ever being able to alter the fact, in relation to the world which remains one and the same, though changing with respect to the composition of its contents. It is continually "on hand" for me and I myself am a member of it. Moreover, this world is there for me not only as a world of mere things, but also with the same immediacy as a world of objects with values, a world of goods, a practical world. I simply find the physical things in front of me furnished not only with merely material determinations but also with value-characteristics, as beautiful and ugly, pleasant and unpleasant, agreeable and disagreeable, and the like. Immediately, physical things stand there as Objects of use, the "table" with its "books," the "drinking glass," the "vase" the "piano," etc. These value-characteristics and practical characteristics also belong constitutively to the Objects "on hand" as Objects, regardless of whether or not I turn to such characteristics and the Objects. Naturally this applies not only in the case of the "mere physical things," but also in the case of humans and brute animals belonging to my surroundings.\(^8\) They are my "friends" or "enemies," my "servants" or "superiors," "strangers" or "relatives," etc.


The complexes of my manifoldly changing spontaneities of consciousness then relate to this world, the world in which I find myself and which is, at the same time, my surrounding world — complexes of investigative inspecting, of explicating and conceptualizing in descriptions, of comparing and distinguishing, of collecting and counting, of presupposing and inferring: in short, of theorizing consciousness in its

\(^{8}\text{Insertion in Copy A: with respect to their social character Marginal note in Copy D: I and other human beings are, accordingly, present as worldlinesses}\)
different forms and at its different levels. Likewise the multiform acts
and states of emotion and of willing: liking and disliking, being glad
and being sorry, desiring and shunning, hoping and fearing, deciding
and acting. All of them — including the simple Ego-acts in
which I, in spontaneous advertence and seizing, am conscious of the
world as immediately present — are embraced by the one Carte-
sian expression, cogito. Living along naturally, I live continually in
this fundamental form of “active” / aktuellen” / living whether, while so
living, I state the cogito, whether I am directed “reflectively” to the Ego
and the cogitare. If I am directed to them, a new cogito is alive, one
that, for its part, is not reflected on and thus is not objective for me.10

I always find myself as someone who is perceiving, objectivating in
memory or in phantasy, thinking, feeling, desiring etc.; and I find
myself actively related in these activities for the most part to the
actuality continually surrounding me. For I am not always so re-
lated; not every cogito in which I live has as its cogitatum physical
things, human beings, objects or affair-complexes of some kind or
other that belong to my surrounding world. I busy myself, let us say,
with pure numbers and their laws: Nothing like that is present in the
surrounding world, this world of “real actuality.” The world of
numbers is likewise there for me precisely as the Object-field of
arithmetical busiedness; during such busiedness single numbers of
numerical formations will be at the focus of my regard, surrounded
by a partly determinate, partly indeterminate arithmetical horizon;
but obviously this factual being-there-for-me, like the factually exist-
ent itself, is of a different sort. The arithmetical world is there for me only if,
and as long as, I am in the arithmetical attitude.11 The natural world,
however, the world in the usual sense of the word is, and has been,
there for me continuously as long as I go on living naturally. As long as
this is the case, I am “in the natural attitude,” indeed both signify
precisely the same thing. That need not be altered in any respect

9 Marginal note in Copy A: Social acts should be mentioned too
10 Marginal note in Copy A opposite the last two sentences: Natural attitude is related here to the real
world at hand; the world is a universe of “what exists in itself.” But being broadened it must
become related to everything “ideal” “existing in itself” over against “us” which, to be sure, is
there for us as coming from spontaneities, as a product, but then it too is nevertheless there
“mentally.”
11 Marginal note in Copy D: I am not always having experience and co-experience of it, as I am
of the real world. Substitution in Copy A: The arithmetical world is there for me only if, and after, I
have studied arithmetic only if, and after, I have systematically formed arithmetical ideas,
seen them, and consequently appropriated them to myself along with an all-embracing
horizon.
whatever if, at the same time, I appropriate to myself the arithmetical world and other similar "worlds" by effecting the suitable attitudes. In that case the natural world remains "on hand:" afterwards, as well as before, I am in the natural attitude, undisturbed in it by the new attitudes. If my cogito is moving only in the worlds pertaining to these new attitudes, the natural world remains outside consideration; it is a backgrond for my act-consciousness, but it is not a horizon within which an arithmetical world finds a place. The two worlds simultaneously present are not connected, disregarding their Ego relation by virtue of which I can freely direct my regard and my acts into the one or the other.

§29. The "Other" Ego-subjects and the Intersubjective Natural Surrounding World.

All that which holds for me myself holds, as I know, for all other human beings whom I find present in my surrounding world. Experiencing them as human beings, I understand and accept each of them as an Ego-subject just as I myself am one, and as related to his natural surrounding world. But I do this in such a way that I take their surrounding world and mine Objectively as one and the same world of which we all are conscious, only in different modes. Each has his place from which he sees the physical things present; and, accord-

12 In Copy A acts substituted for attitudes
13 In Copy A attitudes is bracketed and the following marginal note attached to the beginning of the next sentence: Every world has its open horizon
14 In Copy D, the following comment is added (written ca. 1924, printed by Schuhmann as the last part of Appendix 34): Both worlds are "not connected," the arithmetical world, not finding its place in the horizon of my experiential reality. But that must be formulated more precisely: As said above, I once acquired the arithmetical world for myself, and therefore it has for me a time relation a relation to the time-spatiality in which I was a learner. It also has for me its sensuous form as written, printed - as a system of Objective declarative sentences, localized in the real world, as written sentences, etc. But the arithmetical "itself", the ideal formations themselves, are not in space nor in space-time; they themselves have no place in a spatiotemporal context as does that which alone is essentially spatiotemporal; they themselves are not here and there nor really connected with the real in which they may be "inherent." Their temporal existence is not temporal existence proper; they can be there any number of times and at any number of places simultaneously, without detriment to their identity.
15 Insertion in Copy D: and the fact that the arithmetical world is the world of arithmetical research, etc. In Copy A and Copy D this whole paragraph is bracketed and marked for deletion. Marginal note in Copy A: perhaps best after the next section. It holds for intersubjectivity [The gloss is by Schuhmann.]
ingly, each has different physical-thing appearances. Also, for each the fields of actual perception, actual memory, etc., are different, leaving aside the fact that intersubjectively common objects of consciousness in those fields are intended to as having different modes, different manners of apprehension, different degrees of clarity, and so forth. For all that, we come to an understanding with our fellow human being and in common with them posit an Objective spatiotemporal actuality as our factually existent surrounding world\textsuperscript{16} to which we ourselves nonetheless belong.

§30. The General Positing which Characterizes the Natural Attitude.

What we presented as a characterization of the givenness belonging to the natural attitude, and therefore as a characterization of that attitude itself, was a piece of pure description prior to any "theory." In these investigations, we keep theories — here the word designates preconceived\textsuperscript{17} opinions of every sort — strictly at a distance. Only as facts of our surrounding world, not as actual or supposed unities of validity, do theories belong in our sphere. But we do not set for ourselves now the task of continuing the pure description and raising it to the status of a systematically comprehensive characterization, exhausting the breadths and depths of what can be found as data accepted in the natural attitude (to say nothing of the attitudes which can be harmoniously combined with it). Such a task can and must be fixed — as a scientific task; and it is an extraordinarily important one, even though barely seen up to now.\textsuperscript{18} It is not our task here. For us, who are striving toward the entrance-gate of phenomenology, everything needed along that line has already been done; we need only a few quite universal characteristics of the natural attitude which have already come to the fore with a sufficiently full clarity in our descriptions. Just this full clarity was of particular consequence to us.


\textsuperscript{16}Marginal note in Copy A to surrounding world: The second concept of "subjective surrounding world," each of us has his surrounding world accepted by him, the same communal world just as it is accepted by me in my experience.

\textsuperscript{17}Insertion in Copy A: theoretical

\textsuperscript{18}Marginal comment in Copy D opposite this sentence: Heidegger says the opposite.
spatiotemporal actuality to which I belong like all other human beings who are to be found in it and who are related to it as I am. I find the “actuality”, the word already says it, as a factually existent actuality and also accept it as it presents itself to me as factually existing. No doubt about or rejection of data belonging to the natural world alters in any respect the general positing which characterizes the natural attitude. “The” world is always there as an actuality; here and there it is at most “otherwise” than I supposed; this or that is, so to speak, to be struck out of it and given such titles as “illusion” and “hallucination,” and the like; it is to be struck out of “the” world which — according to the general positing — is always factually existent. To cognize “the” world more comprehensively, more reliably, more perfectly in every respect than naive experiential cognizance can, to solve all the problems of scientific cognition which offer themselves within the realm of the world, that is the aim of the sciences belonging to the natural attitude.

§31. Radical Alteration of the Natural Positing. “Excluding,” “Parenthesizing.”

Instead of remaining in this attitude, we propose to alter it radically. What we now must do is to convince ourselves of the essential possibility of the alteration in question.

The general positing, by virtue of which there is not just any continual apprehensival consciousness of the real surrounding world, but a consciousness of it as a factually existing “actuality,” naturally does not consist of a particular act, perchance an articulated judgment about existence. It is, after all, something that lasts continuously throughout the whole duration of the attitude, i.e., throughout natural waking life. That which at any time is perceived, is clearly or obscurely presentiated — in short, everything which is, before any thinking, an object of experiential consciousness issuing, from the natural world — bears, in its total unity and with respect to all articulated saliencies in it, the characteristic “there,” “on hand;”

19 In Copy A changed to read: In a never deviating concatenated experience I, as a waking Ego, I find the “actuality”, the word already says it, as a factually existent actuality and also accept it as it presents itself to me as factually existing. No doubt about or rejection of data belonging to the natural world alters in any respect the general positing which characterizes the natural attitude. “The” world is always there as an actuality; here and there it is at most “otherwise” than I supposed; this or that is, so to speak, to be struck out of it and given such titles as “illusion” and “hallucination,” and the like; it is to be struck out of “the” world which — according to the general positing — is always factually existent. To cognize “the” world more comprehensively, more reliably, more perfectly in every respect than naive experiential cognizance can, to solve all the problems of scientific cognition which offer themselves within the realm of the world, that is the aim of the sciences belonging to the natural attitude.

20 In Copy A naive is substituted by mere

21 Addition in Copy A: They are the sciences usually called “positive,” sciences characterized by natural positivity.

22 Insertion in Copy A: predicative
and it is essentially possible to base on this characteristic an explicit (predicative) judgment of existence agreeing with it. If we state such a judgment, we nevertheless know that in it we have only made thematic and conceived as a predicate what already was somehow inherent, as unthematic, unthought, unpredicated, in the original experiencing or, correlatively, in the experienced, as the characteristic of something "on hand."

We can now proceed with the potential and inexplicit positing precisely as we can with the explicit judgment-positing. One procedure, possible at any time, is the attempt to doubt universally which Descartes carried out for an entirely different purpose with a view toward bringing out a sphere of absolutely indubitable being. We start from here, but at the same time emphasize that the attempt to doubt universally shall serve us only as a methodic expedient for picking out certain points which, as included in its essence, can be brought to light and made evident by means of it.

The attempt to doubt universally belongs to the realm of our perfect freedom: we can attempt to doubt anything whatever, no matter how firmly convinced of it, even assured of it in an adequate evidence, we may be.

*Let us reflect on what lies in the essence of such an act.* Someone who attempts to doubt some "being" or other, or predicatively explicaded, a "that exists," a "that is how it is," or the like. The sort of being does not matter. For example, someone who doubts whether an object, the being of which he does not doubt, is qualified thus and so, doubts precisely the being-qualified-thus-and-so. Obviously this is carried over from doubting to attempting to doubt. Furthermore, it is clear that we cannot doubt a being and, in the same consciousness (with the form of unity belonging to the simultaneous) posit the substrate of this being, thus being conscious of the substrate as having the characteristic, "on hand." Equivalently expressed: The same material of being cannot be simultaneously doubted and held to be certain. In like manner, it is clear that the attempt to doubt anything intended to as something on hand necessarily effects a certain annulment of positing and precisely this interests us. The annulment in question is not a transmutation of positing into counter positing, of position into negation; it is also not a transmutation into uncertain presumption, deeming possible, undecidedness, into a doubt (in any sense whatever of the word): nor indeed is anything like that within the sphere of our free choice. *Rather it is something wholly peculiar.* We do not give up the
positing we effected, we do not in any respect alter our conviction which remains in itself as it is as long as we do not introduce new judgment-motives: precisely this is what we do not do. Nevertheless the positing undergoes a modification: while it in itself remains what it is, we, so to speak, "put it out of action"; we "exclude it," we "parenthesize it." It is still there, like the parenthesized in the parentheses, like the excluded outside the context of inclusion [wie das Ausgeschaltete außerhalb des Zusammenhanges der Schaltung]. We can also say: The positing is a mental process, but we make "no use" of it, and this is not understood, naturally, as implying that we are deprived of it (as it would if we said of someone who was not conscious, that he made no use of a positing); rather, in the case of this expression and all parallel expressions it is a matter of indicative designations of a definite, specifically peculiar mode of consciousness which is added to the original positing simpliciter\textsuperscript{23} (whether this is or not an actional [aktuelle] and even a predicative positing of existence) and, likewise in a specifically peculiar manner, changes its value. This changing of value is a matter in which we are perfectly free, and it stands over against all cogitative position-takings coordinate with the positing and incompatible with the positing in the unity of the "simultaneous," as well as over against all position-takings in the proper sense of the term.

In the attempt to doubt which accompanies a positing which, as we presuppose, is certain and continued, the "excluding" is brought about in and with a modification of the counter positing, namely the "supposition" of non-being which is, therefore, part of the substratum of the attempt to doubt. In Descartes this part is so predominant that one can say that his attempt to doubt universally is properly an attempt to negate universally. Here we disregard this part; we are not interested in every analytically distinguishable component of the attempt to doubt, and consequently we are not interested in the exact and fully sufficient analysis of it. We single out only the phenomenon of "parenthesizing" or "excluding" which, while obviously not restricted to the phenomenon of attempting to doubt, is particularly easy to analyze out and which can, on the contrary, make its appearance also in other combinations and, equally well, alone. With regard to any positing we can quite freely exercise this peculiar θεν οὐ, a certain refraining from judgment\textsuperscript{24} which is compatible with the unshaken conviction of

\textsuperscript{23} Marginal note to this clause in Copy A: which relates to the original positing

\textsuperscript{24} Marginal note in Copy D: better, refraining from belief
truth, even with the unshakable conviction of evident truth. The positing is "put out of action," parenthesized, converted into the modification, "parenthesized positing;" the judgment simpliciter is converted into the "parenthesized judgment."

Naturally one must not identify this consciousness with the consciousness called "mere phantasying," let us say, that nymphs are performing a round dance. In the latter consciousness, after all, no excluding of a living conviction, which remains alive, takes place. The consciousness of which we are speaking is even further from being a matter of just thinking of something in the sense of "assuming" or presupposing, which, in ordinary equivocal language, can also be expressed by "It seems to me (I make the assumption) that such and such is the case."

It should also be said that nothing prevents speaking correlatively of parenthesizing with respect to a positable objectivity belonging to no matter what region and category. When speaking thus, we mean that every positing related to this objectivity is to be excluded and converted into its parenthetical modification. Furthermore, when the metaphor of parenthesizing is closely examined it is seen to be, from the very beginning, more suitable to the object-sphere; just as the locution of "putting out of action" is better suited to the act- or consciousness-sphere.

§32. The Phenomenological. We could now let the universal in our sharply determinate and novel sense of the term, take the place of the Cartesian attempt to doubt universally. But with good reason we limit the universality of that. Since we are completely free to modify every positing and every judging [Urteil] and to parenthesize every objectivity which can be judged about if it were as comprehensive as possible, then no province would be left for unmodified judgments, to say nothing of a province for science. But our purpose is to discover a new scientific domain, one that is to be gained by the method of parenthesizing which, therefore, must be a definitely restricted one.

25 In Copy D changed to a conviction which we accept
26 In Copies A and D positable is changed to somehow posited
27 In Copy A positing is changed to positing of being
28 Insetion in Copy D: transcendental
The restriction can be designated in a word. We put out of action the general positing which belongs to the essence of the natural attitude; we parenthesize everything which that positing encompasses with respect to being: thus the whole natural world which is continually "there for us", "on hand," and which will always remain there according to consciousness as an "actuality" even if we choose to parenthesize it.

If I do that, as I can with complete freedom, then I am not negating this "world" as though I were a sophist; I am not doubting its factual being as though I were a skeptic; rather I am exercising the "phenomenological" epoche which also completely shuts me off from any judgment about spatiotemporal factual being.

Thus I exclude all sciences relating to this natural world no matter how firmly they stand there for me, no matter how much I admire them, no matter how little I think of making even the least objection to them; I make absolutely no use of the things posited in them [von ihren Geltungen]. Nor do I make my own a single one of the propositions belonging to those sciences, even though it be perfectly evident; none is accepted by me; none gives me a foundation — let this be well noted; as long as it is understood

29 Insertion in Copy A: with a single stroke we parenthesize the realm of the in-itself and everything in itself

30 In Copy D in the proper sense added. The following addition made (written Fall, 1929; published by Schuhmann as Appendix 35): — that is to say: the world which is continually given to me beforehand as existing. I am not accepting, as I do in my whole natural practical life but also and more directly in the positive sciences, as a world existing beforehand and, with respect to the positive sciences, a universal realm of being for a cognition which progresses in experience and thinking. From now on I effect no experience of the real in a naively straightforward way. I do not receive what an experience of the real offers me as simply existing, as presumably or probably existing, as doubtful, as null (as illusion). The modes of acceptance operative in naive experiencing, the naive effecting of which is one's "standing on the basis of experience" (without having put oneself on that basis by a particular purposing and decision), I put out of operation, I deny myself that basis. This concerns experiences of something worldly, not merely singly, one by one. Any single experience of something has, according to its essence, "its" universal experiential horizon which, although inexplicitly, carries with itself the openly endless totality of the existing world as continually co-accepted. I inhibit precisely the being-accepted-beforehand of "this" world or its antecedent being-for-me which, as a being posited both actually and habitually, carries me continuously in my entire natural living and is thus the foundation of all my practical and theoretical living; I take from it the force that, up to now, gave me the world of experience as my basis. And yet the old course of my experience goes on as it always has, except that this experience, modified by the new attitude, no longer supplies the "basis" on which I was standing up to now. In this manner I exercise the phenomenological epoché, which also shuts me off, eo ipso, from effecting any judgment, from taking any position predicatively toward being and being-thus and all the modalities of being which pertain to the spatiotemporal factual being of anything "real."
as it is presented in one of those sciences as a truth about actualities of this world. I must not accept such a proposition until after I have put parenthesis around it.\footnote{Addition to this sentence in Copy D: as a consequence of which I already have subjected to the modification of parenthesizing all natural experience — back to which, as the demonstrative experience of factual being, all scientific grounding ultimately refers.} That signifies that I may accept such a proposition only in the modified consciousness, the consciousness of judgment-excluding,\footnote{In Copy D: judgment-excluding changed to judgment-parenthesizing} and therefore not as it is in science, a proposition which claims validity and the validity of which I accept and use.

The epoché in question here is not to be mistaken for the one which\footnote{Marginal note in Copy A: the Comtean} positivism requires, but which indeed, as we had to persuade ourselves, is itself violated by such positivism. It is not now a matter of excluding all prejudices that cloud the pure objectivity of research, not a matter of constituting a science “free of theories,” “free of metaphysics,” by groundings all of which go back to the immediate findings,\footnote{Insertion in Copy A: of objective experience} nor a matter of means for attaining such ends, about the value of which there is, indeed, no question. What we demand lies in another direction. The whole prediscovecred world posited in the natural attitude, actually found in experience and taken with perfect “freedom from theories” as it is actually experienced, as it clearly shows itself in the concatenations of experience,\footnote{Insertion in Copy D: with illusions rejected} is now without validity for us;\footnote{In Copy D is now without validity changed to is to have its validity excluded} without being tested and also without being contested, it shall be parenthesized. In like manner all theories and sciences which relate to this world, no matter how well they may be grounded positivistically or otherwise, shall meet the same fate.
§33. Preliminary Indication of "Pure" or "Transcendental" Consciousness As the Phenomenological Residuum.

We have learned to understand the sense of the phenomenological \( \xi \pi \omega \chi \eta \) but not by any means its possible effect. Above all, it is not clear to what extent the previous delimitation of the total sphere of the \( \xi \pi \omega \chi \eta \) actually involves a restriction of its universality.\(^1\) What can remain, if the whole world, including ourselves with all our cogitare, is excluded?\(^2\)\(^3\)

Since the reader already knows that the interest governing these meditations concerns a new eidetics, he will at first expect that, more particularly, the world as matter of fact is excluded but not the world as Eidos, not any other sphere of essences. Indeed, the exclusion of the world actually does not signify the exclusion of the world of, e.g., the number series or arithmetic as relating to it.

Nevertheless we shall not take this path; it does not lead toward our goal which we can also characterize as the acquisition of a new region of being never before delimited\(^4\) in its own peculiarity — a region which, like

\(^1\)Substitution in Copy D for this sentence: First of all, it is not clear to what extent the previously given outline of the scope of the epoche may involve a restriction to something less than the universal sphere of experienceable being and possible judgments.

\(^2\)Addition in Copy D: After the exclusion of the universal basis provided in experience, experience in the usual sense, can any possible experience and experiential basis whatever remain by which the field of being for a science might be given?

\(^3\)Substitution in Copy A for this sentence: What can remain if the whole world, including us human beings, is excluded? Marginal note: Is the worldly All not the All of whatever exists? Is there any sense to ask for that which "remains"? As a matter of fact, the expression is objectionable because, having been taken from the world of sensuous reality, it carries with it the thought of doing away with one part of a whole, one part of a real context. The question may, however, still have a legitimate sense when stated in the form: What can still be posited as being if the worldly All, the All of reality, remains parenthesized?

\(^4\)In Copy A the word delimited changed to exhibited
any other genuine region, is a region of individual being. What that means we shall learn, more particularly, from the findings that follow.

We shall proceed, first of all, with a direct demonstrable showing and, since the being that we want to demonstrably show is nothing else than what we shall designate, for essential reasons, as "pure mental processes," "pure consciousness" with its pure "correlates of consciousness" and, on the other hand, its "pure Ego" we shall start with the Ego, the consciousness, and the mental processes which are given to us in the natural attitude.

I, the actual human being, am a real Object like others in the natural world. I effect cogitationes, acts of consciousness in both the broader and narrower sense and these acts, as belonging to this human subject, are occurrences within the same natural actuality. And likewise all my other mental processes, out of the changing stream of which the specific Ego-acts flash in so specifically peculiar a manner, pass over into one another, become connected in syntheses, become incessantly modified. In a broadest sense, the expression consciousness comprehends (but then indeed less suitably) all mental processes. "In the natural attitude," as we are even in our scientific thinking, by virtue of extremely firm habits which have never been contravened, we take all these findings of psychological reflection as real worldly occurrences, just as mental processes in the lives of animate beings. So natural is it for us to see them only as such that now, when already acquainted with the possibility of an altered attitude and searching for the new Object-province, we do not even note that it is from these very spheres of mental processes that the new

*Note in Copy A: Individual being is given as actual by experience. Correlatively, then, we are saying also that it is a question of discovering an experience which, as contrasted with Objective — or, to characterize it more distinctly, worldly — experience, is of a completely new kind, an all-embracing, endless experience, in the harmonious course of which this new sphere of being becomes constituted.
*In Copy D for essential reasons is changed to in a special sense
Addition in Copy D: and can be derived from it with purity
*Insertion in Copy A: the psychological ego
*Insertion in Copy D: purely psychical
In Copy D all mental processes changed to all these mental processes
In Copy A the following replaces even in scientific thinking: and as all human beings have been up to now — as we and all other human beings are, even in scientific thinking, and always were in all historically developed "positive" sciences
In Copy D of psychological reflection replaced by (and that also characterizes them in psychological reflection)
province arises by virtue of the new attitude. As a consequence, it follows that instead of keeping our regard turned toward those spheres, we turned it away from them and sought the new Objects in the ontological realms of arithmetic, geometry, and the like — where, after all, nothing genuinely new could be attained.

We shall therefore keep our regard fixed upon the sphere of consciousness and study what we find immanently within it. First of all, without as yet effecting the phenomenological judgment-exclusions, we shall subject it to a systematic, though by no means exhaustive, eidetic analysis. What we absolutely need is a certain universal insight into the essence of any consciousness whatever and also, quite particularly, of consciousness in so far as it is, in itself, by its essence consciousness of "natural" actuality. In these studies we shall go as far as is necessary to effect the insight at which we are aiming, namely the insight that consciousness has, in itself, a being of its own which in its own absolute essence, is not touched by the phenomenological exclusion. It therefore remains as the "phenomenological residuum," as a region of being which is of essential necessity quite unique and which can

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13 Insertion in Copy A: or: we do not note that, by the method of absolutely universal epoche, psychological experience, presentive of the psychological consciousness itself, becomes changed into experience of a new kind [Gloss by Schuhmann]

14 Insertion in Copy A: natural psychological

15 Insertion in Copy D: with its "Ego," which cannot be separated from it

16 Insertion in Copy D: — derivable from pure "internal experience" or from

17 The following text from Copy D will serve to illustrate one of several attempts made by Husserl to rewrite the text at this point. It is published as Appendix 37 by Schuhmann (Fall, 1929): the insight that consciousness can be seized upon in a consequential internal experience as essentially coherent in itself, an openly endless and yet self-contained sphere of being with its own forms, those of an "immanent" temporality. And it will be our task to show that just this sphere of being is not touched by the phenomenological exclusion described above.

To state the matter more precisely: By virtue of the phenomenological putting out of action our existential acceptance of the Objective world as existing, this sphere of "immanent" being does indeed lose the sense of being a real stratum in the reality belonging to the world and human being (or beast), which is a reality already presupposing the world. It loses the sense of being conscious life, as can be seized upon progressively by anyone in purely "internal" experience. But it is not simply lost; rather, when we maintain that attitude of epoche, it receives the sense of an absolute sphere of being, an absolutely self-sufficient sphere which is, in itself, what it is — apart from any question concerning the being or non-being of the world and its human beings, while we refrain from taking any position regarding that matter, thus receiving the sense of something already existing beforehand in itself and for itself, no matter how the question of the being of the world — which can be rightly asked and answered only in this sphere — may be answered on the basis of good or bad reasons. Therefore the sphere of pure consciousness with whatever is inseparable from it (including the "pure Ego") remains as the "phenomenological residuum," as a region of being which is essentially quite unique, a region which can become the field of a science of consciousness with a correspondingly novel — sense: phenomenology.
indeed become the field of a science of a novel kind: phenomenology.

The "phenomenological" εποχή will deserve its name only by means of this insight; the fully conscious effecting of that εποχή will prove itself to be the operation necessary to make "pure" consciousness, and subsequently the whole phenomenological region, accessible to us. Precisely that makes it comprehensible why this region and the novel science correlated with it remained necessarily unknown: In the natural attitude nothing else but the natural world is seen. As long as the possibility of the phenomenological attitude had not been recognized, and the method for bringing about an originary seizing upon the objectivities that arise with that attitude had not been developed, the phenomenological world had to remain unknown, indeed, hardly even suspected.

Concerning our terminology we may add the following. Important motives, grounded in the epistemological problematic, justify our designating "pure" consciousness, about which we shall have so much to say, as transcendental consciousness and the operation by which it is reached the transcendental εποχή. As a method this operation will be divided into different steps of "excluding," "parenthesizing;" and thus our method will assume the characteristic of a step-by-step reduction. For this reason we shall, on most occasions, speak of phenomenological reductions (but also, with reference to their collective unity, we shall speak of the phenomenological reduction) and, accordingly, from an epistemological point of view, we shall refer to transcendental reductions. It should be added that these terms and all our others must be understood exclusively in the senses that our expositions prescribe for them and not in any others which history or the terminological habits of the reader may suggest.

18 Insertion in Copy D: essentially
19 In Copy D transcendental sphere of being substituted for phenomenological world
20 In Copy D and at most substituted for indeed, hardly
21 Insertion in Copy D: modern
22 Addition in Copy D: which is contrasted with its psychological parallel, «the epoché pertaining» to pure psychology.

23 Marginal note in Copy D: Improved in b [published as last paragraph of Appendix 38 by Schuhmann:] For this reason we shall speak of transcendental or phenomenological reductions. The word, "phenomenology," and its derivatives have many significations. What is aimed at here, as is apparent from the indications given up to now, is a phenomenology of an entirely peculiar sort, the definite designation of which is transcendental phenomenology. I wish to emphasize especially and with direct reference to these terms (in particular the term "transcendental") that they (like all the terms to be introduced later) [original text follows. The Appendix was written Fall, 1929.]
§34. The Essence of Consciousness as Theme.\(^{24}\)

We begin\(^{25}\) with a series of observations which we shall make without troubling ourselves with any phenomenological\(^{26}\) εποχή. We are directed to the "external world"\(^{27}\) in a natural manner and, without relinquishing the natural attitude, we effect a psychological\(^{28}\) reflection on our Ego and its mental living. Quite as we should if we had heard nothing of the new\(^{29}\) sort of attitude, we engross ourselves in the essence of the\(^{30}\) "consciousness of something," in which, for example, we are conscious of the factual existence of material things, animate organisms, human beings, the factual existence of\(^{31}\) technical and literary works, and so forth.\(^{32}\) We follow\(^{33}\) our universal principle that every individual event has its essence, which can be seized upon in eidetic purity and, in this purity, must belong to a field of possible eidetic research. Accordingly, the general natural fact, "I am," "I think," "I have a world over against me,"\(^{34}\) and the like, has its essential content with which we shall now busy ourselves exclusively. We therefore effect, as examples, any single mental processes whatever of consciousness and take them as they themselves are given to us in the natural attitude, as real human facts; or else we presentiate such mental processes to ourselves in memory or in freely inventive phantasy. On the basis of such examples which, let us presuppose, are perfectly clear,\(^{35}\) we seize upon and fix,\(^{36}\) in an adequate ideation,\(^{37}\)

\(^{24}\) Insertion in Copy D: as the Theme of Psychological Phenomenology Marginal note in Copy D: Cf. also function, p. 176. Marginal note in Copy A: p. 168.

\(^{25}\) Insertion in Copy D: the more detailed exposition

\(^{26}\) In Copy D phenomenological changed to transcendental

\(^{27}\) In Copy D "external world" changed to "real world"

\(^{28}\) In Copy D psychological changed to a pure psychological Note in Copy D: Phenomenological reflection. It is to be explicitly emphasized that here a psychological investigation of a proper sort — a pure, intentional one, is to be carried out, one which suggests a fundamental reform.

\(^{29}\) In Copy D new changed to transcendental

\(^{30}\) Insertion in Copy D: pure Marginal note in Copy A: consequently in eidetic-phenomenological psychology

\(^{31}\) Insertion in Copy D: human communities

\(^{32}\) Marginal note in Copy D: We are in the attitude pertaining to the phenomenological-psychological reduction already described, <the attitude> in which everything transcending the pure consciousness belonging to the consciousness-subjectivity — transcending it on the side belonging to what is currently intended to in the consciousness and on the side belonging to the Ego — remains excluded.

\(^{33}\) Insertion in Copy D: at the same time

\(^{34}\) Insertion in Copy D: even when taken purely

\(^{35}\) Insertion in Copy D: and pure

\(^{36}\) Insertion in Copy D: (freely varying and, in the pure Any-Whatever, picking out intuitively as universal the «?» unvaryingly persistent)

\(^{37}\) Marginal note in Copy C: If the ideation is adequate, then, as eventually becomes apparent, we no longer have something "psychical"
the pure essences that interest us. In the process, the single facts, the facticity of the natural world taken universally, disappear from our theoretical regard — as they do wherever we carry out a purely eidetic research.

Let us limit our theme still more narrowly. Its title runs: consciousness or, more distinctly, any mental processes whatever of consciousness in an extraordinarily broad sense, the exact limitation of which fortunately does not matter. Such a limitation does not lie at the beginning of analyses of the sort which we are carrying on here, but is a late result of great labors. As the starting point, we take consciousness in a pregnant sense and one which offers itself first, which we can designate most simply by the Cartesian term cogito, by the phrase "I think." As is well known, cogito was understood so broadly by Descartes that it comprised every "I perceive, I remember, I phantasy, I judge, I feel, I desire, I will," and thus all egoical mental processes which are at all similar to them, with their countless flowing particular formations. The Ego itself, to which they are all related or which, in very different manners, lives "in" them actively, passively or spontaneously, which "comports" itself receptively and otherwise in them, shall be at first left out of consideration; more particularly, the Ego in every sense shall be left out of consideration. Later on the Ego shall be dealt with thoroughly. For now, enough is left that gives support to analysis and the apprehension of essences. In that connection, we shall find ourselves immediately referred to those comprehensive concatenations of mental processes that compel a broadening of the concept, mental process of consciousness, beyond this sphere made up of cogitationes in the specific Cartesian sense.

We consider mental processes of consciousness in the entire fullness of the concreteness within which they present themselves in their concrete context — the stream of mental processes — and which, by

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38 In Copy D sense is changed to range
39 Insertion in Copy D: entirely
40 Insertion in Copy D: in which anything called the Ego is left as belonging to the sphere of pure psychology
41 In Copy C Later on is changed to (In the later parts of this work)
42 In Copy D this sentence is placed in brackets, with the marginal note NB
43 Insertion in Copy D: pure-psychological
44 Insertion in Copy D: pure
45 Addition in Copy D: for every Ego, within the totality of a concrete context
virtue of their own essence, they combine to make up. It then
becomes evident that every mental process belonging to the stream which can be reached by our reflective regard has an essence of its own which can be seized upon intuitively, a "content" which allows of being considered by itself in its ownness. Our concern is to seize upon and to universally characterize this own content of the cogitation in its pure ownness by excluding everything which does not lie in the cogitatio with respect to what the cogitatio is in itself. It is equally our concern to characterize the unity of consciousness required, and therefore necessarily required, purely by what belongs to the cogitationes as their own such that they could not exist without that unity.

§35. The Cogito as "Act." Non-actionality Modification.

Let us begin with examples. Lying in front of me in the semi-darkness is this sheet of paper. I am seeing it, touching it. This perceptual seeing and touching of the sheet of paper, as the full concrete mental awareness of the sheet of paper lying here and given precisely with respect to these qualities, appearing to me precisely with this relative obscurity, with this imperfect determinateness in this orientation, is a cogitatio, a mental process of consciousness. The sheet of paper itself, with its Objective determinations, its extension, its Objective position relative to the spatial thing called my organism, is not a cogitatio but a cogitatum; it is not a mental process of perception but something perceived. Now something perceived can very well
be itself a mental process of consciousness; but it is evident that such
an affair as a material physical thing, for example, this sheet of paper
given in the mental process of perception, is by essential necessity not a
mental process but a being\(^{56}\) of a wholly different mode of being.\(^{57}\)

Before we investigate that further, let us multiply the examples. In
perceiving proper, as an attentive perceiving, I am turned toward
the object, for instance, the sheet of paper; I seize upon it as this
existent here and now. The seizing-upon is a singling out and seizing;
anything perceived has an experiential background. Around the
sheet of paper lie books, pencils, an inkstand, etc., also “perceived” in
a certain manner, perceptually there, in the “field of intuition;” but,
during the advertence to the sheet of paper, they were without even a
secondary advertence and seizing-upon. They were appearing and
yet were not seized upon and picked out, not posited singly for
themselves. Every perception of a physical thing has, in this manner,
a halo of background-intuitions (or background-seeings, in case one
already includes in intuiting the advertedness to the really seen), and
that is also a “mental process of consciousness” or, more briefly, “consci-
ousness,” and, more particularly, “of all that which in fact lies in
the objective “background” seen along with it. Obviously in saying this
we are not speaking of that which\(^{58}\) is to be found “Objectively”\(^{59}\) in
the Objective space which may belong to the seen background; we
are not speaking of all the physical things and physical\(^{60}\) occurrences
which valid and progressing experience\(^{61}\) may ascertain there. We
speak exclusively of the halo of consciousness which belongs to the
essence of a perception effected in the mode of “advertence to the

\(^{56}\) In Copy A being is changed to existent

\(^{57}\) Addition in Copy D: In the mental process it is intended to as really existing; but it is not
contained therein as a real component part. Consequently, with all that is proper to it, it
undergoes the phenomenological epoché. Addition in Copy A: And yet it is clear that the cogitatio
is, in itself, cogitatio of its cogitatum, and that its cogitatum, as cogitatum, and in the manner in
which it is there, is inseparable from the cogitatio.

\(^{58}\) Insertion in Copy A: in Objective truth

\(^{59}\) In Copy D “Objectively” is changed to really

\(^{60}\) Insertion in Copy A: existing

\(^{61}\) Insertion in Copy A: properties and other

\(^{62}\) Insertion in Copy A: — that is, as self-confirmative

\(^{63}\) Insertion in Copy D: pure
Object” and, furthermore, of what is inherent in the essence proper of this halo. In it, however, there is the fact that certain modifications of the original mental process are possible which we characterize as a free turning of “regard” — not precisely nor merely of the physical, but rather of the “mental regard” [“geistigen Blickes”] — from the sheet of paper regarded at first, to the objects appearing, therefore intended to “implicitly” before the turning of the regard but which become explicitly intended to (either “attentively” perceived or “incidentally heeded”) after the regard is turned to them.

Physical things are intended to not only in perception but also in memories and in presentations similar to memories as well as in free phantasies. All this, sometimes in “clear intuition,” sometimes without noticeable intuitedness in the manner of “obscure” objections; in such cases they hover before us with different “characteristics” as actual physical things, possible physical things, phantasied physical things, etc. Of these essentially different mental processes obviously everything is true that we adduced about mental processes of perception. We shall not think of confusing the objects intended to in these modes of consciousness (for example, the phantasied water nymphs) with the mental processes themselves of consciousness which are consciousness of those objects. We recognize then that, to the essence of all such mental processes — these always taken in full concreteness — there belongs that noteworthy modification which converts consciousness in the mode of actional [aktueller] advertence into consciousness in the male of non-actionality [Inaktualität] and conversely. At the one time the mental process is, so to speak, “explicit” consciousness of its objective something, at the

64 Insertion in Copy D: or to the perceived as perceived
65 Insertion in Copy D: for me, are freely producible by me (in the “I can”)
66 In Copy A, the beginning of the sentence changed to read: The same physical things which are given in perception are also intended to
67 Addition in Copy A: In going back, which is a unitary process of consciousness, we see evidently “the same” <thing> as remembered earlier and then perceived, etc. Similarly, in phantasy we intend to phantasied physical things, perhaps physical things just like those intended to in perception, and we recognize the likeness “synthetically.”
68 Insertion in Copy D: (empty, non-intuitive)
69 In Copy A different “characteristics” is changed to in different modalities of belief in existence and are given in those
70 Insertion in Copy D: <and> accepted either as actualities or as fictions
71 Insertion in Copy D: Here again the acceptance as an actuality or as nothingness undergoes the reduction, while everywhere each is still consciousness of in its way, in its way “meaning,” bearing in itself the meant as meant as inseparably belonging to its own proper pure essence
other time it is implicit, merely potential. The objective something can be already appearing to us\(^{72}\) as it does not only in perception, but also in memory or in phantasy; however, we are not yet "directed" to it with the mental regard, not even secondarily — to say nothing of our being, in a peculiar sense, \(^{73}\) "busied" with it. \(^{74}\)

In the sense pertaining to the sphere of the Cartesian examples we note something similar in no matter what other cogitationes: with respect to all mental processes of thinking, feeling, or willing, except that, as the next section will show, the "directedness to," the "advertedness to," which distinguishes actionality \([\text{Aktualität}]\) does not (as in the preferred — because the simplest — examples of sensuous objectivations) coincide with that heeding of Objects of consciousness which seizes upon and picks them out. It is likewise obviously true of all such mental processes that the actional ones are surrounded by a "halo" of non-actional mental processes; the \textit{stream of mental processes can never consist of just actionalities}. \(^{75}\) Precisely these, when contrasted with non-actionalities, determine with the widest universality, to be extended beyond the sphere of our examples, the \textit{pregnant} sense of the expression "cogito," "I have consciousness of something," "I effect an act of consciousness." To keep this fixed concept\(^{76}\) sharply separated, we shall reserve for it exclusively the Cartesian terms, cogito and cogitationes — unless we indicate the modification explicitly by some such adjunct as "non-actional."\(^{77}\)

We can define a "\textit{waking}" Ego as one which, within its stream of mental processes, continuously effects consciousness in the specific form of the cogito;\(^{78}\) which naturally does not mean that it continually gives, or is able to give at all, predicative expression to these mental processes. There are, after all, brute animal Ego-subjects. According to what is said above, however, it is of the essence of a waking Ego's stream of mental processes that the continuously un-

\(^{72}\)\textit{Insertion in Copy D}: intuitionally

\(^{73}\)\textit{Insertion in Copy D}: in a peculiar sense \textit{is changed to} in any sense

\(^{74}\)\textit{Insertion in Copy D}: inspectively, judgmentally, affectively, valuationally in doing something

\(^{75}\)\textit{Marginal note in Copy A}: To be sure, I have not yet shown how I get at the stream of mental processes

\(^{76}\)\textit{In Copy D} this fixed concept \textit{is changed to} this concept of an act

\(^{77}\)\textit{Addition in Copy D}: We have, in this pre-eminent sense, experiencing acts, acts of feeling, acts of volition, explicit and implicit

\(^{78}\)\textit{In Copy A} form of the cogito \textit{is changed to} form, act of the cogito \textit{Marginal note in Copy D}: Waking Ego in the narrower sense pertaining to positionality and waking-flowing Ego are then distinguished.
broken chain of cogitationes is continually surrounded by a medium of non-actionality which is always ready to change into the mode of actionality, just as, conversely actionality is always ready to change into non-actionality.


However thorough the alteration which mental processes of actional consciousness undergo in consequence of their going over into non-actionality, the modified mental processes still continue to have a significant community of essence with the original ones. Universally it belongs to the essence of every actional cogito to be consciousness of something. In its own manner however, according to what was set forth previously, the modified cogitatio is also consciousness, and consciousness of the same thing as that intended to in the corresponding unmodified consciousness. Accordingly the universal essential property pertaining to consciousness is still preserved in the modification. All mental processes having these essential properties in common are also called "intensive mental processes" (acts in the broadest sense of the Logische Untersuchungen); in so far as they are consciousness of something, they are said to be "intensively referred" to this something.

As a consequence, it should be well heeded that here we are not speaking of a relation between some psychological occurrence — called a mental process — and another real factual existence — called an object — nor of a psychological connection taking place in Objective actuality between the one and the other. Rather we are speaking of mental processes purely with respect to their essence, or of pure essences and of that which is "a priori" included in the essences with unconditional necessity.

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79 Insertion in Copy A: as every unifying consciousness going back and forth makes evident back and forth from non-actionality and actionality. Marginal note in Copy A opposite the first lines of this paragraph: Refer explicitly to these syntheses of unification which themselves, in turn, can be changed by us into the form of heeding the one affair and identifying what is given in one mode and in the other, perchance explicitly, bringing out identity predicatively.

80 Insertion in Copy A: real

81 In Copy D psychological connection is changed to: a connection which is psycho-physical, and real also in other ways

82 In Copy D the sentence is changed to read: Rather we speak here and throughout of purely phenomenological mental processes
That a mental process is consciousness of something — for example: that a phantasying is phantasying of the determinate centaur, but also that a perception is perception of its "real" object, that a judgment is judgment of its predicatively formed affair-complex, etc. — this concerns, rather than the fact of the mental process in the world, specifically, in the complex of psychological facts, the pure essence which is seized upon in ideation as a pure idea. In the essence of the mental process itself lies not only that it is consciousness but also whereof it is consciousness, and in which determinate or indeterminate sense it is that. It therefore also lies implicit in the essence of non-actional consciousness as to what sort of actional cogitations non-actional consciousness can be converted into by the modification, discussed above, which we characterize as a "turning of heeding regard to the formerly unheeded."

By mental processes in the broadest sense we understand everything

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83 Insertion in Copy A: and of its particular something,
84 In Copy D "real" is changed to "factually existing"
85 Substitution for the rest of this sentence in Copy A: in so far as the fact of the mental process is woven into the world and combined really with this and that among what belongs to the external world, but rather the mental process itself, purely with respect to its own internal contents such as it is in being this moment of life itself and as it can be apprehended in pure intuition. For that very reason, with respect to its form, it enters into the ideation: In itself every mental process, as intensive, is somehow consciousness of its respective What ...

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86 Modification of this sentence in Copy D: This concerns the pure mental process in its own essence, thus essentially, i.e., in the ideation of any perception whatever, any phantasy whatever, in the most formal universality: any intentionality whatever, there is found an invariant composition belonging to the seen universal essence. The same holds down to the lowest level of concreteness.
87 In Copy D the is changed to any
88 In Copy D determinate or indeterminate are crossed out and replaced by In this connection, more particularly, it must be taken into consideration how at any particular time the horizon inseparably belonging to it codetermines the sense.
89 The following passage inserted at this point in Copy D (published by Schuhmann as Appendix 39, 1929): But also in what mode of givenness it is the object of consciousness therein; thus, for example, in what mode of temporal givenness — as now and it itself present, as having been just now itself there, as "being still" an object of consciousness, as "itself just now coming" (immediately awaited), etc. Or else in what mode of presentation, first of all in the living perceptual present, it is given, e.g., as perceptually adumbrated, as near or far or else as approaching or receding, as above or below, and the like. Moreover, in what mode of acceptance: as "existing" in simple certainty, or as possibly, as presumably or as probably existing; as null illusion, as free fiction, etc. Egoic possibilities are also essential: the freely generative running through of modes belonging essentially together (in the "I can" and "I do").
90 Marginal note in Copy A opposite the first lines of this paragraph: There is lacking here discrimination of "really inherent" and "ideal" moments of mental processes. In Copy A this and the next paragraph are enclosed in brackets.
and anything to be found in the stream of mental processes; accordingly not only the intuitive processes, the actional and potential cogitationes taken in their full concreteness, but also whatever is to be found in the way of really inherent moments in this stream and its concrete parts.

One easily sees, that is, that not every really inherent moment in the concrete unity of an intuitive mental process itself has the fundamental characteristic, intentionality, thus the property of being "consciousness of something." That concerns, for example, all data of sensation which play so great a role in perceptual intuitions of physical things. Within the mental process of perceiving this sheet of white paper, more precisely, within those components of the perceiving which relate to the quality, whiteness, belonging to the sheet of paper, we find, by a suitable turning of regard, the Datum of sensation, white. This white is something which belongs inseparably to the essence of the concrete perception, and belongs to it as a really inherent concrete component. As the content that is "presentive" with respect to the appearing white of the paper, it is the bearer of an intentionality; however, it is not itself a consciousness of something. The very same thing obtains in the case of other really inherent Data, for example, the so-called sensuous feelings. Later on we shall discuss this in greater detail.

§37. The Pure Ego's "Directedness-to" Within the Cogito and the Heeding Which Seizes Upon.

Without being able to go more deeply here into a descriptive eidetic analysis of intuitive mental processes, we shall bring out some moments which should be heeded in the interest of further exposition. If an intuitive mental process is actional, that is, effected in the manner of the cogito, then in that process the subject is "directing" himself to the intentional Object. To the cogito itself there belongs, as immanent in it, a "regard-to" the Object which, on the other side,

91 In Copy D the words everything and anything to be found in the stream of mental processes; accordingly are crossed out.
92 Insertion in Copy D: and with phenomenological reduction to the purely psychical
93 Insertion in Copy A: (not the white we find, without reflection, in the physical thing)
94 Insertion in Copy D: psychological
95 In Copy A subject is changed to Ego-subject. Insertion in Copy D: (the "Ego")
wells forth from the "Ego" which therefore can never be lacking. This Ego-regard to something varies with the act: in perception, it is a perceptual regard-to; in phantasying, an inventive regard-to; in liking, a liking regard-to; in willing, a willing regard-to; etc. This signifies that this having the mind's eye on something, which pertains to the essence of the cogito, of the act as act,\textsuperscript{96} is not itself, in turn, an act in its own right and especially must not be confused with a perceiving (no matter how broad a sense) nor with any sorts of act akin to perceptions. It should be noted that\textsuperscript{97} intentional Object of a consciousness (taken in the manner in which the intentional Object is the full correlate of a consciousness), by no means signifies the same as Object seized upon. We are accustomed simply to include being seized upon in our concept of the Object (any object whatever)\textsuperscript{98} because, as soon as we think of the Object, as soon as we say something about it, we have made it the object in the sense of what is seized upon. The seizing-upon in the broadest sense is equivalent to noticing it, whether in being especially attentive or in heeding it incidentally: at least as these locutions are usually understood. Now this heeding or seizing-upon is not a matter of the mode of any cogito whatever, the mode of actionality; seen more precisely, it is instead a particular act-mode which can be taken on by any consciousness, or any act, which does not already have it. If that occurs, its intentional Object is not just any object whatever of consciousness and in view as something to which the mental regard is directed; it is rather an Object seized upon, heeded. To a physical thing, to be sure, we cannot be turned otherwise than in the manner of seizing upon; and so for all objectivities which can be "objectivated simply:" advertence (even if it be in phantasying) is eo ipso "seizing upon," "heeding." However, in the act of valuing, we are turned to the valued; in the act of gladness, to the gladsome; in the act of loving, to the loved; in the acting to the action; but without seizing upon any of them. Rather the intentional Object, the valuable as valuable, the gladsome as gladsome, the loved as loved, the hoped as hoped, the action as action, becomes an object seized upon only in a particular "objectifying" turn. Being turned valuingly to a thing involves, to be sure, a seizing upon the mere thing; not, however, the mere thing, but rather the valuable thing

\textsuperscript{96} Insertion in Copy D: of the specific act
\textsuperscript{97} Insertion in Copy D: (as has already been mentioned above, p. 64)
\textsuperscript{98} In Copy D (any object whatever) is changed to (the intentional object)
or the value\textsuperscript{99} is the full\textsuperscript{100} intentional correlate of the valuing act. (About this we shall still speak in more detail.) Accordingly, "being turned valuingly to a thing" does not signify already "having" the value\textsuperscript{101} "as object" in the particular sense of the seized-upon object such as we must have it in order to predicate about it; and it is the same in the case of all logical acts relating to it.

In acts of the sort to which valuing acts belong, we thus have "an intentional Object" in a dual sense: We must distinguish between the mere "thing" and the full intentional Object; and, correspondingly, there is a dual intentio,\textsuperscript{102} a two-fold advertedness.\textsuperscript{103} If we are directed to a thing in an act of valuing, then our direction to the thing itself is a heeding\textsuperscript{104} of it, a seizing upon it; but we are "directed" — only not in the manner of seizing upon — also to the value. Not only the objectivating of the thing but also the valuing of the thing which includes\textsuperscript{105} the objectivating, has the mode of actionality.\textsuperscript{106}

But we must immediately add that the situation is as simple as this only in simple acts of valuing. Universally, emotional acts and acts of willing are founded on higher levels; and, accordingly, the intentional Objectivity is multiplied as are the manners in which the Objects included in the unitary total Objectivity are, or can be, turned to. In any case however, what is said in the following paragraph holds good:

\textit{In any act\textsuperscript{107} some mode of heedfulness dominates. But whenever the act is not simply consciousness of a thing, whenever there is founded on such a consciousness a further consciousness in which "a position is taken" with respect to the thing, then thing and full intentional Object (for example: "thing" and "value"), likewise heeding and having the mind's eye on, separately arise. But, at the same time, the essence of these founded acts involves the possibility of a modification by which their full intentional Objects become heeded and, in this sense, "ob-}

\textsuperscript{99}Insertion in Copy A: the value intended to
\textsuperscript{100}In Copy D full is crossed out.
\textsuperscript{101}Insertion in Copy D: and what belongs to it
\textsuperscript{102}Insertion in Copy D: or
\textsuperscript{103}Insertion in Copy D: in the unity of one cogito a dual cogito is intentionally interwoven
\textsuperscript{104}In Copy A heeding is changed to an objective heeding
\textsuperscript{105}Insertion in Copy D: and exercises a function for
\textsuperscript{106}Addition in Copy D: Obviously, when the heedful objectivating of the mere physical thing founds a valuing advertedness, it has a mode of heedfulness (of seizing-upon which objectivates the object) other than the one it has when not exercising such a subservient function.
\textsuperscript{107}Insertion in Copy D: in the pregnant sense
"jectivated" objects which are then, for their part, capable of serving as substrates for explications, relations, conceptual apprehensions, and predications. Thanks to this Objectivation in the natural attitude we confront, and therefore as members of the natural world, not only mere things of nature but also values and practical Objects of every sort: streets with street lights, dwellings, furniture, works of art, books, tools, and so forth.108


We add the following:109 When living in the cogito we are not101 conscious of the cogitatio itself as an intentional Object; but at any time it can become an Object of consciousness; its essence involves the essential possibility of a reflective turning of regard and naturally in the form of a new cogitatio that, in the manner proper to a cogitatio which simply seizes upon,111 is directed to it. In other words, any <cogitatio> can become the object of a so-called "internal perception" and in further succession the Object of a reflective valuation, an approval or a disapproval, etc. The same holds in a correspondingly modified way not only for actual112 acts in the sense of act-

108 Addition in Copy D (published by Schuhmann as Appendix 40, dated Fall, 1929): It is thus not only in the case of concrete real Objects, but also in the case of processes, relationships, combinations, wholes and parts, and the like. For example: we have not only natural processes but also actions, alterations in the works of the mind, in cultural Objects of every sort and as cultural Objects (e.g., loss of value in works of art because of "spoiling," machines becoming useless), and complexes of literary works, not as mere physical things belonging to Nature but as chapters in a book or as the complex of works making up a national literature, relative to authors, readers, nations, etc. With respect to the manners of givenness, we then find not merely physical "horizons" as horizons of a possible experience of Nature, but also value-horizons and practical horizons; for example, the practical horizon which the doer has at all times in his purposefully active doing relative to the unity of a goal which itself stands in mere extensive concatenations of ends. In addition, however, there are essentially possible differences in attitude (always within the total frame of the natural attitude) such that all Objectivities, no matter how highly founded, for instance, those arising from the originally valuing attitude, or from the originally practical attitude, can be taken over into the "theoretical" attitude of seizing-upon and can therefore become the themes of either a transitory or a consistently maintained "objectivating:" in particular, an experiencing, explicating, predicating, etc.

109 In Copy A these words are crossed out.

110 Insertion in Copy D: actionally

111 Insertion in Copy A: and, more particularly, an attentively experiencing

112 In Copy D actual is changed to of livingly present
impressions, but also for acts of which we are conscious "in" phantasy, "in" memory, or else "in" empathy when we are understanding and living another's acts after him. We reflect "in" memory, empathy, etc., and in the various possible modifications, make the acts of which there is consciousness "in" them Objects of seizing-upon and of position-taking acts based on seizures-upon.

We start here with the distinction between perceptions or acts of whatever sort of something transcendent and of something immanent. Because of serious objections to it, we shall avoid the locution, external and internal perception. We offer the following clarifications.

By acts directed to something immanent, more generally formulated, by intensive mental processes related to something immanent, we understand those to which it is essential that their intentional objects, if they exist at all, belong to the same stream of mental processes to which they themselves belong. That is the case, for example, wherever an act related to an act (wherever a cogitatio relates to a cogitatio) of the same Ego, or where an act relates to a sensuous feeling-Datum belonging to the same Ego, etc. The consciousness and its Object form an individual unity made up purely of mental processes.

Intensive mental processes of which that is not the case are directed to something transcendent. Such, for example, are all acts directed to essences or to intensive mental processes belonging to other Egos with other streams of mental processes, and likewise all acts directed to physical things or to realities of whatever sort, as will be shown.

In the case of a perception directed to something immanent, or briefly expressed, a perception of something immanent (so-called "internal" perception), perception and perceived form essentially an unmediated unity, that of a single concrete cogitatio. Here the perceiving includes its Object in itself in such a manner that it only can be separated abstractly, only as an essentially non-selfsufficient

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113 Insertion in Copy A: and this is a peculiar and remarkable property of intentionality
114 Insertion in Copy D: "in" phantasy
115 Addition in Copy D: A more precise treatment would require profound analyses.
116 Marginal note to these lines in Copy D: 1. Purely psychically directed acts, the purely psychical directed, in its intentionality, to the purely psychical.
2. Acts which transcend the purely psychical (the purely phenomenological sphere). The former are divided into egological acts and acts which we call purely intersubjective.
117 In Copy D of a perception is changed to of an experience
118 In Copy D perception and perceived changed to experience and experienced
119 In Copy A only can be separated abstractively enclosed in parentheses.
moment, from its Object. If that which is being perceived is an
intentive mental process, as it is when we are reflecting on a convinc­
tion which is alive just now (perhaps stating: I am convinced that ...),
we have an interpenetration of two intentive mental processes, at
least the higher of which is non-selfsufficient and at the same time not
only founded on the lower but also intentively turned to it.

This sort of really inherent "includedness" (strictly speaking, a meta­
phor) is a pre-eminent characteristic of the perception of something immanent
and of the position-taking founded on such perception; it is lacking in most
other cases of relation to something immanent on the part of
intentive mental processes. Thus, for example, it is lacking even in
the case of rememberings of rememberings. The remembered remem­
bering that occurred yesterday does not belong to the present
remembering as a really inherent component of its concrete unity.
With respect to its own full full essence, the present remembering could
exist even though in truth the past remembering had never existed;
whereas the past remembering, if it actually did exist, belongs
necessarily with the present remembering, to the one identical and
uninterrupted stream which continuously mediates the two by vari­
ous concretions of mental processes. In this respect, the situation is
obviously quite different in the case of perceptions of something
transcendent and other intentive mental processes relating to some­
thing transcendent. Not only does the perception of the physical
thing not contain the physical thing itself as part of its really inherent
composition; the perception of the physical thing is also without any
essential unity with it, its existence, naturally, being presupposed here.
The unity of the stream of mental processes is the only unity determined purely by
the essences proper of the mental processes themselves; or, this being the
same thing, a mental process can be combined only with mental
processes to make up a whole the total essence of which embraces and
is founded on the essences proper of these mental processes. In the
sequel this proposition will become even clearer and acquire its
proper, and great, significance.

120 Insertion in Copy D: of experience of something immanent and
121 Insertion in Copy D: of whatever sort
122 Insertion in Copy A: own
123 Insertion in Copy D: single
124 Insertion in Copy A: absolute
125 In Copy A: acquire changed to disclose

All of the essential characteristics of a mental process and of consciousness which we have discovered are for us so many necessary steps for reaching the goal continually guiding us, namely the acquisition of the essence of that "pure" consciousness which will determine the field of phenomenology. Our observations have been eidetic; but the single particulars falling under the essences Mental Process, Stream of Mental Processes, and "Consciousness" in every sense, have belonged to the natural world as real occurrences. We have therefore, not abandoned the basis of the natural attitude. An individual consciousness is involved with the natural world in a dual manner: it is the consciousness belonging to some human being or beast; and, at least in a great number of its particularities, it is consciousness of that world. In view of this involvement with the real world, what is meant now by saying that a consciousness has an essence "of its own" and that, with another consciousness, it makes up a self-contained concatenation determined purely by the essences proper, a concatenation of the stream of consciousness? Since we can understand consciousness here in any, even the broadest, sense, which ultimately coincides with the concept of mental process, the question concerns the essence proper of the stream of mental processes and all its components. To what extent, in the first place, is the material world something of an essentially different kind excluded from the essentiality proper of mental processes? And if that is true of the material world, if the material world stands in

126 Insertion in Copy D: pure
127 Substitution in Copy D for necessary steps: initial steps along our chosen path, which leads through the elaborating of the sphere of "purely psychical" experience as the beginning, we may say, of a "pure psychology -- steps
128 In Copy D essence changed to sense
129 Insertion in Copy D: "transcendental"
130 In Copy D have belonged changed to have always still belonged
131 In Copy D the next two sentences are bracketed and the following change suggested (published by Schuhmann as the first paragraph of Appendix 42, dated Fall, 1929): But how are we to understand this involvement? Is it not the real world which exists for us, and is as it is for us, exclusively as the world objectivated, experienced and otherwise intended to in our consciousness? Is not consciousness itself, in its many different modes and syntheses in us, in its own essential coherence, that which gives us the world as the world obtaining for us, and perhaps proving itself in us, and gives us its whole sense and with all evidences, proofs, groundings in this sense-bestowing — flowing concatenations in the stream of consciousness itself, in the current conscious life of the Ego (which comprises all of its pure doing ([Leisten])?
132 Insertion in Copy D: immanent
contrast to all consciousness, and to the own-essentiality of consciousness, as "something alien," the "otherness," then how can consciousness become involved with it — with the material world and consequently with the whole world other than consciousness? For one is easily persuaded that the material world is not just any part, but rather the fundamental stratum\(^\text{133}\) of the natural world to which all other real being is essentially related. The components still lacking from the material world are the psyches of humans and brutes;\(^\text{134, 135}\) and the novelty which they introduce is, above all, their "mental living" with their relatedness to their surrounding world in the manner peculiar to consciousness. Nevertheless consciousness and physicalness are a combined whole,\(^\text{136}\) combined into the single psychophysical unities which we call animalia and, at the highest level, combined into the real unity of the whole world. Can the unity of a whole exist otherwise than by virtue of its parts, and must the latter not have some sort of community of essence instead of being heterogeneous of essential necessity?

To answer these questions I shall look for the ultimate source which feeds the general positing of the world effected by me in the natural attitude, the source which, therefore, makes it possible that I consciously find a factually existing world of physical things confronting me and that I ascribe to myself a body in that world and now am able to assign myself a place there. Obviously this ultimate source is sensuous experience.\(^\text{137}\). For our purposes, however, it will be sufficient if we consider\(^\text{138}\) sensuous perception which plays the role among experiencing acts of what may be called, in a certain legitimate sense, a primal experience\(^\text{139}\) from which all other experiencing acts derive.

\(^{133}\)In Copy B there is a question mark in the margin opposite fundamental stratum

\(^{134}\)Addition in Copy D (second paragraph of Appendix 42): and that which is determined in the world by them: for example, the whole of culture as a personally accruing mental and moral world [Geisteswelt]. — Since, indeed, persons themselves cannot be anything but ownnesses, what is novel is conscious living as a reference, in the manner peculiar to consciousness, of the Ego in passive and active cogitationes to its surrounding world.

\(^{135}\)Addition in Copy A after humans and brutes: and the spirituality of culture

\(^{136}\)Insertion in Copy D: which is concrete only as physical

\(^{137}\)Substitution in Copy D for this sentence: Whatever may be the kind of consciousness in which I am aware of something worldly, if that kind of consciousness means the being of the latter as actual, then the question about the correctness of this opinion can be asked; and any legitimation ultimately leads back to experience. And, since the fundamental supporting stratum of all reality is corporeality, we arrive at sensuous experience. Let us consider sensuous

\(^{138}\)In Copy D the first part of the sentence changed to: In that connection, we must consider

\(^{139}\)In Copy B a question mark in the margin opposite primal experience
a major part of their grounding force. Any perceiving consciousness has the peculiarity of being a consciousness of the own presence\textsuperscript{140} "in person" of an individual Object which is, for its part, either an individuum in the sense of pure logic or else a logico-categorial variant of such an individuum.\textsuperscript{141} In our case, that of sensuous perception or, more plainly, perception of a physical thing, the logical individuum is the physical thing; and it is sufficient to treat perception of the physical thing as the representative of all other perceptions (of qualities, processes, and the like).

Our natural wakeful Ego-life is\textsuperscript{142} a continuous actional or non-actional perceiving. Incessantly the world of physical things and, in it, our body, are perceptually there. How does, and how can, consciousness itself become separated out\textsuperscript{143} as a concrete being in itself?\textsuperscript{144} And how does that which is intended to in it, the perceived being, become separated out as "over against" consciousness and as "in itself and by itself?"

At first I shall meditate as a "naive" human being. I see and apprehend the physical thing as given "in person." To be sure, I am sometimes deceived, and not only with respect to perceived determinations but also with respect to the factual being of the thing itself. I suffer an illusion or hallucination. At such times perception is not "genuine" perception. But when it is, and that means when it allows of being "confirmed"\textsuperscript{145} in concatenations of actional experience, perhaps with the help of correct thinking based on experience, then the perceived physical thing is actual and, more particularly, actually itself given in perception "in person." The perceiving,\textsuperscript{146} when I consider it purely as a consciousness and disregard my body and bodily organs, appears like something which is, in itself, inessential: an empty looking at the Object itself on the part of an empty "Ego" which comes into a remarkable contact with the Object.\textsuperscript{148}

\textsuperscript{140}Marginal note in Copy A; Cf. below, "Reason and Actuality."
\textsuperscript{141}Author's footnote: Cf. §15, p. 29 above.
\textsuperscript{142}In Copy D is changed to includes
\textsuperscript{143}Insertion in Copy D: for us in original experience
\textsuperscript{144}Insertion in Copy D: and moreover as always my consciousness, including my continuous perceiving
\textsuperscript{145}Insertion in Copy D: and always again confirmed
\textsuperscript{146}In Copy D perceiving changed to I-am-perceiving
\textsuperscript{147}This word cancelled in Copy D.
\textsuperscript{148}Insertion in Copy A: which seize upon it immediately, which is "with" the object itself

If I, as a "naive" human being who is "deceived by the senses" have yielded to my inclinations to develop such reflections, I now recall, as a "scientific" human being the well-known distinction between secondary and primary qualities according to which the specific qualities pertaining to the senses are "merely subjective," and only the qualities dealt with in geometry and physics are "Objective." The color, the sound, the odor, and the taste of the physical thing, however much they appear "in person" in the thing, as qualities included in its essence, are not themselves actually as what they appear to be there, but are instead mere "signs" of certain primary qualities. But if I recall certain familiar theories of physics, I see at once that such widely favored propositions should not be taken literally, as though only the "specific" sensuous qualities of the perceived physical thing were a mere appearance; for that would be saying that the "primary" qualities, which remain after the "specific" sensuous qualities are removed along with other such qualities which do not appear, belong to the physical thing existing in objective truth. If the propositions are so understood, then the old Berkeleyian objection is correct that extension, the essential core of corporeality and of all primary qualities, is inconceivable without secondary qualities. Rather the entire essential contents of the perceived physical thing, thus the whole physical thing standing there "in person" and all its qualities, including all those which could ever be perceived, is a "mere appearance" and that the "true physical thing" is the one determined by physics. When physics determines the physical thing given exclusively by such concepts as atoms, ions, energies, and so forth, and as, in any case, space-filling processes for which the only characterizations are mathematical expressions, it means them as something transcendent to the whole physical-thing content standing there "in person." As a consequence, it cannot mean the physical thing as something located in the natural space pertaining to the senses. In

149 Insertion in Copy A: (prescientific)
150 Insertion in Copy A: as the true ones
151 Insertion in Copy A: the meaning can only be that
152 Insertion in Copy A: according to this conception
153 Insertion in Copy A: in sensuous experience
other words, the space of physics cannot be the space belonging to the world given “in person” in perception: if it were, then the Berkeleyian objection would also apply to it.

Therefore “true being” would be something determined completely and, of essential necessity, differently from the actuality given “in person” in perception, given exclusively with sensuous determinations, to which spatial determinations pertaining to the senses also belong. The experienced physical thing proper provides the mere “This,” an empty X, which becomes the bearer of mathematical determinations and corresponding mathematical formulae, and which exists, not in perceived space, but in an “Objective space” of which <perceived space> is merely a “sign” — a three-dimensional Euclidean multiplicity which is representable only symbolically.

Let us accept that. Let us assume, as the theory maintains, that whatever is given “in person” in any perception is “mere appearance,” of essential necessity “merely subjective,” though still not an empty illusion. By applying the strict method of natural science, what is given in perception serves to validly determine — which anyone can do and test by insight — that transcendent being of which it is the “sign.” The sensuous contents of the perceptually given itself are always held to be other than the true physical thing existing in itself; nevertheless, the substrate, the bearer (the empty X) of the perceived determinations, is always held to be that which is determined by the exact method as having the predicates assigned to it in physics. Conversely, then, any cognition in physics serves as an index to the course of possible experiences with the things pertaining to the senses and their occurrences found in those experiences. It serves, therefore, to orient us in the world of actional experience in which we all live and act.

154 Insertion in Copy D: directly
156 Insertion in Copy D: Thus one would have to say that
157 Insertion in Copy D: of physics
158 Addition in Copy A: Such then would be the concrete sense of the theory of the indication of the being which is true for physics by sensuous experiencing. In Copy B question marks in the margin.
159 Insertion in Copy A: entire
§41. The Really Inherent Composition of Perception and Its Transcendent Object.

Now, all of that being presupposed, what is included in the concrete, really inherent composition of perception itself, as the cogitatio? Obviously not the physical thing as determined by physics, that utterly transcendent thing — transcendent to the whole "world of appearance." But not even the latter, although it is called "merely subjective," with all the particular physical things and occurrences belonging to it, is excluded from the really inherent composition of perception; it is "transcendent" to perception. Let us consider this more closely. We have already spoken, though only in passing, of the transcendence of the physical thing. We now must acquire a deeper insight into how the transcendent stands with respect to the consciousness which is a consciousness of it, into how this mutual relationship, which has its paradoxes, should be understood.

Let us therefore exclude the whole of physics and the whole domain of theoretical thinking. Let us remain within the limits of simple intuition and the syntheses belonging to it, among which perception is included. It is evident then that intuition and intuited, perception and perceived physical thing are, more particularly, essentially interrelated but, as a matter of essential necessity, are not really inherently and essentially one and combined.

Let us start with an example. Constantly seeing this table and meanwhile walking around it, changing my position in space in whatever way, I have continually the consciousness of this one identical table as factually existing "in person" and remaining quite unchanged. The table-perception, however, is a continually changing one; it is a continuity of changing perceptions. I close my eyes. My other senses have no relation to the table. Now I have no perception of it. I open my eyes; and I have the perception again. The perception? Let us be more precise. Returning, it is not, under any circumstances, individually the same. Only the table is the same, intended to as the same in the synthetical consciousness which connects the new perception with the memory. The perceived phys-

161 Insertion in Copy D: even
162 Insertion in Copy D: above
163 Addition in Copy D: of mere sensuous experience, the physical thing which in everyday life, prior to science, is held to be the physical thing
ical thing can exist without being perceived, without even being potentially intended to (in the already described\textsuperscript{164} mode of non-actionality); and it can exist without changing. The perception itself, however, is what it is in the continuous flux of consciousness and is itself a continuous flux: continually the perceptual Now changes into the enduring consciousness of the Just-Past and simultaneously a new Now lights up, etc. Like the perceived thing as a whole, whatever parts, sides, moments accrue to it necessarily, and always for the same reasons, transcends the perception regardless of whether the particular property be called a primary or a secondary quality. The color of the seen physical thing is, of essential necessity, not a really inherent moment of the consciousness of color; it appears, but while it is appearing the appearance can and must, in the case of a legitimating experience, be continually changing. The same color appears “in” continuous multiplicities of color adumbrations. Something similar is true of every sensuous quality and also of every spatial shape. One and the same shape (given “in person” as the same) appears continuously but always “in a different manner,” always in different adumbrations of shape. That is a necessary situation, and obviously it obtains universally. Only for the sake of simplicity have we taken as our example the case of a physical thing appearing in perception as unchanging. The application to cases involving changes of any kind is obvious.

Of essential necessity there belongs to any “all-sided,” continuously, unitarily, and self-confirming experimental consciousness / Erfahrungsbewufitsein / of the same physical thing a multifarious system of continuous multiplicities of appearances and adumbrations in which\textsuperscript{165} all objective moments falling within perception with the characteristic of being themselves given “in person” are\textsuperscript{166} adumbrated by determined continuities. \textsuperscript{167} Each determination has its system of adumbrations; and each of them, like the physical thing as a whole, is there as the Same for the seizing-upon consciousness which synthetically unites memory and new perception as the Same, despite any interruption of the continuous course of actional perception.

At the same time we now see what actually and indubitably is included in the really inherent composition of those concrete inten-

\textsuperscript{164} Author’s footnote: Cf. §35, above, especially p. 63.

\textsuperscript{165} Insertion in Copy D: (if they are actionally accepted)

\textsuperscript{166} Insertion in Copy A: presented and

\textsuperscript{167} Insertion in Copy D: in the consciousness of identity
tive mental processes called perceivings of physical things. Whereas the physical thing is the intentional unity, the physical thing intended to as identical and unitary in the continuously regular flow of perceptual multiplicities\textsuperscript{168} which interpenetrate and change into one another, the perceptual multiplicities themselves always have their \textit{derminate descriptional composition essentially} coordinated with that unity. For example, each phase of the perception necessarily contains a determined content of adumbrations of color, adumbrations of shape, etc. They are included among \textit{"the Data of sensations,"} Data of an own peculiar region with determined genera and which join together with one of these genera to make up concrete unities of mental processes sui generis (\textit{"fields" of sensation}). Furthermore, in a manner which we shall not describe here more precisely, the Data are animated by \textit{"construings"} within the concrete unity of the perception and in the animation exercise the \textit{"presentive function,"} or as united with the construings which animate them, they make up what we call \textit{"appearings of"} color, shape, and so forth. These moments, combined with further characteristics, are the really inherent components making up the perception which is a consciousness of one and the same physical thing by virtue of joining together, grounded in the \textit{essence} of those construings, to make up a \textit{unity of construing}, and again by virtue of the possibility, grounded in the \textit{essence} of various unities of construing, to make up \textit{syntheses of identification}.\textsuperscript{169}

It must be borne clearly in mind that\textsuperscript{170} the Data of sensation which exercise the function of adumbrations of color, of smoothness, of shape, etc. (the function of \textit{"presentation"}) are, of essential necessity, entirely different from color simpliciter, smoothness simpliciter, shape simpliciter, and, in short, from all kinds of moments belonging to \textit{physical things}. \textit{The adumbration, though called by the same name, of essential necessity is not of the same genus as the one to which the adumbrated belongs.} The adumbrating is a mental process. But a mental process is possible only as a mental process, and not as something spatial. However, the adumbrated is of essential necessity possible only as something spatial (it is spatial precisely in its essence), and not possible as a mental process. In particular it is a countersense to take

\textsuperscript{168} Insertion in Copy A: perceived in the harmony of the perceptual continuity as existing and having such and such a composition of sensuously intuited traits,

\textsuperscript{169} Addition in Copy A: more precisely: syntheses of the one object, the one color, the one shape — the one, presented in ever new presentations

\textsuperscript{170} Insertion in Copy A: as already became apparent in the \textit{Logische Untersuchungen}
the adumbration of shape (e.g., the adumbration of a triangle) for something spatial and possible in space; and whoever does so confuses the adumbrating with the adumbrated, i.e., with the appearing shape. As for how the different really inherent moments of the perception as cogitatio (in contrast to the moments of the cogitatum, which is transcendent to it) are to be separated from one another and characterized with respect to their sometimes very difficult differences, is a theme for extensive investigations.

§42. Being as Consciousness and Being as Reality. Essentially Necessary Difference Between the Modes of Intuition.

Our considerations have established that the physical thing is transcendent to the perception of it and consequently to any consciousness whatever related to it; it is transcendent not merely in the sense that the physical thing cannot be found in fact as a really inherent component of consciousness; rather the whole situation is an object of eidetic insight: With an absolutely unconditional universality and necessity it is the case that a physical thing cannot be given in any possible perception, in any possible consciousness, as something really inherently immanent. Thus there emerges a fundamentally essential difference between being as mental process and being as a physical thing. Of essential necessity it belongs to the regional essence, Mental Process (specifically to the regional particularization, Cogitatio) that it can be perceived in an immanental perception; fundamentally and necessarily it belongs to the essence of a spatial physical thing that it cannot be so perceived. If, as we learn from a deeper analysis, it is of the essence of any intuition presentive of a physical thing that, along with the physical-thing datum, other data analogous to physical things can be seized upon in a corresponding turn of the regard in the manner, let us say, of detachable strata and lower levels in the constitution of the appearing physical thing — e.g., "sight thing" with its different particularizations — still precisely the same is true of them: They are of essential necessity transcendencies.

Before tracing this contrast between something immanent and

171 Insertion in Copy A: (the confusion continually pervades the literature of psychology)
172 Insertion in Copy A: as an object of sensuous experience
173 In Copy A Mental Process changed to anything subjective whatever and subjective mental living
something transcendent somewhat further, let us introduce the follow-
ing remark. Disregarding perception, we find intuitive mental pro-
cesses of many kinds that, by virtue of their essence, exclude the really
inherent immanence of their intentional objects no matter what the
objects may otherwise be.¹⁷⁴ That holds, for example, of any pre-
sentation: of any memory, of the empathic seizing upon someone
else's consciousness, etc. Naturally we must not confuse this tran-
scendence with the transcendence with which we are concerned here.
To the physical thing as physical thing, to any reality in the genuine
sense, the sense of which we have yet to clarify and fix, there belongs
essentially and quite "universally"¹⁷⁵ the incapacity of being imma-
nently perceived and accordingly of being found at all in the con-
catenation of mental processes. Thus the physical thing is said to be,
in itself, unqualifiedly transcendent. Precisely in that the essentially
necessary diversity among modes of being, the most cardinal of them
all, becomes manifest: the diversity between consciousness and reality.¹⁷⁶

Our exposition has brought out the further fact that this contrast
between something immanent and something transcendent includes
an essentially fundamental difference between the corresponding kinds of given-
ness. Perception of something immanent and of something transcen-
dent do not differ merely in that the intentional object, which is there
with the characteristic of something it itself, "in person," is really
inherently immanent in the perceiving in one case but not in the
other: rather they are differentiated by modes of givenness the
essential difference between which is carried over mutatis mutandis
into all the presentational modifications of perception, into the
parallel memorial intuitions and phantasy intuitions. We perceive
the physical thing by virtue of its being "adumbrated" in respect of
all the determinations which, in a given case, "actually" and pro-
perly "fall within the scope of" perception. A mental process is not
adumbrated.¹⁷⁷ It is neither an accident of the own peculiar sense of the
physical thing nor a contingency of "our human constitution," that

¹⁷⁴ Insertion in Copy A: even if immanent
¹⁷⁵ Author's footnote: Here, and throughout this essay, we use the word "prinzipiell" in a
strict sense, referring to the highest and therefore the most radical, eidetic universalities or
necessities.
¹⁷⁶ Addition in Copy D: But we have not yet progressed far enough to apprehend that diversity
in its purity. On the natural basis upon which we are operating, my consciousness, my stream of
consciousness even when taken purely as immanent, and my pure Ego as pertaining to my
consciousness, are still worldly determinations of the real human being.
¹⁷⁷ Insertion in Copy D: in this manner
"our" perception can arrive at physical things themselves only through mere adumbrations\textsuperscript{178} of them. Rather is it evident and drawn from the essence of spatial physical things (even in the widest sense, which includes "sight things") that, necessarily a being of that kind can be given in perception only through an\textsuperscript{179} adumbration; and in like manner it is evident from the essence of cogitationes, from the essence of mental processes of any kind, that they exclude anything like that. For an existent belonging to their region, in other words, anything like an "appearing," a being presented, through\textsuperscript{180} adumbrations makes no sense whatever. Where there is no spatial being it is senseless to speak of a seeing from different standpoints with a changing orientation in accordance with different perappearances,\textsuperscript{181} adumbrations. On the other hand,\textsuperscript{182} it is an essential necessity, to be seized upon as essential in apodictic insight, that any spatial being whatever is perceivable for an Ego (for any possible Ego) only with the kind of givenness designated. A spatial being\textsuperscript{183} can "appear" only in a certain "orientation," which necessarily predelineates a system of possible new orientations each of which, in turn, corresponds to a certain "mode of appearance" which we can express, say, as givenness from such and such a "side," and so forth. If we understand modes of appearance in the sense of modes of mental processes (the phrase can also have a corresponding ontic sense, as is evident from the description just offered), then this signifies: It is essential to certain sorts of mental processes which have a peculiar structure, more precisely, it belongs to certain concrete perceptions which have a peculiar structure,\textsuperscript{184} that what is intended to in them is meant as a spatial physical thing; to their essence belongs the ideal possibility of their changing into determinately ordered\textsuperscript{185} continuous multiplicities of perception which can always be continued, thus which are never completed. It is then inherent in the essential structure of those multiplicities that they bring about the unity of a harmoniously presentive consciousness and, more particularly, of the one
perceptual physical thing appearing ever more perfectly, from ever new sides, with an ever greater wealth of determinations. On the other hand, the spatial thing is nothing other than an intentional unity which of essential necessity can be given only as the unity of such modes of appearance.

§43. The Clarification of a Fundamental Error.

It is therefore fundamentally erroneous to believe that perception (and, after its own fashion, any other kind of intuition of a physical thing) does not reach the physical thing itself. The latter is not given to us in itself or in its being-in-itself. There belongs to any existent the essential possibility of being simply intuited as what it is and, more particularly, of being perceived as what it is in an adequate perception, one that is presentive of that existent itself, "in person," without any mediation by "appearances." God, the subject possessing an absolutely perfect knowledge and therefore possessing every possible adequate perception, naturally has that adequate perception of the very physical thing itself which is denied to us finite beings.

But this view is a countersense. It implies that there is no essential difference between something transcendent and something immanent, that, in the postulated divine intuition, a spatial physical thing is present as a really inherent constituent, that it is therefore itself a mental process also belonging to the divine stream of consciousness and divine mental processes generally. The holders of this view are misled by thinking that the transcendence belonging to the spatial physical thing is the transcendence belonging to something depicted or represented by a sign. Frequently the picture-theory is attacked with zeal and a sign theory substituted for it. Both theories, however, are not only incorrect but countersensical. The spatial physical thing which we see is, with all its transcendence, still something perceived, given "in person" in the manner peculiar to consciousness. It is not the case that, in its stead, a picture or a sign is given. A picture-

\[\text{\textit{Addition in Copy A:}}\] Moreover, as long as the harmony is not interrupted and as a consequence carries with it the necessary presumption that it will continue to follow its style, it presents the physical thing and, correspondingly with respect to its determinations of being thus, in the mode of certain factual being and continuing to be.

\[\text{\textit{Insertion in Copy A:}}\] according to its universal sense, instituted by external experience and its style.

\[\text{\textit{Addition in Copy A:}}\] — and, first of all, given to me, if I am not speaking of others.
consciousness or a sign-consciousness must not be substituted for perception.

Between perception, on the one hand, and depictive-symbolic or signitive-symbolic objectivation, on the other hand, there is an unbridgeable essential difference. In the latter kinds of objectivation we intuit something in consciousness as depicting or signitively indicating something else; having the one in our field of intuition we are directed, not to it, but to the other, what is depicted or designated, through the medium of a founded apprehending. Nothing like that is involved either in perception or in simple memory or in simple phantasy.

In immediately intuitive acts we intuit an “it itself;” on their apprehendings no mediate apprehendings are built up at a higher level; thus there is no consciousness of anything for which the intuited might function as a “sign” or “picture.” And just on that account it is said to be immediately intuited as “it itself.” In perception the “it itself” is further characterized in its peculiarity as “in person” in contrast to its modified characteristic as “floating before us,” as “presentiated” in memory or in free phantasy. One would fall into a countersense if one were to confuse these modes of objectivation of essentially different structures, and if one were, accordingly, to mix up, in the usual fashion, the correlative objects given in these modes: thus confusing simple presentation with symbolizing (whether depictive or signitive) and — even worse — simple perception with both of them. The perception of a physical thing does not presentiate something non-present, as though it were a memory or a phantasy; perception makes present, seizes upon an it-itself in its presence “in person.” Perception does this according to its own peculiar sense; and to attribute something other than that to perception is precisely to contradict its sense. If we are dealing, as here, with the perception of

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189 Marginal note in Copy A: Essential additions (in §52) p. 97, especially p. 99.
190 In Copy A or in simple phantasy is bracketed.
191 Author’s footnote: In my Gottingen lectures (beginning with the summer semester of 1904) I substituted an improved exposition for the inadequate one which I (being still too greatly influenced by the concepts involved in the dominant psychology) had given in the Logische Untersuchungen concerning the relationships between these simple and founded intuitions, and offered a detailed report of my further research — which, incidentally, has meanwhile exerted both a terminological and a material influence on the literature. I hope to be able to publish these and other investigations, long since utilized in my lectures, in the next volumes of the Jahrbuch.
192 In Copy A or a phantasy bracketed.
a physical thing then it is inherent in its essence to be an adumbrative perception; and, correlative, it is inherent in the sense of its inten- tional object, the physical thing as given in it, to be essentially perceivable only by perceptions of that kind, thus by adumbrative perceptions.

§44. Merely Phenomenal Being of Something Transcendent, Absolute Being of Something Immanent.\[193\]

Moreover, and this is also an essential necessity, the perception of a physical thing involves a certain inadequacy. Of necessity a physical thing can be given only “one-sidedly;” and that signifies, not just incompletely or imperfectly in some sense or other, but precisely what presentation by adumbrations prescribes. A physical thing is necessarily given in mere “modes of appearance” in which necessarily a core of “what is actually presented” is apprehended as being surrounded by a horizon of “co-givenness,” which is not givenness proper, and of more or less vague indeterminateness. And the sense of this indeterminateness is, again, predelineated by the universal essence of this type of perception which we call physical-thing perception. Indeed, the indeterminateness necessarily signifies a determinableness which has a rigorously prescribed style. It points ahead to possible perceptual multiplicities which, merging continuously into one another, join together to make up the unity of one perception in which the continuously enduring physical thing is always showing some new “sides” (or else an old “side” as returning) in a new series of adumbrations. Accordingly, those moments of the physical thing which are also seized upon, but not in the proper sense of the word, gradually become actually presented, i.e., actually given; the indeterminacies become more precisely determined and are themselves eventually converted into clearly given determinations; conversely, to be sure, the clear is changed again into the unclear, the presented into the non-presented, etc. To be in infinitum imperfect in this manner is part of the unannulable essence of the correlation between “physical thing” and perception of a physical thing. If the sense of the physical thing is determined by the

\[193\] In Copy A this section is retitled: The Merely Phenomenal Givenness of Something Transcendent as the Absolute Givenness of Something Immanent. Marginal note in Copy A: None of §44 can be used!
data of physical-thing perception (and what else could determine it?), then that sense demands such an imperfection and necessarily refers us to continuously unitary concatenations of possible perceptions which, starting from any perception effected, extend in infinitely many directions in a systematically and rigidly regular manner\(^{194}\) and, moreover, extend in every direction without limit, being always dominated throughout by a unity of sense. Necessarily there always remains a horizon of determinable indeterminateness, no matter how far we go in our experience, no matter how extensive the continua of actual perceptions of the same thing may be through which we have passed. No god can alter that no more than the circumstance that \(1 + 2 = 3\), or that any other eidetic truth obtains.

It can already be seen universally that, no matter what its genus may be, the being of something transcendent, understood as a being for an Ego, can become given only in a manner analogous to that in which a physical thing is given, therefore through appearances\(^{195}\). Otherwise it would be precisely a being of something which might become immanent; but anything that is perceivable immanently is perceivable only immanently. Only if one is guilty of the above-indicated confusions, which now have been cleared up, can one believe it possible for one and the same affair to be given on one occasion by appearance in the form of a perception of something transcendent and, on another occasion, by a perception of something immanent.

First of all, let us still develop the other side of the specific contrast between a physical thing and a mental process. No mental process, we said, is presented \(\left[\text{stellt sich... nicht dar}\right]\)\(^{197}\). That means that the perception of a mental process is a simple seeing of something which\(^{198}\) is (or can become) perceptually given as something absolute, and

\[^{194}\text{In Copy A manner is changed to form}\]
\[^{195}\text{In Copy D sensuously adumbrative inserted before appearances. In Copy A this sentence is altered to read as follows: It can already be seen universally that no matter what its genus may be, any real being of something transcendent can become perceptually given to an Ego only through appearances. To be sure, that need not signify that everything real is itself a physical thing which is itself presented by adumbration with respect to all that which it is. Human beings, other persons, to be sure, are not themselves given to me as unities of adumbration with respect to their beings as Egos or with respect to their Egoic lives, but they can only exist for me by virtue \(<\ldots>\) their bodies \(<\ldots>\) which are adumbrational physical things and by means of which they are "appresented" [\textit{Glosses by Schuhmann}]}\]
\[^{197}\text{Insertion in Copy D: sensuous}\]
\[^{198}\text{Insertion in Copy A: as perceptually present according to its whole present content (and thus in each moment)}\]
\[^{188}\text{Insertion in Copy D: in its present, at every point in its Now,}\]
not as something identical in modes of appearance by adumbration. Everything which we have worked out about the givenness of the physical thing loses its sense here, and one must make that fully clear to oneself in detail. A mental process of feeling is not adumbrated.

If I look at it, I have something absolute; it has no sides that could be presented sometimes in one mode and sometimes in another. I can think something true or something false about a feeling, but what I see when I look at it is there, with its qualities, its intensity, etc., absolutely. A violin tone, in contrast, with its objective identity, is given by adumbration, has its changing modes of appearance. These differ in accordance with whether I approach the violin or go farther away from it, in accordance with whether I am in the concert hall itself or am listening through the closed doors, etc. No one mode of appearance can claim to be the one that presents the tone absolutely although, in accordance with my practical interests, a certain appearance has a certain primacy as the normal appearance: in the concert hall and at the “right” spot I hear the tone “itself” as it “actually” sounds. In the same way we say that any physical thing in relation to vision has a normal appearance; we say of the color, the shape, the whole physical thing which we see in normal daylight and in a normal orientation relative to us, that this is how the thing actually looks; this is its actual color, and the like. But that points to what is only a kind of secondary objectivation within the limits of total objectivation of the physical thing, as we can easily be persuaded.

We therefore hold fast to the following: Whereas it is essential to givenness by appearances that no appearance presents the affair as something “absolute” instead of in a one-sided presentation, it is
essential to the giveness of something immanent precisely to present something absolute which cannot ever be presented with respect to sides or be adumbrated.\textsuperscript{206} It is indeed evident also that the adumbrative sensation-contents themselves, which really inherently belong to the mental process of perceiving a physical thing, function, more particularly, as adumbrations of something but are not themselves given in turn by adumbrations.\textsuperscript{207}

The following distinction should also be noted. It is the case also of a mental process that it is never perceived completely, that it cannot be adequately\textsuperscript{208} seized upon in its full unity.\textsuperscript{209} A mental process is, with respect to its essence, in flux which we,\textsuperscript{210} directing the reflective regard to it, can swim along after it starting from the Now-point, while the stretches already covered are lost to our perception. Only in the form of retention do we have a consciousness of the phase which has just flowed away, or else\textsuperscript{211} in the form of a retrospective recollection. And my whole stream of mental processes is, finally, a unity of mental processes which, of essential necessity, cannot be seized upon completely in a perceiving which "swims along with it." But this incompleteness or "imperfection," pertaining to the essence of the perception of a mental process, is radically different from the incompleteness or "imperfection" pertaining to the essence of the perception of something "transcendent," perception by means of adumbrative presentation, by means of something such as appearance.

All the modes of givenness, and all the differences among modes of givenness, which we find in the sphere of perception are also present, but in a modified fashion, in the sphere of reproductive modifications. The presentiations of physical things make those things "present" by virtue of presentations such that the adumbrations themselves, the apprehensions and, accordingly, the whole phenomenon, are reproducitively modified throughout. We also have reproductions of mental processes and acts of reproducitively intuiting mental processes in the manner characteristic of presentation and of reflection in presentia-

\textsuperscript{206}Marginal note in Copy D to this sentence: Cf. §46, pp. 85ff.
\textsuperscript{207}Addition in Copy D: and that, while the perceived physical thing can be cancelled and regarded as non-existent, as an illusion <del. the sensation-contents> themselves are beyond question in their absolute being.
\textsuperscript{208}In Copy A the word adequately is cancelled.
\textsuperscript{209}Marginal note to this sentence in Copy A: More distinct!
\textsuperscript{210}Insertion in Copy A: as it were
\textsuperscript{211}Insertion in Copy A: also
tion. Naturally we do not find any reproductive adumbrations here.

We now add the following contrast. Gradual differences in relative clarity or obscurity belong to the essence of presentiations. Obviously this difference in perfection has nothing to do with the one related to givenness by virtue of adumbrative appearances. A more or less clear objectivation is not adumbrated by the degree of clarity, namely in the sense which determines our terminology, according to which a spatial shape, any quality which covers a shape, and therefore the whole "appearing physical thing as appearing" is manifoldly adumbrated — whether the objectivation of them is clear or obscure. A reproductive objectivation of a physical thing has its various possible degrees of clarity and, more particularly, for each of its modes of adumbration. One sees that it is a matter of differences that lie in different dimensions. It is also obvious that the distinctions we make within the sphere of perception itself under the headings of "clear and unclear", "distinct and indistinct" seeing do indeed exhibit a certain analogy with the differences in clarity of which we were just now speaking in so far as, in both cases, it is a matter of gradual increases and decreases in the fullness with which the objectivated affair is given; but these differences also belong to other dimensions.

§45. Unperceived Mental Processes, Unperceived Reality.

If we penetrate more deeply into this situation we also understand the following difference in essence between mental processes and physical things with respect to their perceivableness.

The kind of being belonging to mental processes is such that a seeing regard of perception can be directed quite immediately to any actual mental process as an originary living present. This occurs in the form of "reflection," which has the remarkable property that what is seized upon perceptually in reflection is characterized fundamentally not only as something which exists and endures while it is being regarded perceptually but also as something which already existed before this regard was turned to it. "All mental processes are intended to:" This signifies, then, that in the specific case of intentive mental processes not only are they consciousness of something and

\[\text{Insertion in Copy A: (stated more explicitly, reflection on a mental process)}\]

\[\text{Marginal note in Copy A: Cf. §77, p. 144}\]
present\textsuperscript{213} as consciousness of something when they themselves are the Objects of a reflecting consciousness, but also that they are there already as a “background” when they are not reflected on and thus of essential necessity are “ready to be perceived” in a sense which is, in the first place, analogous to the one in which unnoticed physical things in our external field of regard are ready to be perceived. Physical things can be ready to be perceived only in so far as already, as unnoticed things, they are intended to and this signifies: only if they are appearing. \textit{Not all} physical things fulfill this condition: the “field of attentive regard” embracing everything which appears is not infinite. On the other hand, the mental process which is not reflected on also must fulfill certain conditions of readiness, although in quite different ways and as befits its essence. After all, it cannot be “appearing.” Nevertheless it fulfills those conditions at all times by the mere mode of its existence; it fulfills them, more particularly, for the particular Ego to which it belongs, the Ego-regard which, perchance, lives “in” it. Only because reflection and the mental process have those \textit{essential} peculiarities which have been mentioned here, is it possible for us to know something about mental processes, including reflections themselves, which are not reflected on. That reproductive (and retentional) modifications of mental processes have the same determination, correspondingly modified, is obvious.

Let us develop that contrast further. We see that \textit{the sort of being which belongs to the mental process is such that the latter is essentially capable of being perceived in reflection}. The physical thing is also essentially \textit{capable of being perceived}, and it is seized upon in perception as a physical thing belonging to my surrounding world. Even without being perceived it belongs to that world; and, therefore, \textit{even when it is not perceived it is there for the Ego}. But still not in such a manner that, in general, a regard of simple heeding could be directed to it. The background field, understood as a field of simple observability, includes only a small piece of my surrounding world. That the unperceived physical thing “is there” means rather that, from my actually present perceptions, with the actually appearing background field, \textit{possible} and, moreover, continuously-harmoniously \textit{motivated} perception-sequences, with ever new fields of physical things (as unheeded backgrounds), lead to those concatenations of perceptions in which the physical thing in question would make its appearance and

\textsuperscript{213}In Copy D present cancelled.
become seized upon. \footnote{Marginal note in Copy D: What the essential foundation is for the fact that one's attentive regard becomes directed to this or that in the background field of regard ("affection" and essential conditions governing affection), is a special problem and will not be treated here.} Fundamentally, nothing essential is altered if, instead of a single Ego, a plurality of Egos is taken into consideration. Only by virtue of the relationship of possible mutual understanding can my experienced world become identified with that of others and, at the same time, enriched by their more extensive experience. Thus a transcendency which lacked the above-described connection by harmonious motivational concatenations with my current sphere of actually present perceptions would be a completely groundless assumption; a transcendency which lacked such a concatenation \emph{essentially} would be \emph{nonsensical}. Such then is the kind of presence characterizing what is not currently perceived pertaining to the world of physical things; it is something essentially different from the necessarily intended-to being of mental processes.\footnote{Addition in Copy D: which at any time are present for me and are, at most, inconspicuous and unheeded} 

\section{46. Indubitability of the Perception of Something Immanent, Dubitability of the Perception of Something Transcendent.} 

From all of this there emerge important consequences. Every perception of something immanent necessarily guarantees the existence of its object. If reflective seizing-upon is directed to a mental process of mine, I have seized upon something absolute itself, the factual being of which is essentially incapable of being negated, i.e., the insight that it is essentially impossible for it not to exist; it would be a countersense to believe it possible that a mental process \emph{given in that manner} does \emph{not} in truth exist. The stream of mental processes which is mine, of the one who is thinking, no matter to what extent it is not grasped, no matter how unknown it is in the areas of the stream which have run their course and which have yet to come —: as soon as I look at the flowing life in its actual present\footnote{Insertion in Copy D: and take it purely as it itself} and, while doing so, apprehend myself as the pure subject of this life (later we shall busy ourselves particularly with what that means), I say unqualifiedly and necessarily that I am, this life\footnote{Insertion in Copy A: of mine} is, I am living: cogito.
To each stream of mental processes and to each Ego, as Ego, there belongs the essential possibility of acquiring this evidence; each bears in itself, as an essential possibility, the guarantee\textsuperscript{218} of its absolute factual being. But, one might ask, is it not conceivable that an Ego have only phantasies in its stream of mental processes, that this stream consists of nothing but inventive intuitions? Such an Ego would find only phantasies [\textit{Fiktionen}] of cogitationes; its reflections, because of the nature of these mental processes as the medium \textit{bei der Natur des Erlebnismediums}, would be exclusively reflections in imagination. — But that is an obvious countersense. What hovers before one may be a mere figment; the hovering itself, the inventive consciousness, is not itself invented and there belongs to its essence, as to any other mental process, the possibility of a perceiving reflection which seizes upon absolute factual being. No countersense\textsuperscript{219} is implicit in the possibility that every other consciousness, which I posit in empathic experience, is non-existent\textsuperscript{220}. But \textit{my} empathizing, my consciousness of whatever sort,\textsuperscript{221} is originarily and absolutely given not only with respect to its essence but also with respect to its existence. Only for an Ego, or a stream of mental processes, in relation to itself, does this distinctive state of affairs exist; here alone there is, and here there must be, such a thing as perception of something immanent\textsuperscript{222}.

\textsuperscript{218} In Copy A possibility, the guarantee \textit{changed to} possibility of guaranteeing

\textsuperscript{219} Insertion in Copy A: obtainable from experience

\textsuperscript{220} Marginal note in Copy A: Be more precise

\textsuperscript{221} Insertion in Copy D: as a flowing present

\textsuperscript{222} Addition in Copy D: As a consequence, however, I must not attribute to my mental processes anything which I do not seize upon absolutely, anything which they do not make up of themselves in their own-essentialness — that they are a component of the real human being, psychophysically united with one's organism, that the Data of sensation are caused physically and psychophysically in Nature, and the like, does not itself belong to the mental process with respect to its own absolute essence; and if I have knowledge of it, if I “apprehend” my mental processes accordingly as pertaining to human being (I as a human being) and have the most certain convictions about this, then precisely these apprehendings, these convictions, are new mental-process moments which I can bring to light as really immanent Data, whereas I experience the real world, including all of my human self, only transcendentally and non-apodictically. — To be sure, this exposition forces us to go further, and actually it is not adequate; yet what is brought out here is not to be taken lightly. The being of mental processes may involve identifiability and therefore an ability to go back to them again; it may be that the absoluteness of components belonging to recollection and an apodictic content are presupposed and, above all, if I am to speak of my life, my stream of mental processes, my identical being as an Ego, in their own essential purity: But one sees in advance that here an answer may be possible and that there is a content, in itself absolutely concrete and self-containedly unitary, in itself indefeasibly existent, as the content in which alone I can experience, know, and in acting presuppose, the world and my human being as a worldly real existence, and that thus there is a pure, own essential being prior to the being of the world.
In contradistinction, as we know, it is of the essence of the physical world that no perception, however perfect, presents anything absolute in that realm; and essentially connected with this is the fact that any experience, however extensive, leaves open the possibility that what is given does not exist in spite of the continual consciousness of its own presence "in person." According to eidetic law it is the case that physical existence is never required as necessary by the givenness of something physical, but is always in a certain manner contingent. This means: It can always be that the further course of experience necessitates giving up what has already been posited with a legitimacy derived from experience. Afterwards one says it was a mere illusion, a hallucination, merely a coherent dream, or the like. Furthermore, as a continuously open possibility in this sphere of givenness, there exists such a thing as alteration of construing, a sudden changing of one appearance into another which cannot be united harmoniously with it and thus an influx of the latter upon the earlier experiential posittings owing to which the intentional objects of these earlier posittings suffer afterwards, so to speak, a transformation — occurrences all of which are essentially excluded from the sphere of mental processes. In this absolute sphere there is no room for conflict, illusion, or being otherwise. It is a sphere of absolute positing.

Thus in every manner it is clear that whatever is there for me in the world of physical things is necessarily only a presumptive actuality and, on the other hand, that I myself, for whom it is there (I, when the "part of me" belonging to the world of physical things is excluded) am absolute actuality or that the present phase of my mental processes is an absolute actuality, given by an unconditional, absolutely indefeasible positing.

Over against the positing of the world, which is a "contingent" positing, there stands then the positing of my pure Ego and Ego-life which is a "necessary," absolutely indubitable positing. Anything physical which is given "in person" can be non-existent; no mental process which is given "in person" can

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223 Insertion in Copy A: given in experience which has flowed harmoniously and at present is still flowing harmoniously

224 Marginal note in Copy A opposite last clause: Develop in greater detail

225 Insertion in Copy D: of the living immanental present

226 Insertion in Copy D: in the whole world of realities

227 In Copy D the parenthesis altered to read: (I, when all apprehensions of myself as a reality, all correct or false beliefs in which I, in my natural living, ascribe to myself the sense: human being in the real world)

228 Insertion in Copy D: despite its givenness "in person"
be non-existent. This is the eidetic law defining this necessity and that contingency.\textsuperscript{229}

Obviously that does not imply that the necessity of the being of this or that present mental process is a pure essential necessity, that is: a purely eidetic particularity subsumed under an eidetic law; it is the necessity of a fact, and is called so because an eidetic law is involved in the fact and indeed, in this case, involved in the existence of the fact as fact. The ideal possibility of a reflection having the essential characteristic of an evidently indefeasible positing of factual existence is grounded in the essence of any\textsuperscript{230} Ego whatever and of any mental process whatever.\textsuperscript{231}

The deliberations just carried out also make it clear that no conceivable proofs gathered from experiential consideration of the world could make the existence of the world certain for us with an absolute assurance. The world is dubitable not in the sense that rational motives are present to be taken into consideration over against the tremendous force of harmonious experiences, but rather in the sense that a doubt is conceivable because, of essential necessity, the possibility of the non-being of the world is never excluded.\textsuperscript{232} Any force of experience, no matter how great, can gradually become counterbalanced and outweighed. The absolute being of mental processes is in no respect altered thereby; in fact, they always remain presupposed by all of that.

Our considerations now have succeeded in reaching a point of culmination. We have acquired the cognitions we needed. Already included in the concatenations of essences disclosed to us are the most important premises from which we shall draw the inferences con-

\textsuperscript{229}In Copy A the following comment on these last two sentences (published by Schuhmann as Appendix 44, ca. 1917): One should notice in what sense, and what particular sense this contingency pertaining to the positing of the world possesses. (See above, on this page). One must never tear such sentences out of context. The physical thing must exist if the continuity of experience goes on harmoniously ad infinitum. (Miss Stein believes that this might become misunderstood.)

\textsuperscript{230}Author’s footnote: Thus we have here a quite pre-eminent case among the empirical necessities mentioned in §6 at the end of the second paragraph (p. 15). Cf. Logische Untersuchungen, new edition, Vol. II. Third Investigation."

\textsuperscript{231}As amended in Copy A, the sentence may be translated: The world is dubitable not in the sense that rational motives are present, to be taken into consideration over against the tremendous force of harmonious experiences; the world even has an empirical dubitability since it is apodictically impossible, while experience is going on harmoniously, to believe in the non-being of experienced physical things and of the (world); but dubitability exists in the sense that a becoming doubtful and a becoming null are conceivable; the possibility of non-being, as an essential possibility, is never excluded. [Glosses by Schuhmann.]
cerning the essential detachableness of the whole natural world from the domains of consciousness, of the sphere of being pertaining to mental processes; we can persuade ourselves that, in these inferences, justice is at last done to a core of Descartes’s *Meditations* (which were directed to entirely different ends) which only lacked a pure, effective development. Subsequently, to be sure, we shall need some easily acquired additional supplementations in order to reach our final goal. In a preliminary way we draw our consequences within the bounds of a restricted application.
CHAPTER THREE

THE REGION OF PURE CONSCIOUSNESS

§47. The Natural World as a Correlate of Consciousness.

Taking the results of the last chapter as our point of departure, we may take the following into consideration. The de facto course of our human experiences is such that it constrains our reason to go beyond intuitionally given physical things (those of the Cartesian imaginatio) and base them on the "truth of physics." But that course might be different. It is not as though human development had never progressed, nor would ever progress, beyond the prescientific stage so that, while the world of physics indeed had its truth, we should never know anything about it. And it is not as though the world of physics were different and ordered according to laws different from the ones that in fact obtain. Rather it is conceivable that our intuited world were the ultimate one, "behind" which would be no world of physics whatever, i.e., that perceived physical things would lack mathematical or physical determination, that the data of experience would exclude any physics belonging to the same kind with ours. The concatenations of experience would then be correspondingly other and different in kind from what they in fact are in so far as the experiential motives fundamental to the fashioning of the concepts and judgments of physics would be absent. But, on the whole, within the limits of the presentive intuitions which we comprehend under the name "simple experience" (perception, recollection, etc.), "physical things" can still be presented as they are now as intentional unities persisting continuously in multiplicities of appearances.¹

¹Addition in Copy A to this sentence: persisting, that is, undergoing consistent confirmation during our actual and foreseeable living. Addition in Copy D: thus in me and in the multiplicities of appearances of the others being demonstrated in the first place in me, being "empathically" demonstrated purely for me as pure subject, therefore as multiplicities of appearances being manifested in presentations of their own specific kind.
But we can go further in this direction: No limits check us in the process of conceiving the destruction of the Objectivity of something physical — as the correlate of experimental consciousness. It must always be borne in mind here that whatever physical things are — the only physical things about which we can make statements, the only ones about the being or non-being, the being-thus or being-otherwise of which we can disagree and make rational decisions — they are as experienceable physical things. It is experience alone that prescribes their sense; and, since we are speaking of physical things in fact, it is actual experience alone which does so in its definitely ordered experiential concatenations. But if the kinds of mental processes included under experience, and especially the fundamental mental process of perceiving physical things, can be submitted by us to an eidetic consideration, and if we can discern essential possibilities and necessities in them (as we obviously can) and can therefore eidetically trace the essentially possible variants of motivated experiential concatenations: then the result is the correlate of our factual experience, called "the actual world," as one special case among a multitude of possible worlds and surrounding worlds which, for their part, are nothing else but the correlates of essentially possible variants of the idea, "an experiencing consciousness," with more or less orderly concatenations of experience. As a consequence, one must not let oneself be deceived by speaking of the physical thing as transcending consciousness or as "existing in itself." The genuine concept of the transcendence of something physical which is the measure of the rationality of any statements about transcendence, can itself be derived only from the proper essential contents of perception or from those concatenations of definite kinds which we call demonstrative experience. The idea of such transcendence is therefore the eidetic correlate of the pure idea of this demonstrative experience.

This is true of any conceivable kind of transcendence which could be treated as either an actuality or a possibility. An object existing in itself is never one with which consciousness or the Ego pertaining to consciousness has nothing to do. The physical thing is a thing belonging to the surrounding world even if it be an unseen physical thing, even if it be a really possible, unexperienced but experienceable, or perhaps experienceable, physical thing. Experienceableness never means a mere logical possibility, but rather a possibility motivated in the concatenat-

*Insertion in Copy A: imaginative*
ions of experience. This concatenation itself is, through and through, one of "motivation," always taking into itself new motivations and recasting those already formed. With respect to their apprehension-contents or determination-contents, the motivations differ, are more or less rich, are more or less definite or vague in content depending on whether it is a matter of physical things which are already "known" or "completely unknown," "still undiscovered" or in the case of the seen physical thing, whether it is a matter of what is known or unknown about it. It is exclusively a matter of the essential structures of such concatenations which, with respect to all their possibilities, can be made the objects of a purely eidetic exploration. It is inherent in the essence that anything whatever which exists in reality but is not yet actually experienced can become given and that this means that the thing in question belongs to the undetermined but determinable horizon of my experiential actuality at the particular time. This horizon, however, is the correlate of the components of undeterminateness essentially attached to experiences of physical things themselves; and those components — again, essentially — leave open possibilities of fulfillment which are by no means completely undetermined but are, on the contrary, motivated possibilities predelineated with respect to their essential type. Any actual experience points beyond itself to possible experiences which, in turn, point to new possible experiences and so ad infinitum. And all of that is effected involving species and regulative forms restricted to certain a priori types.

Any hypothetical formulation in practical life or in empirical science relates to this changing but always co-posed horizon whereby the positing of the world receives its essential sense.

³Marginal note in Copy A: rationally motivated
⁴Insertion in Copy D: purely immanental
⁵Author's footnote: It should be noted that this fundamental phenomenological concept of motivation, which arose immediately with the isolation of the purely phenomenological sphere in the Logische Untersuchungen (and in contrast to the concept of causality, as relating to the transcendent sphere of reality), is a universalization of that concept of motivation in accordance with which we can say, e.g., that the willing of the end motivates the willing of the means. Incidentally, the concept of motivation undergoes, for essential reasons, a variety of modifications; the corresponding equivocations become harmless, and even appear to be necessary as soon as the phenomenological situations are clarified.
§48. The Logical Possibility and the Material Countersense of a World Outside Ours.

The hypothetical assumption of something real outside this world is, of course, "logically" possible; obviously it involves no formal contradiction. But when we ask about the essential conditions on which its validity would depend, about the mode of demonstration demanded by its sense, when we ask about the mode of demonstration taken universally essentially determined by the positing of something transcendent — no matter how we might legitimately universalize its essence — we recognize that something transcendent necessarily must be experienceable not merely by an Ego conceived as an empty logical possibility but by any actual Ego as a demonstrable unity relative to its concatenations of experience. But one can see (here, to be sure, we are not yet advanced enough to establish it in detail; only our later analyses can provide all the premises for doing so) that what is cognizable by one Ego must, of essential necessity, be cognizable by any Ego. Even though it is not in fact the case that each stands, or can stand, in a relationship of "empathy," of mutual understanding with every other, as, e.g., not having such relationship to mental lives living on the planets of the remotest stars, nevertheless there exist, eidetically regarded, essential possibilities of effecting a mutual understanding and therefore possibilities also that the worlds of experience separated in fact become joined by concatenation of actual experience to make up the one intersubjective world, the correlate of the unitary world of mental lives (the universal broadening of the community of human beings). When that is taken into account the

*Insertion in Copy D: analytically

*Insertion in Copy D: or, more precisely I, the particular Ego who is exercising pure reflection, recognize

*Insertion in Copy D: by me

*In Copy D any actual Ego changed to my actual Ego

*In Copy D its substituted by my

*In Copy D one substituted by my

*Addition in Copy D: about which I can speak at all, which can have for me any sense of possible being as an other Ego, and as one among "the" open plurality of others. The "other Ego" also derives its legitimacy from sources belonging to my experience; the demonstration of the other (a demonstration which, to begin with, must not be understood as being any logical actus) is effected in me. And if I then reduce natural human existence to the proper essentiality of an Ego and a life, as I do in my own case, I see that I can do likewise in the case of any other human being who becomes demonstrated to me and that I thus attain the pure Ego-plurality.

*Addition in Copy D: each as reduced to his pure conscious living and his pure Ego
formal-logical possibility of realities outside the world, the one spatiotemporal world, which is fixed by our actual experience, materially proves to be a countersense. If there are any worlds, any real physical things whatever, then the experienced motivations constituting them must be able to extend into my experience and into that of each Ego in the general manner characterized above. Obviously there are physical things and worlds of physical things which do not admit of being definitely demonstrated in any human experience; but that has purely factual grounds which lie within the factual limits of such experience.

§49. Absolute Consciousness as the Residuum After the Annihilation of the World.

On the other hand, all of that does not imply that there must be some world or some physical thing or other. The existence of a world is the correlate of certain multiplicities of experience distinguished by certain essential formations. But it cannot be seen that actual experiences can flow only in such concatenated forms; nothing like that can be seen purely on the basis of the essence of perception taken universally, and of the essences of other collaborating kinds of experiential intuition. It is instead quite conceivable that experience, because of conflict, might dissolve into illusion not only in detail, and that it might not be the case, as it is de facto, that every illusion manifests a deeper truth and that every conflict, in the place where it occurs, is precisely what is demanded by more inclusive contexts in order to preserve the total harmony; in our experiencing it is conceivable that there might be a host of irreconcilable conflicts not just for us but in themselves, that experience might suddenly show itself to be refractory to the demand that it carry on its posittings of physical things harmoniously, that its context might lose its fixed regular organizations of adumbrations, apprehensions, and appearances — in short, that there might no longer be any world.

\[91\]

\[14\] Insertion in Copy D: demonstrated in me

\[15\] Insertion in Copy D: in me and in my intersubjectivity

\[16\] Insertion in Copy D: i.e., as is made indubitable by experience in its fashion (not, that is to say, apodictically)

\[17\] Insertion in Copy A: consistently

\[18\] Insertion in Copy A: and that it might actually remain so ad infinitum

\[19\] Insertion in Copy A: harmoniously positable and therefore existent
Nevertheless, in that case it could be that, to some extent, crude unity-formations become constituted, transient supports for intuitions which were mere analogues of intuitions of physical things because quite incapable of constituting conservable "realities," enduring unities "which exist in themselves, whether or not they are perceived."

Now let us add the results reached at the end of the last chapter; let us recall the possibility of non-being of everything physically transcendent: it then becomes evident that while the being of consciousness, of any stream of mental processes whatever, would indeed be necessarily modified by an annihilation of the world of physical things its own existence would not be touched. Modified, to be sure. For an annihilation of the world means, correlative, nothing else but that in each stream of mental processes (the full stream — the total stream, taken as endless in both directions, which comprises the mental processes of an Ego), certain ordered concatenations of experience and therefore certain complexes of theorizing reason oriented according to those concatenations of experience, would be excluded. But that does not mean that other mental processes and concatenations of mental processes would be excluded. Consequently no real being, no being which is presented and legitimated in consciousness by appearances, is necessary to the being of consciousness itself (in the broadest sense, the stream of mental processes).

Immanent being is therefore indubitably absolute being in the sense that by essential necessity immanent being nulla "re" indiget ad existendum.

In contradistinction, the world of transcendent "res" is entirely referred to consciousness and, more particularly, not to some logically conceived consciousness but to actual consciousness.

In so far as its most universal sense is concerned, that has already been made clear by the exposition above (in the preceding sections). A something transcendent is given\(^{20}\) by virtue of certain concatenations of experience. As given directly\(^{21}\) and with increasing perfection in perceptual continua which show themselves to be harmonious and in certain methodical forms of thinking based on experience, a something transcendent acquires, more or less immediately, its insightful, continually progressive determination. Let us assume that consciousness, with its constituent mental processes and with the course it

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\(^{20}\) Insertion in Copy A: though, of essential necessity, only with a proviso

\(^{21}\) In Copy A directly substituted by originaliter
runs, is actually of such a nature that the conscious subject, in his free activity of theoretical experiencing and of thinking oriented according to experience, could effect all such concatenations (in which connection we should also have to take into account the reinforcement received by mutual understanding with other Egos and other streams of mental processes); let us assume, furthermore, that the pertinent regularities of consciousness are actually maintained, that, in the course of consciousness taken universally, nothing whatever is lacking which is requisite for the appearance of a unitary world and for the rational theoretical cognition of such a world. All that being assumed, we now ask: is it still conceivable and not rather a countersense that the corresponding transcendent world does not exist?

Thus we see that consciousness (mental process) and real being are anything but coordinate kinds of being, which dwell peaceably side by side and occasionally become “related to” or “connected with” one another. Only things which are essentially akin, the respective proper essences of which have a like sense, can become connected in the true sense of the word, can make up a whole. An immanent or absolute being and a transcendent being are, of course, both called “existent,” an “object,” and have, more particularly, their objective determining contents. But it is evident that what is called “an object” and “an objective determination” in the one case, and what is called by the same name in the other case, are called so only with reference to the empty logical categories. In so far as their respective senses are concerned, a veritable abyss yawns between consciousness and reality. Here, an adumbrated being, not capable of ever becoming given absolutely, merely accidental and relative; there, a necessary and absolute being, essentially incapable of becoming given by virtue of adumbration and apprearance.

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22 In Copy A: of theoretical ... experience substituted by: of experiencing and of theoretical thinking oriented according to experience
23 In Copy D in which connection ... mental processes substituted by: (It is to be noted in this connection that we are including in the infinitely continuable harmony of perceptions, of experience, those in which other human beings, standing in mutual understanding with them, and a possible reduction of them to pure Egos and concatenations of mental processes, become demonstrated to us.)
24 Insertion in Copy A: in infinitum
25 In Copy A not capable ... absolutely substituted by: essentially capable of becoming given only with a presumptive horizon and never absolutely
26 Addition in Copy A: to consciousness
27 Addition in Copy A: in a presumptive manner, which perpetually leaves open the possibility that is itself perceived is non-existent
Thus it becomes clear that, in spite of all our assuredly well-founded statements about the real being of the human Ego and its conscious mental processes, in the world and about everything in the way of "psychophysical" interconnections pertaining to them — that, in spite of all that, consciousness considered in its "purity" must be held to be a self-contained complex of being, a complex of absolute being into which nothing can penetrate and out of which nothing can slip, to which nothing is spatiotemporally external and which cannot be within any spatiotemporally complex, which cannot be affected by any physical thing and cannot exercise causation upon any physical thing — it being presupposed that causality has the normal sense of causality pertaining to Nature as a relationship of dependence between realities.

On the other hand, the whole spatiotemporal world, which includes human being and the human Ego as subordinate single realities is, according to its sense, a merely intentional being, thus one has the merely secondary sense of a being for a consciousness. It is a being posited by consciousness in its experiences which, of essential necessity, can be determined and intuited only as something identical belonging to motived multiplicities of appearances: beyond that it is nothing.

§50. The Phenomenological Attitude; Pure Consciousness as the Field of Phenomenology.

Thus the sense commonly expressed in speaking of being is reversed. The being which is first for us is second in itself; i.e., it is what it is, only in "relation" to the first. But it is not as though there were a blind regularity such that the ordo et connexio rerum necessarily con-

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28 Insertion in Copy D: not by any being prior to it conceived as absolute
29 Addition in Copy A: as a being which is experienceable in subjects of consciousness by virtue of appearances and possibly becomes confirmed ad infinitum as a verificational unity of appearances
30 Insertion in Copy A: harmoniously
31 Insertion in Copy A: or, more precisely, its being anything beyond that is a countersensical thought. In Copy D this sentence is altered to read: it is a being which consciousness intends to as the same in manifold acts of consciousness, and in such a manner that this conscious having of it leads back to multiplicities of a possible experience presentive of it-itsel, experiences of it in the modes of the itself-here, the itself-having-been, the itself-coming — a being which, of essential necessity, can be determined and intuited only as something identical belonging to motived appearance multiplicities: as anything beyond that it is a countersense.
formed to the ordo et connexio idearum. Reality, the reality of the physical thing taken singly and the reality of the whole world, lacks self-sufficiency in virtue of its essence (in our strict sense of the word). Reality is not in itself something absolute which becomes tied secondarily to something else; rather, in the absolute sense, it is nothing at all; it has no "absolute essence" whatever; it has the essentiality of something which, of necessity, is only intentional, only an object of consciousness, something presented [Vorstelliges] in the manner peculiar to consciousness, something apparent (as apparent). We now turn our thoughts back again to the first chapter, to our observations concerning the phenomenological reduction. It now becomes clear that, in contrast to the natural theoretical attitude, the correlate of which is the world, a new attitude must in fact be possible which, in spite of the "exclusion" of this psychophysical universe of Nature, leaves us something: the whole field of absolute consciousness. Instead, then, of living naively in experience and theoretically exploring what is experienced, transcendent Nature, we effect the "phenomenological reduction." In other words, instead of naively effecting the acts pertaining to our Nature — constituting consciousness with their posittings of something transcendent, and letting ourselves be induced, by motives implicit in them, to effect ever new posittings of something transcendent — instead of that, we put all those posittings "out of action," we do not "participate in them;" we direct our seizing and theoretically inquiring regard to pure consciousness in its own absolute being. That, then, is what is left as the sought-for "phenomenological residuum," though we have "excluded" the whole world with all physical things, living beings, and humans, ourselves included. Strictly speaking, we have not lost anything but rather have gained the whole of absolute being which, rightly understood, contains within itself, "constitutes" within itself, all worldly transcendencies.

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32 Marginal note to this sentence in Copy D: As the motivated actuality and potentiality in the pure Ego is to be something actualized, or objectivated, in possible appearances
33 In Copy D the last part of this sentence changed to read: or of possible presentations, only something actualizable in possible appearances
34 Insertion in Copy D: experience and
35 Insertion in Copy D: (whether they be actual acts or acts which, as predelineated potentials, are possible and actualizable)
36 Insertion in Copy D: (the actual and also, before the fact, the potential posittings)
37 Insertion in Copy D: — or better, parenthesized —
38 Addition in Copy D: as an intentional correlate of the ideally actualizable and harmonious continuable acts of habitual acceptance
Let us make this clear to ourselves in detail. In the natural attitude we simply effect all the acts by virtue of which the world is there for us. We live naively in perceiving and experiencing, in these acts of positing in which unities of physical things appear and not only appear but also are given with the characteristic of things “on hand,” “actual.” When engaged in natural science we effect experientially and logically ordered acts of thinking in which these actualities, being accepted as they are given, become conceptually determined and in which likewise, on the basis of such directly experienced and determined transcendencies, new transcendencies are inferred. In the phenomenological attitude in essential universality we prevent the effecting of all such cogitative posittings, i.e., we “parenthesize” the posittings effected; for our new inquiries we do not “participate in these posittings.” Instead of living in them, instead of effecting them, we effect acts of reflection directed to them; and we seize upon them themselves as the absolute being which they are. We are now living completely in such acts of the second degree, acts the datum of which is the infinite field of absolute mental processes — the fundamental field of phenomenology.

§51. The Signification of the Transcendental Preliminary Considerations.

Of course reflection can be effected by anyone and anyone can bring consciousness within the sphere of his seizing regard; but that is not necessarily to effect a phenomenological reflection, nor is the consciousness seized upon necessarily pure consciousness. Radical considerations, such as we have carried out, are necessary in order to penetrate to the cognition that there is any such thing as the field of pure consciousness, indeed, that there is such a thing which is not a

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39 Insertion in Copy A: actually
40 Insertion in Copy D: and realities of every kind
41 Addition in Copy D: and with everything which is meant or experienced in them and which, as so meant or experienced, is inseparable from their own being
42 Note of translator: Reading with Dorion Cairns simply Bewußtsein or das Bewuβtsein instead of im Bewuβtsein as in all printed editions. Cf. §50, p. 94 where the sense is the same when Husserl says: ... unseren erfassenden und theoretisch forschenden Blick richten wir auf das reine Bewuβtsein in seinem absoluten Eigensein.
43 In Copy A such as we have carried out is crossed out and a question mark placed in the margin.
44 In Copy D are necessary in order to substituted by alone can bring us to the point from which
45 Insertion in Copy D: transcendentally
component part of Nature, and is so far from being that, that Nature is possible only as an intentional unity motivated in transcendentally pure consciousness by immanental connections. Such considerations are necessary in order to know, moreover, that such a unity is given to us, and theoretically explorable by us, only in an attitude other than the one in which the consciousness "constituting" that unity, and likewise any absolute consciousness whatever, is explorable. They are necessary in order that, in the face of our philosophical poverty in which, under the fine name of a "world view founded on natural science," we are vainly fatiguing ourselves, it may at last become clear that a transcendental investigation of consciousness cannot signify an investigation of Nature and cannot presuppose the latter as a premise because Nature is as a matter of essential necessity parenthesized in the transcendental attitude. They are necessary in order to recognize that our disregarding of the whole world in the form of the phenomenological reduction is something totally different from a mere abstracting from components within more comprehensive interconnections, be they necessary or factual. If mental processes of consciousness were inconceivable without involvement with Nature in the same fashion in which colors are inconceivable without extension, then we could not regard consciousness as an absolutely peculiar region by itself in the sense in which we must so regard it. One must see, however, that by such an "abstracting" from Nature only something natural can be acquired, and not transcendentally pure consciousness. And, again, phenomenological reduction does not mean a mere restriction of judgment to a connective part of actual being as a whole. In any particular science of actuality the theoretical interest is restricted to a particular province within the whole of actuality; the others remain disregarded in so far as the real relations which run back and forth between provinces do not compel a mediative inquiry. In this sense mechanics "abstracts" from optical events, from physics taken as a

Insertion in Copy D: of the real world

Marginal note to these lines in Copy D: These considerations produced for me, as engaged in a critique of reason, the insight that a transcendental epoché can be effected, which makes a well-founded and independent transcendental philosophy possible

Insertion in Copy A: or any other worldly research. Insertion in Copy D: or investigation of mental life as worldly research

Insertion in Copy A: and the entire worldly universe

Insertion in Copy D: <or from> what belongs to the world taken universally

Addition in Copy D: i.e., not to consciousness as "pure" in the psychological sense
whole and, in the broadest sense, abstracts from the psychological. Still, as every natural scientist knows, that does not mean that any province of reality is isolated; the whole world is ultimately a single "Nature," and all the natural sciences are members of the one natural science. The situation is fundamentally and essentially different in the case of the domain made up of mental processes as absolute essentialities. It is a strictly self-contained domain, yet without any boundaries separating it from other regions. For anything which could limit it would have to share a community of essence with it. It is, however, the All of absolute being in the definite sense brought out by our analyses. In its essence it is independent of all worldly, all natural, being; nor does it need any worldly being for its existence. The existence of a Nature cannot be the condition for the existence of consciousness, since Nature itself turns out to be a correlate of consciousness: Nature is only as being constituted in regular concatenations of consciousness.

Note

In passing let us note the following in order to prevent misunderstandings: If the factuality in the given organization of the course of consciousness with its separate individual streams, and the teleology immanent in that factuality were grounds for seeking the basis for precisely that organization, then for essentially necessary reasons the theological principle which might perhaps be rationally supposed could not be assumed as something transcendent in the sense in which the world is something transcendent; for, as is already evident in advance from our findings, that would involve a countersensical circularity. The ordering principle of the absolute must be found in the absolute itself, considered purely as absolute. In other words, since a worldly God is evidently impossible and since, on the other hand, the immanence of

52 Addition in Copy D: and a yet to be legitimated pure intentional psychology abstracts from the psychophysical
53 In Copy A this sentence changed to read: The whole world is ultimately one single world; and through it there extends one single "Nature," ...
54 Addition in Copy D: all the worldly sciences, psychology, cultural sciences in every natural sense included
55 In Copy A essentialities crossed out
56 Marginal note in Copy A: That will be misunderstood. The sentence It is, however, ... of consciousness placed in brackets.
God in absolute consciousness cannot be taken as immanence in the sense of being as a mental process (which would be no less counter-sensical), there must be, therefore, within the absolute stream of consciousness and its infinities, modes in which transcendencies are made known other than the constituting of physical realities as unities of harmonious appearances; and ultimately there would also have to be intuitional manifestations to which a theoretical thinking might conform, so that, by following them rationally, it might make intelligible the unitary rule of the supposed theological principle. It is likewise evident, then, that this rule must not be taken to be "causal" in the sense determined by the concept of causality as obtaining in Nature, a concept attuned to realities and the functional interdependencies proper to their particular essence.

But none of that concerns us here any further. Our immediate aim is not theology but phenomenology, however mediately important the latter may be for the former. To phenomenology, however, the fundamental considerations, since they were indispensable, served to open up the absolute sphere as the field of research peculiar to phenomenology.

§52. Supplementation. The Physical Thing as Determined by Physics and the "Unknown Cause of Appearances." But now for the necessary supplementations. We carried out the last series of our deliberations chiefly with respect to the physical thing pertaining to the sensuous imaginatio and did not take due notice of

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57 Insertion in Copy D: or in the world as a whole
58 In Copy A indispensable placed in brackets with a question mark in margin.
59 Marginal note to title of §52 in Copy A: This again belongs to transcendental idealism
60 The following passage inserted in Copy D (published by Schuhmann as Appendix 46, dated Fall, 1929):

With reference to the material world which is, however, only the core-stratum of the world itself, the world of realities. This world, which is the surrounding world common to us all, is, more particularly with respect to each single real being belonging to it, also material but, in general, not merely that: not in the case of man and beast who indeed include materially corporeal organisms but are not mere organisms as corporeally real worldly occurrences, nor in the case of language, art, state, etc. Although they, as belonging to the real world as far as each of their single real constitutents is concerned, have their physical strata, they also have a "spiritual" stratum. Yet even if we were emphasizing only the specifically natural, our consideration seems insufficient. We take the Object belonging to Nature, the material physical thing, only as the Object of mere sensuous imagination (sensuous experience).

[Glosses by Schuhmann.]
the physical thing as determined by physics, for which the sensuously appearing (the perceptually given) physical thing is said to function as a "mere appearance," perhaps even as something "merely subjective." Nevertheless it is already implicit in the sense of our earlier statements that this mere subjectivity ought not to be confused (as it is so frequently) with a subjectivity such as characterizes mental processes, as though the perceived physical things, with respect to their perceptual qualities, and as though these qualities themselves were mental processes. Not can it be the true opinion of scientific investigators of Nature (particularly if we keep, not to their pronouncements, but to the sense of their method) that the appearing physical thing is an illusion or a faulty picture of the "true" physical thing as determined by physics. Likewise the statement that the determinations of the appearance are signs of the true determinations is misleading.61

Are we then allowed to say, in accordance with the "realism" which is very widely accepted: The actually perceived (and, in the primary sense, appearing) should, for its part, be regarded as an appearance of, or an instinctive basis for, inferring something else, intrinsically foreign to it and62 separated from it? May we say that, theoretically considered, this something else should be accepted as a reality, completely unknown by acquaintance, which must be assumed hypothetically in order to explain the course of mental appearance-processes, accepted as a hidden cause of these appearances characterizable only indirectly and analogically by mathematical concepts?

Already, on the basis of our general presentations (which will be greatly deepened and undergo continual confirmation by our further analyses), it becomes evident that such theories are possible only as long as one avoids seriously fixing one's eyes on, and scientifically exploring, the sense of a physical thing-datum and, therefore, of "any physical thing whatever," a sense implicit in experience's own essence — the sense which functions as the absolute norm for all rational discourse about physical things. If anything runs counter to that sense it is countersensical in the strictest signification of the word;63

61 AUTHOR'S FOOTNOTE: See the comments on the picture-theory and the sign-theory in §43, pp. 78ff.

62 INSERTION IN COPY D: or, if not inherently foreign to it, then at least

63 AUTHOR'S FOOTNOTE: In this essay Widersinn [countersense, absurdity] is a logical term and expresses no extra-logical affective valuation. Even the greatest scientific investigators have
and that, without doubt, is true of all epistemological theories of the type indicated.

It could easily be shown that if the supposed unknown cause existed at all, it would have to be essentially perceivable and experienceable if not by us then by other Egos who see better and further. What is in question here is not, perchance, an empty, merely logical possibility but rather an essential possibility which is rich in content and valid with that content. Furthermore, it could be shown that the possible perception itself\textsuperscript{64} would, as a matter of essential necessity, have to be another case of perception by means of appearances and that, consequently, we should fall into an inevitable infinite regress. It could be pointed out, moreover, that an explanation of perceptually given processes by hypothetically assumed causative realities, by unknown physical affairs (for example, the explanation of certain planetary disturbances by the assumption of an as-yet-unknown planet, Neptune) is something essentially different from an explanation in the sense of a determining of experienced physical things in the manner peculiar to physics — an explanation by such physical-scientific means as atoms, ions, and the like. In this manner a great many points having a similar sense might be developed.

Here we need not enter into a systematically exhaustive discussion of all such matters. It is sufficient for our purposes to bring out distinctly a few main points.

We begin with the easily verified statement that the perceived physical thing itself is always and necessarily precisely the thing which the physicist explores and scientifically determines following the method of physics.

This proposition seems to contradict the propositions stated earlier\textsuperscript{65} in which we sought to determine more precisely the sense of certain locutions commonly used by physicists and the sense of the traditional distinction between primary and secondary qualities. After eliminating obvious misinterpretations we said that the “experienced physical thing proper” gives us the “mere This,” an “empty $X$” which becomes the bearer of the exact determinations ascribed in physics which do not themselves fall within experience proper. The being which is “true according to physics” would therefore “of essential necessity be determined quite differently” occasionally fallen into countersense; and, if it is our scientific duty to say so, that will not impair our respect for them.

\textsuperscript{64}\textit{Insertion in Copy D:} of those cause-realities

\textsuperscript{65}\textit{Author’s footnote:} See §40, p. 72.
from the being which is given "in person" in perception itself. The latter is present with purely sensuous determinations which are precisely not those ascribed in physics.

Nevertheless, the two presentations are quite compatible and we need not quarrel seriously with that interpretation of the conception involved in physics. We need only understand it correctly. By no means ought we to fall into either the picture-theory or the sign-theory, the fundamentally wrong theories which we considered earlier without particular regard to the physical thing as determined in physics and which we likewise refuted in a radically universal manner. A picture or a sign refers to something lying outside it which would "itself" be seized upon were we to go over into a different mode of objectivation, into that of presentive intuition. In themselves, a sign or a picture do not "make known" the designated (or depicted) affair itself. The physical thing as determined by physics, however, is nothing foreign to what appears sensuously "in person;" rather it is something which makes itself known originaliter in it and, more particularly, a priori (for indefeasible eidetic reasons) only in it. Accordingly, even the sensuous determination-content of the X which functions as bearer of the determinations ascribed in physics is no clothing foreign to these determinations and hiding them: rather, only because the X is the subject of the sensuous determinations is it the subject also of the determinations ascribed in physics which, for their part, make themselves known in the sensuous determinations. According to what has been set forth in detail, it is necessary that a physical thing, and precisely the physical thing of which the physicist speaks, can be given only sensuously in sensuous "modes of appearance;" and the identical appearing in the changing continuity of these modes of appearance is what the physicist subjects to a causal analysis in its relationship to all experienceable (thus perceived or perceivable) concatenations which can be considered as "circumstances," an exploration with respect to its necessary real connections with them. The physical thing which he observes, with which he experiments, which he continually sees, takes in his hand, puts on the scale or in the melting furnace: that physical thing, and no other, becomes the subject of the predicates ascribed in physics,

Author's footnote: See §43, pp. 79ff.

Addition in Copy A: It is not a giving of something itself

Marginal note in Copy A: Improve

Marginal note in Copy A: But not merely to a causal analysis. First comes geometrization.
such as weight, temperature, electrical resistance, and so forth. Likewise, it is the perceived processes and concatenations themselves which become determined by means of concepts such as force, acceleration, energy, atom, ion, etc. The sensuously appearing thing, which has the sensuous shapes, colors, odor- and taste-properties, is thus anything but a sign for some other thing; rather it is, so to speak, a sign for itself.

Only this much can be said: The physical thing appearing with such and such sensuous determinations under the given phenomenal circumstances is, for the physicist, who has already carried out in a universal manner for all such physical things, in phenomenal concatenations of the sort in question, their determination by means of concepts peculiar to physics, an indicative sign of a wealth of causal properties belonging to this same physical thing which, as causal properties, make themselves known in phenomenal dependencies of familiar sorts. What makes itself known here — by being made known in intentional unities pertaining to mental processes of consciousness — is obviously something essentially transcendent.

According to all this it is clear that even the higher transcendency characterizing the physical thing as determined by physics does not signify reaching out beyond the world which is for consciousness, or for every Ego functioning as a cognizing subject (singly or in an empathic context).

Indicated in a universal way, the situation is this, that the thinking pertaining to physics establishes itself on the foundation laid by natural experiencing (or by natural posittings which it effects). Following the rational motives presented to it by the concatenations of experience, it is compelled to effect certain modes of conception, certain intentional constructions required by reason, and to effect them for the theoretical determination of sensuously experienced things. Precisely because of this there arises the contrast between the physical thing as object of the sensuous imaginatio simpliciter and the physical thing as object of the physicist's intellectio; and, for the latter side, all the ideally inherent ontological formations produced by thinking accrue which become expressed in the concepts peculiar to physics and which draw, and should draw, their sense exclusively from the method of natural science.

If experiential-logical reason, under the name of physics, fashions in this manner an intentional correlate belonging to a higher level —
if it fashions the Nature determined by physics out of simply appearing Nature — then we rightly call it mythologizing when this intellectually seen datum of reason, which indeed is nothing more than the experiential-logical determination of the Nature given in intuition simpliciter, is made out to be an unknown world of physical realities which is hypothetically substructed for purposes of explaining the appearances causally.\textsuperscript{71}

In a countersensical manner one thus connects by causality things pertaining to the senses and physical things as determined by physics. As a consequence, in the usual realism, however, one confuses the sensuous appearances by virtue of their "mere subjectivity," i.e., the appearing objects, as appearing (which are themselves already something transcendent), with the absolute mental processes of any appearing, of any experiencing consciousness whatever, which is constituting them. Everywhere this confusion is perpetrated in at least this form: one speaks as though Objective physics were engaged not in explaining the "physical thing-appearances" in the sense of the physical things appearing, but in the sense of the constituting mental processes of experiencing consciousness.\textsuperscript{72} Causality, which belongs essentially to the context of the constituted intentional world and has sense only within that world, is now made not merely into a mythical bond between the "Objective" being which physics determines and the "subjective" being which appears in immediate experience — the "merely subjective" thing pertaining to the senses with the "secondary qualities" —; rather, by the illegitimate shifting from the latter to the consciousness constituting it, causality is made into a bond between the being which physics determines and absolute consciousness and, specifically, the pure mental processes of experiencing. In so doing, one attributes a mythical absolute reality to the being determined by physics, while completely failing to see what is truly absolute: pure consciousness as pure consciousness in its purity. Accordingly, no note is taken of the absurdity involved in absolutizing Nature as conceived by physics, in absolutizing this intentional correlate of logically determinative thinking; and likewise no note is taken of the absurdity in making this Nature, which

\textsuperscript{71} \textit{Marginal note in Copy A}: Here the unknown is only the untheorized; the legitimately theoretically cognized is known, and it is a countersense to search further for something knowable beyond it.

\textsuperscript{72} \textit{Marginal note in Copy A opposite the latter part of sentence}: Here sensuous Data should have been mentioned, and the confusion of secondary qualities and immanent sensuous modalities.
determines the directly intuited physical world in terms of experiential logic and which, in this function, is fully known (so that to look for something behind it makes no sense) into an unknown and only secretly indicated reality which itself can never be apprehended with respect to any determination of its own, and to which one now imputes the role of a causative reality in relation to the courses of subjective appearances and experiencing mental processes.

A not insignificant influence is exercised in these misinterpretations by the circumstance that one misinterprets the lack of sensuous intuitability which is a property of all categorial unities produced by thinking (and is particularly striking, naturally, in the case of those formed at a highly mediated level) as well as the useful inclination in the practice of cognition to attach sensuous images, "models," to these unities: that which is not intuitable sensuously is understood to be a symbolic representative of something hidden, which could become an object of simple sensuous intuition if there were a better intellectual organization; and the models are understood to serve as intuited schematic pictures in place of this hidden reality having, accordingly, a function similar to that belonging to the hypothetical drawings of extinct living beings73 which the paleontologist makes on the basis of meagre Data. One does not pay attention to the evident sense of the constructional unities produced by thinking, as constructional; and one overlooks the fact that here the hypothetical is restricted to the sphere of cogitative synthesis. Not even a Divine physics74 can make simply intuited determinations out of those categorial determinations of realities which are produced by thinking, any more than a Divine omnipotence can bring it to pass that someone paints elliptic functions or plays them on the violin.

However greatly this exposition needs deepening, however sensible to us because of the need for a full clarification of all relevant matters may be, what we require for our purposes has become evident to us: that of essential necessity the transcendency belonging to the physical thing as determined by physics is the transcendency belonging to a being which becomes constituted in, and tied to, consciousness, and that the taking into consideration of mathematical natural science (no matter how many particular enigmas may be involved in its cognition) in no way alters our results.

73 Reading Lebewesen with Schuhmann instead of Lebewelten in all three printed editions.
74 Marginal note in Copy A: Geyser
It requires no special explanation\textsuperscript{75} to see that everything we have made clear to ourselves with respect to Objectivities belonging to Nature, as "mere things," must hold in the case of all axiological, and all practical Objectivities which are founded on them: all aesthetic objects, all cultural formations, etc. And, likewise, in the case of all transcendencies of whatever sort which become constituted in the manner peculiar to consciousness.\textsuperscript{77}

\section*{53. Animalia and Psychological Consciousness.}

Great importance is attached to another extension of the limits within which we have confined our observations. We have included within the sphere of our findings the whole of material Nature, appearing sensuously, and the nature founded in the latter and determined by physics at a higher level of cognition. But what about animate realities, humans and beasts? What about their psyches and psychical mental processes? The complete world is not merely physical; it is also psychophysical.\textsuperscript{78} It must — who can deny it? — include all the streams of consciousness connected with animated organisms. Thus, on the one hand consciousness is said to be the absolute in which everything transcendent and, therefore, ultimately the whole psychophysical world, becomes constituted; and, on the other hand, consciousness is said to be a subordinate real event within that world. How can these statements be reconciled?

Let us make clear to ourselves how consciousness, so to speak, can enter into the real world, how that which in itself is absolute can relinquish its immanence and take on the characteristic of transcendance.\textsuperscript{79} We immediately see that it can do so only by a certain

\textsuperscript{75} In Copy D altered to read: It can be understood in advance

\textsuperscript{76} Addition in Copy D: (on relative actualities which, in all ordinary practice, have acceptance as existing, and on the ideal logicized actualities of exact physics)

\textsuperscript{77} Marginal note in Copy D: This comes too soon here

\textsuperscript{78} Addition in Copy D to this sentence (published by Schuhmann as part of Appendix 49, dated Fall. 1929): The complete real world is not merely physical it is also psychophysical and it is a practical world, a world of manifold cultural formations which, for their part, are relative to psychophysical subjectivity. But, as soon as we take the latter into account, a particular difficulty arises.

\textsuperscript{79} In Copy D this sentence changed to read: Let us make it clear to ourselves how my consciousness which, as posited with its immanent own-essentialness in purely immanent experience, always precedes everything which becomes posited and demonstrated in it and thus precedes whatever, under the name "world" has sense and existential validity for me ... how my consciousness, so to speak, enters into "the world". Marginal note to the rest of this paragraph in Copy D:
participation in transcendence in the first, the originary sense; and this is obviously the transcendence belonging to Nature. Only by virtue of its experienced relation to the organism does consciousness become real human or brute consciousness, and only thereby does it acquire a place in the space belonging to Nature and the time belonging to Nature — the time which is physically measured. We also recall that only by virtue of the connection joining a consciousness and an organism to make up an empirically intuited unity within Nature is any such thing as mutual understanding between animate beings pertaining to a world possible; and that only thereby can any cognizing subject find the complete world and at the same time know it as one and the same surrounding world belonging in common to him and to all other subjects.

A peculiar kind of apprehending or experiencing, a peculiar kind of "apperception," effects the production of this so-called "annexation," this reification [Realisierung] of consciousness. Regardless of that whereof this apperception consists, or of what particular kind of demonstration it may demand, this much is obvious: Consciousness itself, in these apperceptive involvements or in this psychophysical relationship to something corporeal, loses none of its own essence and can take up into itself nothing alien to its essence; indeed, that would be a countersense. Corporeal being is essentially a being which appears, which becomes presented by virtue of sensuous adumbration. Consciousness apperceived as part of Nature [naturhaft apperzierte Bewusstsein], the stream of consciousness given as a stream of human or brute consciousness, naturally does not become, by means of that apperception, something which appears by virtue of adumbration.

And still it has become something other, a component part of Nature. In itself, it is what it is by its absolute essence. But it is not seized upon in this flowing thisness; it is instead "apprehended as something;" and in this specifically peculiar apprehending a tran-

We have clarified sufficiently for our purposes the conviction that Nature is inseparably relative to the subjectivity which experiences Nature and, on the basis of experience, logically cognizes it. Already, on the basis of the merely general structural sketches we have given, it is inevitable. (Both the change and note are published by Schuhmann as parts of Appendix 49.)

80 Insertion in Copy D: experience of a
81 Insertion in Copy D: corporeal
82 Insertion in Copy D: in a worldly real and extended sense
83 In Copy D subject changed to Ego
84 Addition in Copy D: What it actually takes on is a new stratum of consciousness
85 Insertion in Copy C: (as a state)
scentence of a peculiar kind becomes constituted: there now appears a sequence of conscious states of an identical real Ego-subject\textsuperscript{86} which manifests in them its individual real properties and who now — as this unity of properties becoming manifest in states — is intended to as united with the appearing organism. Thus, as something which appears, the psychophysical unity in Nature, a human or a beast, becomes constituted as a somatically founded unity corresponding to the founding involved in apperception.\textsuperscript{87}

As in the case of any other transcending apperception, so here two attitudes are essentially effected. With one our seizing regard is directed to the apperceived object, as it were, through the transcending apprehension; in the other it is directed reflectively to\textsuperscript{88} the pure apprehending consciousness. In our case we have, accordingly, on the one hand, the psychological attitude in which our naturally focused regard is directed to mental processes — e.g to a mental process of rejoicing — as a sequence of mental states of human or beast. On the other hand, we have the phenomenological attitude combined with the latter\textsuperscript{89} as an essential possibility which, reflecting and excluding the positings of something transcendent, is a turning toward absolute, pure consciousness and finds, as an absolute mental process, the apperception of a sequence of states: thus, in the example above, the affective mental process of rejoicing as an absolute phenomenological datum, but in the medium of an apprehensional function which animates it — precisely the function of “manifesting” a sequence of states connected with the appearing organism and belonging to a human Ego-subject. The “pure” mental process\textsuperscript{90} “lies,” in a certain sense, within what is psychologically apperceived, in the mental process as a human state; in its own essence it takes on the form of a sequence of states and with that form its intentional relationship to the human Ego and the human organism.\textsuperscript{91} If the mental process in question — in our example, the feeling of rejoicing — loses that intentional form (and it is, after all, conceivable), it does indeed undergo an alteration, but only in that it is thereby simplified so that

\textsuperscript{86} In Copy D Ego-subject substituted by human subject
\textsuperscript{87} Marginal note in Copy D: Supplement! With respect to the unification
\textsuperscript{88} Insertion in Copy D: the latter itself
\textsuperscript{89} In Copy D combined with crossed out
\textsuperscript{90} Insertion in Copy D: of feeling
\textsuperscript{91} Insertion in Copy D: In pure consciousness this alteration means that instead of the simple feeling which we apprehend here, the feeling characterized as belonging to a human being is seized upon.
it becomes a pure consciousness, that it no longer has the sense of an event in Nature.  

§54. Continuation. The Transcendent Psychological Mental Process Accidental and Relative; the Transcendental Mental Process Necessary and Absolute.

Let us imagine that we effect natural apperceptions, but that our apperceptions are always invalid since they allow for no harmonious concatenations in which experienced unities might become constituted. In other words, let us imagine that, in the manner described above, the whole of Nature, in the first place, physical nature, is "annihilated.” Then there would be no more animate organisms and therefore no more human beings. I should no longer exist as a human being: and, a fortiori, no fellow human beings would exist for me. But my consciousness, greatly as the mental processes comprised in it would be altered, would remain a stream of absolute mental processes with its own essence. If anything were still left which allowed my mental processes to be apprehended as “states” of a personal Ego, states in the changes of which identical personal psychical properties became manifest, we could dissolve those apprehendings, do away with the intentional forms which they constitute, and reduce my mental processes to pure mental processes.  

Psychical states also point back to regularities of absolute mental processes in which they become constituted, in which they take on the intentional, and in its fashion, transcendent form “state.”

Certainly a consciousness without an animated organism and, paradoxical as it sounds, also without a psyche, a consciousness which is not personal, is imaginable. That is to say, a stream of consciousness in which the intentional unities of experience, organ-  

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92 Marginal note to this sentence in Copy A: Improve.
93 Insertion in Copy D: always cancelled in the course of further experience.
94 Author's footnote: Cf. §49, p. 91.
95 In Copy D personal substituted by human.
96 In Copy D personal substituted by human-psychical.
97 In Copy D the latter part of this sentence altered to read: we could imagine that those apprehendings were deprived of their existential validity; they would then remain ours as pure mental processes. But if, from the very start, we reduce to that which is transcendentally pure, then, even in the normal case where the apprehendings in question are valid, we retain the constituting multiplicities.
98 In Copies A and D is not personal substituted by does not animate a human organism.
ism, psyche, and empirical Ego-subject did not become constituted, in which all of these experiential concepts, and therefore the concept of a mental process in the *psychological sense* (as a mental process of a person, an animate Ego), were without any basis and, in any case, without any validity. *All* empirical unities, and therefore also psychological mental processes, are *indices pointing to concatenations of absolute mental processes* having a distinctive essential formation, along with which *other* formations are imaginable; all are, in the same sense, transcendent, merely relative, accidental. One must convince oneself that the obviousness with which every mental process in one's own life or in another's is accepted, and quite legitimately, as a psychological and psychophysical sequence of states of an animate subject, has its limit in the aforementioned consideration: that in contrast to the empirical mental process there stands, as a presupposition for the sense of that process, the absolute mental process; that the latter is not a metaphysical construction but rather something which, in its absoluteness, can become indubitably demonstrated, given in direct intuition by a corresponding change in one's attitude. One must convince oneself that anything psychical, in the sense relevant to psychology, psychical personality, psychical properties, mental processes or states, are empirical unities and are therefore, like other realities of every kind and level, merely unities of intentional "constitution" — in its sense, truly existing: intuitable, experienceable, scientifically determinable on the basis of experience, but still "merely intentional" and hence merely "relative." To take them as existing in the absolute sense is consequently a countersense.

§55. Conclusion. *All Reality Existent By Virtue of "Sense-bestowal." Not a "Subjective Idealism."*

In a certain way, and with some caution in the use of words, we can also say that *all real unities are "unities of sense."* Unities of sense presuppose (as I again emphasize: not because we can deduce it from

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99 Insertion in Copy D: Objectively real
100 Insertion in Copy D: more precisely, concatenations of actual and of motivated possible absolute mental processes —
101 Insertion in Copy D: empirical unities
102 In Copy D empirical substituted by real psychological. Addition in Copy D: pertaining to human being in the world.
103 Insertion in Copy D: a real and, in the sense
some metaphysical postulates or other, but because we can show it by
an intuitive, completely indubitable procedure)\textsuperscript{104} a sense-bestowing
consciousness which, for its part, exists absolutely and not by virtue of
another sense-bestowal. If one derives the concept of reality from
natural realities, from unities of possible experience, then "all the
world" or "all of Nature" is, of course, equivalent to the all of
realities; but to identify the latter with the all of being, and thus to
absolutize it itself is a countersense. An absolute reality is just as valid as a
round square. Reality and world are names here precisely for certain
valid unities of sense, unities of "sense" related to certain concatenations
of absolute, of pure consciousness which, by virtue of their essence, bestow sense and demonstrate sense-validity precisely thus
and not otherwise.

If anyone reading our statements objects that they mean changing
all the world into a subjective illusion and committing oneself to a
"Berkeleyan idealism," we can only answer that he has not seized
upon the sense of those statements. They take nothing away from the
fully valid being of the world as the all of realities, just as nothing is
taken away from the fully valid geometrical being of the square by
denying that the square is round (a denial admittedly based, in this
case, on what is immediately obvious). The real actuality is not
"reinterpreted," to say nothing of its being denied; it is rather that a
countersensical interpretation of the real actuality, i.e., an interpreta­tion which contradicts the latter's own sense as clarified by insight,
is removed. That interpretation stems from a philosophical absolutiz­ing of the world completely alien to the natural way of considering
the world. This is, precisely, natural; it lives naively in the effecting of
the general positing described by us; thus it can never become a
countersense. The countersense only arises when one philosophizes
and, while seeking ultimate intelligence about the sense of the world,
ever even notices that the world itself has its whole being as a certain
"sense" which presupposes absolute consciousness as the field where
sense is bestowed;\textsuperscript{106} and when, at the same time, one fails to notice
that this field, this sphere of being of absolute origins,\textsuperscript{106} is accessible to

\textsuperscript{104} In Copy A question mark in margin at this sentence.

\textsuperscript{105} Author's footnote: Here, in passing, I am allowing myself an extraordinary and yet, in its
way, admissible broadening of the concept "sense" in order to state the contrast more effectively.

\textsuperscript{106} Marginal note in Copy D: i.e., of the unitary existential certainty involved in the perpetually
continuing stream of experience, as a unity motivated in the latter — a unity of the pre-linguistic
certainty of the Is and of all the existential validities involved in the background, a certainty
arising in such strata, particular contents, "physical things," properties, etc.: validity in the mode
insightful inquiry [schauenden Forschung] yielding an infinite wealth of cognitions given in insight with the highest scientific dignity. The latter, to sure, is something which we have yet to show; only as these investigations progress will it become clear.

Let us note in conclusion that the universality with which, in the deliberations carried out above, we have spoken about the constitution of the natural world in absolute consciousness, should not be found objectionable. That we have not ventured empty philosophical conceits from on high but, on the basis of systematic fundamental work in this field, have concentrated in universal statements cautiously acquired cognitions will be evident to the scientifically experienced reader from the conceptual definiteness of the exposition. The need for more detailed statements and for filling in gaps which have been left open may be felt, and rightly so. The further presentations will furnish considerable contributions to a more concrete development of the sketches previously given. It should be noted, however, that our aim here has not been to give a finished theory of that transcendental constitution and, accordingly, to project a new “theory of knowledge” pertaining to the various spheres of reality; our aim has been instead only to bring about insight into certain general thoughts which can help one to acquire the idea of transcendentally pure consciousness. For us what is essential is the evidence that the phenomenological reduction, as an excluding of the natural attitude; or of the latter’s general positing, is possible, the evidence that, after we effect that reduction, absolute or transcendentally pure consciousness remains as a residuum to which reality cannot be ascribed without absurdity.

of continuing validity, the mode of immanent tradition, so to speak, having its sources in earlier experience and association.

107 Insertion in Copy D: not only
108 Insertion in Copy D: easily acquired
109 Insertion in Copy D: but instead.
§56. The Question About the Range of the Phenomenological Reduction. Natural and Cultural Sciences.

The exclusion\(^1\) of Nature was for us the methodic means for initially making possible the turning of regard to transcendentally pure consciousness. Now that we have brought it into the purvue of seeing regard, it is still useful to consider, conversely, what must remain excluded for the purpose of an investigation of pure consciousness and whether the necessary exclusion\(^2\) concerns only the sphere of Nature. From the standpoint of the phenomenological science which we propose to establish, that signifies "considering" in addition which sciences it might draw from without violating its pure sense, which sciences it might and might not use as given beforehand, which, hence, need "parenthesizing." Because of its peculiar essence as a science of "origins," methodological questions of that sort, which are far removed from any naive ("dogmatic") science, must be considered carefully by phenomenology.

In the first place, it is immediately understandable that, with the exclusion of the natural world, the physical and psychophysical\(^3\) world, all individual objectivities which become constituted by axiological and practical functionings of consciousness are excluded,\(^4\) all the sorts of cultural formations, all works of the technical and fine arts, of sciences (in so far as they come into question as cultural facts rather than as accepted unities), aesthetic and practical values of every form. Likewise, naturally, such actualities as state, custom, law, religion. Consequently, all natural sciences and cultural sciences, with their total

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\(^1\) In Copy A exclusion is crossed out. Insertion in Copy A: of the positing of the world

\(^2\) In Copy A exclusion changed to parenthesizing

\(^3\) Insertion in Copy A: the natural world with its physical things, animalia, human beings

\(^4\) Insertion in Copy A: from our field of judgment
stock of cognition, undergo exclusion precisely as sciences which require the natural attitude.

§57. The Question of the Exclusion of the Pure Ego [Ich].

Difficulties arise at one limit. Human being as natural being and as person in personal association, in that of "society," is excluded; likewise every other animate being. But what about the pure Ego? Has the phenomenological Ego which we also find become a transcendental nothing because of the phenomenological reduction? Let us reduce to the stream of pure consciousness. In reflection every cogitatio effected takes on the explicit form, cogito. Does it lose this form if we exercise the transcendental reduction?

This much is clear from the very beginning: After carrying out this reduction we shall not encounter the pure Ego anywhere in the flux of manifold mental process which remains as a transcendental residuum — neither as one mental process among others, nor as strictly a part of a mental process, arising and then disappearing with the mental process of which it is a part. The Ego seems to be there continually, indeed, necessarily, and this continualness is obviously not that of a stupidly persistent mental process, a "fixed idea." Instead, the Ego belongs to each coming and going mental process; its "regard" is directed "through" each actional cogito to the objective something. This ray of regard changes from one cogito to the next, shooting forth anew with each new cogito and vanishing with it. The Ego, however, is something identical. At least, considered eidetically, any cogito can change, come and go, even though one may doubt that every cogito is necessarily something transitory and not simply, as we find it, something in fact transitory. In contradistinction, the pure Ego would, however, seem to be something essentially necessary; and, as something absolutely identical throughout every actual or possible change in mental processes, it cannot in any sense be a really inherent part or moment of the mental processes themselves.

In every actional cogito the ego lives out its life in a special sense. But all mental processes in the background likewise belong to it; and it

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5 Insertion in Copy A: from our sphere of judgment

6 In Copy A the passage even though ... something transitory placed in brackets, the word doubt crossed out and the remark appended: Think this over, false.
belongs to them. All of them, as belonging to the one stream of mental processes which is mine, must admit of becoming converted into actional cogitationes or incorporated into actional cogitationes as immanental constituents. In Kant's words, "The 'I think' must be capable of accompanying all my presentations."

If we retain a pure Ego as a residuum after our phenomenological exclusion of the world and of the empirical subjectivity included in it (and an essentially different pure Ego for each stream of mental processes), then there is presented in the case of that Ego a transcendency of a peculiar kind — one which is not constituted — a transcendency within immanency. Because of the immediately essential role played by this transcendency in the case of any cogitation, we must not undertake its exclusion; though in many investigations the questions concerning the pure Ego can remain in suspenso. But only in so far as its immediate, evidently ascertainable essential peculiarity and its givenness along with pure consciousness extend do we propose to count the pure Ego as a phenomenological datum; all theories about it which exceed those limits undergo exclusion. In the Second Book of this essay we shall find occasion, moreover, to devote a separate chapter to the difficult questions concerning the pure Ego; in that context we shall also make secure the position taken here in a preliminary way.

§58. The Transcendency, God, Excluded.

After the natural world is abandoned, we encounter yet another transcendency which is not given, like the pure Ego, immediately in union with reduced consciousness but becomes cognized in a highly mediated fashion, a transcendency standing, as it were, in polar contrast to the transcendency pertaining to the world. We mean the

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7 Insertion in Copy A: whether also {Kant's} sense I leave undecided...
8 Insertion in Copy A: (as may here be asserted with suitable reservations)
9 Insertion in Copy A: in a certain sense
10 Author's footnote: In the Logische Untersuchungen I advocated a skepticism with respect to the question about the pure Ego, but which I could not adhere to as my studies progressed. The criticism which I directed against Natorp's thoughtful Einleitung in die Psychologie [Introduction to Psychology] (Freiburg, 1888) is, as I now see, not well-founded in one of its main contentions. (Unfortunately the recent revised edition of Natorp's book Allgemeine Psychologie nach kritischer Methode [Universal Psychology According to Critical Method] (Tübingen, 1922) appeared too late for me to read and take into consideration.)
11 In Copy A in a highly mediated fashion substituted by in an entirely different way
transcendency pertaining to God. Reduction of the natural world to the absolute of consciousness yields factual concatenations of mental processes of consciousness of certain kinds with distinctive regular orders in which a morphologically ordered world in the sphere of empirical intuition becomes constituted as their intentional correlate, i.e., a world concerning which there can be classifying and describing sciences. At the same time precisely this world, with respect to the material lower level, admits of becoming determined in the theoretical thinking of the mathematical natural sciences as the "appearance" of a Nature as determined by physics, subject to laws of Nature which are exact. In all this, since the rationality made actual by the fact is not a rationality demanded by the essence, there is a marvelous teleology.

Furthermore: The systematic exploration of all teleologies to be found in the empirical world itself, for example the factual evolution of the sequence of organisms as far as human being and, in the development of mankind, the growth of culture with its spiritual treasures, is not yet completed with the natural-scientific explanation of all such produced formations as coming from the given factual circumstances and according to the laws of Nature. Rather, the transition to pure consciousness by the method of transcendental reduction leads necessarily to the question about the ground for the now-emerging factuality of the corresponding constitutive consciousness. Not the fact as such, but the fact as source of endlessly increasing value-possibilities and value-actualities forces the question into one about the "ground"—which naturally does not have the sense of a physical-causal reason. We pass over whatever else, from the point of view of religious consciousness, is able, as a rationallygrounding motive, to lead to the same principle. What concerns us here, after merely indicating different groups of such rational grounds for believing in the existence of an extra-worldly "divine" being is that this being would obviously transcend not merely the world but "absolute" consciousness. It would therefore be an "absolute" in the sense totally different from that in which consciousness is an absolute, just as it would be something transcendent in a sense totally different from that in which the world is something transcendent.

Naturally we extend the phenomenological reduction to include this "absolute" and "transcendent" being. It shall remain excluded from the new field of research which is to be provided, since this shall be a field of pure consciousness.
§59. The Transcendency of the Eidetic. Exclusion of Pure Logic as Mathesis Universalis.¹²

Having excluded individual realities in every sense of the word, we now attempt to exclude all other sorts of "transcendencies." This attempt concerns the set of "universal" objects, of essences. They are also "transcendent" to pure consciousness in a certain manner; they are not to be found as really inherent within it. Nevertheless, we cannot go on excluding transcendencies without limit; transcendental purification cannot mean an exclusion of all transcendencies since otherwise even though a pure consciousness would indeed remain, there would not remain, however, any possibility of a science of pure consciousness.

Let us make this clear. Let us attempt the maximum possible exclusion of the eidetic and consequently a like exclusion of all eidetic sciences. To each regionally delimitable sphere of individual being, in the broadest logical sense, there belongs an ontology. For example, an ontology of Nature belongs to physical nature; an ontology of psychophysical being to the psychophysical. All of these disciplines, whether already developed or merely required, undergo reduction. In contrast to the material ontologies, we find "formal" ontology (united with the formal logic of significations produced by thinking), to which the quasi-region, "any object whatever," belongs. If we try to exclude in addition «formal ontology», doubts arise which will, at the same time, concern the possibility of an unrestricted exclusion of the eidetic.

The following series of thoughts emerge. To each province of being we must attach, for the purposes of science, certain eidetic spheres as adjuncts, not simply as provinces of research but as places into which the investigator of the province in question must be allowed to reach for eidetic cognitions whenever the interconnected theoretical motives within the essential peculiarity of that province incline him to do so. Above all, every investigator must surely be able to freely call on formal logic (or formal ontology). For no matter what things he may be investigating, they are always objects; and whatever is true formaliter of any objects whatever¹³ (any properties whatever, any predicatively formed affair-complexes whatever, and the like), that too is his. And no matter how he frames concepts and propositions, draws conclusions, etc., what formal logic establishes with formal universality regarding

¹² Addition to title of section in Copy A: The Norm of Phenomenology
¹³ Insertion in Copy A: with respect to all their categorically produced forms
such significations and their genera, concerns him too and, in the same manner, any other investigator of the special sciences. Therefore it concerns the phenomenologist. Every pure mental process is also subsumed under the logically broadest sense of the word, object. It appears that we are consequently unable to exclude formal logic or formal ontology. And, for obviously similar reasons, we should also be unable to exclude universal noetics which enounces eidetic insights concerning the rationality or irrationality of any judgmental thinking the significational contents of which are determined only in formal universality.

But if we consider the situation more closely, we see that, given certain presuppositions, there arises a possibility of "parenthesizing" formal logic and consequently all the disciplines of formal mathe­sis (algebra, theory of numbers, theory of manifolds, etc.). If we presuppose, namely, that the investigation of pure consciousness by phenomenology does not and need not impose any problems other than those of a descriptive analysis which can be solved in pure intuition, then neither the forms\(^{14}\) of theories of the mathematical disciplines nor any derivative theorems of the latter can be of use to phenomenology. Where the fashioning of concepts and judgments is not a process of constructing them, where no systems of mediate deductions are built, the doctrine of forms\(^ {15}\) of all deductive systems, as found in mathematics, cannot function as an instrument in material research.

Now phenomenology is, in fact, a purely descriptive discipline, exploring the field of transcendentally pure consciousness by pure intuition. The only propositions of logic to which phenomenology might ever have occasion to refer would therefore be mere logical axioms, like the law of contradiction, axioms the universal and absolute validity of which it would be able\(^ {16}\) to make evident, however, on the basis of examples included among its own data. Therefore we can extend the explicitly excluding εποχή to formal logic and to mathe­sis in its entirety and, in so doing, be assured of the legitimacy of the norm which we, as phenomenologists intend to follow: To avail ourselves of nothing but what we can make essentially evident by observing consciousness itself in its pure immanence.\(^ {17}\)

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\(^{14}\) In Copy A forms crossed out

\(^{15}\) In Copy A doctrine of forms crossed out and marginal note: the science of valid forms

\(^{16}\) In Copy A be able to make substituted by have to make

\(^{17}\) Marginal note to this sentence in Copy A: That looks as though only real data were to be taken into account
At the same time we thus acquire the explicit knowledge that a descriptive phenomenology is essentially independent of all those disciplines. In connection with a utilization of phenomenology for philosophical purposes, this finding is not without importance; and it is therefore advantageous to take note of it on this occasion.

§60. The Exclusion of Material-Eidetic Disciplines.

As for what now concerns the material-eidetic spheres, one of them is marked out for us in such a manner that obviously there can be no thought of excluding it: the eidetic sphere pertaining to phenomenologically purified consciousness itself. Even if our aim were to study pure consciousness in its single particularizations, i.e., in the way proper to a science of matters of fact, though not as it is studied by empirical psychology (since we are operating within the limits imposed by our phenomenological exclusion of the world), we could not do without the Apriori belonging to consciousness. A science of matters of fact cannot renounce the right to make use of the eidetic truths which relate to individual objectivities belonging to its own province. But, according to what has already been said in the Introduction, our aim is precisely to found phenomenology itself as an eidetic science, as the theory of the essence of transcendentally purified consciousness.

If we do that, phenomenology embraces as its own all "immanental essences," i.e., all those which become singularized exclusively in the individual events of a stream of consciousness, in fleeting single mental processes of any kind. Now it is of fundamental importance to see that not all essences belong to that sphere, that just as in the case of individual objectivities the difference between immanental and transcendent objectivities obtains, so too it obtains in the case of the corresponding essences. Thus, for example, the essences "physical thing," "spatial shape," "motion," "color of a physical thing," and the like, and also the essences "human being," "human sensation," "psyche," "psychical process" (mental process in the psychological sense), "person" "character trait," and the like, are transcendent. If we intend to develop a phenomenology as a purely descriptive eidetic doctrine of the immanental consciousness-formation, the occurrences in the stream of mental processes which can be seized upon within the boundaries drawn by phenomenological exclusion, then no transcendent individuals and, therefore, none of the "transcendent essences" belonging within those
boundaries are included. These have their logical place in the eidetic doctrine of the relevant transcendent objectivities.\(^{18}\)

Concerned only with the immanental, phenomenology *in no way posits the* being of such essences, makes no statements about their *validity or nonvalidity*, or about the ideal possibility of objectivities corresponding to them, and establishes no *eidetic laws* relating to them.

Regions and disciplines concerning transcendent essences are essentially incapable of contributing any premises for a phenomenology which actually seeks to restrict itself to the region of pure mental processes. Since our aim is to ground phenomenology precisely in this purity (in conformity with the norm stated a moment ago), and since extremely great philosophical interests depend on its being developed with full awareness as having such purity, we *explicitly broaden the original reduction* to cover all provinces of transcendent essences and the *ontologies* pertaining to them.

Thus, just as we exclude actual physical Nature and the empirical natural sciences, we exclude the eidetic natural sciences, i.e., those which investigate\(^{19}\) whatever essentially belongs to objectivity pertaining to physical nature as physical nature. Geometry, phoronomy, and the "pure" physics of matter, are parenthesized. In like manner, just as we have excluded all experiential sciences of animate natural beings and all empirical cultural sciences of personal beings in personal associations, of human beings as the subjects of history, the bearers of culture, and also such sciences of cultural formations themselves, etc., so now we also exclude the eidetic sciences corresponding to those objectivities. We exclude them before the fact and in idea; because up to now, as everyone knows, these\(^{20}\) eidetic sciences (e.g., rational psychology and rational sociology) have not been founded or else have not been founded purely and in a manner free from objection.

With respect to the philosophical functions which phenomenology is called upon to assume, it is well to state explicitly that our exposition has, at the same time, established the fact that *phenomenology is absolutely independent of the material-eidetic sciences*, as well as of all the others.

Our broadenings of the phenomenological reduction obviously do not have the fundamental significance which attaches to our original exclusion merely of the natural world and the sciences relating to it.

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18 *Insertion in Copy A*: in the ontology of the latter

19 *Insertion in Copy A*: ontologically

20 *Insertion in Copy A*: ontologico-
This first reduction is, after all, what makes it at all possible in the first place to turn one's regard to the phenomenological field and seize upon its data. The other reductions, because they presuppose the first, are secondary; but this by no means implies that they have less significance.


For the phenomenological method (and consequently for the method of any transcendental inquiry whatever) a systematic doctrine of all the phenomenological reductions which we have tried to outline here has a great importance. Their explicitly stated "parenthesesings" have the methodic function of continually reminding us that the spheres of being and cognition in question essentially lie outside the one which, as the transcendental phenomenological sphere, is to be explored, and that any intruding of premises belonging to those parenthesized spheres is an indication of countersensical confusion, a genuine μετάβασις. If the province of phenomenology were presented with such immediate obviousness as the province pertaining to the natural attitude in experiencing, or if it became given in consequence of a simple transition from the latter to the eidetic attitude as, for example, the province of geometry becomes given when one starts from what is empirically spatial, then there would be no need of circumstantial reductions with the difficult deliberations which they involve. Nor would there be any need for care in distinguishing the separate steps were it not for the continuous temptations to fallacious Metabasis, particularly in the interpretation of the objectivities pertaining to the eidetic disciplines. They are such strong temptations that they threaten the person who, in so far as some single provinces are concerned, has freed himself from generally prevalent misconceptions.

In the first place, there is the extraordinarily wide-spread inclination of our age to psychologize the eidetic. Its victims include many who call themselves idealists; indeed, the effect of all empiricistic conceptions on the idealistic camp has been a strong one. Anyone who regards ideas, essences, as "psychical structures," anyone who, in the case of those operations of consciousness in which the "concepts" of color, shape, etc., are attained on the basis of an exemplificatory
intuition of physical things with their colors, shapes, etc., confuses the resulting consciousness of these essences (color, shape) with the essences themselves, ascribing to the flux of consciousness as its really inherent component part something which necessarily transcends it: anyone who does this, on the one hand, corrupts psychology since it concerns even empirical consciousness; on the other hand (and this is what interests us here) it corrupts phenomenology. It is of very great importance, then, that clarity be produced in this respect if the region sought is to be actually found. This, however, is done naturally along the way which we have followed: first of all in a universal vindication of the eidetic as eidetic, and then in the context of the doctrine of the phenomenological reduction as involving a specific exclusion of the eidetic.

Now this exclusion, to be sure, had to be restricted to the eidetics of transcendent individual objectivities in every sense. Here a new fundamental moment is to be considered. Once we have freed ourselves from the inclination to psychologize the essence and the relationships among essences, it is another great step forward, one which by no means follows as a matter of course, when the highly significant distinction which we have designated briefly as the distinction between the essence of something immanent and of something transcendent is recognized and consistently taken into consideration throughout. On the one hand, essences of formations belonging to consciousness itself; on the other hand, essences of individual affairs transcendent to consciousness, thus the essences of those individual affairs which only become "manifested" in formations belonging to consciousness, which become "constituted" in the manner peculiar to consciousness by virtue of sensuous appearances.

At least for me the second step was very difficult, even after the first. Today that cannot escape an attentive reader of the Logische Untersuchungen. With complete decisiveness the first step was taken there by grounding in detail the independent legitimacy of the eidetic in opposition to its being psychologized — much against the spirit of the times which was reacting so strongly against "Platonism" and "logicism." As for the second step, it was decisively taken in some theories, for example, in those concerning logico-categorial objectivities and the presentive consciousness of them; but in other expositions in the same volume the vacillation is obvious, e.g., in that the concept of the logical proposition is related sometimes to the logico-categorial objectivity and sometimes to the corresponding immanent essence.
of the judgmental thinking. The fact is that the beginner in phenomenology finds it difficult to acquire a reflective mastery of the different focusings of consciousness with their different objective correlates. That, however, is true with respect to all eidetic spheres which do not pertain to the immanency of consciousness itself. One must gain this insight not only regarding formal-logical and formal-ontological essences and relationships among essences (thus in the case of essences such as “proposition” and “syllogism” and, on the other hand, “number,” “ordered set” and “manifold”), but also regarding essences drawn from the sphere of the natural world (like “physical thing,” “bodily shape,” “human being,” and “person”). An index to this insight is the broadened phenomenological reduction. Ruling us as a result is the practical consciousness that, as in the case of the sphere of the natural world, none of these eidetic spheres of essential necessity must be accepted by the phenomenologist as spheres given with respect to their veritable being; that, to ensure the purity of one’s region of inquiry, his judgments may refer to them only as parenthesized spheres; and that, from all the sciences pertaining to them, not a single theorem, indeed not even an axiom, can be taken and admitted as a premise for phenomenological purposes — all of this now acquires great methodological significance. Precisely by this <practical consciousness> we protect ourselves methodically against these confusions so deeply rooted in us as born dogmatists; in no other way could we avoid them.


I just used the word “dogmatist.” It will become apparent that this was no merely analogical usage and that, on the contrary, the epistemological allusion has its source in the proper essence of the matters under consideration here. There is good reason for recalling here the epistemological antithesis between dogmatism and criticism and for calling all the sciences which have undergone reduction “dogmatic.” For it can be seen, by virtue of the own peculiar essence of the sources, on the one hand, that they and they alone are the sciences which require “criticism” — and, indeed, a criticism, which they themselves are essentially incapable of effecting; and, on the other hand, that the science having the unique function of effecting the
criticism of all others and, at the same time, of itself is none other than phenomenology. Stated more precisely: It is the distinctive peculiarity of phenomenology to embrace within the sphere of its eidetic universality all cognitions and sciences and, more particularly, with respect to everything in them which is an object of immediate insight, or at least would have to be such if they were genuine cognitions. The sense and legitimacy of all possible immediate starting-points and of all immediate steps in any possible method lie within its sphere of jurisdiction. Thus phenomenology includes all the eidetic (therefore unconditionally and universally valid) cognitions with which the radical problems of “possibility” relating to any alleged cognitions and sciences become solved. As applied phenomenology, of essential necessity it produces the ultimately evaluative criticism of each specifically peculiar science; and thus, in particular, it determines the ultimate sense of the “being” of its objects and the fundamental clarification of its methods. Accordingly, it is understandable that phenomenology is, so to speak, the secret nostalgia of all modern philosophy. The striving toward phenomenology was present already in the wonderfully profound Cartesian fundamental considerations; then, again, in the psychologism of the Lockean school; Hume almost set foot upon its domain, but with blinded eyes. And then the first to correctly see it was Kant, whose greatest intuitions become wholly understandable to us only when we had obtained by hard work a fully clear awareness of the peculiarity of the province belonging to phenomenology. It then becomes evident to us that Kant’s mental regard was resting on that field, although he was still unable to appropriate it or recognize it as a field of work pertaining to a strict eidetic science proper. Thus, for example, the transcendental deduction in the first edition of the Kritik der reinen Vernunft was actually operating inside the realm of phenomenology, but Kant misinterpreted that realm as psychological and therefore he himself abandoned it.

But we are anticipating matters to be presented later (in the Third Book of this essay). Let the preliminary indications stated here serve to justify us in calling the complex of sciences which undergo reduction “dogmatic” and in contrasting them with phenomenology as a science pertaining to a completely different dimension. At the

21 Author's footnote: Cf. above, §26, pp. 46f. Naturally the sciences referred to there as specifically philosophical are based on phenomenology.
same time we draw a parallel contrast between the dogmatic and the phenomenological attitude. Obviously the natural attitude is then subordinate to the dogmatic attitude as a particularity.

Note

The circumstance that the specifically phenomenological exclusions we have expounded are independent of the eidetic exclusion of individual existence suggests the question of whether, within the limits drawn by those exclusions, a factual science of transcendentally reduced mental processes is possible. This question, like every other question concerning fundamental essential possibilities, can be answered only within the realm of eidetic phenomenology. The answer is such that it becomes understandable why any attempt to start naively with a phenomenological science of matters of fact, before developing the phenomenological theory of essences, would be nonsense. For it is apparent that, alongside the extra-phenomenological sciences of matters of fact, there can be no phenomenological science of matters of fact as a science parallel to and co-ordinate with them. The reason for this is that the ultimate evaluation of all the sciences of matters of fact leads to a unitary link connecting the factual phenomenological contexts and the phenomenological contexts motivated as factual possibilities which correspond to all those sciences — a connected unity which is nothing else than the field belonging to the missing phenomenological sciences of matters of fact. A major part of this science is therefore a "phenomenological conversion" of the ordinary sciences of matters of fact which eidetic phenomenology makes possible; and the only remaining question is whether, starting from there, something more should be done.
PART THREE

METHODS AND PROBLEMS OF PURE PHENOMENOLOGY
§63. The Particular Significance of Methodic Deliberations for Phenomenology.

If we heed the norms prescribed by the phenomenological reductions, if, as they demand, we exclude precisely all transcendencies and if, therefore, we take mental processes purely as they are with respect to their own essence, then, according to all that has been said, a field for eidetic cognitions is opened up to us. Once the initial difficulties have been overcome, it presents itself as infinite on every side. The multiplicity of kinds and forms of mental processes, with their really inherent and essential intentional constituents, is indeed inexhaustible as is, accordingly, the multiplicity of concatenations of essences and apodictically necessary truths based on those kinds and forms. This infinite field of the Apriori of consciousness which, in its peculiar ownness, has never received its due, indeed, has actually never been seen, must be brought under cultivation, then, and made to yield its fullest fruits. But how can we find the right beginning? As a matter of fact, the beginning is what is most difficult here, and the situation is unusual. The new field does not lie spread out before our view with a wealth of salient data in such a manner that we can simply reach out and be sure of the possibility of making them the objects of a science — to say nothing of being sure of the method by which we ought to proceed.

If we attempt to increase our knowledge of them by investigative activities of our own, the situation here is not as it is in the case of what is given in the natural attitude, particularly in the case of objects belonging to Nature which, because of continuous experience and

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1 Marginal note in Copy D to the first chapter: Is not the first chapter dispensable? Its contents, however, should be taken into account and, in part, introduced into the exposition of phenomenology itself.
ways of thinking which have been practised for centuries, are quite familiar to us with respect to manifold peculiarities, with respect to their elements and laws. Anything unknown there is a horizon of something known. Every methodic effort starts from something given; every further development of the method starts from the method already on hand; generally speaking, it is only a matter of developing special methods which fit into the already given and fixed style of a tested set of general scientific methods the discovery of which is guided by that style.

How different it is in phenomenology. It is not only that, prior to any method for determining matters within its field, a method is needed in order to bring, without exception, the field of affairs pertaining to transcendentally pure consciousness within the regard which seizes upon it; it is not only that this requires a difficult turning of the regard from the natural data which continue to be objects of consciousness and are thus, as it were, interwoven with the data newly intended to, so that the danger of confusing the two sets of data is always threatening; but it is also that everything helpful to us in the case of the natural sphere of objects is lacking: familiarity by virtue of long-practiced intuition, the benefit of inherited theorizations and methods adapted to the subject-matter. Obviously, even in the case of methods already developed there is lacking that comfortable confidence which would be nourished by a multiplicity of successful and confirmed applications in the accepted sciences and in the practice of daily life.

In making its first appearance phenomenology must therefore reckon with a fundamental mood of skepticism. It must not only develop the method for acquiring novel cognitions from the novel subject-matter; with respect to the sense and validity of that method it must produce the most perfect clarity so that it can meet every serious objection.

In addition — and this, because it pertains to something essentially fundamental, is much more important — phenomenology, by virtue of its essence, must claim to be "first" philosophy and to offer the means for carrying out every possible critique of reason; therefore it demands the most perfect freedom from presuppositions and, concerning itself, an absolute reflective insight. It is of its own essence to realize the most perfect clarity concerning its own essence and therefore also concerning the principles of its method.

For these reasons the painstaking efforts to acquire insight into the
basic components of its method, into that which is methodically
determinative for the new science from its very inception and contin­
nually throughout its progress, have a significance for phenomenolo­
gy quite distinct from that which analogous efforts could ever have
for other sciences.

§ 64. The Phenomenologist's Self-Exclusion.

We must mention, first of all, a methodological objection which
blocks even the first steps.

We exclude the entire natural world and all transcendent-eidetic
spheres; by so doing we should acquire a "pure" consciousness. But
have we not just said that "we" exclude? Can we phenomenologists,
who are indeed included among the members of the natural world,
put ourselves out of action?

One is soon convinced that there is no difficulty whatever in so
doing, provided that we have not shifted the sense of "excluding." We
can even go on calmly speaking in the way we must as natural
human beings; for as phenomenologists we are not supposed to stop
being natural human beings or positing ourselves as such when we
speak. But as a part of the method for ascertaining the truths which
are to be entered in the registry book of phenomenology, which we
are about to begin, we prescribe for ourselves the norm of phenome­
nological reduction which is concomitantly related to our empirical
factual being and prevents us from entering any proposition which
contains, explicitly or implicitly, natural positions of that kind. In so
far as it is a matter of individual factual being, the phenomenologists
proceed like any other eidetic scientist, e.g., the geometer. In their
scientific treatises geometers often speak of themselves and their
research; but the mathematizing subject is not included among the
eidetic contents of mathematical propositions themselves.

§ 65. The Reflexive Reference of Phenomenology to Itself.

Again, it might be found objectionable that in the phenomenological
attitude we direct our regard to some pure mental processes or other

\footnote{Insertion in Copy A: human}
in order to explore them, but that the mental processes of this research itself, with this attitude and line of vision, should, when taken in phenomenological purity at the same time belong to the realm to be explored.

Here, too, there is no difficulty. The situation is precisely similar in psychology and likewise in logical noetics. The thinking of the psychologist is itself something psychological; the thinking of the logician is something logical, i.e., something which lies within the realm to which the norms of logic apply. This reflexive reference to themselves would be of concern only if the phenomenological, psychological, or logical cognition of the thinking currently done by the particular thinker were a condition on which the cognition of all the other things in the respective provinces of research would depend. But that is an obviously absurd proposition.

Admittedly, a certain difficulty is involved in all disciplines reflexively related to themselves, in that the first introduction to them, as well as the first investigative penetration into them, must operate with methodic resources to which the discipline in question can only subsequently give a scientifically definitive form. Without preliminary and preparatory deliberations on its subject-matter and method, no new science could ever be projected. But the concepts and the other elements of method with which an incipient psychology or phenomenology operates in such preparatory efforts are themselves psychological or phenomenological and acquire their scientific stamp only within the system of the science after the latter has already been legitimated.

Obviously no serious objections which could hinder the actual development of such sciences, particularly phenomenology, are to be found along the way. If phenomenology, then, is to be entirely a science within the limits of mere immediate Intuition, a purely "descriptive" eidetic science, then what is universal of its procedure is already given as something obvious. It must expose to its view events of pure consciousness as examples and make them perfectly clear; within the limits of this clarity it must analyze and seize upon their essences, trace with insight the essential interconnections, formulate what is beheld in faithful conceptual expressions which allow their sense to be prescribed purely by what is beheld or generically seen; and so forth. This procedure, followed naively, serves at first only for the sake of looking about in the new province, acquiring some general practice in seeing, seizing upon and analyzing in it and becoming
somewhat familiar with its data. Then scientific reflection on the essence of the procedure itself, on the essence of the modes of givenness functioning in it, on the essence, the effect, the conditions of perfect clarity and insight as well as of perfectly faithful and fixed conceptual expression, and on other such things, now takes on the function of a generical and logically rigorous grounding of the method. Consciously followed, it now assumes the characteristic and rank of a scientific method which, in any given case, allows for practicing a limiting and improving criticism by applying the strictly formulated norms of method. Here the essential relatedness of phenomenology to itself becomes manifest in that what reflection on the method examines and ascertains under the headings of clarity, insight, expression, and the like, is, on its side, itself included in the domain of phenomenology and that all the reflective analyses which are phenomenological analyses of essences and the acquired methodological insights, with respect to what they ascertain, must square with the norms which they formulate. Therefore one must be able to persuade oneself at any time, by new reflections, that the predicatively formed affair-complexes asserted in the methodological statements can be given with perfect clarity, that the concepts used actually conform faithfully to what is given, etc.

What has just been said obviously holds for all methodological investigations relating to phenomenology, no matter how far we might extend their limits; we therefore understand that this whole essay, which aims at preparing the way for phenomenology, is itself phenomenology throughout.


Let us directly follow a bit further the most universal methodological thoughts which have come out in the previous sections. In phenomenology, then, which is to be nothing else but a theory of essences produced within pure intuition, we perform acts of seeing essences immediately in given examples of transcendentally pure consciousness and fix them conceptually and terminologically. The words used may derive from the common language; they may be ambiguous and their changing senses may be vague. As soon as they "coincide" with the intuitionally given in the manner characteristic of an actual expression, they take on a definite sense as their actually present and
clear sense, *hic et nunc*; and starting from there we can fix them scientifically.

To be sure, not everything has been done in merely applying the word in faithful conformity to the essence seized upon intuitionally, even though everything necessary may have been carried out in so far as this intuitive seizing-upon is concerned. Science is possible only where the results of thinking can be stored up in the form of knowledge and used for later thinking in the form of a system of statements which are distinct in their logical sense and can be understood or actualized in a judging, but without clearness in the underlying objectivatings and therefore without insight. Of course, *science* requires at the same time subjective and objective provisions for the reproducing at will (and, more particularly, intersubjectively) the relevant groundings and actual insights.

All of that, now, requires that the same words and sentences preserve an unambiguous coordination with certain intuitionally apprehensible essences which make up their “fulfilling sense.” On the ground, then, of eidetic intuition and thoroughly practised intuitions of single examples they are furnished with distinct and single significations (the other significations which occasionally emerge by force of habit being, as it were, “cancelled”) in such a manner that, in all possible concatenations of actually present thinking, they keep their concepts produced by thinking and lose their capacity of conforming to other intuitional data with other fulfilling essences. Since, for good reasons in view of the existing ambiguities of common usage, foreign technical terms should, in so far as possible, be avoided in the generally accepted language, there is a continuing need for caution and for frequent re-examination to see whether what was fixed in the earlier context is actually employed in the same sense in the new one. But this is not the place for going more precisely into these and similar rules (including, e.g., those relating to science as a product of inter-subjective collaboration).
§67. The Method of Clarification. ³ "Nearness of Givenness" and "Remoteness of Givenness." ³⁴

Of greater interest to us are methodological deliberations relating, not to expression, but to the essences and essential concatenations to be expressed by it and to be seized upon prior to being expressed. If our inquiring regard is directed to mental processes they will generally offer themselves with an emptiness and a vague remoteness which make them useless for either single or eidetic findings. The situation would be different if, instead of those mental processes themselves, we were interested in their mode of givenness and if we wished to explore the essence of emptiness or vagueness itself which, for their part, become given in such cases with the fullest clarity rather than vaguely. But if something itself vaguely intended to, e.g., the obscurely hovering object of memory or phantasy, is asked to deliver up its essence, then what it delivers up will have to be something imperfect; that is, where those intuitions of single particulars which are the basis for seizing upon an essence have a low degree of clarity, the seizures upon the essence likewise have a low degree of clarity; and, correlative, what is seized upon is, in respect of its sense, "unclear." it is hazy, undecisively separated both internally and externally. One cannot decide, or can decide "only roughly," whether what is seized upon here and what is seized upon there as the same (or the same essence); one cannot ascertain what components are actually included in it, or what those components "really are" which perhaps are already shown by vague contrast or are indicated in a wavering fashion.

That which floats before us in fluid unclarity, with a greater or less intuitional remoteness, must therefore be brought into normal nearness and made perfectly clear before it can be used as the basis for a correspondingly valuable eidetic intuition in which the essences and eidetic relationships intended to attain perfect givenness.

Thus the seizing upon essences itself has its degrees of clarity, as does the single particular floating before us. However, just as there is for the moment corresponding to it in the individual, there is for any essence an absolute nearness, so to speak, in which its givenness, compared to the series of degrees of clarity, in an absolute — i.e., a pure givenness of it itself. We are aware of what is objective [das Gegenständ-

³ Marginal note in Copy A: Presentive Consciousness
⁴ Marginal note in Copy A: Cf. the essential supplementations, §125, p. 260 below. Marginal note in Copy D: But this and the following sections concern the subject-matter of phenomenology.
liches (scl.) either the objective essence or the individual] not merely somehow or other as “it itself” standing in view and as “given,” but as a purely given something itself, completely and precisely as it is in itself. In so far as a residue of unclarity remains, it casts a shadow over certain moments in that which is “itself” given and, accordingly, those moments remain outside the circle of light suffusing the purely given. In the case of complete unclarity, the polar opposite to complete clarity, nothing at all has become given; the consciousness is “blind,” is no longer in the least intuitive, is not at all a “presentive” consciousness in the proper sense. As a consequence, we have to say:

A presentive consciousness in the pregnant sense and an intuitive consciousness in contradistinction to a non-intuitive consciousness, a clear consciousness in contradistinction to an unclear one: these coincide. The same holds for degrees of givenness, of intuitedness, and of clarity. The zero-limit is complete obscurity; the limit, one, is complete clarity, intuitedness, givenness.

In this context, however, givenness must not be understood as originary givenness and therefore not as perceptual. We do not identify what is “given as it itself” with what is “given originarily,” “given in person.” In the definitely characterized sense, “given” and “given as it itself” are the same; and our employment of the redundant expression serves only to exclude givenness in the broader sense in which it is said, ultimately, concerning anything objectively intended to [jedem Vorstelligen] that it is given in the intending to it [Vorstellung] (though perhaps in an “empty manner”).

As can be seen immediately, our definitions apply moreover to any intuitions and empty objectivatings [Leervorstellungen], and therefore without any restriction with respect to the objectivities, although we are interested here only in the manners in which mental processes and their phenomenological (really inherent and intentive) components are given.

But in consideration of future analyses, it should be also noted that the most essential part of the situation remains: whether or not the regard of the pure Ego goes through the mental processes in question; stated more precisely, whether or not the pure Ego “advertis to” a

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5 Marginal note in Copy A: Consciousness is “itself” in clarity and unclarity (e.g., memory), and, more particularly, consciousness that seize upon, cf. the following page.

6 Marginal note in Copy A: But what about “illustrative intuitions,” intuitions in which something is pictorialized?

7 Insertion in Copy A: thus categorial intuitions of the categorial itself is also included
“datum” and perchance “seizes upon” it. Accordingly, for example, “perceptually given” — instead of being tantamount to “perceived” in the proper and normal sense of seizing upon this datum in its being — can signify merely “ready for perception.” In like manner, “given in the mode characteristic of phantasy” need not signify “seized upon in a phantasying;” and the like is true universally and with respect to all degrees of clarity or obscurity. We refer in advance to “readiness,” which is to be discussed in detail later on, and wish to say at the same time that where nothing to the contrary is added or obvious from the context, under the heading of “givenness” we also understand being seized upon and, in the case of givenness of an essence, being seized upon originally.

§68. Genuine and Spurious Degrees of Clarity. The Essence of Normal Clarification.

But we must still continue our descriptions. If we speak of degrees of givenness or clarity, we must distinguish between genuine graded degrees of clarity, with which one may include, in the same series, graded degrees of obscurity; and spurious degrees of clarity, namely extensive broadenings of the sphere of clarity, perhaps with a simultaneous intensive enhancement of clarity.

An already given, already actually intuited moment, e.g., a tone or a color, can be given with greater or less clarity. Let us exclude all apprehendings which reach out beyond what is given intuitionally. We are dealing then with a number of graded degrees which occur inside the limits within which the intuited moment is indeed actually intuited; intuitedness as intuitedness admits of continuous intensity-like differences under the heading of clarity which, like intensities, begin with zero but end with a fixed upper limit. One might say that the lower degrees indicate the latter in a certain fashion; intuiting a color in a mode of imperfect clarity, we “mean” the color as it is “in itself” — i.e., precisely the color given with perfect clarity. Nevertheless one must not let oneself be misled by the metaphor of indicating — as though one thing were a sign of another; nor may one speak here (we recall something noted once before) of a presentation of the “In itself” by virtue of the unclear, somewhat as a physical property

8 AUTHOR’S FOOTNOTE: cf. above, §44, p. 83.
becomes "presented," i.e., adumbrated, in intuition by virtue of a moment belonging to sensation. **Graded differences in clarity are exclusively differences of a peculiar kind in the mode of givenness.**

The situation is quite different where an apprehending which reaches *out beyond* the intuitionally given interweaves empty apprehendings with the actually intuitive apprehendings so that, in a quasi-graded fashion, *more* of what is emptily intended to can become intuited and, conversely, more of what is already intuited can become emptily intended to. Accordingly, in this case *making something clear to oneself* consists of processes of two kinds which combine with one another: *processes of actualizing intuition and processes of enhancing the clarity of what is already intuited.*

But that is a description of the *essence of normal clarification.* For, as a rule, it is not the case that pure intuitions are present or that pure empty intendings turn into pure intuitions; rather it is normally the case that, perhaps as intermediate stages, *impure intuitions* play a major role, intuitions which make their objects intuited with respect to certain sides or moments, but intend to them only emptily with respect to others.

§69. The Method of Perfectly Clear Seizing Upon Essences.

In consequence of its essence, *perfectly clear seizing-upon* has the advantage that it allows for an absolutely certain identifying and distinguishing, explicating, relating, and so forth, thus allowing for effecting all "logical" acts "with insight." The acts of seizing upon essences also belong among these acts to the correlates of which, as already said above, the differences in clarity, to be spelled out now in greater detail, are transferred just as, on the other hand, the methodological cognitions we just now acquired are transferred to the attainment of a perfect givenness of essences.

Thus the method, which is a *fundamental part of the method of all eidetic science,* universally requires proceeding step by step. The intuitions of single particulars serving the seizing upon essences may be already clear to an extent which allows for acquiring an essentially universal moment which, however, does not extend as far as the guiding

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9 Marginal note to this sentence in Copy A: The recent investigations: a kind of modification.

10 Marginal note to this paragraph in Copy A: Too brief
intention; clarity is lacking on the side pertaining to more detailed determinations of the essences combined with ‘what had been attained’, consequently there is a need to bring the exemplificatory single particulars nearer or to provide anew more suitable ones in which the confusedly and obscurely single traits intended to stand out and, consequently, can become given with maximum clarity.

A bringing nearer is effected here throughout, even in the sphere of obscurity. What is obscurely intended to comes closer to us in its own manner; finally it knocks at the door of intuition, but even so it need not come in (and perhaps it cannot “because of psychological obstructions”).

It should also be mentioned that what is given at any particular time is usually surrounded by a halo of undetermined determinability, which has its mode of being brought closer “explicatively” in becoming separated into a number of intendings [Vorstellungen]; at first it still may be in the realm of obscurity, but then within the sphere of givenness until what is intended to comes into the sharply illuminated circle of perfect givenness.

Attention should also be called to the fact that it would doubtless be too much to say that all evidence in seizing upon essences requires a complete clarity of the underlying single particulars in their concreteness. To seize upon the most universal eidetic differences, like those between color and sound and between perception and will, it is doubtless sufficient that the examples be given with a low degree of clarity. It is as though the most universal, the genus (color taken universally, sound taken universally) were given completely but not as yet the differentia. The phraseology is objectionable, but I see no way of avoiding it. Let the reader make the situation present to himself in living intuition.

§70. The Role of Perception in the Method of Eidetic Clarification. The Primacy of Free Phantasy.

Let us bring out a few especially important features of the method followed in seizing upon essences.

It is of the universal essence of the immediately intuitive seizing upon essences that (as we have already emphasized11) it can be

11 Author's footnote: Cf. §4, pp. 12ff
effected on the ground of a mere presentation of exemplificative single particulars. Presentiation, e.g., phantasy, however, as we have just explained, can be so perfectly clear that it makes possible a perfect seizing upon essences and a perfect eidetic insight. Originarily presentiative perception in general and, of course, external perception in particular, has its primacies over all kinds of presentation not merely as an experiencing act for findings about factual being (which, after all, do not concern us here), but also as a foundation for phenomenological eidetic findings. External perception has its perfect clarity with respect to all the objective moments actually given in it in the mode of originariness. But it also offers, perhaps with the cooperation of reflection related back to it, clear and steady singularizations for universal eidetic analyses of a phenomenological kind, more precisely even for act-analyses. Anger may be evaporated, its content may be quickly modified by reflection. Nor is it always available like perception, producible at any time by easy experimental arrangements. To study it reflectively in its originariness is to study an evaporating anger which, to be sure, is by no means insignificant but may not be what ought to be studied. In contrast, external perception, which is so much more accessible, is not “evaporated” by reflection; its universal essence and the essence of its components and essential correlates universally belonging to it can be studied within the limits of originariness without particular efforts to produce clarity. If it be said that perception also has its differences in clarity, namely with reference to cases of perception in the dark, in a fog, etc., we do not wish to become involved in more precise deliberations about whether or not these differences should be placed on a par with those already discussed. It is sufficient that perception is not normally beclouded and that clear perception is always at our disposal when we need it.

If the primacies of originariness were very important for our method we should now have to consider where, how, and to what extent they are realizable in the various kinds of mental processes, which kinds of mental processes come especially close in this respect to the privileged sphere of sense perception, and many other similar questions. But all that may be disregarded. There are reasons by virtue of which in phenomenology, as in all other eidetic sciences, presentations and, more precisely, free phantasies acquire a position of

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12 Insertion in Copy A: and corresponding to the perfection with which they are so given
13 Marginal note in Copy A: N.B.
primacy over perceptions and do so even in the phenomenology of perception itself, excluding, to be sure, the phenomenology of the Data of sensation.

In his investigative thinking the geometer operates on the figure or model incomparably more in phantasy than in perception, and even more so does the "pure" geometer, i.e., the one who dispenses with algebraic methods. In phantasy, to be sure, he must make an effort to attain clear intuitions from which he is exempted by the sketch or model. But in actually sketching and constructing a model he is restricted; in phantasy he has incomparably more freedom reshaping at will the figures feigned, and in running through continuously modified possible shapings, thus in generating an immense number of new formations; a freedom opens up to him for the very first time an access to the expanses of essential possibilities with their infinite horizons of eidetic cognitions. For that reason the sketches normally come after the phantasy-constructions and the eidetically pure thinking done on the basis of the latter and serve chiefly to fix certain stages in the previously performed process, thereby making it easier to presentiate again. Even where one "ponders" while looking at the figure, the processes of thinking which follow are, with respect to their sensuous substratum, processes of phantasy the results of which fix the new lines in the figure.

In its most universal features, the situation is no different for the phenomenologist who deals with reduced mental processes and their eidetically necessary correlates. There are also infinitely many eidetic phenomenological formations. He too can use the resource of originary givenness only to a limited extent. To be sure, in the mode of originary givenness he has at his free disposal all the chief types of perceptions and presentiations as perceivable exemplifications for a phenomenology of perception, phantasy, memory, etc. In so far as the most universal essences are concerned, in the sphere of originariness he has at his command in the same way examples of judgings, deemings likely, feelings, and willings. However, of course he does not have examples for all possible particular formations any more than the geometer has sketches or models at his disposal for the infinitely many kinds of solids. Here, in any case, the freedom of eidetic research also necessarily demands operating in phantasy.

While on the other hand (and, again, as in geometry which not without reason has recently attached great value to collections of models and the like), naturally, it is necessary to exercise one's phantasy abundantly in the required activity of perfect clarification...
and in the free reshaping of phantasy-data, it is also necessary, before doing that, to fertilize one's phantasy by observations in originary intuition which are as abundant and excellent as possible: whereby this is not to say that experience as experience has here a function in grounding validity. Extraordinary profit can be drawn from the offerings of history, in even more abundant measure from those of art, and especially from poetry, which are, to be sure, imaginary but which, in the originality of their invention of forms [Neugestaltungen], the abundance of their single features and the unbrokenness of their motivation, tower high above the products of our own phantasy and, in addition, when they are apprehended understandingly, become converted into perfectly clear phantasies with particular ease owing to the suggestive power exerted by artistic means of presentation.

Thus if one is fond of paradoxical phrases, one can actually say, and if one means the ambiguous phrase in the right sense, one can say in strict truth, that "feigning" [Fiktion] makes up the vital element of phenomenology as of every other eidetic science, that feigning is the source from which the cognition of "eternal truths" is fed.14

§71. The Problem of the Possibility of a Descriptive Eidetics of Mental Processes.

Repeatedly in the foregoing we have characterized phenomenology simply as a descriptive science. There again a fundamental question of method arises, and a consideration which checks us, eager though we may be to penetrate the new province. Is it correct to set for phenomenology the tasks of mere description? A descriptive eidetics—is that not something altogether wrong?

The motives for such questions are sufficiently obvious in all of us. Anyone who in our fashion is, so to speak, feeling his way into a new eidetics, asking what kind of inquiries are possible here, what starting points should be taken and what methods should be followed, looks involuntarily at the old highly developed eidetic disciplines, thus at the mathematical disciplines, especially geometry and arithmetic. We note immediately, however, that these disciplines cannot be called upon to offer guidance in our case, that in them the relations

14 Author's footnote: A sentence which, as a quotation, should be especially suitable for a naturalistic ridiculing of the eidetic mode of cognition.
must be essentially different. For the person who has not yet become acquainted with any piece of genuine phenomenological eidetic analysis there is some danger here of becoming puzzled about the possibility of a phenomenology. Since the mathematical disciplines are the only ones which can at present represent in an effective manner the idea of a scientific eidetics, he will at first be far from thinking that there could be eidetic disciplines of another kind, non-mathematical eidetic disciplines fundamentally different from the familiar eidetic disciplines in their whole theoretical kind. Therefore if he has let himself be won over by general considerations to the belief that a phenomenological eidetics is required, the immediately abortive attempt to establish anything like a mathematics of phenomena can mislead him into a relinquishing of the idea of a phenomenology. But that would really be wrong.

Let us make clear to ourselves the most universal peculiarities of mathematical disciplines as contrasted with those of an eidetic theory of mental processes, and let us therefore make clear what those aims and methods really are which, as we have suggested, are essentially inappropriate to the sphere of mental processes.

§72. Eidetic Sciences: Concrete, Abstract, "Mathematical."

We start from the division of essences and eidetic sciences into material and formal. The formal ones we can eliminate (thereby eliminating the whole set of formal mathematical disciplines), since phenomenology obviously belongs among the material eidetic sciences. If analogy can be any guide to method, it will act most powerfully if we restrict ourselves to material mathematical disciplines like, for example, geometry and accordingly ask more specifically whether a phenomenology must be, or can be, constituted as a "geometry" of mental processes.

To acquire the insight desired here, it is necessary to bear in mind some important findings which belong to the general theory of science.15

Any theoretical science unites an ideally closed totality by reference to a province of knowledge which, for its part, is determined by a

15 Author's footnote: In connection with the further exposition, cf. above Part One, Chapter One, especially §§12, 15 and 16.
higher genus. A radical unity is attained only when we go back to the absolutely highest genus, i.e., when we go back to the particular region and to the components of the regional genus, i.e., to the highest genera united in the regional genus, genera which may be based one upon another. The structure of the highest concrete genus (the region), made up in part of discrete highest genera and in part of highest genera founded one upon another (and, in this fashion, embracing one another), corresponds to the structure of the subordinate concreta made up in part of discrete lowest species and in part of lowest species founded one upon the other; for example, in the case of the physical thing, temporal determinateness, spatial determinateness and material determinateness. To each region there corresponds a regional ontology which comprises a number of regional sciences either self-sufficiently closed or perhaps based one upon another, corresponding precisely to the highest genera which are united in making up the region. To subordinate genera mere disciplines or so-called theories correspond — e.g., the discipline pertaining to conic sections corresponds to the genus conic section. In conceptual terms, such a discipline has no complete self-sufficiency, since in its cognitions and in their cognitive groundings it naturally must have at its disposal the entire foundation of eidetic cognitions which derives its unity from the highest genus.

In accordance with whether the highest genera are regional (concrete) or merely components of regional genera, the sciences are either concrete or abstract. The distinction obviously corresponds to the universal distinction between concrete and abstract genera. Consequently the province is made up either of concrete objects (as in the case of the eidetics of Nature) or else of abstract objects (such as spatial shapes, temporal shapes, or the shapes of movements). The essential relationship of all abstract genera to concrete and ultimately to regional genera gives to all abstract disciplines and complete abstract sciences an essential relationship to concrete sciences and ultimately to the regional sciences.

The division of eidetic sciences has its exact parallel, moreover, in a division of the experiential sciences. They too are distinguished from one another with respect to the regions. We have, for example, one physical science of Nature; and all the single sciences of Nature are properly mere disciplines: the potent set of laws, not only eidetic but

16 Author's footnote: Cf. above, §15, pp. 30f.
also empirical, which pertain to Nature as a whole prior to any separation into spheres of Nature, gives them unity. In addition, different regions can prove to be interconnected by empirical laws, as for example the region of the physical and the region of the psychical.

If we look now at the familiar eidetic sciences, we are struck by the fact that their procedure is not descriptive, that, e.g., the lowest eidetic species, that is to say, the countless spatial shapes which can be drawn in space, are not seized upon in intuitions of single particulars, described and ordered into classes by geometry, as do the empirical sciences of Nature with respect to the empirical formations of Nature. On the contrary, geometry fixes a few kinds of fundamental structures, the ideas of solid, plane, point, angle, and the like, the ones which play the determining role in the “axioms.” With the help of the axioms, i.e., the primitive eidetic laws, it is then in a position to derive purely deductively all the spatial shapes “existing,” that is, ideally possible shapes, in space and all the eidetic relationships pertaining to those shapes in the form of exactly determining concepts which take the place of the essences which, as a rule, remain foreign to our intuition. The generic essence of the province of geometry, or the pure essence of space, is of such a character that geometry can be completely certain of dominating actually by its method all the possibilities and of determining them exactly. In other words, the multiplicity comprising all spatial formations has a remarkable fundamental logical property, indicated in the names, “definite manifold” and “mathematical manifold in the pregnant sense,” which we hereby introduce.

Such a manifold is characterized by the fact that a finite number of concepts and propositions derivable in a given case from the essence of the province in question, in the manner characteristic of purely analytic necessity completely and unambiguously determines to totality of all the possible formations belonging to the province so that, of essential necessity, nothing in the province is left open.

We can also say that such a manifold has the distinctive property of being “mathematically-exhaustively definable.” The “definition” consists of the system of axiomatic concepts and axioms; and the “mathematically exhaustive” consists of the fact that the defining assertions involve the greatest conceivable prejudgment [Präjudiz] concerning the manifold: nothing remains undetermined.

An equivalent of the concept of a definite manifold is contained in the following propositions:
Any proposition which can be constructed out of the distinctive axiomatic concepts, regardless of its logical form, is either a pure formal-logical consequence of the axioms or else a pure formal-logical anti-consequence — that is to say, a proposition formally contradicting the axioms, so that its contradictory opposite would be a formal-logical consequence of the axioms. *In the case of a mathematically definite manifold the concepts "true" and "formal-logical consequence of the axioms" are equivalent; and so are the concepts "false" and "formal-logical anti-consequence of the axioms."

A system of axioms which, in the manner indicated, "exhaustively defines" a manifold purely analytically is what I call also a definite system of axioms. Any deductive discipline based on such a system is a definite discipline or, in the pregnant sense, one which is mathematical.

The definitions continue to exist collectively if we let the material particularization of the manifold become completely undetermined — that is to say, if we undertake formalizing universalization. The system of axioms then changes into a system of forms of axioms; the manifold, into a form of manifolds; and the discipline, into a discipline-form.17

§73. Application to the Problem of Phenomenology. Description and Exact Determination.

What can be said, then, about phenomenology in comparison with geometry as a representative of all material mathematics? It is clear that phenomenology belongs among the concrete-eidetic disciplines. Its extension is made up of essences of mental processes which are not abstracta but instead concreta. These concreta, as concreta, have

17 **Author's footnote:** On this cf. Logische Untersuchungen, Vol. 1, §§69 and 70. — The concepts introduced here served me already at the beginning of the 1890's (in the "Untersuchungen zur Theorie der formal-mathematischen Disziplinen" ["Investigations Pertaining to the Theory of Formal-Mathematical Disciplines"], which I intended as a continuation of my *Philosophie der Arithmetik* [Philosophy of Arithmetic], namely to the purpose of finding a fundamental solution to the problem of the imaginary. (Cf. the brief reference, Logische Untersuchungen, Vol. 1, p. 250 [English translation, p. 242].) Since then I have often had occasion to develop the relevant concepts and theories in lectures and seminars, partly in complete detail; and in the winter semester of 1901/02 [reading with Schuhmann, instead of 1900/01 as in the three printed editions] I dealt with them in a double lecture to the Göttingen Mathematical Society. Some parts of this train of thoughts have found their way into the literature, without mention of their original sources.

The close relationship of the concept of definiteness to the "axiom of completeness" introduced by Hilbert for the foundation of arithmetic will be immediately obvious to every mathematician.
abstract moments of many kinds; and the question now is: Do the highest genera pertaining to those abstract moments form provinces here for definite disciplines, "mathematical" disciplines after the manner of geometry? Must we accordingly look for a definite system of axioms here and erect a deductive system upon it? Correlatively, must we look for "fundamental formations" here, and from them derive by construction, i.e., deductively by a consequential application of the axioms, all the other essential formations in the province and their essential determinations? But involved in the essence of such a deriving, and this must also be noted, is that it is a mediate logical determining the results of which, even if they are "drawn in the figure," are of essential necessity incapable of being seized upon in immediate intuition. We can frame a correlative version of our question in these words: Is the stream of consciousness a genuine mathematical manifold? Taken in its factualness, is it like Nature, the Nature which physics is about, which indeed, if the ideal which guides the physicist is valid, and strictly conceived, must be characterized as a concrete definite manifold?

A highly significant problem pertaining to the theory of science is that of becoming completely clear about all the relevant essential questions involved here; thus after the concept of the definite manifold has been fixed, there is the problem of examining the conditions which a materially determined province must satisfy if it is to correspond to that idea. One necessary condition is exactness in "concept-formation," which is by no means a matter of free choice and logical technique; rather, in the case of the supposedly axiomatic concepts which, after all, must be demonstrable in immediate intuition, it presupposes exactness in the essences themselves which are seized upon. But the extent to which "exact" essences can be found in a particular eidetic province, and whether exact essences can be seized upon in actual intuition as substructuring all essences and accordingly as substructuring all their eidetic components too, are matters depending entirely on the peculiar nature of the province in question.

The problem just mentioned is intimately related to the fundamental and still unsolved problems pertaining to an essentially necessary clarification of the relationship between "description," with its "descriptive concepts," and "unambiguous determination" or "exact determination," with its "ideal concepts," and, parallel with that, a clarification of the so-little understood relationship between "descriptive" and "explanatory" sciences. An attempt to deal with these
problems will be communicated in the sequel to these investigations. Here the interruption of the main trend of our deliberations must not be unduly prolonged; nor has our preparation been sufficient to enable us to treat such questions exhaustively. In what follows here it will be enough if we indicate in a general fashion some points deserving our consideration.

§ 74. Descriptive and Exact Sciences.

Let us connect our considerations to the contrast between geometry and descriptive natural science. The geometer is not interested in de facto sensuously intuitable shapes, as the descriptive natural scientist is. He does not, like the latter, fashion morphological concepts of vague configurational types which are directly seized upon on the basis of sensuous intuition and which, in their vagueness, become conceptually and terminologically fixed. The vagueness of such concepts, the circumstance that their spheres of application are fluid, does not make them defective; for in the spheres of knowledge where they are used they are absolutely indispensable, or in those spheres they are the only legitimate concepts. If the aim is to give appropriate conceptual expression to the intuitionally given essential characteristics of intuitionally given physical things, that means precisely that the latter must be taken as they are given. And they are given precisely as fluid; and typical essences can become seized upon as exemplified in them only in immediately analytic eidetic intuition. The most perfect geometry and the most perfect practical mastery of it cannot enable the descriptive natural scientist to express (in exact geometrical concepts) what he expresses in such a simple, understandable, and completely appropriate manner by the words "notches," "scalloped," "lens-shaped," "umbelliform," and the like — all to them concepts which are essentially, rather than accidentally, inexact and consequently also non-mathematical.

Geometrical concepts are "ideal" concepts, expressing something which cannot be "seen;" their "origin" and therefore their content are essentially other than those of descriptive concepts; as concepts they express, not "ideals," but essences drawn immediately from intuition simpliciter. Exact concepts have as their correlates essences which have the characteristic of "ideas" in the Kantian sense. Contrasted with these ideas, or ideal essences, we find morphological essences as the correlates of descriptive concepts.
That ideation which yields ideal essences, as ideal "limits" which it is essentially impossible to find in any sensuous intuition but which morphological essences "approach" more or less closely without ever reaching them — this ideation is fundamentally different in its essence from the seizing upon an essence by simple "abstraction" in which a salient "moment" is raised into the region of essences as something essentially vague, as something typical.\textsuperscript{18} The firmness and the pure distinguishability of generic concepts, or generic essences, which have their extension in the realm of fluidity, must not be confused with the exactness of ideal concepts and of genera which include only the idea in their extension.\textsuperscript{19} It can then be seen, furthermore, that exact sciences and purely descriptive sciences do indeed combine but that they cannot take the place of the other, that no exact science, i.e., no science operating with ideal substructions, no matter how highly developed, can perform the original and legitimate tasks of pure description.\textsuperscript{20}

\textbf{§75. Phenomenology as a Descriptive Eidetic Doctrine of Pure Mental Processes.}

As for phenomenology, it is concerned to be a descriptive eidetic doctrine of transcendentally pure mental processes as viewed in the phenomenological attitude; and, like any other descriptive, non-substructing and non-idealizing discipline, it has its inherent legitimacy. Whatever can be apprehended eidetically in pure intuition as belonging to reduced mental processes, either as a really inherent component part or as an intentional correlate of the latter, properly belongs to phenomenology and is for it a great source of absolute cognitions.

But let us examine somewhat more closely the extent to which actually scientific descriptions can become established in the phenomenological field with its innumerable eidetic concreta, and what such descriptions are in a position to accomplish.

\textsuperscript{18} Marginal note in Copy A: Yet another fundamental kind of abstraction is that of forming formal-ontological eidetic concepts
\textsuperscript{19} Addition to this sentence in Copy A: nor with the exactness of formal-logical concepts, which are exact themselves. But the latter need not be considered here in the material sphere.
\textsuperscript{20} Marginal note in Copy A: That is not correct because the difference between a limit-idea and a formal idea is not taken into consideration. On the other hand, material disciplines and material eidetic laws were the things to be considered here.
It is peculiar to consciousness of whatever sort that it fluctuates in flowing away in various dimensions in such a manner that there can be no speaking of a conceptually exact fixing of any eidetic concreta or of any of their immediately constitutive moments. Let us take, for example, a mental process of the genus, "phantasy of a physical thing," as that process is given to us in a phenomenological-immanental perception or in an (always reduced) intuition of some other kind. Then the phenomenologically single example (the eidetic singularity) is that physical thing-phantasy in the entire fullness of its concretion precisely as it flows smoothly in the flux of mental processes, precisely the determinateness and indeterminateness with which it makes its physical thing appear now from one side and now from another, precisely in the distinctness or blurriness, in the vacillating clarity and intermittent obscurity, etc., which are indeed proper to it. Phenomenology not only drops the individuation but elevates the whole essential content, in the fullness of its concretion, into eidetic consciousness and takes it as an ideally identical essence which, like any other essence, could be singularized not only hic et nunc but also in countless examples. One sees at once that there can be no thought of a conceptual and terminological fixing of this or any other such fluid concretum, and that the same holds with respect to each of its immediate and no less fluid parts and abstract moments.

But though there can be no speaking of an unambiguous determining of eidetic singularities in our sphere of description, the situation is quite otherwise in the case of essences belonging to higher levels of specificity. These are accessible to rigid differentiation, to continuous identifying maintenance [Durchhaltung], and strict conceptual formulation and likewise to analysis into component essences; and accordingly in their case the tasks of a comprehensive scientific description can be imposed as meaningful tasks.

Thus we describe and, in so doing, determine by strict concepts the generic essence of perception taken universally or that of subordinate species, such as the perception of physical things and their determinations, the perception of animate beings, etc.; likewise the essence of memory taken universally, empathy taken universally, willing taken universally, etc. Prior to these, however, are the highest universalities: the mental process taken universally, the cogitatio taken universally, which already make extensive essential descriptions possible.

21 Marginal note in Copy D: That is too restricted
The nature of the process of seizing upon, analyzing, and describing generic essences is obviously such that what can be done at higher levels is not dependent on what has been done at lower levels, e.g., in such a manner that a systematic inductive procedure might be the required method, a gradual ascending of the scale of increasing universality.

Still another consequence may be added here. According to what has been stated, deductive theorizings are excluded from phenomenology. Mediate inferences are not exactly denied to it; but, since all its cognitions ought to be descriptive, purely befitting the immanent sphere, inferences, non-intuitive modes of procedure of any kind, only have the methodic function of leading us to the matters in question upon which a subsequent direct seeing of essences must make given. Analogies which emerge may suggest presumed likelihoods about concatenations of essences prior to actual intuition, and conclusions may be drawn from them; but ultimately an actual seeing of the concatenations of essences must redeem the presumed likelihoods. As long as that has not occurred, we have no phenomenological result.

In the eidetic province of reduced phenomena (either as a whole or in some partial province), this admittedly does not answer the pressing question of whether, besides the descriptive procedure, one might not follow — as a counterpart to descriptive phenomenology — an idealizing procedure which substitutes pure and strict ideals for intuited data and might even serve as the fundamental means for a mathesis of mental processes.

However much the investigations just carried out were compelled to leave open, they have advanced us considerably and not just by bringing a series of important problems within our field of vision. It is now completely clear to us that nothing of value for the establishing of phenomenology can be gained by proceeding according to analogy. It is only a misleading prejudice to believe that the methods of historically given a priori sciences, all of which are exclusively\textsuperscript{22} exact sciences of ideal objects, must serve forthwith as models for every new science, particularly for our transcendental phenomenology — as though there could be\textsuperscript{23} eidetic sciences of but one single methodic type, that of "exactness." Transcendental phenomenology, as a

\textsuperscript{22} Insertion in Copy D: throughout idealizing
\textsuperscript{23} Insertion in Copy A: only material
descriptive science of essence, belongs however to a *fundamental class of eidetic sciences totally different* from the one to which the mathematical sciences belong.
§76. The Theme of the Following Investigations.

The realm of transcendental consciousness as the realm of what is, in a determined sense, “absolute” being, has been provided us by the phenomenological reduction. It is the primal category of all being (or, in our terminology, the primal region), the one in which all other regions of being are rooted, to which, according to their essence, they are relative and on which they are therefore all essentially dependent. The theory of categories must start entirely from this most radical of all ontological distinctions — being as consciousness and being as something which becomes “manifested” in consciousness, “transcendent” being — which, as we see, can be attained in its purity and appreciated only by the method of the phenomenological reduction. In the essential relationship between transcendental and transcendent being are rooted all the relationships already touched on by us repeatedly but later to be explored more profoundly, between phenomenology and all other sciences — relationships in the sense of which it is implicit that the dominion of phenomenology includes in a certain remarkable manner all the other sciences. The excluding has at the same time the characteristic of a revaluing change in sign; and with this change the revalued affair finds a place once again in the phenomenological sphere. Figuratively speaking, that which is parenthesized is not erased from the phenomenological blackboard but only parenthesized, and thereby provided with an index. As having the latter it is, however, part of the major theme of inquiry.

It is absolutely necessary that this situation with the points of view peculiar to it be understood thoroughly. Included here is, for example, the fact that physical Nature undergoes exclusion, while at the same time there is not only a phenomenology of natural-scientific consciousness as a matter of natural-scientific experiencing and think-
ing but also a phenomenology of Nature itself as the correlate of natural-scientific consciousness. Likewise, though psychology and the cultural sciences are affected by the excluding, there is a phenomenology of man, his personality, his personal properties and his (human) flow of consciousness; furthermore, a phenomenology of the social mind, of social formations, cultural products, etc. Everything transcendent, in as much as it becomes given in consciousness, is an object for phenomenological investigation not only with respect to the consciousness of it — e.g., the different modes of consciousness in which it becomes given as the same — but also, though this is essentially involved with the former, as what is given and accepted in the modes of givenness.

Thus there are immense domains of phenomenological research for which one is not in the least prepared when one starts out from the idea of the mental process — especially if one begins, as we all do, with the psychological attitude and has allowed the concept of the mental process to be prescribed for him in the first place by the psychology of our times — and which one will at first be little inclined to accept as at all phenomenological because of the influence of internal hindrances. In the case of psychology and the cultural sciences this inclusion of what has been parenthesized results in quite peculiar and at first rather confusing situations. To indicate this only in the case of psychology we note that consciousness, as a datum of psychological experience, thus as human or brute consciousness, is an object of psychology, in experiential-scientific research, an object of empirical psychology; in essential-scientific research, an object of eidetic psychology.\(^1\) On the other hand, as having the modification effected by parenthesizing, the whole world with all its psychical individuals and their psychical processes, belongs in phenomenology: all of it as a correlate of absolute consciousness. Consciousness therefore makes its appearance here in different modes of apprehension and different contexts, and different ones moreover within phenomenology itself: namely, within the latter itself first as absolute consciousness and secondly, in the correlate, as psychological consciousness which occurs in the natural world — as in a certain manner revalued, yet without losing the content peculiar to it as consciousness. Those are difficult and extraordinarily important contexts. They account for the fact that any phenomenological finding concer-

\(^1\) Marginal note to this sentence in Copy A: Unclear
ning absolute consciousness can be reinterpreted as an eidetic-
psychological finding (which, strictly considered, is itself by no me-
ans phenomenological), although here the phenomenological modes
of observing things is the more inclusive and, as absolute, is the more
radical mode. To see all this and consequently to confer a completely
transparent clarity on the essential relationships between pure phi-
omenology, on the one hand, and eidetic and empirical psychology
(or cultural sciences, as the case may be) on the other hand, is of great
concern to those disciplines and to philosophy. Specifically psychol-
y, which is aspiring so strongly in our times, can acquire the radical
foundation still lacking to it only if it has at its command far-reaching
insights into the essential contexts indicated.

The indications just given make us sensible of how far we still are
from an understanding of phenomenology. We have learned to
practice the phenomenological attitude; we have removed a number
of confusing methodological objections; we have defended the legiti-
macy of a pure description: the field of research lies open. But we do
not yet know what the major themes are in <that field>; more particular-
ly, what fundamental lines of description are prescribed by the most universal
essential species of mental processes. To produce clarity in these con-
nections, in the following chapters we shall attempt to characterize
just these most universal essential species, at least with respect to
some especially important traits.

With these new considerations we are not actually forsaking the
problem of method. Our discussions of method up to the present were
already determined by the most universal insights into the essence of
the phenomenological sphere. It is obvious that a more penetrating
knowledge of the latter — not with respect to its single particulars but
with respect to the all-prevasive universalities — must also put into
our hands norms of method which have a richer content and which
are, at the same time, norms with which all specific methods must
square. A method, after all, is nothing which is, or which can be, brough in from outside. Rather than a method, formal logic and
formal noetics provide only the form of a possible method; and useful
as a knowledge of form may be methodologically, a determinate me-
thod — determined not with respect to its technical particularity but
with respect to the universal type of method <to which it belongs> — is
a norm which arises from the fundamental regional specificity and
the universal structures of the province in question, so that a cogni-
tive seizing upon such a method depends essentially on knowledge of
these structures.
§77. Reflection as a Fundamental Peculiarity of the Sphere of Mental Processes. Studies in Reflection.

Among the most universal essential peculiarities of the sphere of pure mental processes we shall deal with reflection first. We shall do so because of its universal methodological function: the phenomenological method operates exclusively in acts of reflection. But concerning the efficacy of reflection and therefore the possibility of any phenomenology whatever there exist skeptical doubts which we wish to remove completely at the outset.

Already in our preliminary deliberations we had to speak of reflection. The results which we achieved there, even before entering the field of phenomenology, we can still take over now while rigorously effecting the phenomenological reduction, since those findings concerned only what is essentially peculiar to mental processes, thus, as we know, what need only be transcendentally purified with respect to the formulation placed upon them in order for us to retain them as a secure possession. First of all we shall recapitulate what is already familiar and attempt at the same time to penetrate more deeply into the subject-matter as well as into the nature of the phenomenological studies made possible and demanded by reflection.

Each Ego is living its mental processes, and in the latter a great variety is included really-inherently and intensively. It lives them: that is not to say that it has them and has its "eye on" what they include and is seizing upon them in the manner characteristic of an experiencing of something immanent or of any other intuiting and objectivating of something immanent. Any mental process which is not an object of regard can, with respect to ideal possibility, become "regarded;" a reflection on the part of the Ego is directed to it, it now becomes an object for the Ego. The situation is the same in the case of possible Ego-regards directed to the components of the mental process and to its intentionalities (to that of which the mental process may be a consciousness). In turn, the reflections are mental processes and, as reflections, can become the substrates of new reflections; and so on ad infinitum as a matter of essentially necessary universality.

2 Author's footnote: Cf. above, §38, pp. 65f., and §45, p. 83.
3 Marginal note in Copy A: It is always better not to refer to the plurality of Egos, moreover, and could give rise to unnecessary doubt.
When the mental process which, at any particular time, is actually being lived comes into reflective regard it becomes given as actually being lived, as existing "now." But not only that: it becomes given as having just now been and, in so far as it was unregarded, precisely as having been unregarded, as not having been reflected on. In the natural attitude, without our thinking about it, we take it for granted that mental processes do not exist only when we advert to them and seize upon them in an experience of something immanent; and we also take it for granted that they actually existed and, indeed, were actually lived by us if they are still, in reflection on something immanent, within retention ("primary" memory) as having been "just now," "still intended to."

We are convinced moreover that reflection on the basis of and "in" recollection gives us cognizance of our earlier mental processes, the ones which were present "then," which were then perceivable, though not perceived, as something immanent. According to the naively natural view the very same holds with respect to anticipation, to forward-looking expectation. The first thing to be considered in that connection is immediate "protention" (as we might say), the precise counterpart of immediate retention; and then, presentiating in a quite different way, the anticipation which is, in more proper sense, reproductive and is the counterpart of recollection [Wiedererinnerung]. In such anticipation the intuitively expected, that to which one intends in foresight as "coming in the future," has at the same time, owing to possible reflection "in" anticipation, the signification of something which will be perceived; just as the retrospectively remembered has the signification of something which was perceived. Thus we can reflect in anticipation too, and become aware of mental processes of our own upon which we were not focused in it, as processes belonging to the anticipated as such: as we do whenever we say that we shall see what is coming, our reflective regard on such occasions adverting to the "future" mental processes of perception.

We make all that clear to ourselves in the natural attitude, perhaps as psychologists, and we trace the broader contexts in which the phenomena are involved.

If we now effect the phenomenological reduction, our findings (inside their parentheses) change into exemplificatory cases of eidetic

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4 Marginal note in Copy A: Reflection in memory (also p. 148).
5 Insertion in Copy D: and eidetic
universalities which we can appropriate and systematically study within the limits of pure intuition. For example, in a living intuition (which even may be imaginary) we put ourselves into the effecting of some act or other, perhaps into a rejoicing at a course of theoretical thought which goes on freely and fruitfully. We effect all the reduct-ions and see what lies in the pure essence of the phenomenological matters here. First of all, then, a being adverted to the thought which are going on. We develop the exemplificatory phenomenon still further: During the pleasing course of thoughts a reflective regard becomes adverted to the rejoicing. The latter becomes a mental process regarded and perceived as something immanent, fluctuating and fading away thus and so as it is regarded reflectively. At the same time, the freedom of the course of thought suffers; we are now conscious of it in a modified manner; the pleasiness belonging to its continuance is also affected essentially — that too we can observe by advertsing our <reflective> regard in yet other directions. But let us leave this out of considerations now and take note of the following.

The first reflection on the rejoicing finds it as actually present now, but not as only now beginning. It is there as continuing to endure, as already lived before, only not looked at. That is, there evidently exists the possibility of tracing the past duration and mode of givenness of what is pleasing, of paying attention to earlier phases in the course of the theoretical course of thought and also to the regard which was previously directed to it; on the other hand, there exists the possibility of paying attention to the rejoicing advertence to it and, by contrast, to seize upon the lack of a regard adverted to it in the phenomenon which has run its course. But also, with respect to the rejoicing which has subsequently become an object, we have the possibility of effecting a reflection on the reflection which objectivates the latter and of thus making even more effectively clear the difference between a rejoicing which is lived, but not regarded, and a regarded rejoicing; likewise the modifications which are introduced by the acts of seizing-upon. explicating, etc., which start with the advertence of regard.

All that we can consider in the phenomenological attitude and eidgetically, either in its higher universality or with respect to whatever may come to light essentially in the case of particular kinds of mental processes. The entire stream of mental processes, with the lived processes which, in the mode of consciousness as not modified reflectionally, belong to it, can thus be submitted to a scientific eidgetic study aiming
at systematic completeness and, more particularly, with respect also to all the possibilities of mental process-moments *intentively* contained in them and therefore specifically with respect to the mental processes which are perhaps intended to in them in a modified manner and to the intentionalia of *these* processes. We have already become acquainted with examples of the latter in the form of those modifications of mental processes which are intentionally included in all presentations and can be singled out by reflection “in” presentations: for example, the “was-perceived” which is contained in any memory and the “will-be-perceived” contained in every expectation.

The study of the stream of mental processes is, for its part, carried on in variety of peculiarly structured reflective acts which themselves also belong in the stream of mental processes and which, in corresponding reflections at a higher level, can be made the Objects of phenomenological analyses. This is because their analysis is fundamental to a universal phenomenology and to the methodological insight quite indispensible to it. Something similar is obviously true in the case of psychology. By vague references to a study of mental processes in reflection or in memory — which people usually identify with reflection — nothing is accomplished, apart from many a falsity which is frequently combined directly with such references (precisely because of the lack of serious eidetic analysis) such as, e.g., that there can be no such thing at all as perception and observation of something immanent.

Let us enter somewhat more closely into these matters.

§ 78. The Phenomenological Study of Reflections on Mental Processes.

According to what has just been explained, reflection is a name for acts in which the stream of mental processes, with all its manifold occurrences (mental process-moments, intentionalia) become evidentially apprehensible and analyzable. It is, as we can also say, the name of the method of consciousness leading to the cognition of any consciousness whatever. By this very method, however, it itself becomes an Object of possible studies: Reflection is also the name for kinds of mental processes which belong essentially together and is therefore the theme of a main chapter of phenomenology. The task of that chapter is to distinguish the different “reflections” and analyze them all in a systematic order.
In this connection, first of all, one must make it clear that “reflection” of any kind has the characteristic of being a modification of a consciousness and, moreover, a modification which essentially any consciousness can undergo.

We speak here of modification because any reflection is, according to its essence, the consequence of changes in attitude whereby an already given mental process or really immanent Datum thereof (one not modified reflectationally) undergoes a certain transmutation precisely into the mode of consciousness (or object of consciousness) reflectationally modified. The already given mental process can itself already have the characteristic of reflectationally modified consciousness of something, so that the new modification belongs to a higher level; but ultimately we get back to mental processes which are absolutely unmodified reflectationally, and to the really inherent and the intuitive dabile belonging to them. Now, according to an eidetic law, any mental process can become converted into reflectational modifications, and <can be converted> along different lines with which we shall become more precisely acquainted.

The fundamental methodological significance of the eidetic study of the reflections for phenomenology and, no less, for psychology, is shown by the fact that under reflection all modes of the seizing upon the essence of something immanent and, on the other hand, of experiencing something immanent, are included. Included therefore is, e.g., perception of something immanent which is, in fact, a reflection in so far as it presupposes a turning of one's regard from something else of which one was conscious to the consciousness of that something. In like manner, as we mentioned (in the last section) when discussing the taken-for-granted features of the natural attitude, any memory admits not only of a reflective turning of one's regard to it itself but also of the peculiar modification of reflection “in” memory. In memory there is at first, perhaps, consciousness of, e.g., the course of a piece of music unmodified reflectationally in the mode of the “past.” But there belongs to the essence of the object of such a consciousness the possibility of reflecting on the having-been-perceived of that object. There likewise exists for expectation, for consciousness foreseeing “what is coming,” the eidetic possibility of turning one's regard away from what is coming to its having-become-perceived. Inherent in these eidetic connections is the fact that the statements, “I remember A” and “I have perceived A,” “I foresee A” and “I will perceive A,” are a priori and immediately equivalent — but they are only equivalent since the sense is different in each case.
Here the phenomenological task is to investigate systematically all the modifications of mental processes falling under the heading of reflection, in connection with all the modifications to which they are essentially related and which they presuppose. The latter concerns the totality of essential modifications which any mental process must undergo during its originary course and, in addition, the different kinds of variations which can be conceived idealiter as effected on each mental process by means of "operations."

In itself every mental process is a flux of becoming, is what it is in a generation originaliter of an invariant essential type; it is a continuous flow of retentions and protentions mediated by a flowing phase of originarity itself in which there is consciousness of the living now of the mental process in contradistinction to its "before" and "after."\(^6\) On the other hand, every mental process has its parallel in the different forms of reproductions which can be regarded as ideally inherent "operative" transformations of the original mental process: each has its "precisely corresponding" and yet thoroughly modified counterpart in a recollection, likewise in a possible anticipation, in a possible mere\(^7\) phantasy and, again, in the reiterations of such variations.

Naturally we conceive all the parallelized mental processes as parallelized processes of a common essential composition: the parallel mental processes should therefore intend to the same intentional objectivities, and intend to them in identical modes of givenness by virtue of the range of all those which, in other respects of possible variation, can take place.

Because the\(^8\) modifications under consideration belong to any mental process as ideally inherent possible variations, thus to a certain extent designating operations idealiter which can be thought of as effected on any «mental process», they are reiterable ad infinitum, they are also to be effected on the modified mental processes. Conversely, starting from any mental process already characterized as such a modification, and which then in itself is always characterized as that «modification», we are led back to certain primal mental processes, to "impressions" which absolutely originary mental processes exhibit in the phenomenological sense. Thus perceptions of physical things are originary mental processes in relation to all rememberings, presentations

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\(^6\) Marginal note in Copy D: Constitution of the temporality of all mental processes

\(^7\) Insertion in Copy A: reproductive

\(^8\) Insertion in Copy A: reproductive
in phantasy; and so forth. They are therefore as originary as concrete mental processes can be universally. This is because they have in their concretion, more precisely considered, only one, but also always a continuously flowing, absolutely originary phase — the moment of the living now.

We can relate these modifications primarily to the actionally conscious mental processes not reflectionally modified, since we can see at once that everything intended to in reflectionally modified consciousness eo ipso must acquire a share in these primary modifications by the fact that they, as reflections on mental processes and taken in full concretion, are themselves conscious mental processes not reflectionally modified and as not so modified take on all modifications. Now, reflection is certainly itself a new kind of universal modification — this directing itself to mental processes pertaining to the Ego and in unity with the effecting of acts of the cogito (particularly of acts belonging to the lowest, fundamental stratum, that of presentation simpliciter) “in” which the Ego directs itself to its mental processes; but just the combining of reflection with intuitive or empty apprehensions or seizing-upon conditions the necessary combining of the study of the reflectional modifications with that of the modifications indicated above.

By the reflectional experiencing acts alone we know something of the stream of mental processes and of the necessary relatedness of the «stream» to the pure Ego; thus we know that it is a field of free effectings of cogitationes belonging to one and the same pure Ego; that all mental processes of the stream are the Ego’s precisely in so far as it regards or can direct its regard “through” «the stream» to something other than the Ego. We are convinced that these experiencings also preserve their sense and legitimacy as reduced «experiencings», and in generical eidetic universality we seize upon the legitimacy of any experiencings of such a characteristic, just as, in a way parallel with that, we seize upon the legitimacy of seeing an essence related to any mental process whatever.

Thus, e.g., we seize upon the absolute legitimacy of reflection on preceiving something immanent, i.e., perception simpliciter of something immanent\(^*\) and, more particularly, with respect to what, in its flowing away, it actually makes given originarily; similarly, the absolute legitimacy of retention of something immanent with respect to what

\(^*\text{Marginal note in Copy A: Cf. Lectures of 1922/23.}\)
is intended to in it in the characteristic of what is “still” living and what has “just now” been, but of course only so far as the content of what is thus characterized reaches. Thus, e.g., in view of the fact that it was the perceiving of a tone and not of a color. We likewise seize upon the relative legitimacy of recollection of something immanent which reaches so far as the content of this remembering, singly regarded, shows the genuine recollection-characteristic (which, universally, by no means is done by each moment remembered) — a legitimacy which occurs entirely in any recollection. But, of course, it is merely a “relative” legitimacy, one which can be outweighed no matter to what extent it is still a legitimacy. And so forth.

As a consequence, we see with the most perfect clarity and with the consciousness of unconditioned validity that it would be countersensical to mean that mental processes would be cognitionally assured only to the extent that they are given in the reflectional consciousness pertaining to the perceiving of something immanent; or even that they would only be assured in the particular actual Now; that it would be wrong to doubt the having existed of what, in the turning back of the regard, is found as “still” intended to (the immediate retention); and, again, it is wrong finally to doubt whether mental processes which become the object of a regard are not, as a consequence, converted toto coelo into something different; and so forth. It is only necessary here not to let oneself be confused by arguments which, in all formal precision, allow that conformity to the primal source, to that of pure intuition, be confounded; it is necessary to remain faithful to the “principle of all principles” that perfect clarity is the measure of all truth, and that statements which faithfully express their data need not be concerned about arguments, no matter how refined they may yet be.


From what has just been set forth we can see that phenomenology is not affected by that methodological skepticism which in empirical psychology has, in parallel cases, so frequently led to the denial or the improper limitation of the value of experience of something internal. Recently H.J. Watt has, nevertheless, believed that this skepticism

10 Author’s footnote: Cf. Sammelbericht II: “Über die neueren Forschungen in der
can be advocated against phenomenology whereby he certainly has not seized the sense peculiar to pure phenomenology which the *Logische Untersuchungen* tried to introduce; nor has he seen the difference between pure phenomenological matters and empirical psychological ones. No matter how closely akin the difficulties of both sides are, there is still a difference between whether we ask, «on the one hand», about the range and the essentially necessary cognitive value of *existential* findings which give expression to the givennesses of our (human) experiences of the internal — we therefore ask about psychological method; or if we ask, on the other hand, about the phenomenological method, about the essentially necessary possibility and range of *essential* findings which, on the ground of pure reflection, should concern mental processes as mental processes with respect to their own being free from natural apperception. Nevertheless, between both «methods» there subsist inner relationships, indeed in an appreciable measure congruences, which justify our taking into consideration Watt’s objections, in particularly significant statements such as the following:

“One can indeed scarcely even inquire into the likelihood of how one arrives at the cognition of immediate mental living. For it is neither knowledge nor the object of knowledge; it is rather something else. It is not to be discerned how a report about the mental living of mental living, even when it is there, could be put down on paper.”

“But this is always the ultimate question of the fundamental problem of self-observation.” “Today one designates this absolute description as phenomenology.”

Reviewing the work of Th. Lipps, Watt then further states: “The *known* / *gewussten* / actuality of objects of self-observation stands over against the actuality of the present Ego and the present consciousness-processes. This actuality is mentally lived [namely, merely lived, not 'known,' i.e., not seized upon reflectively]. It is therefore precisely absolute actuality.” “One may now be of a very different conviction,” he now adds for his part, “about what one can do...
with this absolute actuality... Moreover, it is a matter here only of the results of self-observation. When, now, this ever retrospective observation is always knowledge about mental processes just had as objects, how can one establish the states of which one has no knowledge, of which there is only consciousness? Indeed, it all turns on the importance of the whole discussion of, namely, the derivation of the concept of immediate mental living which is not knowledge. One must be able to observe. Finally, each of us lives mentally. Only he does not know it. And if he were to know it, how can he know that his mental living is in actuality absolutely thus as he thinks it is? From whose head does phenomenology spring fully armed? Is a phenomenology possible and in which sense? All of these questions thrust themselves to the fore. Perhaps a discussion of the question of self-observation by experimental psychology will shed new light on this domain. For the problem of phenomenology is one which also necessarily arises for experimental psychology. Perhaps the latter's answer will also be more careful since it lacks the zeal of the discoverer of phenomenology. In any case, it is, by virtue of itself, referred more to an inductive method.”

With the pious belief in the omnipotence of the inductive method referred to in the last lines (and which Watt would scarcely be able to maintain if he were to reflect on the conditions for the possibility of this method), it is certainly surprising to find the admission “that a functional-analytic psychology will never be able to explain the facts of knowledge.”

In contrast to these statements characteristic of recent psychology — precisely in so far as they are meant psychologically — we must bring to light, in the first place, the separation made above between psychological and phenomenological questions and, in this respect emphasize the fact that a phenomenological doctrine of essences is of no more interest to the method by which the phenomenologist can make sure of the existence of those mental processes which serve him as foundations for his phenomenological findings than the geometer would be interested in how the existence of figures on the board or the models on the shelf could be methodologically established. As sciences of pure essence, geometry and phenomenology do not recognize any findings about real existence. Connected with just that is the fact

12 Authors's footnote: Ibid., p. 7.
13 Insertion in Copy A: and hence indirect
14 Author's footnote: Ibid., p. 12.
that clear feignings not only offer them foundations as good as, but to a great extent better than, the data of actual perception and experience.\textsuperscript{15}

If, now, phenomenology does not, as a consequence, have to make existential findings about mental processes, if it thus need not make “experiences” and “observations” in the natural sense, in the sense in which a science of matters of fact must support itself by them, it nevertheless makes eidetic findings about reflectionally unmodified mental processes as the essentially necessary condition of its possibility. But it owes this to reflection, more precisely to reflective intuition of essences. As a result, the skeptical doubt with respect to self-observation likewise comes into view for phenomenology; it comes into view for phenomenology, more particularly, in so far as this doubt allows of being extended in an obvious way from reflection on something immanent to reflection taken universally.

As a matter of fact, what should phenomenology become if it “were not to be seen how a report about the mental living of mental living, even when it is there, could be put down on paper”? What should be made of phenomenology if it could make statements about the essence of “known,” reflectionally modified mental processes but not about mental processes pure and simple? What should it be if “one can scarcely even inquire into the likelihood of how one arrives at cognition of immediate mental living?” — or, to cognition of its essence? It may be that phenomenology cannot produce any existential findings in relation to the mental processes which hover before it as examples for its ideation. Yet in these ideations it only sees, one can object, ideas of just what it has before its eyes at the moment in the examples. As soon as its regard adverts to the mental process, it only adverts to what is now presented to the regard, just as when it turns away the regard it adverts to a different <mental process>. The essence seized upon is only the essence of the reflectionally modified mental process; and the conviction proves to be completely ungrounded that by reflection we can acquire absolutely valid cognitions true for any mental process whatever, be it reflectionally modified or not. “How can one establish states,” even as essential possibilities, “of which one can have no knowledge?”

That obviously concerns every kind of reflection, although in phenomenology each of them still holds as the source of absolute

\textsuperscript{15} Author’s footnote: Cf. above, §70, pp. 129ff.
cognitions. In phantasy a physical thing, be it even a centaur, hovers before me. I mean to know that it is presented in certain "modes of appearance," in certain "adumbrations of sensations," apprehensions, and so forth. I mean to have there the *eidetic* insight that such an object taken universally *can* only be intuited in that kind of modes of appearance only by means of such and such adumbrational functions and whatever else might play a role here. But having my eye on the centaur, I do not regard its modes of appearance, adumbrative Data, apprehensions; and seizing upon its essence, I do not seize upon those modes of appearance, Data and apprehensions and their essence. A certain reflective turning of the regard to them is necessary, but which modifies and brings the whole mental process into flux; and in the new *act of* ideation I therefore have my eye on something new and need not assert that I have acquired the eidetic components of the reflectionally unmodified mental process. Nor need I assert that it pertains to the essence of a physical thing as physical to be presented in "appearances," to be adumbrated by Data of sensation of the kind indicated which, on their side, undergo apprehensions, etc.

Obviously the difficulty also concerns analyses of consciousness with respect to the "sense" of intenitive mental processes, with respect to everything which belongs to what is meant, to what is intentional-y objective as intentional, to the sense of a statement; and the like. For that too is analysis within the relevantly directed reflections. Watt himself even goes so far as to say that "psychology must make it clear that in the case of self-observation the relation to something objective pertaining to the mental processes to be described changes. Perhaps this change has a much greater signification than one is inclined to believe." If Watt is right, then we would, as a consequence, be asserting too much by claiming in self-observation that we were just now attentive to this book here and were still attentive to it. At best that holds prior to reflection. But reflection changed "the mental process to be described" pertaining to attention and, more particularly (according to Watt), with respect to the relation to something objective.

All genuine skepticism of whatever kind and persuasion is indicated by the essentially necessary countersense that, in its arguments, it implicitly presupposes as conditions of the possibility of its validity precisely what it denies in its theses. Without difficulty one
can persuade himself that this feature is equally true of the argumenta-
tions under discussion. He who also says: I doubt the cognitive signification of reflection, asserts a countersense. For as he declares his doubt, he reflects, and setting down this statement as valid presupposes that reflection actually and without doubt (scl. for the cases present) has the cognitive value doubted, that it does not change the relation to something objective, that the reflectionally unmodified mental process does not forfeit its essence in the transition to reflection.

Furthermore: The argumentations continuously speak of reflection as a matter of fact and of that which it encumbers and can encumber; as a consequence, one also speaks, naturally, of the "unknown," reflectionally unmodified mental processes as, again, matters of fact, namely as those on the basis of which the reflectionally modified processes arise. Therefore a knowledge of reflectionally unmodified mental processes, among them reflectionally unmodified reflections, is continuously presupposed, while at the same time the possibility of that knowledge is placed in question. This occurs in so far as there is doubt concerning the possibility of claiming anything whatever about the content of the reflectionally unmodified mental process and about the production of reflection: to what extent does it change the original mental process, and does it falsify it, so to speak, making it a totally different mental process?

However, it is clear that if this doubt and the possibility posited in it were legitimate, there would not remain the slightest ground of justification for the certainty that a reflectionally unmodified mental process and a reflection are given and can be given at all. It is clear, moreover, that the certainty which indeed was the continual presupposition can only be known by reflection, and that it can only be legitimated as immediate knowledge by a reflectionally presentive intuition. The case is the same with respect to the assertions of the actuality or the possibility of modifications which subsequently came by reflection. But if the like is given by intuition, then it is given in an intuitional content; it is therefore countersensical to assert that there is here nothing cognizable, nothing with respect to the content of the reflectionally unmodified mental process and the kind of modifications which it undergoes.

All that is sufficient to make the countersense distinct. Here, as everywhere, the skepticism loses its force by going back from verbal argumentations to eidetic intuition, tooriginarily presentive intui-
tion and the legitimacy primally its own. Of course, everything depends on one also actually effecting it and being capable of raising what is in question into the light of genuine eidetic clarity or presentations, as we have tried to do in the previous paragraphs — thus taking them up in the same intuitive way in which they have been effected and offered.

The phenomena of reflection are, in fact, a sphere of pure and possibly perfectly clear data. It is an *eidetic insight*, always attainable because immediate, that starting from the objectively given as objective reflection on the presentive consciousness and its subject is always possible: starting from the perceived, from what is "there ‘in person’," a reflection on the perceiving; starting from the remembered, just as it "hovers before us" as remembered, as "having been," a reflection on the remembering; starting from the statement in the flowing off of its being given, a reflection on the stating, etc. As a consequence, the perceiving becomes given as the perceiving of just this perceived, the present consciousness becomes given as consciousness of something intended to. It is evident that by virtue of its essence — thus not for adventitious reasons, perchance merely "for us" and our adventitious "psychological constitution" — something such as consciousness and consciousness-content (in the sense of what is really inherent or intentional) is cognizable by reflection. God is also bound to this absolute necessity given in insight, just as He is to discerning that $2 + 1 = 1 + 2$. Even God can only acquire cognition of His consciousness and consciousness-content by reflection.¹⁷

In that connection, it is said at the same time that with the ideal of perfect cognition reflection cannot be implicated in any antinomian controversy. We have had to emphasize many times that each species of being has, owing to its essence, *its* modes of givenness and with that its own cognitive method. It is countersensical to treat their essential peculiarities as deficiencies, let alone to count them among the sort of adventitious, factual deficiencies pertaining to "our human" cognition. Another question, but likewise to be considered in eidetic insight, is, however, that about the possible "range" of the cognition in question; it is thus the question about how we are to protect ourselves from statements which go beyond what is actually given at

¹⁷ *Author’s footnote*: We do not extend the controversy here to the domain of theology. The idea of God is a necessary limiting concept in epistemological considerations, and an indispensible index to the construction of certain limiting concepts which not even the philosophizing atheist can do without.
the moment and which is to be seized upon eidetically. And still another question concerns the empirical methods: how do we human beings have to proceed, for instance as psychologists, under given psychological circumstances in order to confer upon our human cognitions the highest dignity possible.

In addition, we must emphasize that our repeated recourse to insight (evidence or intuition) is not to mere rhetoric here or anywhere else; in the sense of the introductory part, the regress to what is ultimate in cognition signifies, instead, precisely the same thing when the word insight is used in the most primitive logical and arithmetical axioms. But he who has learned to apprehend with insight what is given in the sphere of consciousness will be able to read with astonishment statements such as the ones cited above: “One cannot even inquire into the likelihood of how one arrives at the cognition of immediate mental living;” from this we can see how alien the eidetic analysis of the immanent still is to modern psychology, even though eidetic analysis is the uniquely possible method for fixing the concepts which have to function as determinative in all psychological description of what is immanent.

18 Author’s footnote: While this book was in press I read in the just published Erkenntnistheorie auf psychophysiologischer und physikalischen Grundlage [Theory of Knowledge on the Grounds of Psychophysiology and Physics] (Jena, 1912) by Theodor Ziehen a characteristic utterance about “that suspicious, so-called intuition or evidence ... which has two principal properties: first of all, it varies from one philosophical school to another; and, secondly, it has a special preference for occurring just when the author renders an especially doubtfull point of his theory. We are then to protect ourselves from doubt by bluff.” As the context reveals, this critique is concerned with the theory of “universal objects” or “essence” and intuition of essence which is worked out in the Logische Untersuchungen. Thus Ziehen further states: “In order to distinguish these supra-empirical concepts from the common herd of ordinary concepts, one often has even ascribed to them in addition a particular universality, an absolute exactitude, and the like. I take all this to be human arrogance.” (Ibid., p. 413) No less characteristic for this theory of knowledge is the utterance on p. 441 related to the intuitive seizing upon the Ego (but in the author’s sense having a quite universal validity): “I can conceive of only one actual testimony for such a primary intuition: the agreement of all sentient and thinking individuals in witnessing such an intuition.” — Certainly it cannot be denied that excesses have often been committed by appealing to “intuition.” The only question is whether or not this excess with an alleged intuition can be discovered any other way than by an actual intuition. Even in the sphere of experience many excesses are committed in the appeal to experience, and it would be hard to accept if one were, on that account, to designate experience taken universally as “bluff,” and its “testimony” made to depend on the “agreement of all sentient and thinking individuals in the witnessing of such ‘experience’.” [Addition to this sentence in Copy A: which indeed would lead to an infinite regress.] Cf. in this connection, Part I, Chapter 2.


20 Author’s footnote: The two articles by August Messer and Jonas Cohn (in the first volume of Jahrbücher der Philosophie [Yearbooks of Philosophy], 1912, edited by Frischeisen-Köhler), which
The intimate connection between phenomenology and psychology is especially tangible in the problems of reflection dealt with here. Every description of essence related to species of mental processes expresses an unconditionally valid norm for possible empirical existence. In particular, this naturally concerns as well all the species of mental processes which are themselves constitutive for the psychological method, just as that method holds for all modes of experience of the internal. Thus phenomenology is the court of appeal for methodologically basic questions of psychology. Psychology must recognize, and if need be, rely on, what it has established generically as the condition for the possibility of all its further methods. What proves to be contradictory in that connection characterizes an essentially necessary psychological countersense in precisely the same way that, in the physical sphere, whatever contradicts the truths of geometry and the ontology of Nature taken universally is the essentially necessary countersense of the natural sciences.

One such essentially necessary countersense is expressed, accordingly, in the hope of overcoming the skeptical doubts about the possibility of self-observation by psychological induction in the ways of experimental psychology. Again, it is like the case in the domain of the cognition of physical nature where one would overcome by experimental physics the parallel skepticism about whether it is not the case that ultimately every perception of something external is deceptive (since, indeed, taken singly, each actual perception can deceive) when in fact the legitimacy of perception of something external is presupposed at every step.

Moreover, what is said here in universality will gain in force by everything which follows, in particular by the clarifications of the range of reflective eidetic insights. The relations touched upon here between phenomenology (or between eidetic psychology, which has not even been separated form phenomenology in a preliminary way,
and which in any case is intimately tied up with phenomenology) and psychology as an experiential science will also be subject to clarification in the Second Book with all the profound problems pertaining to it. I am certain that in the not too distant future it will be a common conviction that phenomenology (or eidetic psychology) will be the methodologically foundational science for empirical psychology in the same sense that the material mathematical disciplines (e.g., geometry and phoronomy) are foundational for physics.

The old ontological doctrine that the cognition of "possibilities" must precede the cognition of actualities is, in my opinion, in so far as it is correctly understood and made useful in the right ways, a great truth.

§80. The Relationship of Mental Processes to the Pure Ego.

Among the universal essential peculiarities pertaining to the transcendentally purified realm of mental processes the first place is due the relationship of each mental process to the "pure" Ego. Each "cogito," each act in a distinctive sense, is characterized as an act of the Ego, it "proceeds from out of the Ego," it "lives" "actionally" in the act. We have already spoken about this and will recall in a few sentences what was previously elaborated.

While observing, I perceive something; in a like manner I am often "busied" with something in memory; while quasi-observing, I follow in inventive phantasy what goes on in the phantasied world. Or I reflect, I draw conclusions; I take back a judgment, perchance "abstaining" from making any judgments at all. I am pleased or displeased, I am glad or sad, I wish, or I will and I do (something); or, again, I "abstain" from being glad, from wishing, willing and doing. In all such acts I am present, I am actionally there. Upon reflecting, I apprehend myself as the human being who is there.

But if I effect the phenomenological ἐποχή, then, as in the case of the whole world in the natural positing, there "I, the human being" undergoes exclusion; what remains behind is the pure act-process with its own essence. However, I also see that the apprehension of that process as human mental process, apart from the positing of existence, brings in a variety of things which need not of necessity be there21 and that, on the other hand, no excluding can annul the

21 In Copy D the words brings in a variety of things which need not of necessity be there are crossed out.
form of *cogito* and cancel out the "pure" subject of the act: the "being directed to," the "being busied with," the "taking a position toward," the "undergoing," the "suffering from," necessarily includes in its essence this: that it is precisely *a ray* "emanating from the Ego" or, in a reverse direction of the ray, "toward the Ego" — and this Ego is the *pure* Ego; no reduction can do anything to it.

We spoke before of mental processes of the particular type "cogito." The other mental processes, which form the universal milieu for the Ego-actionality, to be sure, lack the distinctive Ego-relatedness which we have just mentioned. And yet they also have their share in the pure Ego and the pure Ego has its share in them. They "belong" to <the pure Ego> as "its own" <mental processes,> they are *its* consciousness-background, *its* field of freedom.

In these peculiar combinations with all of "its" mental processes, the Ego living in mental processes [*das erlebende Ich*] is not something taken for itself and which can be made into an Object proper of an investigation. Aside from its "modes of relation" or "modes of comportment," the «Ego» is completely empty of essence-components, has no explicable content, is undescribable in and for itself: it is pure Ego and nothing more.22

For this reason there is still the occasion for a multiplicity of important descriptions precisely with respect to the particular ways in which it is an Ego living in the kinds of mental processes or modes of mental processes in question. Accordingly, there are always distinguished — in spite of the necessary relatedness to one another — the mental process itself and the *pure Ego* pertaining to the mental living. And, again: «there are always distinguished» the *purely subjective moments of the mode of consciousness* and, so to speak, the rest of the content of the mental process turned away from the Ego. As a consequence, there is a certain, extraordinarily important two-sidedness in the essence of the sphere of mental processes, of which we can also say that in mental processes there is to be distinguished a *subjectively oriented*23 side and an *objectively oriented* side: a manner of expression which must not be understood, indeed, as if we taught that the "Object" of the mental processes were something in it analogous to the pure Ego. The manner of expression will nevertheless be justified. And we add at once that to this two-sidedness, at least in significant stretches, there

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22 Marginal note to last sentence in Copy D: ?!
23 Marginal note to this line in Copy D: Egoic
corresponds a division of the investigation (if not an actual separation), one part of which is oriented toward pure subjectivity, the other part toward what belongs to the "constitution" of Objectivity for the subjectivity. We shall have a great deal to say about the "intentional relation" of mental processes (or of the pure Ego living in them) to Objects, and about the many sorts of mental process-components and "intentional correlates" which belong together with <that relation>. But all of these can be explored and described analytically or synthetically in comprehensive investigations without having to be occupied in any more profound way with the pure Ego and its modes of participation. Of course, frequently one must touch upon the pure Ego in so far as the pure Ego is something necessarily involved there.

The meditations which we intend to carry out further in this Part give preference to the objectively oriented side as that which offers itself in the first place when starting from the natural attitude. The problems indicated in the introductory paragraphs of this Part already refer to this objectively oriented side.

§81. Phenomenological Time and Consciousness of Time.

A proper discussion is required by phenomenological time as a universal peculiarity of all mental processes.

We must carefully observe the distinction between this phenomenological time, this unitary form of all mental processes within one stream of mental processes (within one pure Ego), and the "objective," i.e., the cosmic time.24

24 Marginal note to cosmic time in Copy A: cosmic can still be misleading; space-time?

(162) By means of the phenomenological reduction consciousness has not only lost25 its apperceptive "attachement" (which, of course, is a metaphor) to material reality and its incorporation into space, even though this is secondary, but also its place in cosmic time. That time which, by virtue of its essence belongs to the mental process as mental process, with its modes of givenness of Now, Before, After, with their modally determined simultaneity and recession, etc., is not measured nor to be measured by any position of the sun, by any clock, by any physical means.

25 Marginal note to lost in Copy D: lost?
Cosmic time is related to phenomenological time in a certain way analogous to the way in which a "spread" belonging to the immanent essence of a concrete sensation-content (perhaps a visual sensation-content in the field of visual sensation-Data) is related to objective spatial "extension," namely the "extension" of the appearing physical Object being visually "adumbrated" in this sensation-Datum. Just as it would be countersensical to subordinate a sensation-moment, such as color or spread, under the same essential genus with the physical moment, such as the color of the physical thing and the physical extension, adumbrated by the sensation-Datum: so the same would be the case with regard to the phenomenologically temporal and the worldly temporal. Transcendent time can be presented by way of appearance in the mental process and its components; but of essential necessity it makes no sense here as elsewhere to suppose a metaphorical similarity between the presentation and the presented which, as similarity, would presuppose oneness of essence.

In addition, it should not be said, for instance, that the way in which cosmic time is manifested in phenomenological time is precisely the same way in which other, material-essential moments of the world are phenomenologically presented. Certainly the presenting of colors and other sensuous qualities of physical things (in corresponding sense Data pertaining to sense-fields) is essentially different in kind; and, again, the adumbrating of spatial shapes of physical things in the forms of spread within Data of sensation is different in kind. But in what was worked out above commonality exists everywhere.

Moreover, as will emerge from investigations to follow later on, time is a name for a completely delimited sphere of problems and one of exceptional difficulty. It will be shown that in order to avoid confusion our previous presentation has remained silent to a certain extent, and must of necessity remain silent about what first of all is alone visible in the phenomenological attitude and which, disregarding the new dimension, makes up a closed domain of investigation. The transcendentally "absolute" which we have brought about by the reductions is, in truth, not what is ultimate; it is something which constitutes itself in a certain profound and completely peculiar sense of its own and which has its primal source in what is ultimately and truly absolute.

Fortunately we can leave out of account the enigma of conscious-
ness of time in our preliminary analyses without endangering their rigor. In the following sentences we only touch upon it:

The essential property, which the term temporality expresses for any mental process whatever, not only designates something universally belonging to every single mental process, but also a necessary form combining mental processes with mental processes. Each actual mental process (we effect this evidence on the ground of clear intuition of an actuality characterizing mental processes) is necessarily an enduring one; and with this duration it finds its place in an infinite continuum of duration — in a fulfilled continuum. Of necessity it has an all-round, infinitely fulfilled temporal horizon. At the same time this says: it belongs to one endless "stream of mental processes." Every single mental process, e.g., a mental process of joy, can begin as well as end and hence delimit its duration. But the stream of mental processes cannot begin and end. Every mental process, as temporal being, is a mental process of its pure Ego. Belonging of necessity to this is the possibility (which, as we know, is no empty logical possibility) that the Ego directs its pure regard to this mental process and seizes upon <the mental process> as actually existing or as enduring in phenomenological time.

But, again, there belongs to the essence of the situation the possibility that the Ego directs its regard to the temporal modes of givenness and knows with evidence (as we all in fact acquire this evidence by reliving what is described in intuition) that no enduring mental process is possible unless it is constituted in a continuous flow of modes of givenness as something unitary pertaining to the event and to the duration; moreover, <it knows with evidence> that this mode of givenness of the temporal mental process is itself again a mental process, although of a new kind and dimension. Thus, for instance, I can have, first of all, in the pure regard the joy itself which begins and ends and endures in the meantime; I go along with its temporal phases. However, I can take heed of its modes of givenness: I take heed, in the particular case, of the mode of "Now" and accordingly of the fact that a new and continually new <Now> follows upon this Now and, of essential necessity, upon every <Now> in necessary continuity, of the fact that in unity therewith every actually present Now is chan-

26 AUTHOR'S FOOTNOTE: The efforts of the author concerning this enigma, and which were in vain for a long time, were brought to a conclusion in 1905 with respect to what is essential; the results were communicated in lectures at the University of Göttingen.

27 Marginal note in Copy A: <Cf. §118, p.> 245.
ged into a Just Now, the Just Now once more and continuously into an always new Just Now of the Just Now; and so forth. This holds for every new ensuing Now.

The actually present Now is necessarily and remains something punctual, a persisting form for ever new material. It is likewise with the continuity of "just now;" it is a continuity of forms of always new contents. At the same time this signifies: the enduring mental process of joy is given "in the manner peculiar to consciousness" in a consciousness-continuum of constant form: A phase, impression, as the limit-phase of a continuity of retentions which, however, are not on an equal footing; they are instead to be related to one another continuously-intentively — a continuous complexity of retentions of retentions. The form always contains a new content, thus continuously "attaches" to each impression in which the Now of the mental process is given, a new impression corresponding continuously to a new point of the duration; an impression continuously changes into a retention; this retention continuously changes into a modified retention; and so forth.

To this must be added the counter-direction of continuous changes: to the Before there corresponds the After; to the continuum of retentions there corresponds that of protentions.

§82. Continuation. The Three-fold Horizon of Mental Processes As At The Same Time the Horizon of Reflection On Mental Processes.

But we also know still more in this connection. Each Now of the mental process, be it even the beginning phase of a newly appearing mental process, necessarily has its horizon of Before. But of essential necessity that cannot be an empty Before, an empty form without content, a non-sense. Of necessity it has the signification of a past Now which comprises in this form a past something, a past mental process. Every mental process which has newly begun is of necessity temporally preceded by mental processes; the past of mental processes is continuously fulfilled. However, every Now of the mental process also has its necessary horizon of After, and that is also not an empty horizon; of necessity every Now of the mental process, even if it is the end-phase of duration pertaining to a mental process which is ceasing, changes into a new Now, and it is of necessity a fulfilled one.

In that connection, one can also say: Of necessity there is attached
to the consciousness of Now the consciousness of the just past, the consciousness of which is itself again a Now. No mental process can cease without there being consciousness of the ceasing and of the having ceased, and that is a newly filled out Now. The stream of mental processes is an infinite unity, and the stream-form is a form which necessarily comprises all mental processes pertaining to a pure Ego — a form with a variety of systems of forms.

We reserve for future expositions, already announced, the more precise elaboration of these insights and the pointing out of their great metaphysical consequences.

The universal peculiarities of mental processes just dealt with, as possible data of reflective (immanental) perception, are a component part of a still more comprehensive peculiarity which is stated in the eidetic law that every mental process in an essentially self-enclosed concatenation of mental processes is not only considered in view of temporal succession but in view of simultaneity. That means that every Now of a mental process has a horizon of mental processes which also have precisely the originary form of “Now” and, as “Now,” make up an originary horizon of the pure Ego, its total originary Now of consciousness.

In a unitary way this horizon enters into the modes of the past. As a modified Now, every Before implies for every mental process in view, whose Before it is, an infinite horizon embracing everything which belongs to the same modified Now; in short, it embraces its horizon of “what was simultaneously.” The descriptions given a little while ago are therefore to be supplemented by a new dimension, and only when we do that do we have the whole field of phenomenological time of the pure Ego — a field which, from any one of “its” mental processes, it can traverse according to the three dimensions of Earlier, Later, and Simultaneity; or, in other words, we have the whole, essentially unified and strictly self-contained stream of temporal unities of mental processes.

One pure Ego — one stream of mental processes fulfilled with respect to all three dimensions, essentially concatenated in this fulfilling, summoning itself in its continuity of content: these are necessary correlates.
§83. Seizing Upon the Unitary Stream of Mental Processes as "Idea."

To this primal form of consciousness the following is related by eidetic law.

When the pure regard of the Ego reaches any mental process by reflecting and, more particularly, by seizing upon it perceptually, the possibility then exists of the regard turning toward other mental processes as far as this concatenation reaches. But by essential necessity this whole concatenation is never given or to be given by a single pure regard. In spite of this, it also can be seized upon intuitively in a certain, albeit essentially different way; <the whole can be seized upon> in the fashion of "limitlessness in the progression" of intuitions of the immanent going from the fixed mental process to new mental processes pertaining to its horizon of mental processes, from its fixing to those of its horizons; etc. The term horizon of mental processes not only signifies here, however, the horizon of phenomenological temporality according to its described dimensions, but also differences in novel modes of givenness. Accordingly, a mental process which has become an Object of an Ego-regard, which therefore has the mode of being made an object of regard, has its horizon of unregarded mental processes; a mental process seized upon in a mode of "attention" and possibly in unceasing clarity, has a horizon of inattention in the background with relative differences of clarity and obscurity as well as salientness and lack of salientness. Eidetic possibilities are rooted therein: <the eidetic possibility> of making the unregarded an object of the pure regard, of making the marginally noticed the primally noticed; of the making of the unsalient salient, the obscure clear and always clearer.\(^\text{28}\)

In the continuous progression from seizing-upon to seizing-upon, in a certain way, I said, we now seize upon the stream of mental processes as a unity. We do not seize upon it as we do a single mental process but rather in the manner of an idea in the Kantian sense. It is not something posited or affirmed by chance; it is instead an absolutely indubitable givenness. Even though it is also grounded in intuition, this indubitability has a source entirely different from that which exists for the being of mental processes, which therefore becomes given in the perception of the immanent. It is precisely the peculiarity of the

\(^{28}\) Author's footnote: "Horizon" thus has the same value here as the terms "halo" and "background."
ideation which sees a Kantian "idea" that it does not on that account, perhaps, lose the insight because the adequate determination of its content, here the stream of mental processes, is unattainable. At the same time we see that a series of distinguishable modes of givenness belongs to the stream of mental processes and its components — a series of modes of givenness the systematic inquiry into which must form a chief task of universal phenomenology.

On the basis of our considerations we can also formulate the eidetically valid and evidential statement that no concrete mental process can be accepted as a self-sufficient one in the full sense. Each is "in need of supplementation" with respect to a prescribed concatenation, which is therefore not arbitrary according to its kind and form.

E.g.: We observe any perception of something external, let us say of this determined perception of a house taken in concrete fullness; there then belongs to this perception the surroundings of mental processes as a necessary determinational part; however, it is, to be sure, a specifically peculiar, necessary and yet "extra-essential" determinational part, namely that determinational part the change of which alters nothing in the essential contents proper to the mental process. Thus perception itself changes according to change in determinedness of the surroundings, while the ultimate specific differences of the genus Perception, its inner ownness, can be conceived as identical.

That, in this ownness, two essentially identical perceptions are also identical with respect to the determination of the surroundings, is of essential necessity impossible for they would then be individually one perception.

In any case, one can make that evident with respect to two perceptions and therefore to any two mental processes whatever which belong to one stream of mental processes. Every mental process influences the (bright or dark) halo of further mental processes.

A more precise consideration would show, besides, that two streams of mental processes (spheres of consciousness for two pure Egos) of an identically essential content are inconceivable, as well that no completely determined mental process of the one stream can belong to the other — which can be seen from what has been said before; only mental processes of an identical inner characteristic can be common to them.

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29 Marginal note to this phrase in Copy D: proper as perception
30 Marginal note to this paragraph in Copy D: thus the individual difference inheres in the surroundings and hence in the temporal locus.
(although not common as individually identical), but not two\textsuperscript{31} mental processes which, in addition, have a "halo" absolutely alike.

\section*{§84. Intentionality as Principal Theme of Phenomenology}

We now pass over to a peculiarity of mental processes, to intentionality, which one can directly designate as the general theme of "Objectively" oriented phenomenology.\textsuperscript{32} Intentionality is an essential peculiarity of the sphere of mental processes taken universally in so far as all mental processes in some manner or other share in it; nevertheless, we cannot say of each mental process that it has intentionality in the same sense as when we say, e.g., of each mental process, even if it is an abstract moment of the mental process entering as Object into the regard of possible reflection, that it is a temporal mental process. Intentionality is what characterizes consciousness in the pregnant sense and which, at the same time, justifies designating the whole stream of mental processes as the stream of consciousness and as the unity of one consciousness.

In the preliminary eidetic analyses of the Second Part concerning consciousness in its universality (still at the entrance gate to phenomenology and, more particularly, for the goal of acquiring it by the method of the reduction) it was already necessary to work out a series of the most universal determinations concerning any intentionality whatever and concerning the distinctiveness of "acts," of the "cogitatio."\textsuperscript{33} We have made further use of them, and had to do so even though the original analyses were still not carried out under the explicit norm of the transcendental phenomenological reduction. Because they concern the pure essence proper of mental processes, they cannot, as a consequence, be touched by the excluding of the psychological apperception and positing of being. Since it is now a matter of explaining intentionality as a comprehensive name for all-inclusive phenomenological structures, and to sketch the sets of problems essentially related to these structures (in so far as that is possible in a general introduction), we shall recapitulate what we said earlier but in a form required by our goals which now have an essentially different direction.

\textsuperscript{31} \textit{Insertion in Copy D:} individually determined

\textsuperscript{32} \textit{Marginal note in Copy D to rest of paragraph:} ?

\textsuperscript{33} \textit{Author's footnote:} Cf. above, §§36-38, pp. 64-69.
Under intentionality we understand the own peculiarity of mental processes "to be consciousness of something." We first of all encounter this marvelous ownness, back to which all rational-theoretical and metaphysical enigmas lead, in the explicit cogito: a perceiving is a perceiving of something, perhaps a physical thing; a judging is a judging of a predicatively formed affair-complex; valuing of a predicatively formed value-complex; a wishing of a predicatively formed wish-complex; and so forth. Acting bears upon action. Doing bears upon the deed, loving bears upon the loved one, being glad bears upon the gladsome; and so forth. In every actional cogito a radiating "regard" is directed from the pure Ego to the "object" of the consciousness-correlate in question, to the physical thing, to the affair-complex, etc., and effects the very different kinds of consciousness of it. However, now, phenomenological reflection teaches that this objectivating, thinking, valuing ... Ego-advertence, this being-busied-with-the-correlate-object actionally, this being-directed-to-it (or also away from it — and yet with the regard upon it) is not to be found in every mental process: even so (the mental process) can still include intentionality within itself. Thus it is clear, for instance, that the objective background, from out of which the cognitively perceived object is singled out by virtue of the fact that the distinctive Ego-advertence is allocated to it, is, as a mental process, actually an objective background. That is, while we are now adverted to the pure object in the mode of "cogito," all sorts of objects "appear;" they are "intended to" intuitively, they flow together into the intuitive unity of a conscious field of objects. It is a potential field of perception in the sense that a particular perceiving (an attentive cogito) can advert to something which thus appears; but not in the sense as though the sensation-adumbrations present as a mental process, e.g., the visual sensation-adumbrations spread out in the unity of the visual sensation-field, lack any objective construing and therefore only constitute intuitive appearances of objects with the adverting of the regard.

There belong here, moreover, mental processes of the actionality-background, such as the "arousal" of likings, of judgments, of wishes, etc., at different distances in the background or, as we can also say, at a distance from and a nearness to the Ego, since the actional pure Ego living in the particular cogitationes is the point of reference. A liking, a wishing, a judging, and the like, can be "effected" in the specific sense, namely by the Ego which is "livingly busied" in this effecting
(or, as in the "effecting" of sorrow, <the Ego> actionally "undergoes suffering"); but such modes of consciousness can already be "stirring," be arising in the "background" without having to be "effected." With respect to their own essence these non-actionalities are likewise already "consciousness of something." As a consequence, we have not included in the essence of intentionality what is specific to the cogito, the "regard-to," (what is still to be understood in various ways and phenomenologically investigated) the Ego-advertence; we have instead accepted this cogitatio as a particular modality of that something universal which we call intentionality.

On Terminology

In the Logische Untersuchungen precisely this something universal is designated as "act-characteristic" and every concrete mental process of this characteristic as "act." The continual misinterpretations which this concept of act has undergone has decided me (here as in lectures for a number of years back) to delimit the terminology somewhat more cautiously and no longer to use the expressions act and intuitive mental process as equivalent without taking precautions. The sequel will establish the fact that my original concept of act is everywhere quite indispensable, but that it is continually necessary to take into account the modal differences between acts which are and are not effected.

When nothing is added, and we speak simply of act, we mean exclusively the genuine, so to speak, actionally effected acts.

Moreover, we must note quite universally that in phenomenology, at the beginning, all concepts or terms must remain in flux in a certain way, always at the point of being differentiated in accord with the progress of the analysis of consciousness and the cognition of new phenomenological strata within what is at first seen in undifferentiated unity. All terms chosen have their tendencies of being connected with other terms; they refer to relational directions, of which it is afterwards brought out that they do not have their source only in one essence-stratum; as a result, it is better to limit or otherwise to modify the terminology at the same time. Therefore we can only count on definitive terminologies at a very advanced stage of deve-

34 Author's footnote: Cf. above, §37, pp. 65ff.
lopment of a science. It is an error and basically absurd to apply extrinsic and formal criteria of a logic of terminology to scientific expositions which are just emerging and to demand terminologies of the sort which fix the concluding results of great scientific developments at the beginning. For the beginning, any expression is good and, more particularly, any suitably chosen figurative expression which enables us to guide our regard to a phenomenological occurrence which can be seized upon clearly. Clarity does not exclude a certain halo of indeterminateness. Its further determination or clarification is precisely the further task just as is, on the other hand, the internal analysis carried out by comparisons or by varying the contexts: the dividing up into components or strata. Those who, dissatisfied with the intuitive demonstrations, demand "definitions" as in the "exact" sciences or who believe that they can easily get along in a non-intuitive scientific thinking and thereby advance phenomenology with phenomenological concepts acquired from rough analyses of a couple of examples and which they assume to be fixed, are but beginners who have not yet even grasped the essence of phenomenology and the method essentially and necessarily required by it.

What has just been said is true no less for the empirically oriented psychological phenomenology in the sense of a description of psychological phenomena which is attached to what essentially pertains to the immanent.

The concept of intentionality, apprehended in its undetermined range, as we have apprehended it, is a wholly indispensable fundamental concept which is the starting point at the beginning of phenomenology. The universality which it designates may be ever so vague prior to more precise investigation; it may enter into an ever so great plurality of essentially different formations; it may be ever so difficult to set forth in rigorous and clear analyses what makes up the pure essence of intentionality, which components of the concrete formations genuinely contain it in themselves and to which components it is intrinsically alien — in any case, mental processes are observed from a determined and highly important point of view when we cognize them as intentive and say of them that they are consciousness of something. It is, moreover, indifferent to us in such assertions whether concrete mental processes of abstract strata of mental processes are involved: for they can also show the peculiarity in question.
§85. Sensuous ιλη, Intentive μορφή

We already suggested above, when we characterized the stream of mental processes as a unity of consciousness, that intentionality, disregarding its enigmatic forms and levels, is also like a universal medium which ultimately bears in itself all mental processes, even those which are not themselves characterized as intentive. At the level of consideration to which we are confined until further notice, a level which abstains from descending into the obscure depths of the ultimate consciousness which constitutes all such temporality as belongs to mental processes, and instead takes mental processes as they offer themselves as unitary temporal processes in reflection on what is immanent, we must, however, essentially distinguish two things:

1. all the mental processes designated in the Logische Untersuchungen as "primary contents;"  
2. the mental processes or their moments which bear in themselves the specific trait of intentionality.

Among the former belong certain "sensuous" mental processes which are unitary with respect to their highest genus, "sensation-contents" such as color-Data, touch-Data and tone-Data, and the like, which we shall no longer confuse with appearing moments of physical things — coloredness, roughness, etc. — which "present themselves" to mental processes [erlebnismaßig] by means of those "contents". Likewise the sensuous pleasure, pain and tickle sensations, and so forth, and no doubt also sensuous moments belonging to the sphere of "drives." We find such concrete really immanent Data as components in more inclusive concrete mental processes which are intuitive as wholes; and, more particularly, we find those sensuous moments overlaid by a stratum which, as it were, "animates," which bestows sense (or essentially involves a bestowing of sense) — a stratum by which precisely the concrete intuitive mental process arises from the sensuous, which has in itself nothing pertaining to intentionality.

37 Marginal note in Copy A: Accordingly, that would ultimately be intentionality at a higher level
Whether everywhere and necessarily such sensuous mental processes in the stream of mental processes bear some "animating construing" or other (with all the characteristics which this, in turn, demands and makes possible), whether, as we also say, they always have intenitive functions, is not to be decided here. On the other hand, we likewise leave it undecided at first if the characteristics essentially making up intentionality can have concreteness without having sensuous foundations.

Be that as it may, this remarkable duality and unity of sensuous νλη and intenitive μοφή plays a dominant role in the whole phenomenological sphere. In fact these concepts of stuff and form force themselves upon us if we presentiate to ourselves any clear intuitions or clearly effected valuations, acts of liking, willings, or the like. The intenitive mental processes are there as unities by virtue of sense-bestowing (in a greatly extended sense). Sensuous Data present themselves as stuffs for intenitive formings, or sense-bestowings, belonging to different levels, for simple formings and formings which are founded in a peculiar manner; we shall return to this in greater detail. That these locutions are very fitting will be confirmed from another side by the doctrine of "correlates." As for the possibilities left open above, they should be entitled accordingly formless stuffs and stuffless forms.

With respect to terminology, the following may be added. The expression, primary content, no longer appears to us sufficiently characteristic. On the other hand, the expression, sensuous mental process, cannot be used for the same concept because general locutions such as sensuous perceptions, sensuous intuitions of every sort, sensuous gladness, and the like, stand in the way — locutions characterizing as sensuous intenitive mental processes rather than bare hyletic processes; owing to its new ambiguities, the locution, "bare," or "pure," sensuous processes, obviously would not improve the matter. In addition there are the peculiar ambiguities belonging to the word "sensuous" ["sinnlich"], which are retained after the phenomenological reduction. Apart from the double sense which surfaces in the contrast between "sense-bestowing" ["sinngebend"] and "sensuous" and which, disturbing as it occasionally is, can hardly be avoided, the following should be mentioned: sensuousness [Sinnlichkeit] in a narrower sense designates the phenomenological residuum of what is conveyed by the "senses" in normal perception of the external. After the reduction there becomes apparent an essential
kinship among the remaining “sensuous” Data of intuitions of the external; and to it corresponds a peculiar generic essence, correlatively a fundamental concept of phenomenology. In the broader and essentially unitary sense, however, sensuousness also comprises the sensuous feelings and drives which have their own generic unity and, on the other side, no doubt likewise an essential kinship of a general sort with the aforesaid sensuousness in the narrower sense — all that regardless of the additional community expressed by the functional concept of hyle. Together, both compelled the old transference of the originally narrow term sensuousness to the spheres of emotion and will, namely to the intensive mental processes in which sensuous Data belonging to the designated spheres make their appearance as functioning “stuffs.” Be that as it may, therefore, we need a new term which expresses the whole group by the unity of the function and the contrast to the forming characteristics; and we choose for it the expression hyletic Data or stuff-Data, likewise simply sensuous stuffs. Where it is necessary to awaken the memory of the old expressions, unavoidable in their way, we shall speak of sensual, indeed even sensuous stuff [sensuelle, wohl auch sinnliche Stoffe].

What forms the stuff into intensive mental processes and what brings in that which is specific to intentionality is precisely the same thing as what gives the locution, consciousness, its specific sense: precisely according to which consciousness \textit{eo ipso} indicates something of which it is consciousness. Because, now, the locutions, moments of consciousness, awarenesses, and similar constructions, and likewise because the locution, intensive moments, are made quite unusable by the many different equivocations which will be distinctly brought out in what follows, we introduce the term noetic moment or, in short, noesis. These noeses make up what is specific to \textit{nous in the broadest sense} of the word; it refers us back, according to all its actional life-forms, to cogitationes and then to any intensive mental processes whatever, and as a result comprises everything (and essentially only that) which is the \textit{eidetic presupposition of the idea of the norm}. At the same time, it is not unwelcome that the word, nous, recalls one of its distinctive significations, namely precisely “\textit{sense},” although the “sense-bestowing” which is effected in the noetic moments comprises many different things and only as foundation <comprises> a “sense-bestowing” following upon the pregnant concept of sense.

\textsuperscript{38} Marginal note in Copy A to this sentence: modes of appearance and position-takings?
There would be good grounds for designating this noetic side of mental processes as the *psychical* side. This is because the regard of the philosophical psychologists was directed, with a certain preference, in the locutions of Ψυχη and the psychical to what «the locution» intentionality introduces, while the sensuous moments were predicated of the organism and its sensuous activities. This old tendency has found its most recent expression in Brentano's differentiation of "physical" and "psychical" phenomena. It is especially significant because the «differentiation» blazed the trail for the development of phenomenology — although Brentano himself still remained far from the phenomenological standpoint, and although he did not encounter with his differentiation what he really searched for: namely the differentiation of the realm of experience pertaining to the physical natural sciences from psychology. What is of special concern for us here is only the following: Brentano, more particularly, still did not find the concept of stuff-moments — and this is because he did not take account of the differentiation between the "physical phenomena" as stuff-moments (sensation-Data) and "physical phenomena" as objective moments (physical color, physical shape, and the like) appearing in the noetic apprehension of the former — in contradistinction, on the other side he characterizes the concept of "psychical phenomena" in one of its delimiting determinations by the peculiarity of intentionality. Precisely as a result he brought the "psychical" into the sphere of vision of our times in that distinctive sense which had a certain emphasis but was not annulled in the historical signification of the word.

But what speaks against the use of the term as equivalent to intentionality is the circumstance that, without doubt, it is not suitable to designate in the same way the psychical in this sense «scl. intentionality» and the psychical in the sense of the psychological (therefore of that which is the peculiar Object of psychology). Moreover, in view of this latter concept we also have the disagreeable ambiguity which has its source in the familiar tendency toward a "psychology without a soul." Belonging together with that is the fact that under the heading of the psychical — especially of the actual psychical in contrast to the corresponding "psychical dispositions" — one preferably thinks of mental processes in the unity of the empirically posited stream of mental processes. But it is now unavoidable

38 Question mark in margin in Copy A to first two sentences of this paragraph.
39 In Copy D empirically changed to Objectively-real.\]

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to designate as Object of psychology, as also the psychical, the real bearers of this psychical, the animate beings, or their "souls" and their psychically real properties. The "psychology without a soul" confuses, as it would seem to us, the exclusion of the soul-entity, in the sense of some sort of nebulous metaphysics of the soul, with the exclusion of the soul taken universally, i.e., the psychical reality factually given in *empeiria*, the states of which are mental processes. By no means is this reality the mere stream of mental processes inseparable from the organism and empirically governed in certain ways, for which dispositional concepts are mere indices to their regularities. Nevertheless, the presence of equivocations and, above all, the circumstance that the dominant concepts of the psychical do not bear upon the specifically intentional, make the term unsuitable for us.

We therefore retain the term *noetic* and say:

**The stream of phenomenological being has a stuff-stratum and a noetic stratum.**

Phenomenological considerations and analyses which specifically concern stuff can be termed *hyletic-phenomenological* ones just as, on the other hand, those relative to the noetic moments can be termed *noetic-phenomenological* considerations and analyses. The incomparably more important and richer analyses are found on the side of the noetic.

§86. The Functional Problems.\textsuperscript{41}

Nonetheless, the greatest problems of all are the *functional problems*, or those of the "constitution of consciousness-objectivities." These problems concern the way in which noeses, e.g., with respect to Nature, by animating stuff and combining it into manifold-unitary continua and syntheses bring about consciousness of something such that the Objective unity of the objectivity allows of being harmoniously "made known," "legitimated" and "rationally" determined.

In this sense 'function' (in an entirely different sense in contrast to the mathematical one) is something wholly unique, grounded in the pure essence of noesis. Consciousness is precisely consciousness "of" something; it is of its essence to bear in itself "sense," so to speak, the quintessence of "soul," "spirit," "reason." Consciousness is not a name for "psychical complexes," for "contents" fused together, for

\textsuperscript{41} Marginal note in Copy A to section heading: the constitutive problems
"bundles" or streams of "sensations" which, without sense in themselves, also cannot lend any "sense" to whatever mixture; it is rather through and through "consciousness," the source of all reason and unreason, all legitimacy and illegitimacy, all reality and fiction, all value and disvalue, all deed and misdeed. Consciousness is therefore toto coelo different from what sensualism alone will see, from what in fact is irrational stuff without sense — but which is, of course, accessible to rationalization. We shall soon learn to better understand what rationalization signifies.

The point of view of function is the central one for phenomenology; the investigations radiating from it suitably comprise the whole phenomenological sphere, and, finally, all phenomenological analyses in some manner or other enter into its service as component parts or preliminary stages. In place of analysis and comparison, description and classification restricted to single particular mental processes, consideration arises of single particularities from the "teleological" point of view of their function, of making possible a "synthetical unity." Of essential necessity the consideration turns to the multiplicities of consciousness, predelineated, so to speak, in or, as it were, extracted from, the mental processes themselves, their noeses of whatever sort: thus, e.g., in the sphere of experience and experimental thinking, <the consideration turns to> the multiformed continua of consciousness and the discontinuous connections of consciousness-processes which are connected in themselves by belonging to concatenations of sense by means of the unitarily encompassing consciousness of one and the same Objective something, sometimes appearing in this way, sometimes in that way, being given intuitively or being conceptually determined. <The consideration> seeks to inquire into how something self-identical, how Objective unities of any kind which are not really immanental are "intended to," "meant;" how consciousness-formations of very different and yet essentially required structures belong to the identity of the meant, and how these formations are to be strictly described which respect to method. Moreover, <the consideration> seeks to inquire into how, corresponding to the double heading of "reason" and "unreason," the unity of the objectivity of any objective region and category can and must be "legitimated" and "rejected," how it can and must be determined in the forms of consciousness, more "precisely" determined or deter-

42 Marginal note in Copy D to sensualism: but also the more subtle sensualism of intentionality
mined "otherwise," or be entirely rejected as "null," "illusion." In that context all distinctions are accordingly subsumed under the trivial and yet so paradoxical headings of "actuality" and "illusion," "true" reality, "illusion-reality," "true" values, "illusory value and disvalue," the phenomenological clarification of which follows upon these considerations.

It is therefore a matter of inquiring, in the most comprehensive universality, into how Objective unities of any region and category are "constituted in the manner peculiar to consciousness." It is a question of systematically showing how, by its essence, all the concatenations of actual and possible consciousness — precisely as eidetic possibilities — are predelineated: from the simple or founded intuitions intensively related to them, the confused or clear, expressive or non-expressive, prescientific or scientific formations at lower or higher levels produced by thinking, to the highest formations of strict, theoretical science. All of the basic kinds of possible consciousness and the variations, fusions, syntheses of essential necessity belonging to them are a matter to be studied and made evident in eidetic universality and phenomenological purity; how these basic kinds, by their own peculiar essence predelineate all possibilities of being (and impossibilities of being); how, according to absolutely fixed eidetic laws an existing object is the correlate for concatenations of consciousness of quite determined eidetic contents, just as, conversely, the being of such concatenations is equivalent to an existing object; and that, referred to all regions of being and all levels of universality down to the concretion of being.

In its purely eidetic attitude "excluding" every sort of transcendence, on its own peculiar basis of pure consciousness, phenomenology necessarily arrives at this entire complex of transcendental problems in the specific sense, and on that account deserves the name of transcendental phenomenology. On its own peculiar basis phenomenology must come to consider mental processes not as any sort of dead fact such as "content-complexes" which merely exist without signifying anything, without meaning anything; nor should it consider them only with respect to elements, complexes of constructions, with respect to elements, complexes of constructions with respect to classes and subclasses; transcendental phenomenology should instead make

43 Insertion in Copy D: and all culture
44 In Copy D fusions crossed out.
45 Marginal note in Copy D: and naturalistically as foundations for explanations
itself master of the essentially unique set of problems which mental processes offer, and offer purely by their eidetic essence, as intentive mental processes, as "consciousness-of."

Naturally, the pure hyletic is subordinated to the phenomenology of transcendental consciousness. In addition, it has the characteristic of a self-contained discipline; as a self-contained discipline it has a value in itself; on the other hand, but from a functional point of view, it has signification by the fact that it provides possible gussets in the intentional weave, possible stuffs for intentive formations. Not only with regard to the difficulties which it arrives at, but also with regard to the ranking of problems from the standpoint of the idea of an absolute cognition, it obviously stands far below the noetic and functional phenomenology (both of which, moreover, are properly not to be separated).46

We now turn to more precise expositions in the following chapters.

Note

The word, function, in the phrase “psychical function,” is used by Stumpf in his important47 essay for the Berlin academy48 in contrast to what he calls “appearance.” The distinction is meant as a psychological one, and coincides, then, with our opposition (only applied psychologically) between “acts” and “primary contents.” It is to be noted that the terms in question in our presentation have a completely different signification when in those of the distinguished investigator. Superficial readers of both writings have confused more than once Stumpf’s concept of phenomenology (as the doctrine of “appearances”) with ours. Stumpf’s phenomenology would correspond to what was defined above as hyletic, except that our definition in its methodical sense is essentially conditioned by the encompassing frame of transcendental phenomenology. On the other hand, the idea of the hyletic eo ipso is transferred from phenomenology to the basis of an eidetic psychology which, according to our conception, would include Stumpf’s “phenomenology.”

46 Marginal note in Copy D to this paragraph: The concept of formal phenomenology — the contingency of the hyletic must be elaborated here
47 In Copy A important crossed out.
48 Author’s footnote: C. Stumpf, “Erscheinungen und psychischen Funktionen” ["Appearances and Psychical Functions"] (pp. 4ff.), and "Zur Einteilung der Wissenschaften" ["Toward the Classification of the Sciences"]; both in the Abhandlungen der königl. preuss. Akademie der Wissenschaften vom Jahre 1906 <1907>.
§87. Preliminary Remarks.¹

The peculiarity of the intentive mental process is easily designated in its universality; we all understand the expression "consciousness of something," especially in ad libitum exemplifications. It is so much more difficult to purely and correctly seize upon the phenomenological essence-peculiarities corresponding to it. That this heading circumscribes a large field of painfully achieved findings and, more particularly, of eidetic findings, would seem even today alien to the majority of philosophers and psychologists (if we can judge by the literature). This is because nothing is accomplished by saying and discerning that every objectivating relates to something objectivated, that every judging relates to something judged, etc. Or that, in addition, one refers to logic, theory of knowledge, ethics, with their many evidences, and now designates these as belonging to the essence of intentionality. This is, at the same time, a very simple way of taking the phenomenological doctrine of essences as something very old, as a new name for the old logic and those disciplines which must be ranked with it. For without having seized upon the peculiar ownness of the transcendental attitude and having actually appropriated the pure phenomenological basis, one may of course use the word, phenomenology; but one does not have the matter itself. In addition, it does not suffice, let us say, to merely change the attitude, or to merely carry out the phenomenological reduction in order to make something like phenomenology out of pure logic. For how far logical and, in a like way, pure ontological, pure ethical, and whatever other apriori propositions one may cite, actually express something phenomenological, and to which phenomenological strata the

¹ Marginal note in Copy A: For the term noesis, p. 199 [Reconstruction by Schuhmann].
respective propositions may belong, is not obvious. On the contrary, the most difficult problems of all are hidden, the sense of which is naturally concealed from all those who still have no inkling of the determinative fundamental distinctions. In fact, it is (if I may be allowed a judgment from my own experience) a long and thorny way starting from purely logical insights, from insights pertaining to the theory of signification, from ontological and noetical insights, likewise from the customary normative and psychological theory of knowledge, to arrive at seizing upon, in a genuine sense, the immanent-psychological and then phenomenological data, and finally to arrive at all at the concatenations of essence which make the transcendental relations intelligible apriori. Something similar is the case no matter from where we might set out on the way from objective insights to acquire phenomenological insights which essentially belong to them.

"Consciousness of something" is therefore something obviously understandable of itself and, at the same time, highly enigmatic. The labyrinthically false paths into which the first reflections lead, easily generate a skepticism which negates the whole troublesome sphere of problems. Not a few already bar access by the fact that they cannot bring themselves to seize upon the intuitive mental process, e.g., the perceptual process, with the essence proper to it as perceptual process. Rather than living in the perception, adverted to the perceived in considering and theorizing they do not manage to direct the regard instead to the perceiving, or to the own peculiarities of the mode of givenness of the perceived, and to take what is offered in analysis of something immanent with respect to its essence, just as it is given. If the right attitude has been won, and made secure by practice, above all, however, if one has acquired the courage to obey the clear eidetic data with a radical lack of prejudice so as to be unencumbered by all current and learned theories, then firm results are directly produced, and the same thing occurs for everyone having the same attitude; there accrue firm possibilities of communicating to others what one has himself seen, of testing descriptions, of making salient the unnoticed intrusions of empty verbal meanings, of making known and weeding out errors by measuring them again against intuition — errors which are also possible here just as in any sphere of validity. But now to the matters at hand.
§88. Really Inherent and Intuitive Components of Mental Processes.  
The Noema.

If, as in the present deliberations generally, we begin with the most universal distinctions which, so to speak, can be seized upon at the very threshold of phenomenology, and which are determinative for all further methodic proceedings, then with respect to intentionality we immediately confront a wholly fundamental distinction, namely the distinction between the components proper of intuitive mental processes and their intentional correlates and their components. We already touched upon this distinction in the preliminary eidetical deliberations of Part II. In that connection, in making the transition from the natural to the phenomenological attitude, the distinction served us to make clear the own peculiar being of the phenomenological sphere. But that it acquired a radical signification within this frame of the transcendental reduction, conditioning the entire set of problems pertaining to phenomenology: of that we could not speak there. On the one side therefore, we have to discriminate the parts and moments which we find by an analysis of the really inherent pertaining to mental processes, whereby we deal with the mental process as an object like any other, inquiring about its pieces or non-selfsufficient moments really inherent in it which make it up. But, on the other side, the intuitive mental process is consciousness of something, and it is so according to its essence, e.g., as memory, as judgment, as will, etc.; and we can therefore inquire into what is to be declared as a matter of essential necessity about the side of this "of something."

Owing to its noetic moments, every intuitive mental process is precisely noetic; it is of its essence to include in itself something such as a "sense" and possibly a manifold sense on the basis of this sense-bestowal and, in unity with that, to effect further productions [Leistungen] which become "senseful" precisely by <this sense-

2 The following note, published by Schuhmann as Appendix 51, ca. 1923, appended in Copy D: It is not until p. 199 that it is said in passing that "noesis" signifies the same thing as "concrete-complete intuitive mental process," with "emphasis on its noetic components." Thus the hyletic moments belong to the noesis in so far as they bear the function of intentionality, undergo sense-bestowal, help constitute a concrete noematic sense. But this must be stated earlier with corresponding seriousness. I myself have vacillated before in distinguishing noetic and hyletic moments.

3 In Copy A proper changed to really inherent

4 Author's footnote: Cf. §41, pp. 73ff.

5 Insertion in Copy A: "noetic;" that signifies
Such noetic moments are, e.g., directions of the regard of the pure Ego to the objects "meant" by it owing to sense-bestowal, to the object which is "inherent in the sense" for the Ego; furthermore, seizing upon this object, holding it fast while the regard adverts to other objects which appear in the "meaning" ["Vermeinen"]; likewise, producings pertaining to explicatings, relatings, comprisings, multiple position-takings of believings, deemings likely, valuings; and so forth. All of these are to be found in the mental processes in question, no matter how differently structured and varied they are. Now, no matter to what extent this series of exemplary moments refer to really inherent components of mental processes, they nevertheless also refer to what is not really inherent, namely by means of the heading of sense.

Corresponding in every case to the multiplicity of Data pertaining to the really inherent noetic content, there is a multiplicity of Data, demonstrable in actual pure intuition, in a correlative "noematic content" or, in short, in the "noema" — terms which we shall continue to use form now on.

Perception, for example, has its noema, most basically its perceptual sense, i.e., the perceived as perceived. Similarly, the current case of remembering has its remembered as remembered, just as its remembered, precisely as it is "meant," "intended to" in the remembering; again, the judging has the judged as judged, liking has the liked as liked, and so forth. In every case the noematic correlate, which is called "sense" here (in a very extended signification) is to be taken precisely as it inheres "immanently" in the mental process of perceiving, of judging, of liking; and so forth; that is, just as it is offered to us when we inquire purely into this mental process itself.

How we understand all of this will become clear by carrying out an exemplary analysis (which we will effect in pure intuition).

Let us suppose that in a garden we regard with pleasure a blossoming apple tree, the freshly green grass of the lawn, etc. It is obvious that the perception and the accompanying liking are not, at the same time, what is perceived and liked. In the natural attitude, the apple tree is for us something existing in the transcendent realm of spatial actuality, and the perception, as well as the liking, is for us a

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6 Author's footnote: Cf. Logische Untersuchungen, II 1st Unters., §14, p. 50 (English translation, p. 290) on the "fulfilling sense" (in that connection, 6th Unters., §55, p. 642 (2nd ed., p. 170; English translation, p. 807) on "perceptual sense"); furthermore, for what follows, 5th Unters., §20, on "matter" pertaining to the act; likewise 6th Unters., §§25-29.
psychical state belonging to real people. Between the one and the other real things, between the real person or the real perception, and the real apple tree, there exist real relations. In such situations characterizing mental processes, it may be in certain cases that perception is "mere hallucination," the perceived, this apple tree before us, does not exist in "actual" reality. Now the real relation, previously meant as actually existing, is destroyed. Only the perception remains, but there is nothing actual there to which it is related.

Let us now go to the <transcendental> phenomenological attitude. The transcendent world receives its "parenthesis," we exercise the ἐποχή in relation to <positing> its actual being. We now ask what, of essential necessity, is to be discovered in the complex of noetic processes pertaining to perception and in the valuation of liking. With the whole physical and psychical world, the actual existence of the real relation between perceiving and perceived is excluded; and, nonetheless, a relation between perceiving and perceived (as well as between liking and liked) remains left over, a relation which becomes given essentially in "pure immanence," namely purely on the ground of the phenomenologically reduced mental processes of perceiving and liking precisely as they fit into the transcendental stream of mental processes. Precisely this situation, the purely phenomenological one, will occupy us now. Concerning hallucinations, illusions and perceptual deception of whatever sort, it may be that phenomenology has something to say, and perhaps even a great deal: but it is evident that here, in the role which they played in the natural attitude, they undergo exclusion. Here, in the case of perception and also in the case of any progressive concatenation of perceptions whatever (as when we consider the blossoming tree ambulando), there is no question to be raised of the sort whether or not something corresponds to it in "the" actuality. This posited actuality is indeed not there for us in consequence of judging. And yet, so to

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7 In Copy A excluded is changed to parenthesized
8 In Copy A exclusion is changed to parenthesizing
9 Addition in Copy A: We do not have to effect any of the cancellations, motivated perchance in the continuity of experience, which are expressed precisely by the words illusions and the like: nor need we posit in "the" actuality (actional positing or "accepting") being or non-being. [Glosses by Schuhmann.]
10 In Copy A posited crossed out.
11 Addition in Copy A: and thus also nothing which still needs position or acceptance in relation to it «scl. actuality» as posited or accepted actuality.
speak, everything remains as of old. Even the phenomenologically reduced perceptual mental process is a perceiving of "this blossoming apple tree, in this garden," etc., and, likewise, the reduced liking is a liking of this same thing. The tree has not lost the least nuance of all these moments, qualities, characteristics with which it was appearing in this perception, with which it was appearing as "lovely," "attractive," and so forth "in" this liking.

In our transcendental phenomenological attitude we can and must raise the eidetic question: what the "perceived as perceived" is, which eidetic moments it includes in itself as this perception-noema. We receive the answer in the pure directedness to something given in its essence, and we can faithfully describe the "appearing as appearing" in complete evidence. It is only another expression for this to say that we describe perception in its noematic respect."

§ 89. Noematic Statements and Statements About Actuality. The Noema in the Psychological Sphere.\textsuperscript{12}

It is clear that all these descriptive statements, even though they may sound like statements about actuality, have undergone a radical modification of sense; similarly, the described itself, even though it is given as "precisely the same," is yet something radically different by virtue of, so to speak, an inverse change of signs. "In" the reduced perception (in the phenomenologically pure mental process), we find, as indefeasibly belonging to its essence, the perceived as perceived, to be expressed as "material thing," "plant," "tree," "blossoming," and so forth. Obviously, the inverted commas are significant in that they express that change in sign, the correspondingly radical significational modification of the words. The tree simpliciter, the physical thing belonging to Nature, is nothing less than this perceived tree as perceived which, as perceptual sense, inseparably belongs to the\textsuperscript{13} perception. The tree simpliciter can burn up, be resolved into its chemical elements, etc. But the sense — the sense of this perception, something belonging necessarily to its essence — cannot burn up; it has no chemical elements, no forces, no real properties.

Everything which is purely immanent and reduced in the way

\textsuperscript{12} Addition to title in Copy D: The Psychological Phenomenological Reduction

\textsuperscript{13} Insertion in Copy A: particular
peculiar to the mental process, everything which cannot be conceived apart from it just as it is in itself, and which eo ipso passes over into the Eidos in the eidetic attitude, is separated by an abyss from all of Nature and physics and no less from all psychology — and even this image, as naturalistic, is not strong enough to indicate the difference.

Obviously the perceptual sense also belongs to the phenomenologically unreduced perception (perception in the sense of psychology). Thus one can make clear here at the same time how the phenomenological reduction can acquire for psychologists the useful methodic function of fixing the noematic sense by sharply distinguishing it from the object simpliciter, and recognizing it as something belonging inseparably to the psychological essence of the intentive mental process.

On both sides, in the psychological as well as in the phenomenological attitude, one must therefore not lose sight of the fact that the "perceived" as sense includes nothing in itself (thus nothing should be imputed to it on the ground of "indirect cognizances") other than what "actually appears" in the given case in something perceptually appearing and, more precisely, in the mode of givenness in which it is precisely something intended to in the perception. At any time a specifically peculiar reflection can be directed to this sense as it is immanent in the perception, and the phenomenological judgment has to conform in faithful expression to what is seized upon in it.

§90. The "Noematic Sense" and the Distinction Between "Immanental" and "Actual Objects."

Like perception, every intentive mental process — just this makes up the fundamental part of intentionality — has its "intentional Object," i.e., its objective sense. Or, in other words: to have sense or "to intend to" something [etwas "im Sinne zu haben"], is the fundamental characteristic of all consciousness which, therefore, is not just any mental living [Erlebnis] whatever, but is rather a mental living having sense, which is "noetic."

Certainly what has become prominent as "sense" in the analysis of our examples does not exhaust the full noema; correspondingly, the

14 Insertion in Copy D: pure
noetic side of the intuitive mental process does not merely consist of the moment of "sense-bestowal" proper specifically belonging to the "sense" as correlate. It will be shown directly that the full noema consists of a complex of noematic moments, that in that complex the specific sense-moment only fashions one kind of necessary core-stratum in which further moments are essentially founded which, therefore, should likewise be designated as sense-moments, but in an extended meaning.

Nevertheless, let us remain at first with what alone has clearly emerged. Without doubt we have shown that the intuitive mental process is of such a character that in a suitable focusing of regard a "sense" is to be drawn from it. The situation defining the sense for us cannot remain concealed: the circumstance, namely, that the non-existence (or the conviction of non-existence) of the objectivated or thought of Object pure and simple pertaining to the objectivation in question (and therefore to any particular intuitive mental process whatever) cannot steal its something objectivated as objectivated, that therefore the distinction between both must be made. Such a striking distinction has required expression in the literature. As a matter of fact, the Scholastic distinction between the "mental," "intentional" or "immanent" Object on the one hand, and the "actual" Object on the other hand, refers back to it. Nevertheless, it is an immense step to go from seizing upon a distinction pertaining to consciousness for the first time to its right, phenomenologically pure, fixing and correct valuation — and precisely this step, which is decisive for a harmonious, fruitful phenomenology, has not been effected. Above all, what is decisive consists of the absolutely faithful description of what is actually present in phenomenological purity and in keeping at a distance all the interpretations transcending the given. Here denominations already evince interpretations, and often quite false ones. These interpretations betray themselves here in expressions such as "mental," "immanent" Object, and the expression "intentional Object" requires them the least of all.

It would even be tempting to say: In the mental process the intention is given with its intentional Object which, as intentional Object, inseparably belongs to it, therefore itself inherently dwells within "the intention." Indeed, it is and remains its "Object" meant,
objectivated, and the like, no matter if the corresponding "actual Object" precisely is or is not in actuality, if it has been annihilated in the meantime, etc.

But if, in this way, we try to separate the actual Object (in the case of perception of something external, the perceived physical thing pertaining to Nature) and the intentional Object, including the latter as really inherently in the mental process as "immanent" to the perception, we fall into the difficulty that now two realities ought to stand over against one another while only one reality is found to be present and even possible. I perceive the physical thing, the Object belonging to Nature, the tree there in the garden; that and nothing else is the actual Object of the perceptual "intention." A second immanental tree, or even an "internal image" of the actual tree standing out there before me, is in no way given, and to suppose that hypothetically leads to an absurdity. The image as a really inherent component in the psychologically real perception would be again something real — something real which would function as a depicting of another something real. But that can only be by virtue of a depicturing consciousness in which something first appears — with which we would have a first intentionality — and this would function again in consciousness as a "picture Object" representing another "picture Object" — for which a second intentionality founded in the first intentionality would be necessary. It is no less evident that each particular one of these modes of consciousness already requires the distinction between the immanental and actual object, thus comprising the same problem which should have been resolved by the construction. Over and above this, in the case of perception, the construction is subject to the objection which we have discussed earlier: to include depictive functions in the perception of something physical signifies ascribing to it a picture-consciousness which, descriptively considered, is something of an essentially different kind of constitution. Nevertheless, the main point here is that perception and, then consequently, every mental process, requires a depictive function, unavoidably (as can be seen at once from our critique) leads to an infinite regress.

In contradistinction to such errors we have to abide by what is given in the pure mental process and to take it within the frame of clarity precisely as it is given. The "actual" Object is then to be

17 Author's footnote: Cf. above, §§43, pp. 78f.
“parenthesized.” Let us reflect on what that signifies: if we begin as people in the natural attitude, then the actual Object is the physical thing there, outside <us>. We see it, we stand before it, we have directed our eyes fixingly to it, and then we describe it and make our statements about it just as we find it there in space as what confronts us. Likewise we take a position toward it in valuing; what confronts us, what we see in space, pleases us, or determines us to act; we seize upon or manipulate what is given there, etc. If we now effect the phenomenological reduction, then every positing of something transcendent, thus above all what is inherent to perception itself, receives its excluding parentheses, and this is passed on to all of the founded acts, to every judgment of perception, to the positing of value, and possibly to the value judgment grounded in it. Implicit in this is that we only allow all these perceivings, judgings, etc., to be considered, to be described, as the essentialities which they are in themselves, to pin down what is evidently given with or in them. But we do not tolerate any judgment which makes use of the positing of the “actual” physical thing, nor of the whole “transcendent” Nature, or which “joins in” <that positing>. As phenomenologists we abstain from all such positings. But on that account we do not reject them by not “taking them as our basis,” by not “joining in” them. They are indeed there, they also essentially belong to the phenomenon. Rather we contemplate them; instead of joining in them, we make them Objects, take them as component parts of the phenomenon — the positing pertaining to perception as well as its components.

And, keeping these excludings in their clear sense, we therefore ask quite universally, then, about what is evidentially “inherent” in the whole “reduced” phenomenon. Now, inherent too precisely in perception is this: that it has its noematic sense, its “perceived as perceived,” “this blossoming tree there, in space” — understood with inverted commas — precisely the correlate belonging to the essence of phenomenologically reduced perception. Figuratively stated: the “parenthesis” undergone by perception prevents any judgment about perceived actuality (i.e., any judgment having its basis in unmodified perception, thus taking up into itself its positing). But it does not prevent the judgment about the fact that perception is consciousness of an actuality (the positing of which, however, should not be “effected”); and it does not prevent any description of this perceptually appearing “actuality” as appearing with the particular ways in which it is here intended to, appearing only “one-sidedly,” in
this or that orientation; and so forth. With minute care we must now take heed against attributing to the mental process anything which is not actually included in its essence, and <we must> “attribute” <what is included> exactly and just as it precisely is “inherent” in it.

§91. Extension to the Widest Sphere of Intentionality.

What was carried out in detail primarily in the case of perception actually holds now for all kinds of intenitive mental processes. After the reduction we find the remembered as remembered in remembering, the expected as expected in expecting, the phantasied as phantasied in inventive phantasy.

“Inhering” in each of these mental processes in a noematic sense, and however this <noematic sense> may be akin in different mental processes, indeed perchance essentially quite alike with respect to a core-component, in any case the <noematic sense> is different in kind in various sorts of mental processes; what is common in a given case is at least differently characterized and is so of necessity. In every case it may be a matter of the blossoming tree, and in every case this tree may appear in a certain way such that the faithful description of what appears as it appears necessarily results in the same expression. But for that reason the noematic correlates are still essentially different for perception, phantasy, presentiating something depicted, remembering, etc. At one time what appears is characterized as “actuality in person,” at another time as fiction, then again as something presentiated in a remembering, etc.

These are characteristics which we find present in the perceived, phantasied, remembered, and so forth, as perceived, phantasied, remembered — in the sense of the perception, in the sense of phantasy, in the sense of memory — as something inseparable and as something necessarily belonging in correlation to the respective kinds of noetic processes.

Where it is a matter of describing the intentional correlates faithfully and completely, there we must also apprehend all such characteristics which are never accidental but are instead governed by eidetic law and fixed into rigorous concepts.

In this connection, we note what within the full noema (in fact, as we have previously indicated) we must separate essentially different

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18 Marginal note in Copy D to sense: objective sense
strata which which are grouped around a central "core,"\(^{19}\) around a pure "objective sense" — around that which, in our examples, was describable with purely identical objective expressions because there can be something identical in the parallel mental processes which are different in sort. When, again, we set aside the parentheses effected on the positing, we see that, in a parallel way, corresponding to the different concepts of sense we must distinguish different concepts of unmodified objectivities, of which the "object simpliciter," namely the something identical which is perceived at one time, another time directly presentiated, a third time presented pictorially in a painting, and the like, only indicates one central concept. This indication is sufficient for us in a preliminary way for the moment.

Let us scrutinize the sphere of consciousness still further and try to get acquainted with the noetic-noematic structures in the principal modes of consciousness. In the actual demonstration we shall, at the same time, step by step, assure ourselves of the complete validity of the fundamental correlation between noesis and noema.\(^ {20}\)

§92. The Noetic and Noematic Aspects of Attentional Changes.

In our preparatory chapters we spoke repeatedly of a species of remarkable changes in consciousness which cut across all other species of intentional events and thus make up a quite universal structure of consciousness having its own peculiar dimension: We spoke metaphorically of the pure Ego's "mental regard" or the "ray of its regard," of its advertings toward and turning away from. The relevant phenomena stood out unitarily for us with perfect clarity and distinctness. Wherever "attention" is spoken of originarily, they play a major role without being separated phenomenologically from certain other phenomena; and, mixed with these others, they are usually designated as modes of attention. For our part, we mean to retain the word and, moreover, to speak of attentional changes, but with exclusive reference to the events we have separated distinctly and the groups of phenomenal changes still to be described more precisely in what follows.

\(^{19}\) Marginal note in Copy D to central core and objective sense: Later on core and sense are separated! Pp. 273f.; before pp. 197f., 247f.

\(^{20}\) Addition in Copy A: just as, moreover, also of objectivity simpliciter in case it exists there, in the broadest sense of the term.
In this context it is a question of a series of ideally possible changes which already presuppose a noetic core and the characterizing moments of various genera which necessarily belong to it; of themselves, these possible changes do not alter the correlative noematic productions but, nevertheless, exhibit alterations of the whole mental process with respect to both its noetic and noematic sides. The ray of the pure Ego’s regard sometimes goes through one noetic stratum and sometimes through another, or (as, e.g., in the case of rememberings within rememberings) through one encasement-level or another, sometimes straightforwardly, sometimes reflectively. Within the given total field of potential noeses and correlative objects of noeses we sometimes look at a whole, the tree, perhaps, which is perceptually present, sometimes at these or those parts and moments of it; then, again, we look at a nearby physical thing or at a complex context and process. Suddenly we turn our regard to an object of memory which “comes to mind:” Instead of going through the perceptual noesis, which, in a continuously unitary though highly articulated manner, constitutes for us the continually appearing world of physical things, the regard goes through a remembering noesis into a world of memory; it wanders about in this world, passes over into memories of other degrees or into worlds of phantasy, and so forth.

For the sake of simplicity, let us remain in one intentive stratum in the world of perception which stands there in simple certainty. Let us take a physical thing or a physical process of which there is a perceptual consciousness, and fix it, in idea, with respect to its noematic contents, while we take the whole concrete consciousness of physical thing or the physical process throughout the corresponding section of phenomenological duration, and fix it with respect to its full immanental essence. For the idea in question involves fixing of the attentional ray as wandering in a determinate manner throughout that section of phenomenological duration, since the attentional ray too is a moment of the mental process. It is then evident that modes of alteration of the fixed mental process are possible which we designate by the name, “alterations merely in the distribution of attention and its modes.” It is clear that, throughout such alterat-

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21 Addition in Copy A: which may themselves be, in turn, rememberings of the second or of a still higher degree

22 Insertion in Copy A: mere

23 Insertion in Copy A: ideally speaking
ions, the noematic composition of the mental process remains the same in so far as one can always say that the same objectivity is continuously characterized as being there in person, presenting itself in the same modes of appearance, in the same orientations, with the same appearing traits; that in the modes of indeterminate indication, of making non-intuitively copresent, and so forth, there is a consciousness of such and such a stock of content belonging to it. Selecting out and comparing parallel noematic components, we say that the alteration consists merely of the fact that, in one of the compared cases, one moment of the object is "favored" and, in another case, another; or of the fact that one and the same moment is "paid attention to primarily" at one time and only secondarily at another time, or "just barely noticed still," if not indeed "completely unnoticed" though still appearing. Those are indeed different modes belonging specifically to attention as such. Among them the group of actionality modes are separated from the non-actionality mode, from what we call complete inattention, the mode which is, so to speak, dead consciousness of something.

On the other hand, it is clear not only that these are modifications of the mental process itself with respect to its noetic composition, but also that they affect its noema, that, on the noematic side — without touching the identical noematic core — they present a separate genus of characterizations. Attention is usually compared to a spot light. The object of attention, in the specific sense, lies in the cone of more or less bright light; but it can also move into the penumbra and into the completely dark region. Though the metaphor is far from adequate to differentiate all the modes which can be fixed phenomenologically, it is still designative in so far as it indicates alterations in what appears, as what appears. These changes in its illumination do not alter what appears with respect to its own sense-composition; but brightness and obscurity modify its mode of appearance: they are to be found and described when we direct out regard to the noematic Object.

Obviously the modifications in the noema are not of such a kind that mere outward adjuncts are added to something which remains unvaryingly identical; on the contrary, the concrete noemas...
change through and through, it being a question of necessary modes belonging to the mode in which the identical is given.

Yet, on closer inspection, it is not the case that the entire noematic content (the attentional core, so to speak) characterized by this or that mode can be kept constant in contrast to any attentional modifications whatever. On the contrary, looked at from the noetic side it becomes apparent that certain noeses, either necessarily or with respect to their determined possibility, are conditioned by modes of attention and in particular, by positive attention in the distinctive sense of this word. All „effecting of acts,” the “actional takings of positions,” e.g., “effecting” the settlement of a doubt, the “making” [“Vollzug”] of a refusal, the “effecting” of a subject-positing and a predicative positing-thereupon, the making [Vollzug] of a valuation or of a valuation for the sake of something else, the making of a choice, and so forth—all these presuppose positive attention to that toward which the Ego takes a position. But this in no way alters the fact that this functioning of the regard, which moves about and broadens or narrows its span, signifies a dimension sui generis of correlative, noetic and noematic, modifications, the systematic inquiry into the essence of which is among the fundamental tasks of general phenomenology.

It is in their actionality-modes that attentional formations have, in a pre-eminent manner, the characteristic of subjectiveness: and this characteristic is consequently acquired by all the functionings which become modalized by these modes or which, according to their specific sort, presuppose them. The ray of attention presents itself as emanating from the pure Ego and terminating in that which is objective, as directed to it or being diverted from it. The ray does not become detached from the Ego; on the contrary, it is itself an Ego-ray, and remains an Ego-ray. The “Object” is struck; it is the target, it is put into a relation to the Ego (and by the Ego itself) but is not “subjective.” A position-taking which bears the Ego-ray is, because of it, an act of the Ego itself; the Ego does or undergoes, is free or conditioned. The Ego, as we also said, “lives” in such acts. Its

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26 Marginal note in Copy A: Here no distinction is made between Objective attention, which is the necessary presupposition for “attentive” performings of the higher position-takings, and these themselves. (Gloss by Schuhmann)
27 Marginal note in Copy A: Improve the whole page ocl. p. 192.
28 Additum in Copy A: or perhaps we do better to say: include positive attention to it
29 In Copy D subjectiveness is changed to Egoicalness
30 Insertion in Copy A: spontaneous
living in them signifies, not the being of some “contents” or other in a stream of contents, but rather a multiplicity of describable manners in which the pure Ego, as the “free being” which it is, lives in certain intuitive mental processes, those which have the universal modus cogito. But the expression, “as a free being,” indicates nothing else than such modes of living pertaining to freely going out of itself or freely withdrawing into itself, spontaneous doing, being somehow affected by the Objects. suffering, etc. What goes on in the stream of mental processes outside the Ego-ray or the cogito is essentially characterized otherwise; it lies outside the Ego’s actionality and yet, as we indicated earlier, it is appertinent to the Ego in so far as it is the field of potentiality for the Ego’s free acts.

So much by way of a general characterization of the noetic-noematic themes which must be treated with systematic thoroughness in the phenomenology of attention.32

§93. Transition to the Noetic-Noematic Structures of the Higher Spheres of Consciousness.

In the next series of considerations we wish to examine the structures which belong to the “higher” spheres of consciousness in which a number of noeses are built up on one another in the unity of a concrete mental process and in which, accordingly, the noematic correlates are likewise founded. Thus the eidetic law, confirmed in every case, states that there can be no noetic moment without a noematic moment specifically belonging to it.

31 Insertion in Copy D: merely
32 Author’s footnote: Attention is one of the chief themes of modern psychology. Nowhere does the predominantly sensualistic character of modern psychology show itself more strikingly than in the treatment of this theme, for not even the essential connection between attention and intentionality—this fundamental fact: that attention of every sort is nothing else than a fundamental species of intuitive modifications—has ever, to my knowledge, been emphasized before. Since the appearance of the Logische Untersuchungen (see the statements in Part II, “Second Investigation,” §§22f., pp. 159-165, and “Fifth Investigation” §19, p. 385 of2nd ed., pp. 160-166 and 405; English translation, pp. 381-386 and 384f.) a few words are, to be sure, said occasionally about a connection between attention and “consciousness of objects” but, with few exceptions. I refer to the writings of Theodor Lipps and Alexander Pfänder), in a manner showing a lack of understanding for the fact that what is in question here concerns the radically first beginning of the theory of attention and that the further investigation must be conducted within the limits of intentionality and, moreover, not forthwith as an empirical, but first of all as an eidetical investigation (In Copy A forthwith as an empirical crossed out).
Even in the case of noeses of a higher level\textsuperscript{33} — taken in concrete completeness — there at first emerges in the noematic composition a central core thrusting itself to the fore in a predominate way, the "meant Objectivity as Objectivity," the Objectivity in inverted commas as required by the phenomenological reduction. There this central noema must also be taken precisely in the modified Objective composition in which it is just that noema, something intended to as intended to. Because the Objective something taken in a modified way itself becomes, to be sure, under the heading of sense, as, e.g., in our scientific investigation of it, again an Objective something although of a dignity peculiar to it, one will subsequently see here that this novel Objectivity has its modes of givenness, its "characteristics," its manifold modes with which it is intended to in the full noema pertaining to the noetic mental process or to the species of mental process in question. Of course, here again all the distinctions in the noema must also correspond to parallel distinctions in the unmodified Objectivity.

It is then a further undertaking of more precise phenomenological study to discover what is prescribed according to eidetic law precisely by the species, and what is so prescribed by the differentiating particularities, for noemata of changing particularities of a fixed species (e.g., perception). But the restriction holds throughout: in the sphere of essences there is nothing accidental; everything is connected by eidetic relations, thus especially noesis and noema.

\section*{§ 94. Noesis and Noema in the Realm of Judgment.}

As an example from this sphere of founded essences let us consider the \textit{predicative judgment}. The noema of the judging, i.e., of the concrete judgmental process, is the "judged as judged," that, however, is nothing else, or at least with respect to its main core, it is nothing else than what we usually call simply \textit{the judgment}.

If the full noema is to be seized upon, the judgment must be taken here in the full noematic concreteness intended to in the concrete judging. What is judged must not be confused with what is judged about. If the judging is based on perceiving or on some other simply "positing" objectivating, the noema of the objectivating goes into the

\textsuperscript{33} \textit{Marginal note of Copy D} to noeses of a higher level: not noeses but acts of a higher level
full concretion of the judgment (just as the objectivating noesis becomes an essential component of the concrete judgmental noesis) and takes on certain forms in the judging. That which is objectivated (as objectivated) receives the form of the apophantic subject, or that of the apophantic predicate, or some other such form. Here, for the sake of simplicity, let us disregard the higher stratum pertaining to verbal "expression." These "objects about which," especially the ones which take on <apophantic> subject <-forms> [Subjektgegenstand] are the objects judged about. The whole which is formed out of them, the total What which is judged — and, moreover, taken precisely in the fashion (with the characterization, in the mode of givenness) in which it is "intended to" in the mental process — makes up the full noematic correlate, the "sense" (in the broadest signification of the word) of the judgmental process. Stated more pregnantly, it is the "sense in the How of its mode of givenness" in so far as this mode of givenness is to be found as a characteristic belonging to it.

In this connection, we must not overlook the phenomenological reduction which requires us to "parenthesize" the making of the judgment if we wish to acquire the pure noema of our judgmental process. If we do so, then we have in its phenomenological purity the full concrete essence of the judgmental process or, as we now express it, the judgment-noesis, taken concretely as an essence, and the judgment-noema belonging to and necessarily united with that noesis, the "made judgment" as an Eidos, and it also in its phenomenological purity.

Psychologistic readers will object to all these statements; they are not inclined to distinguish between judging [Urteilen] as an empirical mental process and judging [Urteil]35 as an "idea," an essence. For us this distinction has already been thoroughly established. But the reader who accepts it will also be perplexed. For he is required to recognize that this one distinction is by no means sufficient and that it is necessary to fix a number of ideas which lie on two different sides within the essence of judgmental intentionality. It must above all be recognized that here, as in the case of any other intentive mental process, the two sides, noesis and noema, must by essential necessity be distinguished.

Critically it may be remarked here that the concepts of the "intentive" and the "cognitional essence" which were established in the

34 Note of translator: reading Urteil instead of Urteilen as in all editions.
35 In Copy A question mark opposite this phrase; marginal note in Copy D: Improvement
Logische Untersuchungen are indeed correct but are capable of a second interpretation since they can be essentially understood as expressions not only of noetic but also of noematic essences, and that the noematic interpretation, as carried through there one-sidedly in framing the concept of the judgment in pure logic is precisely not the one to be used in framing the judgment-concept of pure logic (i.e., the concept demanded by pure logic as pure mathesis in contrast to the concept of noetic judging demanded by normative logical noetics). The difference between the making of a judgment and the judgment made, a difference already recognized in ordinary speech, can serve to point out the correct view, namely that to the judgmental mental process there belongs correlative as noema the judgment simpliciter.

The latter, then, should be understood as the "judgment" or proposition in the sense of the word in pure logic — except that pure logic is interested in the noema, not with respect to its components, but only in so far as it is conceived as exclusively determined by a narrower essence, to the more precise definition of which the above-mentioned attempt at a distinction in the Logische Untersuchungen pointed the way. If we wish to obtain the full noema of a determinate judgmental process we must, as has already been said, take "the" judgment precisely as it is intended to in just that process; whereas, for formal logic, the identity of "the" judgment extends much further. An evident judgment, $S$ is $p$, and "the same" judgment as a "blind" judgment are noematically different but identical with respect to a core of sense which alone is decisive from the standpoint of formal logic. The difference here is similar to that already mentioned between the noema of a perception and that of a parallel presentation which intends to the same object, with precisely the same set of determinations and with the same characterization (as "certainly existing," "doubtfully existing," or the like). The act-species are different, and there is wide room for phenomenological differences in other respects — but the noematic What is identical. Let us add that the idea of the judgment which has just been characterized and which functions as the fundamental concept in formal logic (that discipline within mathesis universalis pertaining to predicative significations) has as its correlate the noetic idea: "the judgment" in a second sense understood, namely, as any judging whatever, with an


37 In Copy A changed to "a"
Eidetic universality determined purely by the form. It is the fundamental concept in the formal noetic theory of correct judging.\textsuperscript{38}

Everything just said is also true for other noetic mental processes; for example, it obviously holds good for all those which are essentially akin to judgings as predicative certainties: for the corresponding deemings possible, deemings likely, doubting, also rejectings. Among these the agreement can go so far that, in the noema, a sense-content occurs which is identical throughout and is merely furnished with different "characterizations." The same "S is p," as a noematic core, can be the "content" of a certainty, a deeming possible, a deeming likely, etc. In the noema the "S is p" does not stand alone; rather, as singled out of the noema by thinking, it is something non-selfsufficient; it is intended to with changing characterizations indispensable to the full noema: it is intended to with the characteristic of something "certain," "possible," "probable," "null," or the like — characteristics, to which the modifying inverted commas collectively belong and which, as correlates, are specifically coordinated with the noetic moments of considering-possible, considering-probable, considering-null, and the like.

With this, as we see at the same time, two fundamental concepts of "judgment-content" and likewise of likelihood-content, question-content, etc., are separated from one another. Not infrequently logicians use the term judgment-content in such a way that obviously

\textsuperscript{38} Author's footnote: As for Bolzano's concept of the "judgment in itself" or "the proposition in itself," the exposition in the Wissenschaftslehre (Sulzbach, 1837) shows that Bolzano had not made clear to himself the proper sense of his pioneer conception. He never saw that we have here two essentially possible interpretations, each of which yields something which might be called "the judgment in itself:" the specific essence of the judging process (the noetic idea) and the noematic idea correlative to the noetic idea. His descriptions and explanations are ambiguous. Given a mathematician's objective interest, he undoubtedly had the noematic concept in mind — though an occasional phrase seems to indicate the contrary (cf. op. cit., Vol. I, p. 93, the approving quotation from Mehmel's Denklehre ssel. Versuch einer vollstandigen analytische Denklehre als Vorphilosophie und im Geiste der Philosophie (Erlangen, 1803)). He had it in mind, precisely as the arithmetician has number in mind — being interested in operations with numbers but not in the phenomenological problem of the relationship between number and consciousness of number. Herein the sphere of logic, as well as everywhere else, phenomenology was something quite alien to the great logician. That cannot fail to be clear to anyone who has actually studied Bolzano's Wissenschaftslehre (which has unfortunately become so scarce) and who, in addition to that, is not inclined to confuse every working out of fundamental eidetic concepts with a phenomenologically naive production with a phenomenological production. If one did this, then, in the interest of consistency one would have to say that every mathematician who creates concepts, e.g., Georg Cantor, as the genius who framed the fundamental concepts of the theory of sets, is a phenomenologist, including the unknown creator of the fundamental geometrical concepts in hoary antiquity.
(even though without the so necessary distinction) the noetic or the noematic-logical concept of judgment is meant, the two concepts which we previously characterized. The corresponding pairs of concepts pertaining to likelihoods, questions, doubts, etc., run parallel with them, naturally without ever coinciding with them or with one another. Here, however, a second sense of judgment-content results—as a "content" which the judgment (or the judging) can have identically *in common* with a likelihood (or a deeming likely), with a question (or an asking), and with other act-noemas or noeses.

§95. The Analogous Distinctions in the Emotional and Volitional Spheres.

Analogous statements hold, then, as one can easily see, for the emotional and volitional spheres, for mental processes of liking or disliking, of valuing in any sense, of wishing, deciding, acting. All these are mental processes which contain many and often heterogeneous intuitional strata, the noetic and, correspondingly, also the noematic ones.

In that connection, the stratifications, generally speaking, are such that the uppermost strata of the total phenomenon can be removed without the remainder ceasing to be a concretely complete intuitional mental process, and, conversely, a concrete mental process can also take on a new noetic total stratum: as when a non-selfsufficient moment of "valuing" is stratified on a concrete process of simply objectivating or, on the other hand, is removed again.

If, in this manner, a perceiving, phantasying, judging, or the like, founds a stratum of valuing which overlays it completely, we have different *noemata* or *senses* in the stratified whole which is called a concrete mental process of valuing by being designated according to the highest level within it. The perceived as perceived specifically belongs as sense to the perceiving, but it is also included in the sense of the concrete valuing, founding the *latter's* sense. We must distinguish accordingly: the objects, the physical things, the qualities, the predicatively formed affair-complexes, which are present as valued in

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39 *Insertion in Copy A:* (To be sure, the removal of an upper stratum effects a modification of the remainder, in spite of its identity)

40 *Marginal note in Copy A to the words stratified and removed:* But these are modifications. *Addition in Copy C:* Still, with the removal, certain phenomenological modifications of the lower strata occur too.
the valuing, or else the corresponding noemata of the objectivatings, the judgings, or the like, which found the value-consciousness; on the other hand, the value-objects themselves and the predicatively formed value-complexes themselves, or else the noematic modifications corresponding to them; and then, universally, the complete noemata belonging to the concrete value-consciousness.

By way of explanation let us say first of all that, for the sake of greater distinctness, we do well (here and in all analogous cases) to introduce distinctive relative terms in order to keep sharply separate valuable object and value-object, valuable predicedatively formed affair-complex and predicatively formed value-complexes, valuable property and value-property (a term having itself two senses). We shall speak of the mere "thing" which is valuable, which has a value-characteristic, which has value-quality; in contradistinction, we speak of concrete value itself or the value-Objectiveness [Wertobjektität]. Likewise we shall speak of the mere predicatively formed affair-complex or the mere lay of things [Sachlage] and the predicatively formed value-complex or the lay of values [Wertlage], namely where the valuing has a consciousness of a predicatively formed affair-complex as its founding substratum. The value-Objectiveness involves its mere materially determinate thing [Sache]; it introduces, as a new Objective stratum, the value-quality. The predicatively formed value-complex contains the mere predicatively formed affair-complex belonging to it; in like manner the value-property contains the materially determinate thing-property and, in addition the value-quality.

Here too one must distinguish between the value-Objectiveness simpliciter and the value-Objectiveness in inverted commas which is included in the noema. Just as the perceived as perceived stands over against the perceiving in a way excluding the question of whether the perceived truly exists, so the valued as valued stands over against the valuing, and likewise in a way excluding the question of the being of the value (the being of the valued thing and the latter's being truly a value). One must exclude all actional positings in order to seize upon the noema. Moreover, careful attention must be paid to the fact that the full "sense" of the valuing includes its What in which it is intended to in the mental process of valuing in question, and that the value-Objectiveness in inverted commas is not, by itself, the full noema.

In like manner the distinctions made here can be made in the volitional sphere.
On one side we have the **deciding** which we effect together with the mental processes which it demands as a substratum, and which, when it is taken in its concreteness, it includes. To it belong many different noetic moments. Volitional positings are based on valuing positings, physical-thing positings, and the like. On the other side we find the **decision** as a peculiar kind of Objectiveness specifically belonging to the province of volition; and it is an Objectiveness obviously founded on other such noematic Objectivenesses. If, as phenomenologists, we exclude all our positings, the volitional phenomenon, as a phenomenologically pure intuitive mental process, still retains its "**willed as willed**," as a noema belonging peculiarly to the willing: the "**volition-meaning**," precisely as it is a "**meaning**" in this willing (in the full essence of the willing) and with everything being willed and "**aimed at**."

We said, "the meaning." This word suggests itself in all these contexts, just as do the words "**sense**" and "**signification.**" To the **meaning** [Meinen] or intending to [Vermeinen], then, corresponds the meant [Meinung]; to **signifying**, the **signification**. But the greatest precaution is called for with respect to these words because they all have been infected with so many equivocations by transference, not least of all by equivocations which arise from slipping from one to another of the correlative strata which we are trying to separate with scientific rigor. The scope of our present observations is the broadest extension of the essential genus, "**intentive mental process.**" "**Meaning,**" on the other hand, is normally spoken of in referring to narrower spheres which, however, function as substrata for other phenomena in the wider sphere. As technical terms, therefore, this word and cognate expressions should be used only with reference to those narrower spheres. In referring to the universalities involved, we are undoubtedly better served by our new terms and the attached analyses of examples.

§96. **Transition to Further Chapters. Concluding Remarks.**

We have bestowed such great care on working out universally the difference between noesis (i.e., the concretely complete intuitive mental process, designated by a name emphasizing its noetic components) and noema because the seizing upon and mastering it are of the greatest importance for phenomenology, are indeed decisive for
the legitimate grounding of phenomenology. At first glance it would seem to be something obvious: Any consciousness is a consciousness of something, and the modes of consciousness are highly diversified. On approaching more closely, however, we became sensible of the great difficulties involved. They concern our understanding of the mode of being of the noema, the way in which it is “implicit” in the mental process, in which it is “intended to” in the mental process. Quite particularly they concern the clean separation of those things which, as its really inherent components, belong to the mental process itself and those which belong to the noema, which must be assigned to the noema as its own <components>. Subsequently the correct analysis of the parallel structures of noesis and noema involves considerable difficulties. Even when we have succeeded in making some of the major relevant distinctions in examining the objectivatings and judgings, where they are first presented and for which logic has done valuable though far from adequate preliminary work, some effort and self-control is needed in order to actually make the parallel distinctions clearly given in the case of emotional acts, instead of only postulating and asserting them.

Here, in the context of our merely introductory meditations, we cannot undertake to develop parts of phenomenology systematically. Nevertheless, our aims require that we go into things more deeply than we have up to now and project the beginnings of such investigations. That is necessary in order to make noetic-noematic structures clear enough so that their significance for the problems and methods of phenomenology may become understandable. A detailed idea of the fruitfulness of phenomenology, the magnitude of its problems and the nature of its procedure is only achieved by actually entering province after province and seeing the extent of the relevant problems. But any such province is actually entered and becomes sensible as a field for solid work only when one makes the phenomenological distinctions and clarifications by which alone the sense of the problems to be solved in it can become understandable. Our further analyses and exhibitions of problems will be strictly confined to this style, as our previous efforts have been in part. However complicated the matters treated may seem to the novice, still we shall consider only restricted spheres. Naturally we shall give preference to what is relatively close to the gates of phenomenology and to what is unconditionally necessary in order to trace main systematic lines extending throughout the realm. All of it is hard
and requires laborious concentration on the data of specifically phenomenological eidetic intuition. There is no “royal road” into phenomenology and therefore none into philosophy. There is only the one road prescribed by phenomenology’s own essence.

Finally, the following remark would seem to be in order. Phenomenology is presented in our exposition as a beginning science. How many of the results of the analyses undertaken here are definitive, only the future can tell. Certainly much of what we have described will have to be described otherwise sub specie aeterni. But one thing we may and must strive for: that at each step we faithfully describe what we, from our point of view and after the most serious study, actually see. Our procedure is that of an explorer journeying through an unknown part of the world, and carefully describing what is presented along his unbeaten paths, which will not always be the shortest. Such an explorer can rightfully be filled with the sure confidence that he gives utterance to what, at the time and under the circumstances, must be said — something which, because it is the faithful expression of something seen, will always retain its value — even though new explorations will require new descriptions with manifold improvements. With a like conviction, in the sequel we propose to be faithful describers of phenomenological structures and, moreover, to preserve the habit of inner freedom even with respect to our own descriptions.
The Set of Problems Pertaining to Noetic-Noematic Structures

§97. The Hyletic and Noetic Moments as Really Inherent Moments, the Noematic Moments as Really Non-inherent Moments, of Mental Processes.

When introducing the distinction between the noetic and the noematic in the last chapter, we used the expressions, analysis of the really inherent and intentional analysis. Let us start with that. A phenomenologically pure mental process has its really inherent components. For the sake of simplicity, let us restrict ourselves to noetic mental processes of the lowest level, namely¹ to those which are not complicated in their intentionality by a variety of noetic strata built one upon another such as we found to be the case in acts of thinking and in emotional and volitional acts.

A sensuous perception may possibly serve as an example: the tree-perception simpliciter which we have while looking out into the garden when, in a unity of consciousness, we are looking at that tree over there which is now motionless and then appears blown by the wind, and which is also presented in greatly differing modes of appearance as we, during our continuing observation, change our spatial position relative to the tree — perhaps we go to the window or simply alter the position of our head or eyes, while perhaps at the same time relaxing and concentrating our «visual» accommodation, etc. In this way the unity of one perception can include a great multiplicity of modifications which we, as observers in the natural attitude, sometimes ascribe to the actual objects as its changes, sometimes to a real and actual relationship to our real psychophysical subjectivity and sometimes, finally, to the latter itself. But now we must describe what is left of that as a phenomenological residuum if

¹ Question marks opposite this sentence in Copy A.
we reduce it to its “pure immanence” and what therefore may or may not hold good for the really inherent component of the pure mental process. And here it must be made perfectly clear that, more particularly, there belongs to the essence of the mental process of perception in itself the “perceived tree as perceived,” or the full noema, which is not touched by excluding the actuality of the tree and that of the whole world; on the other hand, however, this noema, with its “tree” in inverted commas, is no more contained inherently than is the tree which belongs to actuality.

What do we find really inherent in the perception as pure mental process, contained in it as the parts, the pieces and the moments not divisible into pieces, of a whole? We have, on occasion, distinguished such genuine really inherent component parts by the names stuff-component parts and noetic component parts. Let us contrast them with the noematic components.

The color of the tree trunk, pure as the color of which we are perceptually conscious, is precisely the “same” as the one which, before the phenomenological reduction, we took to be the color of the actual tree (at least as “natural” human beings and prior to intervention of information provided by physics). Now, this color, put into parenthesis, belongs to the noema. But it does not belong to the mental process of perception as a really inherent component piece, although we can also find in it “something like color:” namely, the “sensed color,” that hyletic moment of the concrete mental process by which the noematic, or “objective,” color is “adumbrated.”

Accordingly, however, one and the same noematic color which is intended to throughout the continuous unity of changeable perceptual consciousness as an identical and, in itself, unchanged color, is being adumbrated by a continuous multiplicity of sensed colors. We see a tree unchanged with respect to color — its color, the color of the tree — while the positions of the eyes and our relative orientations are changing and our regard is incessantly moving over the trunk and branches, and while, at the same time, we come closer and thus, in various ways, bring the mental process of perception into a flow. Let us reflect on sensations, on adumbrations: we then seize upon them as evident data and, in perfect evidence, changing the focus and direction of attention, we can also relate them and the corresponding objective moments, cognize them as corresponding and, in so doing, see at once that, e.g., the adumbrative colors pertaining to any fixed physical-thing color are related to it as a
continual “multiplicity” is related to a “unity.”

Effecting the phenomenological reduction, we even acquire the general eidetic insight that the object, tree, can only appear at all in a perception as objectively determined in the mode in which it does appear in the perception if the hyletic moments (or, in the case of a continuous series of perceptions, if the continuous hyletic changes) are just those and no others. This therefore implies that any changes of the hyletic content of the perception, if it does not quite do away with perceptual consciousness, must at least result in what appears becoming objectively “other,” whether in itself or in the orientation in which it is appearing, or the like.

It is also absolutely indubitable, then, that here “unity” and “multiplicity” belong to wholly different dimensions and, more particularly, that everything hyletic belongs in the concrete mental process as a really inherent component, whereas, in contrast, what is “presented,” “adumbrated,” in it as multiplicity belongs in the noema.

But the stuffs, we said earlier, are “animated” by noetic moments; they undergo (while the Ego is turned, not to them, but to the object) “construings,” “sense-bestowals,” which, in reflections, we seize upon precisely in and along with the stuffs. In view of this it immediately follows that not only the hyletic moments (the sensed colors, sounds, etc.), but also the animating construals — thus both together: the appearing of the color, the sound and thus of any quality whatever of the object — belong to the “really inherent” composition of the mental process.

Now, the following is universally true: In itself the perception is a perception of its object; and to every component which is singled out in the object by “objectively” directed description there correspond a really inherent component of the perception; but, note well, only in so far as the description faithfully conforms to the object as it “is there” in that perception itself. Moreover, we can designate all those noetic components only by appealing to the noematic Object and its moments: thus saying, for example, consciousness, more particularly, perceptual consciousness, of a tree trunk, of the color of the trunk, etc.

Reading with Schuhmann sich zu ihr verhalten wie kontinuierliche “Mannigfaltigkeit” zu Einheit” instead of sich verhalten wie “Einheit” zu kontinuierlicher “Mannigfaltigkeit” in all three printed editions.

Insertion in Copy A: in the changing multiplicity

Marginal note to this paragraph in Copy A: Indeed, relatively: the hyletic Datum is, after all, itself a unity, but, to be sure, an immanent, subjectively really inherent one; on the other hand, behind it, something subjective of a higher level, something subjective constituting that unity.
On the other hand, our considerations have shown indeed that the really inherent unity within the mental process of hyletic and noetic component pieces is totally different from the "unity" of noematic component pieces "intended to" in the noesis; and it is also different from the unity which unites all those really inherent components in the mental process with that whereof, as a noema, we are conscious in and through them. That which is "transcendentally constituted" "on the ground of" the material [stofflich] mental processes "by" the noetic functions is, to be sure, something "given;" and in pure intuition we faithfully describe the mental process and its noematic object intended to [sein noematisch Bewusstes], it is something evidently given; but it belongs to the mental process in a sense entirely different from the sense in which the really inherent and therefore proper constituents belong to the mental process.

The characterization of the phenomenological reduction and, likewise, of the pure sphere of mental processes as "transcendental" rests precisely on the fact that we discover in this reduction an absolute sphere of stuffs and noetic forms whose determinately structured combinations possess, according to immanent eidetic necessity, the marvelous consciousness of something determinate and determinable, given thus and so, which is something over against consciousness itself, something fundamentally other, non-really inherent [Irreelles], transcendent; the characterization of mental processes as "transcendental" further rests on the fact that this is the primal source in which is found the only conceivable solution of those deepest problems of cognition concerning the essence and possibility of an objectively valid knowledge of something transcendent. "Transcendental" reduction exercises the ἐποχή with respect to actuality: but what it retains of actuality includes the noemas with the noematic unity included within them themselves and, accordingly, the mode in which something real is intended to and, in particular, given in consciousness itself. The knowledge that everywhere it is a matter of eidetic, therefore unconditioned, necessary concatenations opens up a great field of research into the eidetic relations between the noetic and the noematic, between the mental process of consciousness and the correlate of consciousness. The latter term, however, includes: consciousness of objectivity as consciousness of objectivity and, at the same time, the forms of the noematic How of meintness of givenness. Within the domain from which we have taken our example, there arises, first of all, the universal evidence
that perception is not an empty presentive having of the object, but that instead it belongs ("a priori") to the essence proper of perception to have "its" object, and to have it as the unity of a certain noematic composition which is always a different, yet always eidetically predelineated composition in the case of other perceptions of "the same" object; or that it is of the essence of the object in question, objectively determined thus and so, to be and only to be able to be a noematic object precisely in perceptions of such a descriptive sort, etc.5

§98. The Mode of Being of the Noema. Theory of Forms of Noeses. Theory of Forms of Noemata.6

Important supplementations are still, however, necessary. First of all, it must be carefully noted that any transition from a phenomenon into the reflection which itself is an analysis of the really inherent, or into the quite differently articulated <reflection> which dissects its noema, generates new phenomena, and that we would fall into error were we to confuse the new phenomena — which, in a certain way, are recastings of the old — with the old phenomena, and were we to impute to the old what really inherently or noematically is included in the <new>. Thus it is not meant, e.g., that the material contents, let us say the adumbrative color-contents, are present in the perceptual mental process in just the same way in which they are present in the mental process of analyzing. To mention only one <difference,> in the former they were contained as really inherent moments, but they were not perceived therein, not seized upon as objects. But in the analyzing mental process they are objects, targets of noetic functions which were not present before. Although these stuffs are still laden with their presentive functions, even these have undergone essential changes (to be sure, of other dimensions). That will be discussed later. Obviously, this difference has an essential importance for the phenomenological method.

5 Addition in Copy A: Naturally all of this is true in the case of perceptions in the very broadest sense and not merely in the case of perceptions of physical things. It holds for all originarily presentive acts: To each fundamental kind of objectivity there corresponds an eidetically appertinent fundamental kind of constitutive consciousness originally — i.e., consciousness presentive originaliter of just that <objectivity> and no other — and eidetically this consciousness has its quite determinate structures the exploration of which is the task.

6 Marginal note in Copy D to Title:
Following this remark let us turn our attention to the following points belonging to our particular theme. In the first place, every mental process is so structured that there exists the essential possibility of turning one's regard to it and its really inherent components and, likewise, in the opposite direction to the noema, perchance to the seen tree as seen. That which is given in this focusing of regard is now, more particularly, stated logically, an object, but utterly non-selfsufficient. Its esse consists exclusively of its "percipi" — except that this proposition does not have the Berkeleyian sense because here the esse does not include the percipi as a really inherent component piece.

This is naturally transferred to the eidetic mode of consideration: the Eidos of the noema points to the Eidos of the noetic consciousness; both belong together eidetically. The intensive as intensive [Intentionale als solches] is what it is as the intentiveness [Intentionales] belonging to consciousness structured thus and so, consciousness which is consciousness of it.

In spite of this non-selfsufficiency the noema allows for being considered by itself, compared with other noemas, explored with respect to its possible transformations, etc. One can project a theory of the universal and pure forms of noemata which would have as its contrasting correlate a theory of the universal and no less pure forms of concrete noetic mental processes with their hyletic and specifically noetic components.

Naturally these two theories would by no means be related as, so to speak, mutual reflections; nor would the one be transformed into the other by a mere change of sign, let us say, by substituting "consciousness of N" for each noema N. That already follows from what we explained before in connection with the way in which unitary qualities belong together in the physical thing — noema with their hyletic adumbration-multiplicities contained in possible perceptions of physical things.

It would now seem as though the same would also be true with respect to the specifically noetic moments. More particularly, one can refer to those moments which bring it about that a complex multiplicity of hyletic Data, e.g., color-Data, etc., acquire the func-

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7 In Copy A a square bracket at the beginning of this sentence, and marginal note: Not serviceable from here on.

8 Marginal note to this sentence in Copy A: Obviously, what is meant is this: Among the really inherent component pieces of consciousness, the quality-noema has its correlate in sensation, but the infinity of changing sensations ... [rest of note not legible]
tion of a manifold adumbration of one and the same objective physical thing. Indeed, it only need be recalled that in the stuffs themselves, by virtue of their own essence, the relation to the Objective unity is not unambiguously predelineated; the same material complex, instead, can undergo a diversity of mutually discrete and shifting construings by virtue of which different objectivities are intended to. Is it not therefore already clear that essential differences lie in the animating construings themselves as moments of mental processes, and which are differentiated along with the attendant adumbrations and by virtue of the animation of which they constitute “sense”? One may therefore draw the following conclusion: A parallelism between noesis and noema is indeed the case, but it is such that one must describe the formations on both sides and in their essentially mutual correspondence. The noematic is the field of unities, the noetic is the field of “constituting” multiplicities. The consciousness which unites the manifold “functionally” and, at the same time, constitutes unity never in fact shows an identity even where an identity of the “object” is given in the noematic correlate. Where, for example, different segments of an enduring perceiving which is constituting a physical-thing unity shows something identical, the one tree unchanging according to the sense of this perceiving — given now in this, then in that orientation, now from the front, now from the back, at first indistinctly and indeterminately, then distinctly and determinately with respect to the properties of one or another place seized upon visually — : there the object found in the noema is intended to as an identical object in the literal sense, but the consciousness of it is a non-identical, only combined, continuously united consciousness in the different segments of its immanental duration.

No matter to what extent these statements contain something right, the conclusions drawn are still not wholly correct; indeed, the greatest caution is required in dealing with these difficult questions. The parallelisms obtaining here — and there are many which are only too easily confused with one another — involve great difficulties which are still in need of clarification. We must carefully keep in view the difference between concrete noetic mental processes, the mental processes together with their hyletic moments, and the pure noeses as mere complexes of noetic moments. Again, we must preserve the

\[9\text{Insertion in Copy A: in the different phases and adumbrations belonging to perceptions of the same}\]
distinction between the full noema and, e.g., in the case of perception, the "appearing object as appearing." If we take this "object" and all its objective "predicates" — the noematic modifications of the predicates of the perceived physical thing, posited in normal perception simply as actual predicates — then this object and these predicates are indeed unities in contradistinction to multiplicities of constituting mental processes of consciousness (concrete noeses). But they are also unities of noematic multiplicities. We recognize that as soon as we take into consideration the noematic characterizations of the noematic "object" (and its "predicates"), characterizations which until now we have grossly neglected. Thus it is certain, for instance, that the appearing color is a unity in contradistinction to noetic multiplicities and, specifically, multiplicities of noetic construing-characteristics. But more precise investigations reveal that changes in these characterizations correspond to noematic parallels — if not in the "color itself," which continues to appear there, then at least in their changing "modes of givenness," e.g., in their appearing "orientation with respect to me." In this way, then noetic" characterizations" are mirrored in the noematic ones.

How that is the case, and not simply for the sphere of perception emphasized here by way of example, must now become a theme of comprehensive analyses. We shall analyze in sequence the different kinds of consciousness with their many different noetic characteristics and explore them with respect to their notic-noematic parallels.

In advance, however, we must impress upon ourselves that the parallelism between the unity of the object noematically "meant" in such and such a way, the unity of the object in the "sense," and the constituting formations of consciousness ("ordo et connexio rerum — ordo et connexio idearum") must not be confused with the parallelism between noesis and noema, understood more particularly as the parallelism of noetic and corresponding noematic characteristics.

The following considerations concern the latter parallelism.


It is our task, therefore, to considerably broaden the sphere of what has been exhibited in the two parallel series of noetic and noematic events in order to arrive at the full noema and the full noesis. What
previously we had in view, although without suspecting the great
problems it contains, is indeed only a central core and, in addition,
not even an unambiguously delimited one.

Let us recall, in the first place, that “objective sense” which, by
comparing the noemata of different sorts of objectivations, of per­
ceptions, of memories, picture-objectivations, and the like, previ­
ously proved to be something describable exclusively with Objective
expressions and even with identical ones in the preferentially
chosen limiting cases in which a wholly like object — oriented in a
like way, apprehended in a like way in every respect — e.g., a tree, is
presented perceptually, memorially, pictorially, etc. In contrast to
the identical “appearing tree as appearing,” with its identical
“Objective” How of appearing, there remain the differences in modes
of givenness varying from one kind of intuition to another kind and in
accordance with other sorts of objectivation.

That which is identical is at one time intended to “originarily,” at
another time “memorially,” then “pictorially,” etc. In that connec­
tion, however, characteristics, found when one’s regard is directed to the
noematic correlate and not to the mental process and its really
inherent composition, are indicated in the “appearing tree as appear­
ing.” Expressed, accordingly, are not “modes of consciousness” in the
sense of noetic moments, but rather modes in which the object itself
intended to and as intended to is given. As characteristics belonging to
what is, so to speak, “ideally inherent” [“Ideellen”], they are them­
selves “ideal” [“ideell”] and not really inherent.

Upon more precise analysis one observes that the characteristics
mentioned as examples do not belong to a single series.

On the one side we have the reproductive modification simpliciter,
the presentation simpliciter, which, in its own essence, remarkably
enough, is given as modification of something else. Presentation refers
back to perception in its own peculiar phenomenological essence;
e.g., as we have already noted before, remembering something past
implies “having perceived;” thus in a certain fashion the “corre­
sponding” perception (perception of the same sense-core) is intended
to in the memory, although it is not actually contained in it. Precisely
in its own peculiar essence, memory is a “modification of” per­
ception. Correlatively, what is characterized as past in itself is presen­
ted as “having been present,” thus as a modification of the “present”

10 Author’s footnote: See §91, pp. 188f.
which as the unmodified, is precisely the "originary," the "present in person" of the perception.

On the other side, the pictorializing modification belongs to another series of modifications. It presentiates "in" a "picture." However, the picture can be an originally appearing one, e.g., the "painted" picture which we seize upon perceptually (obviously not the painting as physical thing of which it is said, e.g., that it hangs on the wall\(^1\)). But the picture can also be something which appears reproductively, as when we have picture-objectivations in memory or in free phantasy.\(^12\)

At the same time one observes that the characteristics of this new series are not only related back to the first series, but also presuppose combinations: the latter <presupposed> with reference back to the difference between "picture" and "depictured" which noematically belongs to the essence of consciousness. One sees too, on that account, that here the noema always includes a pair of characteristics which refer to one another even though they include differing objects as objects of objectivatings.

Finally, sign-objectivations, with their analogous opposites of sign and designated, offer us a closely related and nonetheless new type of modifying noematic characteristics (to which, as everywhere, there correspond parallel noetic characteristics); accordingly, again combinations of objectivations occur, and, as correlates of their own peculiar unity as sign-objectivations, pairs of characterizations which belong together noematically occur in the noematic object-pairs.

One also notes that just as the "picture" ["Bild"] in itself, according to its sense as image [Bild], is given as the modification of something which, without this modification would be there itself simply as "in person" or as presentiated, so the "sign" <is given>, but, in its fashion, likewise as the modification of something.

§100. Eidetically Lawful Hierarchical Formations of Objectivations in the Noesis and Noema.

All the types of objectivation-modifications previously dealt with are always accessible for always newer hierarchical formations of such a

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11 Author's footnote: On this difference, cf. below, §111, p. 226.
12 Marginal comment in Copy D: Easily misunderstood. Addition in Copy A: Living in phantasy or in memory, a painting stands "before our eyes," and the like
kind that the intentionalities in the noesis and noema are hierarchically built up on one another or, rather, in a unique way, encased in one another.

There are presentations simpliciter, modifications simpliciter of perceptions. But there are also presentations of a second, third and, essentially, of any level whatever. Rememberings "in" rememberings will serve as an example. Living in the remembering we "effect" a concatenation of mental processes in the mode of presentation. We persuade ourselves of this by reflecting "in" the remembering (which, for its part, is a presentation-modification of an originary reflecting), and we then find the concatenations of mental processes characterized as memorially "having been lived." Whether we reflect on them or not, among mental processes characterized that way rememberings can themselves now occur characterized as "rememberings having been lived," and the regard can be directed through them to the remembered at the second level. In the secondarily modified concatenation of mental processes, rememberings can arise once again, and thus idealiter in infinitum.

A mere change of sign (the own specific peculiarity of which we must yet learn to understand) translates all of these events into the type, free phantasy, so that phantasyings into phantasyings are yielded, and this at any level of encasement.

Moreover, there are then mixtures of them. It is not only the case that each presentation, according to its essence, with respect to the next level below it, includes presentation-modifications of perceptions which become the object of a seizing regard by the wonderful <process> of reflection in presentation; in the unity of the presentation-phenomenon we can find at the same time, besides presentations of perceptions, presentations of rememberings, expectations, phantasyings, etc., whereby the presentations in question can be themselves of any of these types. And all of this <is found> at different levels.

This also holds for the types of combinations, depictive objectivation and sign-objectivation. Let us take an example with a very complicated and yet easily understandable objectivation-formation belonging to objectivations of higher level. A name reminds us, namely, of the Dresden Gallery and of our last visit there: we walk through the halls and stand before a picture by Teniers which represents a picture gallery. If, let us say, we allow that pictures in the latter would represent again pictures which, for their part, represent legible
inscriptions, and so forth, then we can estimate which inclusion of objectivations and which mediacies are actually producible with respect to objectivities which can be seized upon. But such very complicated examples are not required for *eidetic insights*, in particular for the insight into the ideal possibility for continuing ad libitum the encasement of one objectivation into another.

§101. Characteristics of Levels. Different Sorts of "Reflections."

It is clear that in all those kinds of hierarchical structures which contain reiterated presentation-modifications in their members, noemas with a corresponding hierarchical formation are constituted. In the consciousness of a depicturing at the second level a "picture" in itself is characterized as a picture at the second level, as picture of a picture. If we recall how yesterday we remembered a childhood experience, then the noema, "childhood experience," in itself has a characterization as something remembered at the second level. Thus in general:

To every noematic level there belongs a characteristic appropriate to that level as a kind of index with which each thing characterized manifests itself as belonging to its level — whether it would otherwise be a primary object or one lying in some line or other of the reflective regard. For indeed to every level belong possible reflections at that level, so that, e.g., with respect to remembered things at the second level of remembering, there are reflections on perceivings of just these things belonging to the same level (thus presented at the second level).

Furthermore: each noematic level is an "objectivation" "of" the data of the following level. "Objectivation" does not signify here, however, the objectivation-process, and the "of" does not express here the relation of consciousness and the Object of consciousness. It is, as it were, a noematic in contrast to a noetic intentionality. The latter includes in itself the former as its consciousness-correlate, and its intentionality, in a certain way, goes clear through the line of noematic intentionality.

This will become more distinct when we allow the Ego's attentive

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13 *Marginal comment in Copy A*: Dubious, and to be more precisely characterized as a relative way of speaking
regard to be directed to the consciousness of something objective. The <Ego's regard> then goes straight through the noemata of the sequence of levels — until it arrives at the Object of the ultimate level beyond which it cannot go, but upon which, instead, it fixes. The regard can, however, shift from level to level, and instead of going through all of them it is rather directed to the data of that level upon which it fixes; it can do this either in a “straightforward” or in a reflective direction of regard.

In the previous example: the regard can remain at the level of the Dresden Gallery — “rememberingly” we walk through the Gallery in Dresden. Then we can, again within memory, live in the observation of pictures and find ourselves in the world of pictures. After this, adverted to the gallery of paintings in picture consciousness of the second level, we look at the paintings themselves; or we reflect hierarchically upon the noeses, etc. This multiplicity of possible directions of the regard essentially belongs to the multiplicity of intentionalities related to and founded in one another; and wherever we find analogous founding relationships — and in what follows we will become acquainted with many very different kinds — analogous possibilities of changing reflection are brought out.

It need not be said that these relations require scientifically detailed explorations with respect to their essence.

§102. Transition to New Dimensions of Characterizations.

With respect to all of the specifically peculiar characterizations which we encountered in complex domains of modifications through presentiations, we must clearly distinguish, on grounds already indicated, between the noetic and the noematic. The noematic “objects” — the picture-Object, or the depictured Object, the <Object> functioning as sign and the designated <Object>, disregarding the characterizations belonging to them such as “picture for,” “depicted,” “sign for,” “designated” — are unities transcendent to, but evidentially intended to in, the mental process. But if that is the case, then characteristics, which arise in <those unities> for consciousness and which are seized upon as their properties in focusing the regard on them, cannot possibly be regarded as really inherent moments of the

14 In Copy D the last clause placed in brackets; question mark in margin.

15 Marginal note to this sentence in Copy A: The entire concept of the noetic is problematic simply by the way it is introduced.
mental process. No matter how difficult the problems may still be in how both — that which is a really inherent composition of the mental process and that which is intended to in the mental process as not really inherent in it — may stand with respect to one another, we must make the differentiation throughout. More particularly, we must make it not only with respect to the noematic core, the "intentional object as intentional" (and taken in its "Objective" modes of givenness), which emerges in the particular case as the bearer of the noematic "characteristics," but also as well with respect to the characteristics themselves.

There are, however, still quite different sorts of characteristics which always attach to the noematic core, and the ways in which they pertain to the core are very different. They find their place within fundamentally different genera, within, so to speak, fundamentally different dimensions of characterization. On that account, it may be pointed out at the very beginning that all of the characteristics suggested here or still to be suggested (mere headings of necessary analytic-descriptive research) are of all-embracing phenomenological scope. When we also deal with them immediately, primarily in the case of the relatively simplest structured mental processes which comprise a determined and fundamental concept of "objectivation," and which make up necessary foundations for all other intuitive mental processes, then these same fundamental genera and species of characteristics are also to be found among all these founded and, therefore, among all intuitive mental processes whatever. The situation is such that, accordingly, always and necessarily a noematic core, an "object-noema," is intended to which must be characterized in some manner and, moreover, according to this or that (on its side, exclusive) species in each genus.

§103. Belief-characteristics and Being-characteristics.

If we look about for new characteristics we notice, first of all, that being-characteristics are combined with those obviously totally different characteristics we dealt with before. As noetic characteristics related to correlative modes of being — "doxic" or "belief-characteristics" — we find perceptual belief and, sometimes, to be sure, perceptual certainty, really inherently included in intuitive objectivations, e.g., in those of normal perceptions as "attentive percep-
tions;" corresponding to "perceptual certainty" as its noematic correlate belonging to the appearing object is the being-characteristic: "actual." The same noetic or noematic characteristic is shown by "certain" representation, by every sort of "sure" mindfulness of something which was, or is now, or which will be in the future (as in the case of anticipated expectation). They are being-"positing," "positional" acts. To be sure, we must note concerning this expression that if it refers also to an actus, to a position-taking in a specific sense, precisely this is left out of consideration.

In the sphere considered up to now, that which appears perceptually or memorially had the characteristic of "actually" existing simpliciter — of "certainly" existing as we also say in contrast to other being-characteristics. For this characteristic can become modified; it can become transformed, perhaps, in the same phenomenon by actual modifications, The mode of "certain" belief can change into the mode of mere deeming possible or deeming likely, or questioning and doubting; and, as the case may be, that which appears (and which, with regard to the first dimension of characterizations is characterized as "originary," "reproductive," and the like has taken on now the being-modalities of "possible," of probable," of "questionable," of "doubtful."

For example: at first a perceived object is there with simple unquestionedness, in certainty. Suddenly we suspect that we may have fallen victim to a mere "illusion," we suspect that what is seen, heard, and the like, may be "mere semblance." Or what is appearing keeps its being-certainty, but we are unsure about some determinational complex or other. The thing "suggests itself" as possibly a man. Then a contrary deeming possible occurs: it could be a tree which, in the darkness of the forest, looks like a man who is moving. Now, however, the "weight" of the one "possibility" becomes considerably greater; we decide in its favor, perhaps in the manner in which we definitely deem it likely that "it was a tree after all."

Being-modalities likewise change even more frequently in memory and, more particularly, they change such that, in a large measure, they are set up and replaced within the bounds of intuitions, or of obscure objectivations, without the participation of any "thinking" in the specific sense, without a "concept" and predicative judgment.

At the same time, one sees that the relevant phenomena suggest various studies, that many further characteristics (like "decided," "weights" of possibilities, and the like) make their appearance here,
and that, in particular, the question about the essential foundations of the various characteristics, the question about the whole structure of noemas and noeses governed by eidetic laws, also requires profounder investigations.

And here, as elsewhere, it is sufficient to have brought out\(^{16}\) the group of problems.

\section*{§104. The Doxic Modalities as Modifications.}

But with respect to the series of belief-modalities specifically occupying us, we must still point out that, in the pre-eminent specific intentional sense of the word, modification again finds the application which we made distinct for ourselves in the analysis of the previous series of noetic or noematic characteristics. In the present series belief-certainty obviously plays the role of the unmodified or, as we had to say here, the "unmodalized" primal form of the mode of believing. Correlatively, in the correlate: the being-characteristic simpliciter (the noematically "certain" or "actually" existing) functions as the primal form from which all being-modalities are derived. In fact, all of the being-characteristics originating from it, the ones, to be specifically called being-modalities, have in their own sense a relation back to the primal form. \textit{In itself} "possible" is tantamount to "possibly existing;" "probable," "doubtful," "questionable" are tantamount to "probably existing," "doubtfully and questionably existing." The intentionality of the noeses is mirrored in these noematic respects \textit{Beziehungen}, and one feels oneself forced to speak again even of a "noematic intentionality" as a "parallel" of the noetic \textit{intentionality}, which is \textit{intentionality} properly so called.

All of this is transferred to the full "\textit{posita}," i.e., to the unities of sense-core and being-characteristic.\(^{17}\)

It is convenient, besides, to employ the term "being-modality" for the whole series of the being-characteristics, thus also for unmodified "being" wherever this is to be considered as \textit{a member of this series} — perhaps similar to the way in which the arithmetician also includes "ones" under the name number. In the same sense, we universalize the sense of the phrase, doxic modalities, under which we comprise,

\begin{flushleft} \footnotesize Addition in Copy A: the main lines and \footnotesize\textit{Author's Footnote: For particulars concerning the concept of "positum" in our extraordinarily amplified sense, see the first chapter of Part Four, pp. 265ff.} \end{flushleft}
often consciously with a double significance, the noetic and noematic parallels.

Furthermore, in the designation of unmodalized being as "being certain," one should heed the equivocation of the word "certain," "certainty" ["gewiß"], and not only with respect to its signifying sometimes noetic, sometimes noematic "being certain." It also serves (and here this is very misleading) to express, e.g., the correlate of affirmation: "yes" as the opposite of "no" and "not." This must remain strictly excluded here. The significations of words continually shift within the bounds of immediate logical equivalence. But our task is to bring to light everywhere the equivalences, and to sharply separate what lies behind them in essentially different phenomena.

Belief-certainty is belief simpliciter in the pregnant sense. It has, in fact, according to our analyses a highly remarkable special place in the multiplicity of acts all of which are comprehended under the title of belief — or "judgment" as is frequently but unsuitably said. A proper expression is needed which takes account of this special place and blots out every memory of the conventional placing of certainty and other belief-modes on a par. We introduce the term primal belief or protodoxa, by which the intentional retrorelatedness, elaborated by us, of all "belief-modalities" is suitably expressed. We add further that we shall use this latter expression (or "doxic modality") for all intentional variants grounded in the essence of protodoxa, even for those new ones to be brought out in the following analyses.

We scarcely require a critique of the basically false theory according to which a genus, "belief" (or "judgment") is only differentiated into certainty, uncertain presumption, etc., as though it were a matter there of a series of coordinate species (no matter where the series is broken off) — just as color, sound, etc., are coordinate species in the genus, sensuous quality. In addition, we must refrain here, as elsewhere, from pursuing the consequences of what we have ascertained phenomenologically.

§ 105. Belief-modality as Belief, Being-modality as Being.

If, with respect to the highly remarkable situation described above, we speak of an intentionality whereby the secondary modes relate back to proto-doxa, the sense of this locution requires the possibility of multiple directions of regard of the kind which universally belong
to the essence of intentionality at a higher level. The possibility indeed exists. On the one hand, we can, e.g., while living in probability-consciousness (in the deeming likely) look at what is probable; on the other hand, we can, however, look at the probable itself as probable, that is, at the noematic Object as having the characteristic allotted to it by the deeming-likely noesis. The "Object," however, with its sence-composition and with this probability-characteristic, is given as existing in the second focusing of regard: in relation to this, accordingly, consciousness is simple belief in the unmodified sense. Likewise we can live in possibility-consciousness (in the "deeming possible"), or in questioning and doubting, our regard being directed to what we are conscious of there as possible, questionable, doubtful. But we can also look at the possible, the questionable, doubtful as possible, questionable, doubtful and then, perhaps explicitly, seize upon the being possible, the being questionable, the being doubtful, predicating them of the sense-Object: the latter then is given as being in the unmodified sense.

Thus quite universally we can observe the highly remarkable eidetic peculiarity that, in relation to all the noetic moments the "intentional Object" as "Object" is constituted as having by means of its noeses, every mental process functions as belief-consciousness in the sense of protodoxa; or, as we can also say:

It is not the case that only new noematic characteristics are constituted by the new supervening noetic characteristics or by modifications of old ones; instead, new Objects posited as existent are therewith eo ipso constituted for consciousness; to the noematic characteristics correspond predicable characteristics in the sense-Object as actual and not merely noematically modified predicables.

These propositions will acquire further clarity when we have made ourselves familiar with new noematic spheres.

§106. Affirmation and Denial Along With Their Noematic Correlates.

Again a new retrorelated modification and, moreover, one which is possibly on a higher level by virtue of its essential intentional relation back to belief-modalities of every sort, is rejection as well as its analogue, assent. Expressed more specifically: denial and affirmation. Every denial is denial of something, and this something refers us back to some belief-modality or other. Noetically, therefore, negation is the
"modification" of some "position" or other; that does not signify an affirmation but instead a "positing" in the extended sense of some belief-modality or other.

Its new noematic effect is the "cancellation" of the corresponding posited characteristic, its specific correlate is the cancellation-characteristic, the characteristic of "not." The line of negation goes through something positional, more concretely stated, through a "positum" and, more particularly, by virtue of the cancellation of a specific positum-characteristic, i.e., of its being-modality. Precisely on this account this characteristic and the positum itself are present as "modification" of something else. Differently stated: by transmutation of the simple being-consciousness into the corresponding negation-consciousness, the simple characteristic "existing" becomes, in the noema, "non-existing."

Analogously, "possible," "probable," "questionable," become "impossible," "improbable," unquestionable." And hence the whole noema, the whole "positum," taken in its concrete noematic fullness, becomes modified.

Just as negation, metaphorically speaking, strikes out, so affirmation "underscores," it "confirms" a position by "assenting" instead of "annulling" it as in negation. This too yields a series of noematic modifications parallel to the cancellation-modifications. We cannot follow up on this here.

Up to now we have disregarded what is peculiar to the "position-taking" of the pure Ego which, in the rejection, specifically here in the negating <rejection>, is "directed" against what is rejected, against the being to be cancelled, just as in the affirmation <the Ego> is inclined toward what is affirmed, directed to it. This descriptive side of the situation should also not be overlooked and requires its own analysis.

Similarly, account is to be taken, again, of the circumstance that, with respect to the complexity of the intentionalities, different directions of the regard are always possible. We can live in the negating consciousness, in other words, "effect" the negation; the regard of the Ego is then directed to that which undergoes the cancellation. But we can also direct the regard as a seizing <regard> to the cancelled as cancelled, to that which bears the stamp of cancellation: <the cancelled> is then there as a new "Object," and, to be sure, it is there in the simple protodoxic mode as "existing." The new focusing does not generate the new Object posited as existent; in the "effecting" of the rejection
what is rejected is also intended to as having the characteristic of cancelledness; but it is only in the new focusing that the characteristic becomes the *predicable determination* of the noematic sense-core. Likewise the same is also true, naturally, of affirmation.

The tasks of phenomenological eidetic analysis also lie, therefore, in this direction.\(^{18}\)

§107. Reiterated Modifications.

What we have already appropriated by such analyses is sufficient to directly achieve the following advance of insight:

Since every negatum and affirmatum is itself an Object posited as existent, it can, like everything else intended to as having a mode of being, become affirmed or denied. *In consequence* of the constitution of something as existent effected anew at every step, *an ideally infinite chain of reiterated modifications* therefore results. Thus at the first level, "not non-existent," "not impossibly existent," "not unquestionably existent," "not improbably existent," and so forth.

The same holds good, as is immediately seen, for all the modifications of being discussed earlier. That something is possible, probable, questionable, and so forth, can itself be intended to again in the mode of possibility, probability, questionability, the noematic being-formations corresponding to the noetic formations: it is possible that it is possible, that it is probable, that it is questionable; and thus in all complexities. Affirmata and negata correspond to the formation of higher levels, they being modifiable anew, and thus it continues, ideally stated, in infinitum. It is a matter here of anything but mere verbal repetitions. We need only recall the theory of probability and its applications where possibilities and probabilities are continually weighed, denied, doubted, deemed likely, inquired into, ascertained, etc.

But it should always be noted that the term modification refers, on the one hand, to a possible transmutation of the phenomena, thus to a possible actional operation; on the other hand, it refers to the much more interesting eidetic peculiarity of the noeses or to the noemas in

\(^{18}\)Author's footnote: It would be instructive to think over the acute essay of Adolf Reinach, "Zur Theorie des negativen Urteils" ["On the Theory of Negative Judgment"], *Münchner Philos. Abhandlungen*, 1911, on the basis of clarifications of the essence of doxic events which we have attempted in the present chapter, and to view its problems in our own light.
their pointing back to something other, something unmodified in their own essence, without any consideration of origin. But in both respects we stand on pure phenomenological grounds. For the terms transmutation and origin here refer to phenomenological eidetic occurrences and in no way signify empirical mental processes as facts of Nature.

§108. Noematic Characteristics Not Determinations Produced by "Reflection."

With each new group of noeses and noemas of which we have acquired clear consciousness, it is necessary that we also assure ourselves anew of the fundamental cognition so contrary to the habits of psychologistic thinking: that noesis and noema must be distinguished actually and correctly precisely to the extent demanded by faithful description. If one has already become accustomed to pure eidetic description of what is immanent (which so many have failed to do who otherwise prize description), and has brought himself in that connection to grant to every consciousness an intentional Object as belonging to it and describable in its immanence, the temptation is still great to construe the noematic characteristics, and above all the ones last dealt with, as determinations merely produced by "reflection."

Recalling the usually narrow concept of reflection, we understand what that signifies: Determinations which accrue to the intentional Objects by virtue of being referred back to the modes of consciousness in which they are precisely Objects of consciousness.

Thus the negatum, the affirmatum, and the like, supposedly result because when relating reflection bears on the negating, on the affirming, likewise on the deeming likely, the "judgment-"object is characterized as negated, as affirmed, as probable, and thus throughout. This is mere construction already shown to be wrong by the fact that if these predicates were actually only predicates of relating reflection they could only be given just in actual reflection on the act-side and in relating to it. It is evident, however, that they are not given by such reflection. We seize upon what is properly a matter of the correlate when we direct our regard directly and precisely to the correlate. We seize upon the negatum, the affirmatum, the

possible, the questionable, etc., the appearing object as appearing is constituted as having. Accordingly, in no way do we direct our regard back to the act. Conversely, the noetic predicates accruing by such reflection by no means have the same sense as the noematic predicates in question. Connected with this is the fact, therefore, that also from the standpoint of truth, non-being is obviously only equivalent to, and not identical with, "being validly negated;" being possible is only equivalent to, and not identical with "being accepted as possible in a valid way;" and the like.

Natural language, undistorted by any psychological prejudice, provides a witness for us should we need it. Looking into the steroscope, we say: this appearing pyramid is "nothing," is mere "semblance;" What is appearing as appearing is obviously the subject of predication and we ascribe to it (which is a physical thing-noema but not a physical thing) what we find present in it itself as a characteristic — precisely nullity. Here, as throughout phenomenology, one must have the courage to accept what is really to be seen in the phenomenon precisely as it presents itself rather than interpreting it away, and to honestly describe it. All theories must be directed accordingly.

§ 109. The Neutrality Modification.

Among the modifications related to the sphere of belief we must still characterize a most important one which occupies a completely isolated place, therefore which need not be located in a series discussed above. If we dedicate a detailed consideration of it at this place, this is justified by the peculiar manner in which it is related to doxic positing and by the circumstance that it can only be discovered in its peculiarity with a more profound investigation — as a highly significant universal modification of consciousness rather than one specifically belonging just to the sphere of belief. In this connection, we will also find the occasion to examine a kind of genuine belief-modification still lacking to us, easily confused with the new modification in question: assumption.

It is a matter, now, of a modification which, in a certain way, completely annuls, completely renders powerless every doxic modality to which it is related — but it is a modification in a totally different sense than that of negation which, moreover, as we saw, has
its positive effect in the negatum: a non-being which is itself again a being. The modification does not cancel out, does not "effect" anything: it is the conscious counterpart of all producing: its neutralization. It is included in every abstaining-from-producing something, putting-something-out-of-action, "parenthesizing-" it, "leaving-something-undecided" and then having-an-"undecided"-something, being-"immersed"-in-the-producing, or "merely conceiving" the something produced without "doing anything with it."

Since this modification has never been scientifically elaborated, and, therefore, also not fixed terminologically (where it had been touched upon it had been confused with other modifications), and since even a univocal name is lacking for it in ordinary language, we can only approach it circumspectly and successively by a process of elimination. For all the expressions just collected together as a preliminary indication contain a surplus of sense. They all connote a voluntary doing, whereas that should not matter at all. We therefore eliminate it. In any case, the result of this doing has a content peculiar to it which, by disregarding the fact that it "originates" in the doing (which too, naturally, would be a phenomenological Datum), can be considered in itself apart from such voluntary doing as it is possible and present in the concatenation of mental processes. If we thus exclude the letting-it-be-undecided pertaining to everything voluntary, but also not understanding it in the sense of something dubitable or hypothetical, then there remains a certain having-an-"undecided" something or, better still, a certain having-something-"standing there" which is not "actually" intended to as standing there. The posited characteristic has become powerless. Believing is now no longer serious believing, deeming likely is no longer serious deeming likely, negating is no longer serious negating, etc. It is a "neutralized" believing, deeming likely, negating, or the like, the correlates of which repeat those of the unmodified mental processes but in a radically modified way: the being simpliciter, the being possible, the being probable, likewise the non-being and affirmata — all that is consciously there although not in the manner of something "actually" thought of but instead as something "merely thought of," as "mere thought." Everything has the modifying "parentheses," closely akin to to that of

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20 In Copy A a question mark placed in the margin opposite the next two sentences.
21 Marginal note in Copy A to the next four sentences: Deleatur
22 Marginal note in Copy A opposite this phrase: No
which we have spoken so much before, and which is so important for preparing the way to phenomenology. Positings simpliciter, the non-neutralized positings, have as resultant correlates "posita" which are characterized altogether as "what exists." Possibility, probability, questionability, non-being and yes-being [Jasein] — all that is itself something "existing:" namely, characterized in the correlate as existing, as "intended to" in consciousness. Neutralized positings are essentially differentiated, however, by the fact that their correlates do not contain anything positable, anything actually predicatable; in no respect does neutralized consciousness play the role of a "believing" for what is intended to.


That an incomparable peculiarity of consciousness is really present here is shown by the fact that, in accordance with their essence, genuinely non-neutralized noeses are subject to the "legitimation of reason," whereas the question about reason and unreason makes no sense for the neutralized noeses.

The situation is the same, correlativey, for the noemas. Everything characterized noematically as existing (certainly), as possible, deemed likely, questionable, null, etc., can thus be characterized in a "valid" or "invalid" way; it can be "in truth," be possible, be null, etc. Whereas mere thinking-of "posits" nothing, it is not a positing consciousness. The "mere thought of" actualities, possibilities, etc., "claims" nothing; it is neither to be admitted as correct nor rejected as incorrect.

Doubtless any merely thinking-of can be converted into an assuming, a supposing, and this new modification (in the same way as that of merely thinking-of) is subject to unconditioned free will. In its turn, however, supposing is thus something like positing; the supposed, in its turn, is a kind of "positum," except that it is a modification of doxic positing entirely of its own sort standing over against and apart from the principal series dealt with above. It can enter into the unity of posita to be judged about rationally as a member (the supposed as hypothetical "antecedent" or consequent) and hence itself be subject to rational valuation. It is not of a mere undecided thought, but rather of what is hypothetically supposed that it can be said that it is correct or not. It is a fundamental error to confuse the one with the other and
to overlook the equivocations contained in the locutions: merely thinking-of or mere thought-of.

In addition there is, likewise, a deceptive equivocation contained in the word thinking in so far as it is at one time related to the distinctive sphere of explicating, conceiving and expressing thinking, to logical thinking in a specific sense; and, at another time, it is related to the positional as positional which, precisely as we have it in view here, does not ask about any explicating and conceiving predicating.

All of the occurrences considered here we find in the sphere of mere sensuous intuitions and their modifications into obscure objectivations, to which we have given preference in the first place.

§111. The Neutrality Modification and Phantasy.

But a still more dangerous equivocation of the expression, "merely thinking of," comes into question; that is to say, a very likely confusion must be guarded against, namely the confusion of the neutrality modification with phantasy. The deceptive and not really easily untangled circumstance here consists of the facts that phantasy itself is in fact a neutrality modification, that it is of universal significance in spite of the peculiarity of its type, applicable to all mental processes, that it also plays its role in most of the formations pertaining to thinking-of and must, nonetheless, be distinguished in that connection from the universal neutrality modification with its manifold formations corresponding to all kinds of position.

More precisely stated: universally phantasying is the neutrality modification of "positing" presentation, therefore of memory in the widest conceivable sense.

It must be noted here that in ordinary language presentation (reproduction) and phantasy overlap. We use the expressions such that, taking account of our analyses, we leave the universal term presentation without the indication of whether the relevant "position" is properly so-called or neutralized. For universally presentations are divided into two groups: memories of every kind and their neutrality modifications. Nevertheless, it will be shown in what follows that this division cannot be accepted as a genuine classification.23

23 Author's footnote: Cf. the indications on essence and counter-essence, pp. 233f.
On the other hand, any mental process whatever (so to speak, any actually living <mental process>) is a mental process “presently existing.” Belonging to its essence is the possibility of reflection on the same <essence> in which it is necessarily characterized as certainly and presently <existing>. Accordingly, there corresponds to every mental process, as to every originarily individual being of which there is consciousness, a series of ideally possible memorial modifications. To <mental living>, as originarily consciousness of the <mental process>, there correspond, as possible parallels, the memories of it; in addition, therefore, as neutrality modifications of memories there correspond <phantasies>. So it is for every mental process, no matter how it might be attended to in the pure Ego’s direction of regard. The following will serve by way of elucidation:

Whenever any objects whatever are presentiated — let us assume for the moment that it is a mere world of phantasy, and that we are attentively adverted to it — it then belongs to the essence of phantasying consciousness that not only this world, but also at the same time the perceiving “presentive of” it, is phantasied. We are adverted to it, to the “perceiving in phantasy” (i.e., the neutrality modification of memory), but only when, as we said before, we "reflect in phantasy." It is, however, of fundamental significance not to confuse this modification, ideally possible at all times, which would convert any mental process, even the phantasying process itself, into the precisely corresponding <mere phantasy>, or, which is the same, into neutralized memory, with that neutrality modification which we can set over against each “positing” mental process. In this respect memory is a wholly specific positing mental process. Another is normal perception, yet another is the perceptive or reproductive consciousness of possibility, probability, questionability, the consciousness of doubt, of negation, affirmation, supposition, etc.

We can persuade ourselves by an example that the neutrality modification of normal perception, positing in unmodified certainty, is the neutral picture-Object-consciousness which we find as component in normally considering the perceptually presentive depictured world. Let us try to make that clear to ourselves: Let us suppose that we are considering Dürer’s engraving, “Knight, Death and the Devil.” In the first place, let us distinguish the normal perceiving, the correlate of which is the physical thing, “engraved print,” this print in the portfolio. In the second place, we distinguish the perceptive consciousness in which, within the black, colorless lines, there appear to us the figures
of the "knight on his horse," "death," and the "devil." We do not advert to these in aesthetic contemplation as Objects; we rather advert to the realities presented "in the picture" — more precisely stated, to the "depicted" realities, to the flesh and blood knight, etc.

The consciousness of the "picture" (the small, grey figures in which, by virtue of founded noeses something else is "depictively presented" by similarity) which mediates and makes possible the depicturing, is now an example for the neutrality modification of perception. This depicture Object is present to us neither as existing nor as not existing, nor in any other positional modality; or, rather, there is consciousness of it as existing, but as quasi-existing in the neutrality modification of being.

Likewise the depicted too, when we comport ourselves purely aesthetically and take the same thing again as a "mere picture" without imparting to it the stamp of being or non-being, of being possible or being deemed likely, or the like. But this does not signify, as is apparent, any privation, but instead a modification — precisely that of neutralization. Except that we must not objectivate it as a transforming operation attached to a previous position. It can also be this on occasion. But it need not be.


The radical difference between phantasy in the sense of neutralizing presentation and neutralizing modification taken universally is shown — to emphasize still more sharply this decisive point of difference — by the fact that, as presentation, the phantasy modification is reiterable (there are phantasies at no matter what levels: phantasies "in" phantasies), while reiteration of the "operation" of neutralization is, by virtue of its essence, excluded.

Our assertion of the possibility of reiterating reproductive (as well as depictive) modifications seems to meet with rather general opposition. This will only be changed when there will be more extensive practice in genuine phenomenological analysis than heretofore has been the case. As long as one deals with mental processes as "contents" or as psychial "elements" which are still regarded as bits of things despite all the fashionable arguments against atomizing and physicalizing psychology, as long as one can believe that he has
found, accordingly, the distinction between "sensation-contents" and corresponding "phantasy-contents" only in the material traits of "intensity," "fullness," or the like, there can be no improvement. 

One must first learn to see that at issue here is a difference pertaining to consciousness, that therefore the phantasma is not a mere, pale sensation-Datum but instead, in accord with its essence, phantasy of the corresponding sensation-Datum; furthermore, one must learn to see that this "of" cannot enter in by any rarefaction, no matter how refined, of intensity, of content-fullness, etc., pertaining to the sensation-Datum in question. 

He who is practiced in consciousness-reflections (and has previously learned to see any data of intentionality of whatever sort) will see precisely without any further difficulty the levels of consciousness which present themselves with phantasies in phantasies or with memories in memories or in phantasies. One will then see too what is inherent in the essential sort of this hierarchical formation: namely that every phantasy of a higher level can be freely converted into a direct phantasy of what was indirectly phantasied in it, whereas this free possibility does not take place in going over from phantasy to the corresponding perception. For spontaneity there is an abyss here which the pure Ego can transcend only in the essentially new form of actualizing action and creation (where account must also be taken of hallucinating).24

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24 Author's footnote: With respect to the points of the doctrine of neutrality modification dealt with up to now, the Logische Untersuchungen, in the main, had already arrived at the correct notion, especially with respect to what concerns the relation to phantasy. Cf. ibid., Fifth Investigation, especially §39, and the contrast of "qualitative" and "imaginative modification" where the first has the sense of what is called here neutrality modification. — Since Meinong's book, Über Annahmen [On Assumptions] (Leipzig, 1902) has dealt in a detailed manner with questions closely akin to those elaborated in the present chapter, I must explain why I could relate the discussion only to my old writings and not to his book. In my opinion this book, which here as elsewhere has such extensive coincidences with parallel parts of the Logische Untersuchungen with respect to content and theoretical thought — has not demonstrated any actual advance beyond my attempts, neither materially nor methodically. Many motivating thoughts, to which both before and afterwards I believe great weight should be attached, are not considered by Meinong, specifically not even with respect to the points dealt with above. The confusions clarified in our last discussions make up exactly the principal core of Meinong's conception of assumption.
§113. Actual and Potential Positings.  

Our considerations of the neutrality modification and position necessitate important supplementations. We have employed the term “positing” consciousness in a wide sense which necessarily requires a differentiation.

We distinguish actual and potential positing, and we employ “position consciousness” as the universal heading which otherwise we cannot do without.

The difference between actuality and potentiality pertaining to positing is closely related to the previously discussed difference in actuality between attention and inattention. However, by no means do they coincide. By taking notice of the neutrality modification, a duality is introduced in the universal difference between the actuality and non-actuality of the attentional turning of the Ego’s regard, or an ambiguity is introduced in the concept expressed by the term actuality, the essence of which we must clarify.

The neutrality modification appears to us in the contrast of actual believing, deeming likely, etc., with the peculiar modified consciousness of “clearly phantasied possible” believing, deeming likely, etc.; stated correlative, in the contrast between having what exists, what probably exists, etc., “really” before one or “actually posited,” and having it in the manner of a “merely undecided something,” not actually posited. But at the outset we also indicated the essentially different proceeding of a non-neutral and a neutral consciousness with respect to the potentiality of positions. On the basis of any “actual” consciousness various positings potentially included may be

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25 Note of translator: There is considerable ambiguity in Husserl’s use of the words aktuell and inaktuell. Earlier (§35) a mental process which is aktuell is one in which the ego “lives” in contrast to one in which the ego does not or is not now “living.” Here the same term, aktuell, is used for a different contrast: those mental processes which are “actual” or “potential” if not. This latter contrast cuts across the earlier one; thus a mental process in which the ego is not “living,” one which is inaktuell, can be aktuell in the sense of §113. Husserl’s apparent dissatisfaction with the terms can be seen in his frequent changes of aktuell to wirklich in his various copies of Ideen. (In later writings Husserl uses the terms aktiv and passiv for the earlier contrast, but also with significant conceptual differences.) To express Husserl’s distinction here in English, aktuell (and inaktuell) in the earlier contrast is translated by actional (and non-actional); aktuell in the contrast of §113 is translated by actual.

26 Insertion in Copy A: always within the doxic sphere to which all of our terminological distinctions provisionally refer

27 Author’s footnote: Cf. §35, pp. 61ff., §37, pp. 65f., §92, pp. 188ff.

28 In Copy A actual in crossed out; opposite the marginal note: can be crossed out.
derived, and these are then actual positings: in everything actually doxically intended to there are actual predicables. But in itself a neutral consciousness does not “contain” any sort of “actual” predicables. The explication by attentional actualities, by advertence to the different predicates of the objective something intended to, yields nothing but neutral acts or nothing but modified predicates. This disparate potentiality in neutral and non-neutral consciousness, this remarkable fact that the universal potentiality pertaining to attentional advertences is thus bifurcated, now requires a profounder investigation.

The considerations of the last paragraph but one reveal that every actual mental process, as existing in the present — or, as we can also say, as the temporal unity constituted in phenomenological consciousness of time — carries with itself, in a certain way, its own characteristic of being in a way similar to something perceived. To every present of the actual mental process there corresponds idealiter a neutrality modification, namely a possible present of the phantasy-process which precisely corresponds to it in content. Each such phantasy-process is not present as actually existing, but rather is characterized as “quasi” present. It is in fact quite similar to the comparison of noematic givennesses of any perception whatever with those of phantasying (contemplation in phantasy) precisely corresponding to it idealiter: Everything perceived is characterized as “actually present being,” everything phantasied in parallel as the same in content but as “mere phantasy,” as “quasi” present being. Thus:

Consciousness of time originaliter itself functions as perceptual consciousness and has its counterpart in a corresponding phantasy-consciousness.

However, this all-embracing consciousness of time is obviously not a continual perceiving of something immanent in the pregnant sense, i.e., in the sense of an actually positing perceiving which is, indeed, a mental process in our sense: a mental process inherent in immanental time, enduring in the present, constituted in the consciousness of time. In other words, it is without question not a continual inner reflection in which mental processes posited in the specific sense, seized upon as actually existing, would become objective.

29 In Copy A actual [wirklichen] substituted for actual [aktuellen].
30 Addition in Copy A: Every mental process is perceived precisely in inner consciousness
31 In Copy A as [wie] changed to as [als]
Among the mental processes there are distinctive ones called reflections on something immanent, especially perceptions of something immanent which are directed to their objects in actually seizing upon and positing being. In addition, among the same mental processes there are also those perceptions, positing being in the same sense, which are directed to something transcendent, the so-called perceptions of something external. In the normal sense of the word, "perception" not only signifies universally that some physical thing or other appears "personally" present to the Ego, but that the Ego attentively perceives the appearing physical thing, seizing upon, positing it as actually existing. The actuality of positing factual existence is, according to what was elaborated before, neutralized in perceptual picture-consciousness. Adverted to the "picture" (not to the depictured), we do not seize upon anything actual as object, but instead precisely a picture, a fictum. "Seizing-upon" has the actuality pertaining to advertence, but it is not "actual" seizing-upon; it is rather mere seizing-upon in the modification of "quasi," the positing is not actual positing but instead modified into "quasi-positing."

By turning the mental regard away from the fictum, the attentional actuality pertaining to the neutralized position passes over into potentiality: the picture still appears but is not "heeded," it is not — in the mode of "quasi" — seized upon. Included in the essence of this situation and its potentiality are possibilities for actual advertences which here, however, never allow actualities of position to emerge.

Something similar occurs when we compare "actional" (not neutral, actually positing) rememberings with those in which the remembered still appears, to be sure, but is no longer actually posited by turning away the regard. The potentiality of the position of what "still" appears signifies here that, by virtue of attentional actuality, there emerge not just any seizing-upon cogitationes whatever, but precisely those which "actually" seize upon, which actually posit. In the neutrality modifications of rememberings, i.e., mere phantasies, we have attentional potentialities the transmutation of which into actualities yield, to be sure, "acts" (cogitationes), but entirely neu-

\[\text{\textsuperscript{32} In Copy A this sentence changed to read: According to what was previously elaborated, to this actuality of actual positing of factual existence there corresponds an actuality of neutralized positing of factual existence in perceptual picture-consciousness.}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{33} In Copy A actual [aktuelle] changed to actual [wirkliche]\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{34} In Copy A the parenthesis is eliminated; marginal note; Confusing. Deleatur}\]
tralized, doxic positions entirely in the mode of quasi. What is phantasied is intended to not as “actually” present, past, or future; rather it only “hovers” before us as what is without actuality of position. Mere advertence of the regard cannot set aside this neutrality, no more than it can generate posited actuality in other cases.

Every perception has — and this can still serve us by way of further illustration — its background of perception. The specific physical thing seized upon has its perceptively co-appearing physical surroundings, lacking particular positing of factual existence. It is also an “actually existing” surroundings, intended to in such a manner that — in the sense of an eidetic possibility — an actual, existence-posing regard can be directed to it. It is, to a certain extent, a unity of potential positions. The situation is similar in the case of memory and its memorial background; or also in the case of perception or of memory with respect to their halo of retentions and protentions, retrospective memory and anticipations which press forward in greater or lesser fullness and change in their degrees of clarity, but are not effected in the form of actual positing. In all these cases the actualization of “potential positions” necessarily leads, by corresponding advertences of regard (attentional actuality), to always new actual positions, and this belongs to the essence of this situation. But if we pass over to the parallel neutrality modifications, then everything is translated into the modification of the quasi, even the “potentiality” itself. The picture-Object and the phantasy-Object also (and necessarily) have attentional backgrounds. “Background” is, again, the name for potential advertences and “seizings-upon.” However, the effecting of actual advertence does not, of essential necessity, lead here to actual positions but always only to modified ones.

Of particular interest to us here is the fact that the same thing happens with the modal variations of the specific doxic positing (doxic primal positing), with deeming likely, deeming possible, questioning, etc., as well as with denying and affirming. The correlates intended to in them, possibility, probability, non-being, and the like, can undergo doxic positing and therefore at the same time specific “objectivation.” But while we “live in” the deeming likely,

35 In Copy A entirely doxic positions in the mode of quasi changed to: entirely doxic quasi-positions.
36 In Copy A as what is without actuality of position is crossed out.
37 In Copy A posited actuality changed to actuality pertaining to position.
questioning, rejecting, affirming, or the like, we do not effect any doxic primal positing — although other “positings,” in the sense of a necessary universalization of the concept, are effected — that is to say: positings pertaining to deeming likely, to questionability, to denying, etc. But we can at any time effect the corresponding doxic primal positings; grounded in the essence of the phenomenological situations is the ideal possibility of actualizing the potential positings included in them. This actualization leads now, if actual positings were involved at the outset, always again to actual positings as potentially included in the positings which are the starting point. If we translate the positings which are the starting point into the language of neutrality, the potentiality is also translated into the language of neutrality. If we effect deemings likely, questionings, or the like, in mere phantasy, then everything developed before indeed subsists, but now with changed signs. All of the doxic positings and modalities of being, derived from the original acts or act-noemas by possible attentional turning of the regard, are now neutralized.

§114. Further Concerning the Potentiality of Positing and the Neutrality Modification.

The difference between non-neutral and neutral consciousness concerns, according to the analyses carried out, not only processes of consciousness in the attentional mode of the cogito, but also in the mode of attentional non-actuality. The distinction is manifested in the double comportment of the “backgrounds” of consciousness in their attentional transmutation into “foregrounds;” more precisely stated, in their transmutation into attentional actualities with which the original mental process is converted into a doxic cogito, indeed, into protodoxa. This is without question possible under all circumstances; for belonging to the essence of every intentive mental process is the possibility of “looking at” its noeses as well as its noemas, at the noematically constituted objectivities and their predicates — of seizing upon and positing them in the mode of protodoxa.

38 Author’s footnote: Cf. above, §105, p. 217.

39 In Copy A This is ... circumstances changed to read: Now, what we have ascertained in the case of doxic mental processes and also especially in the case of doxic modalities, is transferred to all intensive mental processes universally; [published by Schuhmann as Appendix 57, ca. 1914].
As we can also say, the situation is that the *neutrality modification is not a specific modification* attached to *actional posittings*, which are the only ones which are actual; it is, instead, *an eidetically fundamental peculiarity concerning any consciousness whatever*, expressed in the attitude toward actual protodoxic positableness or non-positableness. Whence the necessity to exhibit them just in the actual primal posittings or in the modification which they undergo.

Determined in greater detail, it is a question of the following: Of whatever kind and form it may be, *taken universally, consciousness is traversed by a radical separation*: in the first place, as we know, there belongs to every consciousness in which the pure Ego does not live from the outset as an “effecting” Ego, which therefore does not have the form “cogito” from the outset, the essentially possible modification of being converted into this form. There now exist *two* fundamental possibilities for the mode of the effecting of consciousness within the mode of cogito;⁴⁰ or expressed in another way:

*To every cogito there belongs a counterpart which precisely corresponds to it* such that *its noema has its precisely corresponding counter-noema* in the parallel cogito.

The relationship of the parallel “acts” consists of the fact that one of the two is an “*actual act,”* the cogito an “*actual” <cogito,> an “*actually positing” cogito, while the other is a “*shadowing” of an act, an *improper*, not “*actually positing” cogito. The one act actually produces, the other is a mere reflection of a production.⁴¹

To this there corresponds the radical difference of *correlates*: on the one side, there is the constituted noematic production which has the characteristic of the unmodified, actual production; on the other side, there is the “*mere thought of” the precisely corresponding production. The actual and modified <productions> correspond to each other idealiter with absolute precision and yet they are not of the same essence. For the modification is carried over to the essence: to the *originary* ⁴³

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⁴⁰ *In Copy A this sentence changed to read:* There now exist *two* fundamental possibilities for the mode of consciousness within the effectuation-mode of cogito; or expressed in another way:

⁴¹ *In Copy A marginal note to this paragraph:* Does not agree with p. 236; substitute appendix. *Published as Appendix 58, ca. 1914, by Schuhmann, this paragraph is altered to read:* The relationship of the parallel “acts” consists of the fact that one of the two is an actually positing act (an “actual” believing, doubting, valuing, wishing, etc.), the other, in contrast, is only a “quasi” positing act of the sort whose positing is improper, namely neutrally modified, and that quite apart from the attentional form of the cogito. (We thus broaden, at the same time, the concept of position to cover all the “act-characteristics” parallel to the doxic “act-characteristic,” as will be explained still more precisely.)
essence there corresponds its counter-essence as a "shadow" of the same essence.

Of course, in the metaphorical language of shadows, reflection, picture, one should not insinuate anything of mere illusion, of deceptive opinion, or the like, by which indeed actual acts or positional correlates would be given. It is not necessary to warn anew against the so obvious confusion of the modification at issue here with the phantasy modification which likewise creates a counterpart, its phantasy image, for every mental process — as the present of the mental process in the consciousness of internal time.

The radical separation of intentional mental processes into two classes which stand to each other as actuality and powerless reflection of noematic producing, is made manifest to us here (when we start out from the doxic domain) by the following fundamental propositions:

Every cogito is\(^42\) in itself either a doxic primal positing or it is not. But by virtue of a lawfulness once more belonging to the generically fundamental essence of any consciousness whatever, any cogito can become converted into a doxic primal positing. «That occurs,» however, in many different ways, and especially in such a way that every "posited characteristic" in the widest sense, constituted in the noema of this cogito as correlate of noetic "positing" (in a correspondingly widest sense) belonging to the cogito, undergoes transmutation into a being-characteristic and accordingly takes on the form of a modality of being in the widest of all senses. In this way the characteristic of "probable," which is the noematic correlate of deeming likely and, to be sure, specifically of the "act-characteristic" of the "positing" of deeming likely as deeming likely, is converted into being probable; similarly, the noematic characteristic of "questionable," this specific correlate of positing of questionability, is converted into the form of being questionable; the negation-correlate is converted into the form of non-being: pure forms which, so to speak, have taken on the stamp of the actual doxic primal positing. But this extends still further. We will find grounds for extending the concept of positing to all act-spheres and thus speak of, e.g., liking—positing, wishing-positing, willing-positing, with their noematic correlates "likes," "wished for," "ought to be in the practical realm," and the like. These correlates also take on the form of being-modalities in an extremely extended sense by the a priori possible conversion of the acts in

\(^42\) In Copy A is crossed out, with marginal note: has?!
question into a doxically primal positing: Thus the "liked," the "wished for," the "ought," etc., become predicable; for in the actual, primal belief-positing it is intended to as being pleasant, as being wished for, etc. But the conversion — in these examples — is to be understood in such a way that it preserves the noema of the original mental process with regard to its whole essence except for the mode of givenness which changes with the conversion in conformity to laws. Nevertheless, this point still requires supplementation.

The cases are now radically separated by the fact that the protodoxa in question is either an actual protodoxa, so to speak, an actually believed belief or, however, its powerless counterpart, the mere "thinking of" (being simpliciter, being possible, etc.). What results from that doxic transmutation of the particular mental process, be it the unfolding of its noematic components into actual doxically primal positions, or be it exclusively into protodoxic neutralities, is predetermined with absolute firmness by the essence of the intentive mental process in question. From the outset, therefore a firm set of potential being-positions is predesignated in the essence of every mental process of consciousness and, more particularly, depending on how the respective consciousness is characterized from the beginning, a field of possible actual positions or possible neutral "shadow positions" is predesignated.

And, again: universally consciousness is of such a character that it is of a double type: prototype and shadow, positional and neutral consciousness. The one is characterized by the fact of its doxic potentiality leading to actual positing doxical acts; the other by being only a shadow-image of such acts, by only allowing a neutrality modification to emerge from them; in other words, it is characterized by the fact that nothing doxically graspm is contained in its noematic composition or, which again is equivalent, that it does not contain an "actual" noema but instead only a counter-image of an "actual" noema. Merely one doxic positedness only remains to the neutral

43 Author's footnote: Cf. above, the final statement of §105, pp. 217f.
44 Author's footnote: Cf. further below, §117, p. 244, first paragraph.
45 In Copy A the following text substituted for And, again ... counter-image, and published by Schuhmann as Appendix 59, ca. 1914: More precisely in this regard, the following law holds: Universally, any process of consciousness has a double value in accordance with its double type as "prototype" and "shadow," as positional or neutral consciousness, as well as with respect to its doxic potentiality: if it is of the positional type, then the unfolding of its doxic potentiality leads to purely actual, to positional doxical acts; if it is of the neutral type, to purely neutral acts. In the latter cases it contains, in other words, in its noematic composition nothing at all which is doxically seizable or, equivalently stated, it contains nothing "actually" noematic of any kind but only "counter-images" of noemas.
mental processes: that belonging to them as consciousness of Data in immanental time, determining them precisely as modified consciousness of a modified noema.

From now on the expressions "positional" and "neutral" should serve us terminologically. Every mental process, whether it has the form of cogito or whether it is or is not an act in some other particular sense, falls under this opposition. Positionality therefore does not signify the presence or the effecting of an actual position; it only expresses a certain potentiality for the effecting of actional positing doxic acts. Let us nevertheless include in the concept of positing mental processes the case where a mental process is from the outset a position which has been effected — an inclusion which is less objectionable because, according to eidetic law, to every position effected there belongs a plurality of potential positions.

The distinction between positionality and neutrality does not express, as has been confirmed, any mere, peculiar ownness related to belief-positings, any mere sort of belief-modification such as deeming likely, questioning, or the like, or, in another direction, assumings, negatings, affirmings — therefore not variations of a primal mode, of believing in the pregnant sense. As we had foretold, it is in fact a universal difference pertaining to consciousness but which, for good reasons, in the course of our analysis appears connected with the distinction specifically demonstrated in the narrow sphere of the doxic cogito between position (i.e., actual) believing and its neutral counterpart (the merely "thinking-off"). There emerge really remarkable and profound eidetic combinations among act-characteristics of believing and all other kinds of act-characteristics, and thus all kinds of consciousness.


It is still important to take account of some earlier observations. Taken universally, the cogito is explicit intentionality. The concept of any intuitive mental process whatever already presupposes the

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46 Marginal note to these lines in Copy D: But position as figment?
47 Author's footnote: Cf. above, §84, pp. 168f.
48 In Copy A explicit is changed to is, so to speak, patent
oppostition of potentiality and actuality and, more particularly, in the universal signification of these terms in so far as we now, in the transition to the explicit\(^49\) cogito and in the reflection on the mental process not made explicit\(^50\) along with its noetic-noematic components, are able to recognize that it includes in itself intentionalities or noemas which are peculiar to it. Thus, e.g., with regard to consciousness of the unobserved, but subsequently observed, background in the case of perception, memory, etc. The explicit\(^51\) intuitive mental process is an "I think" which is "effected." But the same "I think" can be converted into a "non-effected" one by way of intentional changes. The mental process pertaining to an effected perceiving, to an effected judging, feeling, willing, does not disappear when attention adverts "exclusively" to something new; this implies that the Ego "lives" exclusively in a new cogito. The earlier cogito "fades away," sinks into "darkness", but nonetheless always has an existence pertaining to the mental process, even if modified. Similarly, cogitationes break forth into the background of the mental process, sometimes modified memorialy, sometimes neutrally, even sometimes unmodified. E.g., a belief, an actual belief, is "aroused;" we already believe "before we know it." Similarly, under circumstances positing of likings or dislikings, desirings, even resolves, are already alive before we "live" in them, before we effect the cogito proper, before the Ego is "activated" judgingly, likingly, desiringly, willingly.

Thus the cogito designates in fact (and so we had introduced the concept previously) the act proper of perceiving, of judging, of liking,\(^52\) etc. On the other hand, however, the whole structure of the mental process in the cases described, with all its positings and noematic characteristics, is the same even when this actionality of the cogito is lacking to it. It is to that extent that we separate more distinctly effected acts and non-effected acts;\(^53\) the latter are either acts which "have fallen out of effectuation," or they are act-arousals. The latter term can just as well be employed universally for any non-

\(^{49}\) In Copy A explicit is changed to actual [aktuellen]
\(^{50}\) In Copy A not made explicit is changed to non-actual [aktuelle]
\(^{51}\) In Copy A explicit is changed to actual [aktuelle]
\(^{52}\) Insertion in Copy A: of clearly phantasying
\(^{53}\) In Copy A this clause changed to read: To that extent we still correctly speak, on the other hand, in a broader sense of act or intuitive mental process, and then separate effected from non-effected acts (which otherwise sounds better than actual [aktuelle] acts and non-actual acts). [Glosses by Schulmann]
effected acts whatever. Such act-arousals are lived with all their
intentionalities, but the Ego does not live in them as an "effecting
subject." With that the concept of act is extended in a determined and
quite indispensable sense. The effected acts, or as stated better in a
certain respect (namely, with respect to the fact that it concerns
processes), the act-effectings make up the "position-takings" in the widest
sense, whereas the use of the term "position-taking" in the pregnant
sense\(^{54}\) refers back to founded acts of the sort which we shall examine
in more precise detail: E.g., to position-takings of hatred, or of the
one who hates toward what is hated which, on its side, is already
constituted for consciousness in noeses at a lower level as the existing
person or affair; likewise, position-takings of negation or affirmation
with respect to existential claims or the like would belong here.\(^{55}\)

It is now clear that acts in the widest sense,\(^{56}\) precisely as in the case
of specific cogitationes, bear within themselves the distinction be­tween positionality and neutrality, that they are productive noemat­ically and positionally prior to the transmutation into cogitationes,
except that we only first catch sight of these productions by acts in the
narrower sense, by cogitationes. The positings, or the positings in the
mode of "quasi," are already actually present in them with the whole
noeses to which these positings belong: the ideal case being presup­posed that they are not also intentionally enriched and otherwise
altered at the same time \(\text{<that the noeses are}>\) transmuted. In any case,
we can exclude these alterations (and, in particular, also the in­
tentive enrichments and new formations which enter into the flow of
mental processes immediately after the transmutations).

In our whole examination under the title "neutrality"\(^{57}\) doxic
positings were given preference. Neutrality has its index in potent­iality.\(^{58}\) Everything rests upon the fact that any positing act-characteristic

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\(^{54}\) In Copy A this sentence changed to read (published by Schuhmann as Appendix 60, ca. 1914): Pre­
neminently the use of the term "to effect" is applicable to the moment of positing (position)
pertaining to the essence of the act, or else to the variation shared by precisely this moment in
the conversion into the form cogito. The effected positing (according to the earlier mode of
expression, the actual or actualized positing) determines \(\ldots\) restricting ourselves to the case of
positionality — a widest sense of the use of the term "position-taking" or position-taking acts.
There is, accordingly, a position-taking act for every perceiving, judging, valuing, etc., for every
effected and non-neutralized \(\text{<at t>}\). On the other hand, while the use of the term "position­
taking" \(\text{[the original text continues]}\)

\(^{55}\) Marginal note in Copy A to this sentence: Emphasis on positing as a particular moment in the
intensive mental process is still lacking.

\(^{56}\) Insertion in Copy A: intensive mental processes taken universally

\(^{57}\) Insertion in Copy A: in spite of its extension to the whole domain of consciousness

\(^{58}\) Insertion in Copy A: <of doxic positing>
whatever (any act-"intention," e.g., the liking-intention, the valuing, willing-intention, the specific characteristic of liking-positing, willing-positing) includes in its essence a characteristic of the genus, doxic positing, "coinciding" with it in a certain manner. According as the act-intention in question is non-neutralized or neutralized, so is the doxic positing included in it — thought of here as primal positing.

In the further analyses this preference for doxic primal positing will undergo a limitation. It will be seen that the eidetic lawfulness we have developed requires a more precise determination in so far as, first of all and universally, the doxic modalities (in the specific sense which also embraces assumings) obtain in place of, or replace, the doxic primal positings as the "doxic positings" included in all positings. Within this universal primacy of any doxic modalities whatever, the doxic primal positing, the doxic certainty, then has, however, the quite particular primacy of these modalities themselves being transmuted into doxic positings so that now, again, all neutrality has its index in the doxic potentiality in the distinctive sense of being related back to the primal positing. In this connection, the kind of "coincidence" of anything doxic whatever with positing of any sort receives its more precise determination.

Now, the propositions stated in the widest universality (although with some omissions), but which can only be made with insight into specific act-spheres, immediately require a broader basis of grounding. We have not yet thoroughly examined the parallelism of noesis and noema in all realms of intentionality. Of itself this principal theme of this Part also demands the extension of analysis. However, in carrying out this extension our universal assertions about the neutrality modification will at the same time be confirmed and supplemented.

§116 Transition to New Analyses. The Founded Noeses and Their Noematic Correlates.

We studied before a series of universal events in the structure of noeses and noemas within a large and yet very restricted framework — studied them, to be sure, on a very modest scale only to the extent

59 In Copy A non-neutralized or neutralized changed to positional or neutral

60 Author's footnote: Cf. further below, pp. 243f
required to make them stand out and to achieve our guiding purpose of acquiring for ourselves a universal idea, rich in content, of the groups of problems which the universal dual theme of noesis and noema carries with it. No matter how many different complications they have attracted, our studies are related to a mere lower stratum of the stream of mental processes to which intentionalities of an even relatively simpler structure always belong. We have shown a preference (aside from the last anticipatory observations) for sensuous intuitions, in particular those of appearing realities, as well as for the sensuous objectivations which emerge from them by being obscured and yet which, without question, are united with them by a community of essence. At the same time, <sensuous objectivation> designates the genus. As a result, we also draw into consideration, more particularly, all phenomena essentially belonging to it, thus reflective intuitions and objectivations taken universally, the objects of which are no longer things pertaining to the senses. The universal acceptance of our results, given the way in which we have conducted the investigation, and suggesting the feeling that whatever is attached to the lower domain is incidental, is forced upon us as soon as we extend the framework of our research. We then see that all the differences between the central core of sense (which certainly needs further analysis), and the posited characteristics grouped about it, return and likewise all the modifications which — like those of presentation, attention, neutralization — affect the core of sense in its own peculiar ways, nonetheless leaving its "something identical."

We can now follow two different directions, both of which lead to intentionalities founded on objectivations: we can either go in the direction toward noetic syntheses, or in that which leads up to new sorts of, but founded, species of "positing."

If we take the latter direction, then we encounter the noeses of feeling, of desiring, of willing (first of all, the simplest ones possible, i.e., free of syntheses at lower or higher levels), which are founded on "objectivations," on perceptions, on memories, on sign-objectivations etc., and which, in their structure, show obvious

61 Insertion in Copy A: obscure
62 Author's footnote: The firm and essential delimitation of the broadest concept of objectivation which arises from the spheres designated is, naturally, an important task for systematic phenomenological research. For all such questions we refer to prospective publications. The present investigation briefly indicates the findings derived from the theoretical content of those future publications.
63 In Copy A new sorts of changed to new
differences in level-by-level founding. We now give preference everywhere, as concerns the total acts, to the positional forms (which ought not, however, exclude neutral lower levels) because what is to be said of them carries over, appropriately modified, to the corresponding neutralizations. For example, an aesthetic liking may be founded on a neutrality-consciousness with a perceptual or reproductive content; a gladness or a sorrow on a (non-neutralized) belief or belief-modality; a striving for or against on the same, but related to something valued as agreeable, or beautiful, etc.⁶⁴

Before going into the species of this structure, what interests us here is that with the new noetic moments new noematic moments also make their appearance in the correlates. On the one hand, there are new characteristics which are analogous to the modes of belief but possess, at the same time, themselves doxo-logical⁶⁵ positiableness in their new content; on the other hand, connected with the novel moments there are also novel "apprehensions," and a new sense becomes constituted which is founded on, while at the same time embracing, the noesis underlying it. The new sense brings in a totally new dimension of sense; with it no new determining parts of mere "things" are constituted, but instead values of things, value-qualities, or concrete Objects with values: beauty and ugliness, goodness and badness; the use-Object, the art work, the machine, the book, the action, the deed, and so forth.

Moreover, any full mental process of the higher level also shows in its full correlate a structure similar to the one we have seen at a lower level. In the noema belonging to the higher level the valued as valued is possibly a core of sense surrounded by new posited characteristics. The "valued," the "likeable," "happy," etc., function in a way similar to the "possible," "presumable," or, again, like "null," or "indeed" — although it would be absurd to put them in this series of characteristics.

With respect to these new characteristics consciousness is again, in this connection, a positing consciousness: the "valued" can be doxically posited as being valuable. Furthermore, "being," which belongs to "value" as its characterization, can also be meant as modalized like any "existing" or "certain:" if so, consciousness is then consciousness of possible values; the "thing" only suggests itself as

⁶⁴ Marginal note to the latter half of this paragraph in Copy A, published by Schuhmann as Appendix 61, ca. 1914: The separation of higher and lower levels is not clearly delimited. No radical viewpoint is indicated. I do not rightly know how.
⁶⁵ In Copy A doxo-logical changed to doxic
possibly valuable; or else it is intended to as presumably valuable, as non-valuable (which, however, is not equivalent to saying "worthless" — bad, ugly or the like; cancelling out "value" is expressed simply by "non-valuable"). All such modifications affect value-consciousness, the valuing noeses, not just externally but also internally, as well as the corresponding noemas (cf. p. 243).

A multiplicity of profound alterations result again in the form of attentional modifications according as, in conformity with the manifold eidetic possibilities, the attentive regard passes through the various intentive strata to the "materially determinate affair" and the material moments — resulting in an interrelated system of modifications which we already know as a lower level; but the regard then is also directed to the values, to the constituted determinations belonging to a higher level, by passing through the apprehensions constituting them; then «the attentive regards is directed» to the noemas as noemas, again, to their characteristics or, in the other reflection, to the noeses — and all of this in the specific modes of attending to, marginal observing, non-observing or the like.

Extremely difficult investigations are to be carried out in order to explicate purely and make clear these complicated structures, how, eg., the "value-apprehensions" are related to the apprehensions of materially determinate affairs, how the new noematic characterizations (good, beautiful, and so forth) are related to modalities of belief, how they systematically fit into series and species, and the same for similar questions.

§117. The Founded Positings and the Conclusion of the Doctrine of Neutrality Modifications. The Universal Concept of Positing.

We shall now examine the relationship of new noetic and noematic strata of consciousness to neutralization. We relate this modification to doxic positionality. As we can easily persuade ourselves, in the strata now being made prominent, this «positionality» plays the role in fact which we attributed to it in advance in the widest act-spheres and which we specifically considered in the «act-sphere» of modalities of judgment. In the consciousness which deems likely, the "likely," the "probable," are positionally "inherent;" likewise, however, in the consciousness which likes, the "pleasing" is also "inherent;" in the consciousness which is glad, the "gladsome" is inherent; and so
forth. It is inherent in it, i.e., it is accessible to doxic positing, and on that account it is predicable. Accordingly, every emotional consciousness, along with its novel founded emotional noeses, comes under the concept of positing consciousness as we have elaborated this concept for ourselves — with reference to doxic positionalities and ultimately to positional certainties.

Seen more precisely, however, we must still say that the relating of the neutrality modification to doxic positionality, important as the insights are which it grounds, still has been taken in a certain sense in a roundabout way.

Let us make it clear, first of all, that acts of liking ("effected" or not), likewise emotional or volitional acts, of every kind are precisely "acts," "intentional mental processes," and that belonging to them, in every case, is the "intentio," the "position-taking;" or, expressed in another way, they are "positings" in a widest but essentially unified sense, although not doxic positings. We said above in passing, quite correctly, that, taken universally, act-characteristics are "positings" — positings in the extended sense and only in the particular belief-positings or their modalities. The essential analogy of specific liking-noeses with the belief-positings is obvious, as is the case with wishing-noeses, willing-noeses, etc. Even in valuing, wishing, willing, something is "posited," apart from the doxic positionality "inherent" in them. That is indeed also the source of all parallelizations between the various species of consciousness and the classification of those species: one properly classifies the species of positing.

To the essence of every intentive mental process, whatever may otherwise be found in its concrete composition, there belongs the having of at least one, but as a rule many, "positing-characteristics," "positings," interconnected by way of the relationship of founding; there is, in this plurality, then, necessarily a positing which is archontic, so to speak, which unifies and governs all the others.

The highest generic unity connecting all these specific "act-characteristics," the characteristic of "positing," does not exclude essential and generic differences. Thus the emotional positings are

66 In Copy A the first part of the sentence changed to: We have already made use of that above.

Taken universally, act-characteristics are accepted by us as "positings" — Marginal note to this change: The correctness of this extension is grounded in the essential analogy. Marginal note in Copy A: It is not suitable to speak of act-characteristics as positing.

67 Marginal note in Copy A: Positing is still not the whole noesis, and if not even a piece, still something to be abstractively disengaged.

68 Marginal note in Copy A: Why are they called specific act-characteristics?
akin to the doxic positings as positings, but they by no means belong together as do all modalities of believing.

Given *eo ipso* along with the generic community of essence belonging to all positing-characteristics is the community of essence belonging to their noematic correlates of positing (the "positing characteristics in the noematic sense"); and if we take the latter with their further noematic foundations, then the community of essence belonging to all "posita" is *eo ipso* given. Ultimately grounded in this, however, are the analogies, always felt, between universal logic, universal theory of values, and ethics which, if followed to their ultimate depths, lead to the constitution of the universal *formal* parallel disciplines of formal logic, formal axiology, and theory of practice.⁶⁹

We are thus led back to the *universalized* heading of "positing," to which we now relate the following proposition:

*Every consciousness is either an actual or potential "positing" consciousness.* The earlier concept of "actual positing," and along with it that of *positionality*, undergo therefore a corresponding extension. As a consequence, our doctrine of neutralization and its relationship to positionality is carried over to the extended concept of positing. There thus pertains to any positing consciousness whatever, whether or not it is effected, the universal modification which we called the neutralizing modification and, more particularly,⁷⁰ *directly* in the following way. On the one hand, we have characterized positing of positings [*positionalen Thesen*] by the fact that they are actual positings or are converted into actual ones; that, as a consequence, they have "actual" positable noemata — actually positable in the extended sense. In contrast to these, there are the improper, the "quasi"-positings, the ineffectual mirrorings, incapable of taking up into themselves any actual position-effectuations with respect to their noemata, not even neutralized ones. The distinction between neutrality and positionality has its noetic and noematic parallel; it directly concerns, as conceived here, all sorts of positional characteristics without taking the way around positions in the narrow and only ordinary sense of the word doxic primal positing — in which it alone can demonstrate itself.

But that signifies that the pre-eminence of this specifically doxic positing has its deepest foundation in the things themselves. Accord-

⁶⁹ *Author's footnote:* On this point, see below, Part Four, Chapter 3.

⁷⁰ *Insertion in Copy A:* (here is what is new)
ing to our analyses precisely the doxic modalities, and among them in a particular way, the doxic primal positing, that of belief-certainty, have the unique primacy that their positional potentiality embraces the entire sphere of consciousness. According to an eidetic law, any positing, of no matter what genus, can be transmuted into an actual doxic positing by virtue of the doxic characterizations inseparably belonging to its essence. A positional act posits, but in no matter which "quality" it posits, it also posits doxically; whatever is posited by it in another mode is also posited as existing: except that (it is not posited) actually. But actuality can be generated in conformity with its essence in the manner of an essentially possible "Operation." Any "positum," e.g., a wish-positum, can thereby be transmuted into a doxic positum, and it is then in a certain manner still both in one: at the same time, doxic positum and wish-positum.

In this connection, it is conformable to the eidetic laws that the primacy of the doxic properly concerns the doxic modalities in a universal way. For every emotional mental process, every valuing, every wishing, willing, is in itself either characterized as being certain or as being deemed possible or else as a valuing, wishing, being willed, deemed likely, doubtful. Thus, for example, when we are not focused on the doxic modalities value is precisely not actually posited in its doxic characteristics. Value is intended to in valuing, the pleasing in liking, the gladsome in being glad, but sometimes in such a way that we are not entirely "certain" in valuing; or, such that the thing is only deemed possible as valuable, as perhaps valuable, while we still do not take sides in the valuing. Living in such modifications of valuing consciousness, we need not be focused on the doxic. But we can become so focused when, perchance, we are living in the positing of deeming possible and then pass over into the corresponding belief-positing which, conceived predicatively, now receives the form: "the thing should be valuable;" or, turning to the noetic side and to the valuing Ego: "it suggests itself to me as valuable (or perhaps valuable)." The same holds for other modalities.

Doxic modalities, in this form, are inserted into all posited characteristics and, if the mode is that of certainty, doxic primal positings coincide with the posited characteristics according to the noematic sense. But because this also holds for the doxic variations, doxic primal positings

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71 Author's footnote: Cf. above, p. 240.
thus also inhere (now no longer in noematic coincidence) in every act.

We can, accordingly, also say: *Every act, or every act-correlate, includes in itself, implicitly or explicitly, something "logical."* It is always to be explicaded logically, namely by virtue of the essential universality with which the noetic stratum of "expressing" allows of being attached to everything noetic (or that of expression to everything noematic). It is thereby evidential that with the passing over into the neutrality modification the expressing itself and its expressed as expressed are neutralized.

Resulting from all that is the fact that *any acts whatever — even emotional and volitional acts — are "objectivating," "constituting" objects originaliter (and therefore) necessary sources of different regions of being and their respective ontologies.* For example: valuing consciousness constitutes the unique "axiological" objectivity in contrast to the mere world of things, a "being" of a new region in so far as precisely by virtue of the essence belonging to any valuing consciousness whatever actual doxic positings are predelineated as ideal possibilities which single out objectivities of a unique content — values — as "intended to" in valuing consciousness. In emotional acts they are intended to as emotional; by actualization of the doxic content belonging to these acts they come into doxic and, furthermore, into logical-expressive, meantness.

Every non-doxically effected act of consciousness is in this fashion potentially objectivating; *the doxic cogito alone effects actual objectivation.*

Included here is the profoundest of those sources on the basis of which *the universality of the logical*, ultimately that of the predicative judgment, is to be clarified (whereby we include the stratum of significational expressing, which has not yet been considered in detail), and on that foundation the ultimate ground of the universality of the supremacy of logic itself is also understood. In further consequence the possibility, indeed the necessity, is conceived of moral and material noetic or noematic and ontological disciplines essentially related to emotional and volitional intentionality. We shall take up this theme later on after we have ascertained a few supplementary cognitions.\textsuperscript{72}

\textsuperscript{72} \textbf{Author's footnote:} Cf. further below, the concluding chapter of Part IV, pp. 303f.
§118. Syntheses of Consciousness. Syntactical Forms.

If now we turn our attention to the second of the directions indicated above, to the forms of synthetical consciousness, then a multiplicity of modes of formations belonging to mental processes by means of intuitive connections make their appearance in our horizon which, as eidetic possibilities, pertain in part to all intuitive mental processes whatever, in part to the peculiarities of their particular genera. A consciousness and a consciousness are not only bound together universally, but they are combined into one consciousness the correlate of which is one noema which, on its side, is founded on the noemas of the combined noeses.

We have not aimed at, here, the unity of consciousness of immanent time, although that must be remembered too as the all-embracing unity for all mental processes belonging to the stream of mental processes and, more particularly, as a unity of consciousness combining consciousness with consciousness. If we take any particular mental process, it is thus constituted as a unity spread out in phenomenological time in the continual consciousness "originaliter" of time. We can, in the case of a suitable reflective attitude, take heed of the modes of givenness for consciousness of the extents of mental processes belonging to segments of the duration of mental processes; and we can, accordingly, say that the whole consciousness constituting this duration-unity is continually composed of segments in which the segments of the duration of mental processes are constituted; and that therewith the noeses are not only combined but one noesis is constituted with one noema (the fulfilled duration of the mental process) which is founded on the noemas of the combined noeses. What holds for a particular mental process also holds for the whole stream of mental processes. No matter how alien in essence mental processes can be with respect to one another, they are nonetheless constituted altogether as one temporal stream, as members in the one phenomenological time.

Nevertheless, we have excluded this primal synthesis of consciousness originaliter of time (which is not to be thought of as an active and discrete synthesis) along with the set of problems belonging to it. We shall now speak, therefore, of syntheses not in the framework of

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74 In Copy C Syntactical changed to Synthetical. Marginal note: Synthetical?

74 Author's footnote: Cf. p. 239.
consciousness of time, but instead in the framework of time itself, the concretely fulfilled phenomenological time, taken as we have always taken it up to now — as enduring unities, as events receding into the stream of mental processes which itself is nothing else than the fulfilled phenomenological time. On the other hand, we do not even enter into the very important continuous syntheses, in any case, such as those, for example, which essentially belong to all consciousness constituting spatial physicalness. Later on we shall find ample opportunity to become more precisely acquainted with these syntheses. Our interest is turned, rather, to many-membered syntheses, thus to the peculiar modes in which discretely separated acts are combined into a membered unity, into a synthetical act of a higher hierarchical order. In the case of a continuous synthesis we do not speak of an "act of a higher order;" rather the unity (noetic as well as noematic and objective) belongs to the same hierarchical order as the unified. It is easy to see, moreover, that many of the universal considerations to follow concern in the same way continuous as well as membered — polythetical — syntheses. Examples of synthetical acts of a higher level are offered to us in the volitional sphere by the willing relating to "someone else's sake;" similarly, in the realm of the emotional acts, the liking with respect to, the being glad "in reference to," or, as we can likewise say, "for the sake of someone else." And thus for all similar act-occurrences in the case of different act-genera. Obviously, all acts of preference belong here too.

We will subject to closer consideration another group of syntheses, universal in a certain fashion. It comprises collecting (taking together), disjunctive (concerning the "this or that"), explicating, relating syntheses; taken universally, the group comprises the whole series of syntheses which, according to the pure forms of the synthetical objectivities being constituted in them, determine the formal-ontological forms, and, on the other side, with respect to the structure of the noematic formation are mirrored in the apophthegmatic significationa! forms belonging to formal logic (the exclusively noematically directed logic of propositions).

The relation to formal ontology and logic already indicates that it is a matter there of an essentially determined closed group of syntheses which acquire an unconditioned universality of possible application.

75 Author's footnote: Cf. Philosophie der Arithmetik, p. 80, and passim. [Cf. Husserliana, Bd. XII, pp. 74ff.]
76 Marginal note in Copy D: In what follows, syntheses are mostly equated with polytheses.
with respect to the species of mental processes to be combined which, on their side, should therefore be noetic unities of whatever complexity.

§119. The Transmutation of Polythetical into Monothetical Acts.

The following must be noted, first of all, with regard to all species of membered syntheses, of polythetical acts:

No matter how many particular posittings and syntheses may be fitted into it, each synthetically unitary consciousness possesses the total object belonging to it as a synthetically unitary consciousness. It is called a total object in contrast to the objects which intentionally pertain to the synthetical members of a lower or higher level in so far as all of them also contribute to it in the fashion of founding and are fitted into it. Each noesis delimited in its own peculiar way, even if it were a non-selfsufficient stratum, makes its contribution to the constitution of the total object; as, for example, the moment of valuing which is non-selfsufficient since it is necessarily founded on a consciousness of a mere thing, and which constitutes the objective value-stratum, that of "value-quality."

New strata of this sort are also the specific synthetical ones of the previously designated, most universal consciousness-syntheses, that is to say, all the forms which specifically stem from synthetical consciousness as synthetical, thus the forms of combination and the synthetical forms inherent in the members themselves (in so far as they are included in the syntheses).

We said that a total synthetical object is constituted in synthetical consciousness. But it is "objective" therein in a quite different sense than what is constituted in a simple positing. Synthetical consciousness, or the pure Ego "in" it, is directed by many rays to something objective; the positional consciousness simpliciter is directed to something objective by one ray. Thus synthetical collecting is a "plural" consciousness; it is one and one and one taken together. Similarly, in a primal relating consciousness the relation is constituted in a two-fold positing. And likewise everywhere.

To every such many-rayed (polythetical) constituting of synthetical objectivities which, according to their essence can become intended to "originaliter" only synthetically — there belongs, according to eidetic law, the possibility of converting what is intended to in many
rays into what is intended to simpliciter in one ray, the possibility of "making objective" in a "monothetical" act in the specific sense what is constituted synthetically in the first act.

The synthetically constituted collection thus becomes objective in a distinctive sense, it becomes an object of a simple doxic positing in the relation of a simple positing back to the collection just constituted originaliter, thus in an appertinent noetic attaching of a positing to the synthesis. In other words: The plural consciousness, in conformity with its essence, can become converted into a singular consciousness which draws the plurality from the plural consciousness as one object, as something single; on its side, the plurality now can be combined with other pluralities and other objects become posited in a relationship to them; and so forth.

Structured in a way wholly analogous with the collecting consciousness, the situation is the same for disjunctive consciousness and its ontic or noematic correlates. Similarly, the synthetically-originally constituted relationship can be drawn from the relating consciousness in a simple positing attached to it, and be made an object in a distinctive sense; and as an object in a distinctive sense it may be compared with other relationships and, taken universally, become applied as a subject of predicates.77

But it must be made fully evident in that connection that what is presentiated simpliciter and what is synthetically unitary are really the same, and that the subsequent positing, or the extracting, rather than attributing anything to the synthetical consciousness, seizes instead upon what this presents. Also evidential is, certainly, the essentially different mode of givenness.

This conformity to laws is evinced in logic by the law of "nominalization;" according to this law, something nominal corresponds to every proposition and to every component form distinguishable in the proposition: the nominal that-proposition corresponds to the proposition itself, let us say, to "S is p;" e.g., in the subject-place of new propositions being-P corresponds to "is p," similarity corresponds to the relationship-form "similar," plurality to the plural-form; and so forth.78

77 In Copy A marginal note to synthetical-originally: the "originally" must be more precisely elaborated.
78 Author's footnote: Cf. the first attempts in this direction in the Logische Untersuchungen, 11, 5. Unters. §34 §36; further, §49 of the 6. Unters. and generally for the theory of synthesis, cf. the second part of this investigation. [English translation, pp. 624 635, 796 97.]
Conceived as exclusively determined by the pure forms, the concepts which have issued from "nominalization" fashion formal-categorial variations in the idea of any objectivity whatever and supply the fundamental conceptual material of formal ontologies and all of the formal-mathematical disciplines they include. This proposition is of decisive importance for understanding the relations between formal logic, as logic of apophansis, and the universal formal ontology.

§ 120. Positionality and Neutrality in the Sphere of Syntheses.

All syntheses proper, and those are the ones we have had in view all along, are built up on positings simpliciter — taking this term in the universal sense established above where it comprises all "intentions," all "act-characteristics;" and syntheses themselves are positings, positings of a higher level. Everything which we have ascertained about actuality and non-actuality, about neutrality and positionality, is extended, accordingly, to syntheses — which requires no explanation.

In contrast, a more precise investigation would be needed here in order to ascertain in which different ways the positionality and neutrality of founding positings are related to founded positings.

Universally, and not only for the specifically founded acts which we call syntheses, it is clear that one cannot say simply that a positing of a position of a higher level presupposes genuine positions posited at a lower level. Thus an actual seeing of an essence is indeed a positional act and not a neutralized act founded on some exemplificative intuiting consciousness or other which, on its side, can very well be a neutral, a phantasy consciousness. Something similar is true for an aesthetic liking with respect to its appearing object, for a positional depicting consciousness with respect to the depictured image.

If, now, we observe the group of syntheses of interest to us, we immediately recognize the fact that every synthesis in the group is, with respect to its posited characteristic, dependent on the founding noeses; more

79 Author's footnote: The concept of synthesis, moreover, has an ambiguity which is scarcely harmful in that sometimes it designates the full synthetical phenomenon and sometimes it designates the mere synthetical "act-characteristic," the highest positing of the phenomenon.

80 Insertion in Copy A: e.g.
precisely, that it is positional (and can only be positional) if all the lower positings together are positional, and neutral if they are not.

For example, a collecting is an actual collecting or a collecting in the mode of "quasi;" it is an actual or neutralized positing. In the one case, all the acts related to the particular collection-members are actual positings, whereas in the other case they are not. The situation is the same for all other syntheses of the class mirrored in logical syntaxes. Pure neutrality can never function as positional synthesis; it must at least undergo transmutation into "suppositions," perchance into hypothetical antecedents or consequents, into hypothetically supposed nominatives as, e.g., "pseudo Dionysius," and other similar expressions.

§ 121. Doxic Syntaxes in the Emotional and Volitional Spheres.

If we now ask how the syntheses of this group come to be expressed in the syntactical forms of predicative propositions which the logical theory of forms has developed, then the answer is at hand. They are precisely, it will be said, doxic syntheses; or, as we may also say recalling the logical-grammatical syntaxes in which they are expressed, they are doxic syntaxes. Belonging to the specific essence of doxic acts are syntaxes of "and," or the plural forms, the syntaxes of "or," of the relating positing of a predicate to the substratum pertaining to a subject-positing; and so forth. No one can doubt that "belief" and "judgment" in the logical sense are intimately related (even if one does not immediately identify them), that belief-syntheses find their "expression" in the forms of predicative propositions. However correct that may be, it is still to be seen that the interpretation indicated does not comprise in itself the whole truth. These syntheses of "and," of "or," of "if," or of "because" and "thus," in short, the syntheses which first of all are presentive as doxic, are by no means merely doxic.

It is a fundamental fact that those syntheses also belong to the essence proper of non-doxic positings and that they do so, more particularly, in the following sense.

81 Insertion in Copy A: or in the negative
82 In Copy A Syntheses substituted for Syntaxes
83 Author's footnote: The author ran up against this fact (now more than ten years ago) in the attempt to realize the idea of a formal axiology and theory of practice as analogues of formal logic. [Reading, with Schuhmann, Idee instead of Ideen as in all printed editions.]
Undoubtedly there is such a thing as a collective gladness, a collective liking, a collective willing, etc. Or, as I usually express it, there is besides the doxic "and" (the logical "and") an axiological and practical "and." The same holds for the "or" and all the syntheses belonging here. For example: the mother who looks lovingly upon her flock of children, embraces each child singly and all together in one act of love. The unity of the collective act of loving is not a loving and, in addition, a collective objectivating, even if it is attached to the loving as its necessary foundation. Loving, instead, is itself collective; it is, similarly, as many-rayed as the objectivating and perhaps the plural judging "underlying" it. We should speak of a plural loving in precisely the same sense as we speak of a plural objectivating, or judging. The syntactical forms enter into the essence of the emotional acts themselves, namely into the positional stratum specifically peculiar to them. This cannot be carried out for all syntheses; the example given suffices for an indication.

But let us now recall for ourselves the eidetic affinity investigated above between doxic posittings and posittings taken universally. A parallel doxic positing is included in any positing whatever, in conformity to what it produces noematically, e.g., as this love-intention. Obviously, the parallelism between the spheres pertaining to the doxic posittings and those pertaining to all other posittings (the parallelism of the doxic "and," "or," etc., with the "and," "or," of valuing and willing) is a special case of the same eidetic affinity. For the synthetical emotional acts — synthetical, namely, with respect to the syntactical forms explicated here — constitute synthetical emotional objectivities which are objectivated by the corresponding doxic acts. The flock of children loved is, as love-Object, a collectivum; in the correlative application of what was explained above, that signifies not only a material collectivum and in addition a love, but a love-collectivum. Just as, in a noetic respect, a ray of love emanating from the Ego is distributed among a bundle of rays each of which bears upon a particular object, so the many noematic love-characteristics are distributed among the love-collectivum as particular objects collected, and there are just as many posited characteristics which are synthetically combined into the noematic unity of a positional characteristic.

We see that all of these syntactical forms are parallel forms, that is to say, that they belong as much to the emotional acts themselves with their specific emotional components and emotional syntheses as
do also the doxic positionalities which run parallel to them and form an eidetic unity with them, which are extracted from them by the appropriate turning of one's regard to the particular substrata and superstrata. Naturally, what is true for the noetic sphere is transferred to the noematic sphere. The axiological "and" essentially includes in itself a doxic "and," every axiological syntactical form of the group considered here includes a logical syntactical form: precisely just as every noematic correlate simpliciter includes in itself a "being" or another being-modality and, as its substratum, the form of "something" and the forms which otherwise pertain to it. Each time it is a matter of essentially possible turnings of one's regard and of the co-included positional and synthetical-doxic procedures for fashioning a new act on the basis of an emotional act in which we wholly live, so to speak, only emotionally, thus without actualizing the doxic potentialities — a new act in which the only potential emotional objectivity for the present is converted into an actual doxic and possibly expressly explicit objectivity. It is possible, accordingly, and not unusual in empirical life that, for example, we consider many intuitive objects, positing them doxically; that, accordingly, we effect a synthetical emotional act at the same time — perhaps the unity of collective liking, or the unity of a selective emotional act, of a preferential liking, of a repudiating disliking; and all the while we do this, by no means do we go on to turn the whole phenomenon into a doxic phenomenon. But we do effect that turn when we make a statement, e.g., about our liking of the many, or of the one in the many, about our preference for the one over against the others; and so forth.

It need not be emphasized how important the careful carrying out of such analyses is for cognizing the essence of axiological and practical objectivities, significations and modes of consciousness, therefore for the problems of the "origin" of ethical, aesthetical concepts and cognitions as well as those eidetically akin to them.

Because it is not our proper task here to solve phenomenological problems, but rather to work out scientifically the principal problems of phenomenology and to predelineate the directions of investigation cohering with them, we must be satisfied with having carried the matters under discussion this far.84

84 Marginal note to this paragraph in Copy A: Deleatur
§ 122. Modes of Effectuation of the Articulated Syntheses. "Theme."\(^8^5\)

There belongs to posittings and syntheses an important group of universal modifications, a brief indication of which we had best add here.

A synthesis can be *effected* step by step; it becomes, it arises in original production. This originarity of becoming in the stream of consciousness is a quite peculiar one. The positing and synthesis become while the pure Ego actionally takes one step and each new step; the Ego itself lives in the step and "steps forth" with it. The positing, the positing-thereupon, positing antecedently and consequently, etc., is its *free spontaneity and activity*; the Ego does not live in the posittings as passively dwelling in them; the posittings are instead radiations from the <pure Ego> as from a primal source of generations. Every positing begins with a *point of initiation*, with a *positional point of origin*; so it is with the first positing, as with every further one in the concatenation pertaining to the synthesis. This "initiation" belongs precisely to the positing as positing qua distinctive mode of original actionality. It is, perchance, like the *fiat*, like the initiating point of willing and acting.

Still, one should not confuse the universal with the particular. The spontaneous resolve, the purposive, accomplishing deed is *one act* among other acts; its syntheses are particular syntheses among others. But *every* act of no matter what species can begin in the *mode of spontaneity pertaining, so to speak, to its creative beginning* in which the pure Ego makes its appearance as the subject of the spontaneity.

This mode of initiating is immediately, and according to an eidetic necessity, converted into another mode. For example, perceptual *seizing upon, taking hold of*, are immediately and without a break changed into the "*having in one's grip.***

Yet another new modal alteration ensues when the positing is a mere step toward a synthesis, when the pure Ego effects a new step, and when now, in the all-inclusive unity of the synthetical consciousness, it "*still keeps* in grip what it just had in its grip: seizing upon the new thematic Object, or rather seizing upon a new member of the total theme as primary theme, but still holding on to the member previously seized upon as belonging to the same total theme. For

\(^8^5\) *Marginal note in Copy A to "Theme:" Here I do not use the headings of theme and thematic consciousness in the particular sense of my other investigations. Likewise the term "theatic grip" can be understood in still other ways. Theme can also be interpreted in relation to "theoretical interest." [Published by Schuhmann as Appendix 65, ca. 1914.]"
example, in collecting I do not allow what I just perceptually seized upon to escape while I turn the seizing regard to the new Object. Demonstrating an argument, step by step I run through the thoughts which are premises; I abandon no synthetical step that I have acquired, nor do I lose my grip on it; however, the mode of actionality has essentially changed with the effectuation of the new thematic primal actionality.

In that connection it is also, though not merely, a matter of obscurations. The differences we have just tried to describe rather exhibit a completely new dimension in contradistinction to the differences of clarity and unclarity, although both sets of differences are quite closely interwoven.

We may further observe that these new differences fall under the law of the correlation of noesis and noema no less than those of clarity and all other differences in intentionality. Thus, again, the noetic actionality-modifications correspond to the species of noematic modifications which belong here. For example: the mode of givenness of the “meant as meant” changes in the variation of positing, or in the steps of the synthesis, and one can show these changes in the particular noematic content and make them salient in it as a stratum proper.

When the actionality-mode (stated noematically, the givenness-mode) – disregarding the changes in continuous flux – necessarily varies according to certain discrete types, there still always remains throughout the variations something essentially common. Noematically, a What is preserved as the identical sense; on the noetic side, the correlate of this sense, furthermore the whole form of articulation according to positing and synthesizing.

However, a new eidetic modification now occurs. The pure Ego can withdraw wholly from the positing; it releases the positional correlate from its “grip,” “adverting to another theme.” What was a moment ago still its theme (theoretical, axiological, and so forth), with its articulations, even though more or less obscured, has not disappeared from consciousness; it is still intended to, but no longer in the thematic grip.

This holds likewise for isolated positings as well as for members of synthesizings. While thinking about something, a whistle from the street momentarily distracts me from my theme (here the theme of my thinking). For a moment I advert to the noise, but then immediately return to the old theme. The seizing upon the noise has not
been effaced, the whistle is still intended to in a modified way; however, it is no longer in my mental grip. It does not belong to the theme, nor even to a parallel theme. Note that this possibility of simultaneously, perhaps mutually “penetrating” and “disruptive” themata and of thematic syntheses, refers to still further possible modifications; we note then how the heading “theme,” related to all basic species of acts and act-syntheses, makes up an important theme of phenomenological analysis.

§123. Confusion and Distinctness as Modes of Effectuation of Synthetical Acts.

Let us now consider further the modalities of effectuation which, so to speak, lie in a converse direction from the preferred mode of actionality arising originaliter. A thought, furnished with simple or manifold positings, can arise as “confused.” It is then given as a simple presentation without any actional-positional articulation. Perhaps we recall a proof, a theory, a conversation — it “just comes to mind.” At first we do not even advert to it; it comes up “in the background.” Then a regard of the Ego is directed to it in a single ray, seizing upon the noematic objectivity in question in an unmembered grip. Now a new process can begin, the confused recollection being converted into a distinct and clear one: step by step we remember the course of the proof, we “regenerate” the positings and synthesizings pertaining to the proof, we “recapitulate” the stages of yesterday’s conversation, and so forth. Naturally, such reproduction by way of recollection, of regeneration of “earlier” originary generations, is something non-essential. Perhaps a new theoretical idea for carrying out a complicated theory comes to mind in a unitary but confused way, which is then developed in freely effected steps and transformed into synthetical actualities. Everything indicated is without question to be related in the same way to all species of act.

This important difference between confusion and distinctness plays a significant role in the phenomenology of “expressings,” explicit objectivatings, judgings [Urteile], emotional acts, etc., which we have yet to examine. We need only think of the way in which we are accustomed to seize upon very complex, synthetical formations making up the “intellectual content” of our reading at a given time, and reflect on what, in the understanding of what we have read, comes to actual originary actualization with respect to the so-called intellectual foundations of expressions.

Interwoven with all the acts considered before are the expressive act-strata, which are "logical" in the specific sense, in which the parallelism between noesis and noema is to be made evident no less than in the other acts. The universal and unavoidable ambiguity of locutions conditioned by this parallelism, and shown to be at work wherever the relevant relationships are expressed in language, is, naturally, also found in the terms expression and signification. The ambiguity is dangerous only as long as one does not recognize it as dangerous, or else has not separated the parallel structures. But if that occurs, care must be taken so that there can be no doubt as to which of the structures the terms ought to be referred.

We begin with the familiar distinction between the sensuous, so to speak, the corporeal side of the expression, and its non-sensuous or "mental" side. We need not enter into a closer examination of the first side; likewise, we need not consider the manner of unifying both sides. Obviously they too designate headings for not unimportant phenomenological problems.

We shall restrict our regard exclusively to "signifying" and "signification." Originally, these words concerned only the linguistic sphere, that of "expressing." But one can scarcely avoid and, at the same time, take an important cognitive step, extending the signification of these words and suitably modifying them so that they can find application of a certain kind to the whole noetic-noematic sphere: thus application to all acts, be they now combined with expressive acts or not. Thus we have continued to speak of "sense" in the case of all intentive mental processes — a word which is used in general as equivalent to "signification." For the sake of distinctness we shall prefer the term signification for the old concept and, in particular, in the complex locution of "logical" or "expressive" signification. We shall continue to use the word sense as before in the most all-inclusive range.

For example: an object is present to perception with a determined sense, posited monothetically in determined fullness. As is our

**Author's footnote:** In this respect, cf. the Philosophie der Arithmetik, pp. 28f. [Husserliana, xiv, pp. 31f.], where the distinction is already made between the "psychological description of a phenomenon" and the "declaration of its signification," and where we speak of a "logical" in contrast to the psychological "content."
normal custom after first seizing upon something perceptually, we effect an explicating of the given and a relational positing which unifies the parts or moments singled out—perhaps according to the schema, "This is white." This process does not require the minimum of "expression," nor of expression in the sense of verbal sound, nor of anything like a verbal signifying, the latter also being capable of being present independently of the verbal sound (as when this would be "forgotten"). But if we have "thought" or asserted, "This is white," then a new stratum is co-present, unified with the purely perceptually "meant as meant." In this fashion anything remembered as remembered, anything phantasied as phantasied, is also explicable and expressible. Anything "meant as meant," anything meant in the noematic sense (and, more particularly, as the noematic core) pertaining to any act, no matter which, is expressible by means of "significations." Quite universally we may say:

Logical signification is an expression.

The verbal sound can only be called an expression because the signification belonging to it expresses; expressing inheres in it originaliter. "Expression" is a distinctive form which allows for adapting to every "sense" (to the noematic "core") and raises it to the realm of "Logos," of the conceptual and, on that account, the "universal."

As a consequence, the last words are understood in a quite determinate signification to be separated from other significations of these words. Universally, what has just been indicated designates a major theme for phenomenological analysis which is fundamental for eidetically clarifying logical thinking and its correlates. In the noetic respect, a particular act-stratum should be designated under the heading of "expressing" to which, in their own peculiar way, all other acts are to conform and with which they are to fuse in a distinctive manner so that every noematic act-sense, and consequently the relationship to objectivity lying in it, is "conceptually" stamped on the noematic correlate of the expressing. An appertinent intuitional medium is present which, according to its essence, has the distinction, so to speak, of mirroring every other intentionality according to form and content, depicturing it in its own colors and hence imprinting on it its own form of "conceptuality." To be sure, these locutions of mirroring or depicturing imposed upon us are to be taken with care since their metaphorical use can easily lead to error.

Extraordinarily difficult problems are related to the phenomena
subsumed under the headings of "signifying" and "signification." Because every science is objectivated in the specifically "logical" medium, in that of expression, in accord with its theoretical content and with everything which is "doctrine" in it (theorem, proof, theory), the problems of expression and signification are the most immediate for philosophers and psychologists guided by universal logical interests; and they are, therefore, the first to require a phenomenological inquiry into essence as soon as one seriously comes to seek out their ground. From there, on that basis, one is led to the question of how the "expressing" of the "expressed" is to be understood, how expressive mental processes are related to non-expressive ones, and what the latter undergo in supervening expressings: one finds himself referred to their "intentionality," to the "sense immanent" in them, to the "matter" and "quality" (i.e., the act-characteristic of the positing); one is referred to the difference between these senses, to the essential moments which lie in the pre-expressed, and to the signification of the expressive phenomenon itself and its own moments; and so forth. In many ways, one still sees in the current literature how little justice is done to the major problems indicated here with respect to their full and profound sense.

Apart from the fact that it confers expression precisely on all other intentionalities, the stratum of expression — and this makes up its own peculiarity — is not productive. Or, if one wishes: its productivity, its noematic production, is exhausted in the expressing and with the form of the conceptual which is introduced with «the expression».

As a consequence, the expressive stratum, with respect to the posited characteristic, is perfectly identical in essence with the stratum undergoing the expression, and in the coincidence takes up its essence into itself to such an extent that we call the expressive objectivating just objectivating itself, the expressive believing, «expressive» deeming likely, «expressive» doubting themselves, and as a whole, just believing, deeming likely, doubting; similarly, we call the expressive wishing or willing just wishing or willing. It is evident that even the distinction between positionality and neutrality passes

87 AUTHOR'S FOOTNOTE: As can be seen from the second volume of the Logische Untersuchungen where they form a major theme.
88 AUTHOR'S FOOTNOTE: In fact, this was the way in which the Logische Untersuchungen endeavored to penetrate into phenomenology. A second way, starting from the opposite side, namely from the side of experience and sensuous givenness followed by the author since the beginning of the 1890's, was not fully expressed in that work.
over into the expressive, and we have already considered it above. The expressive stratum can have no other qualified posited or neutral position than the stratum subject to the expression, and in the coincidence we find not two positions which are to be separated but only one position.

89 The full clarification of the structures belonging here raises considerable difficulties. Already it is not easy to recognize that, after abstraction from the sensuous verbal sounds, a stratification of the kind we presuppose here is actually present, thus in every case — even in that of a thinking which is still quite unclear, empty, merely verbal — a stratum of expressive signifying and a substratum of the expressed; nor is it easy to understand the essential connections of these stratifications. For not too much should be expected of the metaphor stratification; expression is not something like a coat of varnish, or like a piece of clothing covering it over; it is a mental formation exercising new intenitive functions on the intenitive sub­stratum and which, correlative­ly, is subjected to the intenitive func­tions of the <substratum>. What this new metaphor signifies for its part must be studied in the phenomena themselves and in all their es­sential modifications. Of particular importance is the understanding of the different sorts of “universality” which make their appearance there: on the one side, those which belong to each expression and moment of expression, also to the non-selfsufficient “is,” “not,” “and,” “if,” and so forth; on the other side, the universality of “universal names” such as “human being” in contrast to proper names such as “Bruno;” again, those which belong to an essence which, in itself, is syntactically formless in comparison to the different universalities of signification just touched upon.

§125. The Modalities of Effectuation in the Logical-Expressive Sphere and the Method of Clarification.

In order to clear up the difficulties indicated particular regard must obviously be directed to the differences in modes of actionality dealt with above:90 the modalities of act-effectuation which, like all positi­nings and syntheses, concern as well the expressive modalities. But

89 Marginal note to this part of the sentence in Copy A: false, the expressing proper is the fitting of the expression to the given proper, to the expressed (pertaining to <the substratum>) [Gloss by Schuhmann]

90 Author's footnote: Cf. above, §122, pp. 253f.
this occurs in a double way. On the one hand, they concern the signification-stratum, the specifically logical itself; on the other hand, the founding substrata.

In the course of reading we can articulate and freely effect each signification; we can, as a consequence, synthetically connect significations with significations in the predesignated way. In this effectuation of acts of signification in the mode of production proper we acquire perfect distinctness of "logical" understanding.

This distinctness can be converted into confusion in all the modes described above: the sentence just read sinks into darkness, loses its living articulation, ceases to be our "theme," to be "still in grip."

Such distinctness and confusion are, however, to be separated from that which affects the expressed substrata. A distinct understanding of word and sentence (or a distinct, articulated effectuation of the act of stating) is compatible with the confusion belonging to the substrata. This confusion does not signify mere unclarity, although it can also signify that. The substratum can be a confused unitary something (and often is) which does not actually include in itself its articulation; but instead it owes its articulation to mere adaptation to the stratum of the logical expression actually articulated and effected in original actionality.

That has a highly important methodological signification. We call attention to the fact that essential supplementations are needed by our earlier discussions about the method of clarification with respect to the proposition, which is the element of life in science. It is now easy to designate what needs to be done in order to come from confused thinking to genuine and fully explicit cognizing, to distinct and, at the same time, clear effectuation of acts of thinking: In the first place, all "logical" acts (those of signifying), in so far as they were still effected in the mode of confusion, are to be converted into the mode of originary, spontaneous actionality; thus perfect logical distinctness is to be established. But now the analogue is also to be produced in the grounding substratum, everywhere unliving is to be converted into the living, all confusion into distinctness, but also all non-intuitiveness into intuitiveness. Only when we perform this work of conversion

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91 Marginal note in Copy A to the following lines: Perhaps there comes into play there an error on the one side of the question.

92 AUTHOR'S FOOTNOTE: Cf. above, §67, p. 125.

93 Marginal note in Copy A: It is often and frequently empty, thus only there in the form of the signification-intention itself.
in the substratum — in the event that the incompatibilities becoming visible in it do not make further work superfluous — does the previously described method come into action, whereby account is to be taken of the fact that the concept of intuition, of clear consciousness, is transferred from the monothetical to the synthetical acts.

Moreover, as a profounder analysis will show, it all depends on the species of evidence which should be acquired in each case, or else on the stratum to which the evidence is turned. All evidences related to pure-logical relations, to concatenations of essences of noematic significations — therefore those which we obtain from fundamental laws of formal logic — require precisely the givenness of significations, namely, the givenness of expressive posita of the forms prescribed by the law of signification in question. The non-selfsufficiency of significations also brings it about that exemplification of the logically produced essence-formation mediating the evidence of the law also carries along with it substrata and, more particularly, those subjected to logical expression; but these substrata need not be made clear when it is a matter of a pure-logical insight. Correspondingly modified, that holds for all “analytic” cognitions.  

§126. Completeness and Universality of Expression.

To be emphasized, furthermore, is the difference between complete and incomplete expression. The unity of something which expresses and something which is expressed in the phenomenon is, to be sure, that of a certain coincidence, although it is not necessary that the superstratum be expressively extended over the whole substratum. The expression is complete when it stamps all synthetical forms and materials of the substratum in a conceptual-significational way; it is incomplete when it only partially does that: as when, with respect to a complex event, such as the arrival of a carriage, perhaps, bringing long-awaited guests, we shout in the house: the carriage! the guests! — Obviously this difference of completeness cuts across that of relative clarity and distinctness.

An incompleteness wholly different from the one just mentioned is that which belongs to the essence of expression as expression, that is

94 Marginal note in Copy A: N.B.
to say, to its *universality*. “I would like” universally expresses the wish; the form of the command, the command; “might well be” expresses the deeming likely, or what is deemed likely as likely; and so forth. Everything determined more precisely in the unity of expression is itself again expressed universally. It is inherent in the sense of the universality belonging to the essence of expressing that all the particulars of the expressed can never be reflected in the expression. The stratum of signifying is not, and of essential necessity cannot be, a kind of reduplication of the substratum. Whole dimensions of variability in the substratum do not enter at all into the expressive signifying; they, or their correlates, do not indeed “express themselves” at all: thus the modifications of relative clarity and distinctness, the attentional modifications, and so forth. But even in that which indicates the particular sense of the word expression there subsist essential differences, thus with respect to how the synthetical forms and the synthetical stuff find expression.

Reference is also to be made here to the “non-selfsufficiency” of all forms of significations and all “syncategorematic” significations taken universally. The isolated “and,” “if,” the isolated genitive “of the heavens,” are comprehensible and yet are non-selfsufficient and in need of completion. The question here is what this need of completion signifies, what it signifies with respect to both strata and in retrospect of the possibilities of incomplete signifying.96


All these points must be clarified if one of the oldest and most difficult of problems pertaining to the sphere of signification is to be solved — a problem which has remained without solution until now precisely because it has lacked the requisite phenomenological insights: the problem of how statings as the expressions of judging are related to the expressing of other sorts of acts. We have expressive predications in which a “thus it is!” is expressed. We have expressive deemings likely, askings, doubtings, expressive wishes, commands; etc. Verbally, we find here proposition-forms structured in the way peculiar to them but which are to be interpreted ambiguously: along with predicative

propositions there are interrogative propositions, presumption-propositions, optative propositions, imperative propositions, etc. Leaving aside grammatical wordings and their historical forms, the original argument in that connection was related to whether or not all of these propositions with respect to their signification were not in truth predicative propositions. In the latter case, all pertinent act-formations, e.g., those of the emotional sphere which, in themselves, are not acts of judging, would only be able to come to "expression" in a roundabout way by means of a judging founded on them.

Nonetheless, the whole relation of the problem to the acts, the noeses, is insufficient, and the continual overlooking of the noemata to which the regard is directed just in such reflections on significations, hinders the understanding of these affairs. In order to be able to penetrate to the correct setting of the problem, universally it is necessary to refer to the different structures we have indicated: the universal cognition of the noetic and noematic correlations as one which pervades all intentionalities, all posited and synthesized strata; likewise the separation of the logical signification-stratum from the substratum to be expressed by it; furthermore, the insight here, as elsewhere in the intuitional sphere, into the essentially possible directions of reflection and the directions of modifications; but, specifically, there is needed the insight into the ways in which each consciousness is converted into a judgmental consciousness, just as predicatively formed affair-complexes of noetic and noematic kinds are to be drawn from every consciousness. The radical problem back to which we are finally led, as it emerges from the concatenation of the whole series of the last problem-analyses, is to be formulated as follows:

Is the medium of expressive signifying, this appertinent medium of the Logos, a specifically doxic one? In the adaptation of the signifying to the signified, does it not coincide with the doxic itself inherent in all positionality?

Of course that would not exclude the fact that many modes of expression, let us say of emotional mental processes, are given. One of them would be the direct, i.e., simple expressions of mental processes (or for the correlative sense of the word expression, its noema) by the immediate adaptation of a membered expression to the membered emotional mental process whereby the doxic coincides with the doxic. The doxic form inherent in the emotional mental process with respect to all components would thus be what makes possible the adaptability of the expression, as an exclusively doxo-positional mental process, to the emotional mental process which, as emo-
tional and according to all its members, is multi-positing but also necessarily including doxo-positional «members».

More precisely stated, this direct expression, if it is to be a faithful and complete expression, would only accrue to doxic, non-modalized mental processes. If, in wishing, I am uncertain, it is then incorrect to say in direct adaptation: May S be p. For all expressing is, in the sense of the foundational apprehension, a doxic act in the pregnant sense, i.e., a certainty of believing. If, in wishing, I am uncertain, it is then incorrect to say in direct adaptation: May S be p. For all expressing is, in the sense of the foundational apprehension, a doxic act in the pregnant sense, i.e., a certainty of believing. It can, therefore, only express certainties (e.g., wish-certainties, volitional certainties). In cases of that kind, the expression is only produced as indirectly faithful, perchance in the form: “Perhaps S may be p.” As soon as modalities make their appearance, in order to acquire the most suitable expression possible it is necessary to recur to the doxic positings with changed positional material which lie, so to speak, hidden in them.

If we grant this interpretation as a correct one, then the following must still be pointed out by way of supplement:

There are at all times a number of possibilities of indirect expressions with “periphrases.” To the essence of any objectivity as objectivity, be it constituted by no matter which acts, be the acts simple or complex and synthetically founded acts, there belong various possibilities of relating explication: thus different acts can follow upon any act, e.g., an act of wishing, related to it, to its noematic objectivity, to its entire noema; concatenations of subject-positings, of predicate-positings posited thereupon in which, perchance, what is meant in the original act of wishing is judgmentally unfolded and correspondingly expressed. The expression is then not adapted to the phenomenon originaliter, but instead directly to that which is predicatively derived from it.

In this connection it is always necessary to note that, on the one side explicative or analytic synthesis (judgment prior to the conceptual-significational expression), on the other side statement of judgment in the ordinary sense and, finally, doxa (belief [belief]), are matters which must be kept well separated. What is called “theory of judgment” is something viciously ambiguous. Eidetic clarification of

97 Author’s footnote: One should not say that an expressing expresses a doxic act: if, by the expressing, one understands, as we do here, the signifying itself. But if one relates the word expressing to the verbal sound, then one can very well speak in the manner in question; however, the sense would then be fully changed.

98 Marginal note in Copy A to this sentence: this is certainly not correct
the idea of doxa is something different from that of statement or explication. 99.

99 Author's footnote: Cf. with this whole paragraph the final chapter of the Sixth Investigation of the Logische Untersuchungen, Vol. ii. One sees that since then the author has not stood still, that, however, in spite of much that is debatable and immature, the analyses there move in the direction of progress. Those analyses have been attacked many times, yet without actually entering into the motives of thought and the formulations of problems which were attempted there.
PART FOUR

REASON AND ACTUALITY
§128. Introduction.

The phenomenological excursions of the last chapter have led us into almost all spheres of intentionality. Guided by the radical point of view of the distinction between analysis of the really inherent and intentional analysis, between noetic and noematic analysis, we encountered in all cases structures which always and again became newly ramified. In the case of this distinction, we can no longer avoid the insight that it is indeed a matter of a fundamental structure pervading all intentional structures which must, therefore, determine a governing Leitmotiv of phenomenological methods and the course of all inquiries into problems of intentionality.

With this distinction it is clear at the same time that there becomes salient a distinction between two realms of being which are radically opposed and yet essentially related to one another. We emphasized earlier that consciousness taken universally must be accepted as a proper region of being. We recognized then, however, that eidetic description of consciousness leads back to that of what is intended in it, that the correlate of consciousness is inseparable from consciousness and yet is not really inherent in it. The noematic became distinguished as an objectivity belonging to consciousness and yet specifically peculiar. In that connection, we notice that while objects simpliciter (understood in the unmodified sense) stand under fundamentally different highest genera, all object-senses and all noemas taken completely, no matter how different they may be otherwise, are of essential necessity of one single highest genus. It then also obtains, however, that the essences, Noema and Noesis, are inseparable from one another: Infima species on the noematic side eidetically point back to infima species on the noetic side. That becomes extended naturally to all formations of genus and species.
Cognitions of the essential two-sidedness of intentionality, according to noesis and noema, have the consequence that a systematic phenomenology is not allowed to direct its aim one-sidedly at an analysis of what is really inherent in mental processes and specifically of intentive mental processes. The temptation to do so is, however, very great at the beginning because the historical and natural course from psychology to phenomenology brings with it that one understands the study of what is immanent in pure mental processes, the study of their own essence, as without question a study of their really inherent components. In truth there become opened up in respect of both sides great provinces of eidetic research which are continually related to one another and which yet, as comes to light, are separated with respect to broad extents. In great measure what one has held to be act-analysis, noetic analysis, is gained entirely from the direction of regard to the "meant as meant," and thus it was noematic structures which one described in that analysis.

In our next considerations it will be our purpose to direct our attention to the universal structure of the noema from a point of view which, up to now, has often been mentioned but was still not the guiding one for noematic analysis: The phenomenological problem of the relation of consciousness to an objectivity has primarily its noematic side. The noema in itself has an objective relation and, more particularly, by virtue of its own "sense." If we ask, then, how the consciousness-"sense" has access to the "object" which belongs to it and can be "the same" in manifold acts of very different content, how we see this in the sense, then new structures emerge the extraordinary significance of which is evident. For, progressing in this direction and, on the other side, reflecting on the parallel noeses, we finally confront the question of what the "claim" of consciousness actually to "relate" to something objective, to be "well-founded," properly signifies, of how "valid" and "invalid" objective relations become phenomenologically clarified according to noesis and noema: and with that we confront the great problems of reason, the clarification of which within the realm of phenomenology, the formulation of which as phenomenological problems, will become our aim in this fourth part of the First Book.

1 Author's footnote: That is still the focus of the Logische Untersuchungen. However great the extent to which the nature of the matters themselves compels the carrying out of noematic analyses, the noemas are nevertheless regarded more as indices for the parallel noetic structures; the essential parallelism of the two structures has not yet attained clarity there.
§129. "Content" and "Object," the Content as "Sense."

In our previous analyses a universal noematic structure played its continuous role, designated by the separation of a certain noematic "core" from the changing "characteristics" belonging to it and which the noematic concretion appears involved in the flow of different sorts of modifications. This core has not yet received its scientific due. It was intuitionally, unitarily, and clearly salient so that we could refer to it in general. Now the time has come to consider it more closely and place it at the center of phenomenological analysis. As soon as one does that, universally significant differences running throughout all act-species emerge which are guiding for great groups of investigations.

We begin with the usual equivocal verbal reference to the content of consciousness. As content we take the "sense," of which we say that in or through it consciousness relates to something objective as "its" something objective. So to speak, as title and aim of our discussions we take the propositions:

Each noema has a "content," that is to say, its "sense," and is related through it to "its" object.

In recent times one often hears it praised as a great advance, that now at last the foundation-laying differentiation among act, content, and object has been attained. The three words in this juxtaposition have become nothing short of slogans, particularly since Twardowski's fine treatise. Yet, however great and doubtless the service of this author in having acutely discussed certain generally ordinary confusions and made their error evident, it must still be said that in the clarification of the relevant conceptual essence he did not get considerably beyond what was well-known to the philosophers of earlier generations (despite their incautious confusions). This is not, perchance, to be charged to him as a fault. A radical advance was just not at all possible before a systematic phenomenology of consciousness. With phenomenologically unclarified concepts such as "act," "content," "object" of the "objectivatings," nothing is of help to us. What is there which cannot be called "act" and especially which cannot be called "content of an objectivating," and an "objectivating?" And what can be called so must itself be cognized scientifically.

In this respect a first and, as it would appear to me, necessary step was attempted by means of the phenomenological distinguishing of "matter" and "quality" by means of the idea of the "intentional essence" in its distinction from the "cognitional essence." The one-sidedness of the noetic direction of regard in which these differentiations were made and meant becomes easily overcome by taking into consideration the noematic parallels. We can therefore understand the concepts as noematic; the "quality" (judgment-quality, wish-quality, and so forth) is nothing else than that which we have dealt with up to now as "posited" characteristic ["Setzungs" Charakter, "thetischen" Charakter] in the broadest sense. The expression, originating from contemporary psychology (Brentano's), appears to me now hardly suitable; each specifically peculiar position has its quality but it is not itself to be designated as quality. Obviously now the "matter," which is, in the particular case, the "what" which receives the posited characteristic, the "quality," corresponds to the "noematic core."

The task is now to systematically develop this beginning, to clarify it more deeply, to analyze these concepts further and to carry them through in all noetic-noematic provinces. Each actually successful advance in this direction must be of exceptional significance for phenomenology. It is indeed a question, not of side issues, but of essential moments belonging to the central structure of every inten­tive mental process.

In order to approach matters more closely, let us begin with the following deliberation.

The inten­tive mental process, so one is accustomed to say, has "relation to something objective," but one also says that it is "consciousness of something," for example, a blossoming apple tree, the one here in this garden. To begin with, we shall not hold it to be necessary, in the light of such examples, to discriminate the two manners of speaking. If we recall the preceding analyses, we find the full noesis related to the full noema as its intentional and full What. It is then clear, however, that this relation cannot be the one meant in speaking of the relation of consciousness to its intentional objective something; for to each noetic moment, especially to each positing noetic one, there corresponds a moment in the noema and, in the latter, there is set apart from the complex posited characteristics the noematic core characterized by them. If we recall, furthermore, the "regard-to" which, under circumstances, goes through the noesis (which goes
through the actional cogito) and which converts the specifically positing moments into rays of positing actionality of the Ego, and if we heed precisely how this Ego now with them "directs" itself to something objective as seizing upon being, as deeming likely, as wishing, how its regard goes through the noematic core — we then become attentive to the fact that, with the statements about the relation (and specifically the direction) of consciousness to its objective something, we are referred to an innermost moment of the noema. It is not the just designated core itself but rather something else which, so to speak, makes up the necessary central point of the core and functions as "bearer" for noematic peculiarities specifically belonging to the core, that is to say, the noematically modified properties of the "meant as meant."

As soon as we go into it more precisely we are immediately cognitively aware that indeed the distinction between "content" and "object" is to be made not only for the "consciousness," for the intentive mental process, but also for the noema taken in itself. Thus the noema too is related to an object and possesses a "content" by "means" of which it relates to the object; in which case the object is the same as that of the noesis; as then the "parallelism" again completely confirms itself.

§130. Delimitation of the Essence, "Noematic Sense."

Let us bring these remarkable structures closer to us. We simplify the deliberation in such a way that we leave the attentional modifications out of consideration; we restrict ourselves further to positing acts in the positions of which we live, perhaps, according to the sequence of levels of the founding — living sometimes in the one, sometimes in the other partial position while the others are, it is true, in effect but in a secondary function. That our analyses do not suffer in the least with respect to the universality of their validity by such simplifications is to be made evident subsequently and without further ado. We are concerned precisely with an essence which is insensitive to such modifications.

If we then put ourselves into a living cogito, it has, according to its

3 Marginal note to title in Copy A: Matter in the sense of the Logische Untersuchungen; objective sense in the lectures.
essence and in a pre-eminent sense a "direction" to something objective. In other words, there belongs to its noema "something objective" — in inverted commas — with a certain noematic composition which becomes explicated in a description of determinate delimitation, that is to say, in such a description which, as a description of the "meant objective something, as it is meant," avoids all "subjective" expressions. There formal-ontological expressions are applied, such as "object," "determination," and "predicatively formed affair-complex;" material-ontological expressions, such as "physical thing," "bodily figure" ["Figur"], and "cause;" determinations with a material content, such as "rough," "hard," and "colored" — all have their inverted commas, accordingly the noematic-modified sense. Excluded, in contrast, for the description of this meant objective something as meant are such expressions as "perceptual," "memorial," "clearly intuited," "conceptual," and "given" — they belong to another dimension of descriptions, not to the objective something which is an object of consciousness, but to the mode in which it is an object of consciousness. In contrast, in the case of an appearing physical thing-Object, it would again fall in the bounds of the description to say: a "front side" is thus and so determined with respect to color, shape, etc., its "rear side" has "a color" but a "not further determined" one; the appearing physical thing-Object is, in these and those respects, altogether "undetermined" as to whether it is thus or so.

That is true not only in the case of objects belonging to Nature but quite universally; for example, in the case of objects with value. To their description belongs that of the meant "mere thing" and, in addition, the statement of the "value," as when we say of the appearing tree, "according to the sense" of our valuing-meaning of it, it is covered with "delightfully" scented blossoms. Moreover, the value predicates too have their inverted commas; they are predicates, not of a valuable object [eines Wertes] simpliciter, but of a value noema.

With this, obviously, a quite fixed content in each noema is delimited. Each consciousness has its What and each means "its" objective something; it is evident that, in the case of each consciousness, we must, essentially speaking, be able to make such a noematic description of "its" objective something, "precisely as it is meant;" we acquire by explication and conceptual comprehension a closed set of formal or material, materially determined or "undetermined" ("emp-
"ily" meant⁴) "predicates" and these in their modified signification determine that "content" of the object-core of the noema which is spoken of.⁵

§131. The "Object," the "Determinable X in the Noematic Sense."

The predicates are, however, predicates of "something," and this "something" also belongs, and obviously inseparably, to the core in question: it is the central point of unity of which we spoke above. It is the central point of connection or the "bearer" of the predicates, but in no way is it a unity of them in the sense in which any complex, any combination, of the predicates would be called a unity. It is necessarily to be distinguished from them, although not to be placed alongside and separated from them; just as, conversely, they are its predicates: unthinkable without it, yet distinguishable from it. We say that the intentional Object is continuously intended to in the continuous or synthetical course of consciousness but again and again "presents" itself "differently;" it is "the same;" it is only given in other predicates with a different determination-content; "it" shows itself only from different sides, whereby the predicates which remained undetermined would have become more closely determined; or "the" Object has remained unchanged in this stretch of givenness, now however "it," the identical, becomes altered, it increases in beauty through this alteration, it loses utility-value, and so forth. If this is always understood as noematic description of the currently meant as meant and if this description, as is possible at any time, is made in pure adequation, then the identical intentional "object" becomes evidently distinguished from the changing and alterable "predicates." It becomes separated as central noematic moment: the "object" ["Gegenstand"], the "Object" ["Objekt"], the "Identical," the determinable subject of its possible predicates — the pure X in abstraction from all predicates — and it becomes separated from these predicates or, more precisely, from the predicate-noemas.

⁴ Addition in Copy A (published by Schuhmann as Appendix 66, ca. 1914): It would be well to add here that the situation naturally is not essentially different in the psychological sphere. Subjects, such as persons, furthermore their psychical properties, their transitory or permanent dispositions, finally their perceptions and other psychical states, can become Objects, and there too the Objective something and its "subjective" mode of givenness are to be distinguished.

⁵ Author's footnote: The emptiness of undeterminedness should not be confused with being devoid of intuition, the emptiness of the obscure objectivation.
With the one Object we coordinate multiple modes of consciousness, acts, correletively act-noemas. Obviously this is nothing accidental; no Object is conceivable without there also being conceivable multiple intensive mental processes, connected in continuous or in properly synthetical (polythetical) unity — processes in which "it," the Object, is intended to as an identical object and yet in a noetically different mode: such that the characterized core is a changeable one and the "object," the pure subject of the predicating, is precisely an identical one. It is clear that we can regard each partial extent of the immanent duration of an act as an "act" and the total act as a certain harmonious unity of the continuously combined acts.

We can say then: several act-noemata have here, throughout, different cores, yet in such a manner that, in spite of this, they are joined together to make a unity of identity, to make a unity in which the "something," the determinable which inheres in each core, is intended to as an identical "something."

In just the same manner, however, separate acts, like, for example, two perceptions or a perception and a memory, can join together to make a "harmonious" unity and by virtue of the specific character of the union, which is obviously not alien to the essence of the acts joined together, there is consciousness of the possibly at one time so and at another time otherwise determined something of the at first separated cores as the same something or as harmoniously the same "object."

As a consequence, therefore, there is inherent in each noema a pure object-something as a point of unity and, at the same time, we see how in a noematic respect two sorts of object-concepts are to be distinguished: this pure point of unity, this noematic "object simpliciter," and the "object in the How of its determinations" — including undeterminednesses which for the time being "remain open" and, in this mode, are co-meant. This "How," moreover, is to be taken precisely as that which the particular act prescribes, as which it consequently belongs actually to the noema of the act. The "sense," of which we speak repeatedly, is this noematic "Object in the How,"

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6 Insertion in Copy D: (not only a non-selfsufficient act-phase)
7 Marginal note to different cores in Copy D: objective senses. Additional note in Copy D: But core and sense are differentiated later on, <p. 273>.
8 Marginal note in Copy A to "object simpliciter:" = X
9 Marginal note in Copy A to "object in the How of its determinations:" X α, β, γ.
with all that which the description characterized above is able to find evidently in it and to express conceptually.

Let it be noted that now we cautiously said "sense," not "core." For it will turn out that, in order to gain the actual, concretely complete core of the noema, we must take into account yet another dimension of differences which finds no expression in the characterized description but which defines the sense for us. If at first we keep here purely to that which this description comprehends, the "sense" is therefore a fundamental piece of the noema. Universally it is a piece which, under circumstances, changes from noema to noema, but which under circumstances is an absolutely like piece and perhaps even characterized as "identical," in so far as the "object, in the How of determinations," stands there on both sides as the same and as one to be described in an absolutely like manner. In no noema, however, can it or its necessary center, the point of unity, the pure determinable X, be missing. No "sense" without the "something" and, again, without "determining content." In that connection, it is evident that the subsequent analysis and description do not first introduce such a thing but rather that, as condition for the possibility of evident description and prior to this, it inheres actually in the correlate of consciousness.

Through the sense-bearer (as empty X) belonging to the sense and through the possibility of harmonious combination to make sense-unities of any level whatever — a possibility grounded in the essence of the sense — not only does each sense have its "object" but also different senses relate to the same object, just as far as they are to be made members of sense-unities in which the determinable X of the united senses become coincident with one another and with the X of the total sense of the particular unity of sense.

Our exposition becomes extended from monothetical acts to synthetical or, more distinctly, to polythetical acts. In a positing, many-membered consciousness each member has the described noematic structure; each has its X with the latter's "determining content;" but in addition to that the noema of the synthetical total act has, with respect to the "archontic" position, the synthetical X and its determining content. In the effecting of the act, the ray of the pure Ego's

10 Marginal note in Copy D: that is to be reconsidered. Marginal note in Copy A to "determining content:" content in the second sense (in contrast to sense).

11 Author's footnote: Cf. §114, p. 242.
regard, dividing itself into a plurality of rays, goes to the X which arrives at synthetical unity. With the change we call “nominalization” the synthetical total phenomenon becomes modified in such a way that a ray of actionality goes to the highest synthetic X.

§132. The Core As a Sense in the Mode Belonging to its Fullness.12

As we have determined it, the sense13 is not a concrete essence in the total composition of the noema but a sort of abstract form inherent in the noema. That is to say, if we hold the sense fast, consequently the “meant,” precisely with the determination-content in which it is something meant, then clearly a second concept of the “object in its How” is yielded — <the object> in the How of its modes of givenness. If, in addition, we disregard all attentional modifications, all differences of the sort to which differences in the modes of effecting belong, there come into consideration — always within the preferred sphere of positionality — the differences in fullness of clarity, which are cognitively so very determinative. Something intended to obscurely, as obscurely intended to, and the same thing as intended to clearly are, with respect to their noematic concreteness, very different, just as the whole mental processes are. But nothing stands in the way of the determination-content with which the thing intended to obscurely is meant being absolutely the same as the determination-content of the thing intended to clearly. The descriptions would coincide, and a synthetical unity-consciousness could envelop the consciousness on one side and that on the other in such a way that it was actually a matter of the same meant something. As full core we shall, accordingly, count precisely the full concreteness of the noematic component in question, consequently the sense in the mode belonging to its fullness.14

12 Marginal note in Copy D to whole of §132: This cannot remain in this way; very incomplete.
13 Insertion in Copy D: (the objective sense)
14 Marginal note in Copy D to the last line: sense in the mode belonging to its fullness: conceived this way, the concept is not tenable
§133. The Noematic Positum. Posited and Synthetical Posita.\textsuperscript{15} Posita in the Realm of Objectivations.

There would now be needed a careful carrying-through of these distinctions in all act-provinces as well as supplementary consideration of the posited moments which have a peculiar relation to the sense as noematic. In the Logische Untersuchungen they were (under the title "quality") taken into the concept of sense (of significational essence) and therefore in this unity the two components, "matter" (sense, in the present conception) and quality, were distinguished.\textsuperscript{16} But it seems more suitable to define the term "sense" as merely that "matter" and then to designate the unity of sense and posited characteristic as "\textit{positum}\textquotedblright."\textsuperscript{17} We have then one-membered posita (as in the case of perceptions and other positional intuitions) and many-membered, synthetical posita, such as predicative doxic posita (judgments), uncertain likelihood-posita with predicatively membered material, etc. One-membered as well as many-membered posita are, furthermore, liking-posita, wish-posita, command-posita, etc. The concept of the positum is accordingly indeed extraordinarily and perhaps surprisingly broadened, but nevertheless within the bounds of an important essential unity. Continually it is indeed to be kept in view that the concepts sense and positum contain for us nothing pertaining to expression and conceptual signification; on the other hand, however, they comprehend under themselves all explicit posita or, correspondingly, all posita-significations.

According to our analyses these concepts designate an abstract stratum belonging to the full web of all noemata. For our cognitions it is of great significance to gain this stratum in its fully comprehensive universality, consequently to have the insight that it has its place actually in all act-spheres. Also in the case of intuitions simpliciter the concepts sense and positum have their necessary application, necessarily the particular concepts intuition-sense and intuition-positum must

\textsuperscript{15} In Copy D Posited and Synthetical Positas changed to Monothetical and Polythetical Posita.

\textsuperscript{16} Author's footnote: Loc. cit., Fifth Investigation, §§ 20 and 21, pp. 336-396 [Second edition, pp. 411-421; English translation, pp. 586-593]. Cf. in addition Sixth Investigation, §25, p. 559 [Second edition, p. 87; English translation, pp. 737f.] Neutral having as "undecided" naturally does not now, as it does there, have for us the status of a "quality" (position) alongside other qualities, but rather the status of a modification which mirrors all qualities and therefore whole acts of whatever sort.

\textsuperscript{17} Marginal note to this line in Copy A: "Sense or signification" in the Logische Untersuchungen are now identified with \textit{positum}. 
be coined. So, for example, in the province of perception of something external the object-sense, the physical thing-sense of this perception, which is a different sense (as well as with respect to "the same" physical thing) from perception to perception, is to be singled out intuitively from the "perceived object as perceived" by abstracting from the characteristic of perceivedness as something inhering in the noema prior to all explicating and conceiving thinking. If we take this sense in its completion, with its intuitional fullness, a determined and very important concept of appearance results.\textsuperscript{18} To these senses correspond posita, intuition-posita, objectivation-posita, perceptual posita, and so forth. In a phenomenology of intuition of something external which, as phenomenology has to do, not with objects simpliciter in an unmodified sense, but with noemas as correlates of noeses, concepts like those brought out here stand at the center of scientific research.

If we first turn back to the general theme, the further task now arises of systematically distinguishing the fundamental sorts of senses, of simple and of synthetic senses (that is to say, of senses belonging to synthetical acts), of senses of the first and higher levels. Following partly the fundamental sorts of determinations with respect to content, partly the fundamental forms of synthetic formations playing their role for all significational provinces in a like manner, and thus taking into account everything which is, without exception, determinative a priori for the general structure of senses with respect to form and content, all that is common to all spheres of consciousness or is peculiar to generically closed spheres — we ascend to the idea of a systematic and universal doctrine of the forms of senses (significations). If in addition to that we take into consideration the systematic distinguishing of posited characteristics, there is at the same time produced thereby a systematic description of the types of posita.\textsuperscript{19}

\textsuperscript{18} Marginal note in Copy D to appearance: apparency. Marginal note in Copy A to appearance: One concept of appearance with respect to "sense." Certainly there belongs here the appearing side of the appear\(\textsuperscript{ance}\) pertaining to the features in question of the object and, correspondingly, the object entirely and precisely as the object there in the side, and in the others, appears to us. [Glosses by Schuhmann]

\textsuperscript{19} Insertion in Copy D: and the apparency and the "object itself" in quotation marks.
§134. The Doctrine of Apophantic Forms.

It is a principal task here to project a systematic "analytic" doctrine of the forms of "logical" significations, respectively such a doctrine of the forms of predicative posita, of "judgments" in the sense expressed by this word in formal logic, a doctrine which considers only the forms of analytic or predicative synthesis and leaves undetermined the sense-terms entering into these forms. Although this task is a special one, still it has universal significance because the heading, predicative synthesis, designates a class of operations possible with respect to all possible species of sense; everywhere, equally possible operations of explication and of relating apprehension of the explicated: as determination of the subject of determination, as part of the whole, as relatum of its referent, and so forth. Combined with those operations are the operations of collection, of disjunction, of hypothetical connection. All of that prior to all statement and the explicit or "conceptual" comprehension appearing with it for the first time and, as a significational expression, clinging to all forms and materials.

This doctrine of forms, the idea of which we have repeatedly touched upon before and which, according to our showings, makes up the essentially necessary lower level of a scientific mathesis universalis, loses its isolation because of the results of present investigations; it acquires its home within the universal doctrine of forms of senses of whatever sort — a doctrine conceived as an idea — and its ultimate place of origin in noematic phenomenology.

Let us bring that somewhat closer to us.

Analytic-syntactical operations are, we said, possible operations with respect to all possible sense and posita of whatever determination-content which the noematic sense in question may include "non-explicatedly" (the noematic sense being actually nothing else than the "meant" object as "meant" and with the particular How of its determination-content). However, it always admits of explication and some operations or other essentially connected with explication ("analysis") admit of being effected. The synthetical

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20 Marginal note in Copy D: variable
21 Marginal note in Copy A to last sentence of paragraph:?
22 Marginal note in Copy D: Cf. 4. Log. Unters.
23 Marginal note in Copy A to the first line of paragraph: synthetical operations of the analytical sphere
24 Insertion in Copy A: always
25 In Copy D synthetical changed to polythetical
forms which thus accrue (in reminiscence of grammatical "syntaxes" we also called them the syntactical forms) are wholly determinate, belonging to a fixed system of forms; they can be singled out by abstraction and comprehended conceptually-explicitly. Thus, for example, that which is the perceived as perceived in a perceptual position simpliciter can be treated by us analytically in a manner which is indicated in the expressions: "This is black, an inkpot, this black inkpot is not white, is, if white, then not black," and the like. With each step we have a new sense; instead of the original one-membered positum we have a synthetical\textsuperscript{26} positum which, according to the law of the expressability of all protodoxic posita, admits of being brought to expression or to predicative statement. Within the membered posita each member has its syntactical form originating from the analytic synthesis.

Let us assume that the positings belonging to these sense-forms are doxic proto-positings: then different forms of judgments in the logical sense (apophantic posita) accrue. The aim of determining a priori all these forms, of controlling in systematic completeness the infinitely manifold and yet regulatedly delimited form-formations, designates for us the idea of a theory of the forms of apophantic posita, respectively syntaxes.

\textsuperscript{277} But positions and, in particular, the synthetical total position can also be doxic modalities. We deem likely, perhaps, and explicate that in the mode "presumably" intended to; or it stands there as questionable and, in the questionability-consciousness, we explicate the questionable; etc. If we give expression to the noematic correlates of these modalities ("S may well be p," "Is S p?" and the like) and if we do the same also for the unmodified predicative judgment itself, as we also express affirmation and negation (e.g.: "S is not p," "Yet S is p," "S is certainly, actually p") — then the concept of form and the idea of the theory of the forms of posita is consequently amplified. The form is now\textsuperscript{27} manifoldly determined, partly by means of the properly syntactical forms, partly by means of the doxic modalities. Accordingly, a total position belonging to the total positum always remains, and a doxic position is included in it. At the same time, by means of a sense-explication and predication which converts the modal characteristic into a predication, each such positum and the conceptual "ex-

\textsuperscript{26} In Copy D synthetical changed to polythetical

\textsuperscript{27} Author's footnote: According to the explications above, §117, pp. 262f.; also §§105f., pp. 217ff.
pression" suitable to it admits of being converted into a predicative proposition, into a judgment which judges about the modality of a content of such and such a form (e.g., "it is certain, it is possible, probable that S. is p").

As with judgment-modalities, so it is similarly the case with founded positions or with senses and posita belonging to the emotional and volitional spheres, with the syntheses belonging specifically to them and their corresponding modes of expression. The aim of the new theory of forms of posita and specifically of synthetical posita is then easily indicated.

In this connection, one also sees at the same time that the theory of all posita is mirrored in a suitably amplified theory of forms of doxic posita — if, in precisely the same way as the being-modalities, we include in the judgment-material the modalities of ought to be (providing that the analogous locution is allowed). What this inclusion means certainly does not require a long exposition, but at the most illustration by way of examples: Instead of saying "May S be p," perhaps we say: It may be that S be p, it is desirable (not desired); instead of "S ought to be p:" It ought to be that S be p, it is something which ought to be.

Phenomenology itself does not see its task in the systematic elaboration of the theories of forms in which, as is to be learned from the theory of apophantic forms, the systematic possibilities of all further formations become deductively derived from primitive axiomatically fundamental formations; the field of phenomenology is the analysis of the Apriori which can be legitimated in immediate intuition, the fixing of immediately evident essences and concatenations of essences and their descriptive cognition in the systematic combination of all strata in transcendentally pure consciousness. What the theorizing logician isolates in the formal theory of signification by virtue of his one-sided direction of interest as something dealt with for itself, without heeding and comprehending the noematic and noetic context in which it is phenomenologically interwoven — that the phenomenologist takes in its full interrelationship. To trace out the phenomenological complex of essences from all sides is his great task. Every axiomatic legitimation of a fundamental concept in logic becomes a heading for phenomenological investigations. What has already been brought out purely and simply in the broadest logical universality as "positum" (judgmental positum), as categorical or hypothetical positum, as attributive determination, nominalized adjectivum or relativum, and the like, gives rise to difficult and
far-reaching groups of problems of pure phenomenology in so far as what has been brought out is set back into the corresponding noematic concatenations of essences from which the theorizing regard has singled it out in the first place.

§135. Object and Consciousness. The Transition to the Phenomenology of Reason.

Just as every intuitive mental process has a noema and therein a sense by which it is related to an object, so, conversely, everything which we call object, of which we speak, which we confront as actuality which we hold as possible or probable, no matter how indeterminately we think it, is precisely therefore already an object of consciousness; and that signifies that whatever world and actuality taken universally may be called, they must be represented in the framework of actual and possible consciousness by corresponding senses or posita filled with more or less intuitive contents. If, as a consequence, phenomenology effects “exclusions,” if phenomenology as transcendental parenthesizes all actual positing of realities and effects the other parenthesizing of which we have described earlier, then we now understand on the basis of a profounder ground the sense and rightness of the earlier thesis: that everything excluded phenomenologically in a certain change of sign still belongs within the boundaries of phenomenology. That is to say, the real and ideal actualities which undergo exclusion are represented in the phenomenological sphere by the total multiplicities of senses and posita corresponding to them.

For example, each actual physical thing belonging to Nature is thus represented by all the senses and changing fulfilled posita in which it is the correlate of possible intuitive mental processes as determined and further determinable thus and so; it is therefore represented by the multiplicities of “full cores” or, which signifies the same thing here, by all possible “subjective modes of appearance” in which it can be noematically constituted as identical. But this constitution is related in the first place to an essentially possible individual consciousness, then also to a possible communal con-

28 Author’s footnote: Cf. §76, p. 142.
29 Marginal note in Copy D to modes of appearance: apparenices
sciousness, i.e., to an essentially possible plurality of consciousness-
Egos and consciousness-streams standing in <mutual> "exchange," for which one physical thing is to be intersubjectively given and identified as the same objective actuality. It is always to be noted that all our statements, including the present ones, are to be understood in the sense of the phenomenological reductions and in eidetic universality.

On the other hand, there corresponds to each physical thing, and ultimately to the whole world of physical things with one space and one time, the multiplicity of possible noetic occurrences, the possible mental processes of single individuals and communal individuals related to them — mental processes which, as parallels to the previously considered noematic multiplicities, have in their essence itself the peculiarity of relating themselves to this world of physical things according to sense and positum. There thus appear in them the multiplicities of hyletic Data in question, with the relevant "construings," positional act-characteristics, etc., which, in their connected unity, make up precisely what we call experimental consciousness of physical thingness. The unity of the physical thing stands over against an ideally infinite multiplicity of noetic mental processes of a wholly determined essential content and which can be surveyed despite the infinity, all of them united by being consciousness of the "same thing." This unification becomes given in the sphere of consciousness itself, in mental processes which, on their side, also belong again to the group which we have delimited here.

For the restriction to experiential consciousness was meant only as an example, likewise that to the "physical thing" belonging to the "world." Each and everything is eidetically prescribed no matter how far we stretch the framework <of inquiry>, no matter on which level of universality and particularity we also move — be it even <on the level of> the lowest concretions. As the sphere of mental processes is rigorously conformable to law according to its transcendental essential structure, so that possible essential formation according to noesis and noema is firmly determined in it, just as any possible figure to be inscribed in space is determined by the essence of space according to unconditionally valid laws. What is called possibility (eidetic existence) in both cases is, therefore, absolutely necessary possibility, an absolutely firm member in an absolutely firm framework of an eidetic system. <To achieve> scientific cognition is its goal, i.e., to theoretically stamp and control it <so that it becomes> a system of
concepts and statements of laws which have their source in the pure intuition of essences. All fundamental differentiations, which make formal ontology and the theory of categories accruing to it the theory of the distribution of regions of being and their categories of being, as well as the constitution of material ontologies appropriate to them — are, as will be understood in particular details in further steps, principal headings for phenomenological investigations. Necessarily corresponding to them are the noetic-noematic essential connections which must allow of being systematically described and determined with respect to possibilities and necessities.

If we examine more precisely what the essential connections between object and consciousness characterized in the present consideration signify and must signify, we are made to feel an ambiguity, and in following it up we notice that we stand at a major turning point in our investigations. We assign to an object a multiplicity of "posita" and of mental processes of a certain noematic content and, more particularly, in such a way that syntheses of identification become a priori possible through them by virtue of which the object can and must be presented as the same. There is necessarily consciousness of the X as the same in the different acts or act-noemas furnished with differing "determination-contents." But is it actually the same? And is the object itself "actual"? Can it not be non-actual while the manifoldly harmonious and even intuitionally fulfilled posita — posita of any essence-content whatever — still flow off in the way peculiar to consciousness?

We are not interested in the factualities of consciousness and its processes; rather we are interested instead in the problems of essence which might be formulated here. Consciousness, or the consciousness-subject itself, judges about actuality, asks about it, deems it likely, doubts it, resolves the doubt and thereby effects the "legitimations of reason." Must not the essence of this legitimacy and, correlative, the essence of "actuality" — related to all kinds of objects according to all formal and regional categories — be allowed to become clear in the essential context of transcendental consciousness, thus purely phenomenologically?

There was, therefore, an ambiguity in our speaking of the noetic-noematic "constitution" of objectivities, e.g., physical thing-objectivities. Pre-eminently in every case we thought of "actual" objects, of physical things belonging to the "actual world" or at least of "an" actual world taken universally. But, then, what does "actual" signify
for objects which, in the manner peculiar to consciousness, are still only given through sense and posita? What does it signify for these posita themselves, for the essential sorts of these noemas and of the parallel noeses? What does it signify for the particular modes of their structure according to form and fullness? How is this structure particularized according to the particular object-regions? The question is, thus, how, noetically and noematically, in phenomenological scientificness, all the concatenations of consciousness are to be described which make necessary, precisely in its actuality, an object simpliciter (which, in the sense of ordinary speech, always signifies an actual object). In the broader sense, however, the object is "constituted" — "whether or not it is actual" — in certain concatenations of consciousness which in themselves bear a discernible unity in so far as they, by virtue of their essence, carry with themselves the consciousness of an identical X.

As a matter of fact, what has been worked out does not concern just actualities in some pregnant sense or other. Questions about actuality enter into all cognitions as cognitions, even in our phenomenological cognitions bearing upon the possible constitution of objects: they all have, indeed, their correlates in "objects" which are meant as "actually existing." When, it may everywhere be asked, is the noematically "intended-to" ["Vermeintes"] identity of X "actually" the identity of X instead of the "merely" intended-to identity? And what does this "merely intended-to" everywhere signify?30

We must, therefore, devote new considerations to the problems of actuality and to the correlative ones of rational consciousness which in itself legitimates that actuality.

30 In Copy D the noematically "intended-to," the "actual" pertaining to X. Marginal note: Not quite correct.
If one speaks simply of objects, one normally means actual, truly existing objects belonging to the particular category of being. No matter what one says about such objects, that which is meant and stated must—if one speaks rationally—be something which can be "grounded," "shown," directly "seen" or mediatelv "seen intellectually." In the logical sphere, in the sphere of statement, "being truly" or "actually" and "being something which can be shown rationally" are necessarily correlated. This holds, moreover, for all modalities of being, all doxic positional modalities. Obviously the possibility of the rational showing referred to here should be understood, not as empirical, but as "ideal," as an essential possibility.

§136. The First Fundamental Form of Rational Consciousness: Originarily Presentive "Seeing."

If we now ask what rational showing signifies, that is, of what rational consciousness consists, the intuitive presentation of examples and the beginnings of eidetic analysis performed on them offers us at once a number of differences:

First, the difference between positing mental processes in which the posited becomes given originarily and those in which it does not become given in that mode: thus, between "perceiving" or "seeing" acts—in a broadest sense—and non-"perceiving" acts.

Thus a memorial consciousness—for example, of a landscape—is not originarily presentive; the landscape is not perceived as it would be in case we actually saw it. By this we do not mean to say that memorial consciousness has no competence of its own: only that it is not a "seeing" consciousness. Phenomenology brings to light an analogue of this contrast in each of the other kinds of positing mental...
processes. For example: We can assert "blindly" that two plus one is equal to one plus two; but we can also make the same judgment in the manner peculiar to intellectual seeing. When we do this, the predicatively formed affair-complex, the synthetical objectivity corresponding to the judgment-synthesis, is given originarily, seized upon in an originary manner. It is no longer given originarily after effecting the actual \textit{lebendigen} intellectual seeing which becomes forthwith an obscured retentational modification. Even though this may have a rational superiority to just any obscure or confused consciousness with the same noematic sense — for example, an "unthinking" reproduction of something learned and, perhaps, intellectually seen on an earlier occasion — it is not an originarily presentive consciousness.

These differences do not concern the pure sense or the pure positum, since in both members of any such exemplary pair this is identical and also can always be intentively seen as identical. The difference concerns the mode in which the bare sense or the bare positum — which, as merely an abstract moment in the concrete noema of consciousness, requires complementary moments — is or is not a fulfilled sense or positum.

A fullness of the sense does not make all the difference; the How of the fulfilledness matters as well. One mode of consciousness pertaining to the sense is the "intuitive" mode, which is such that the "meant object as meant" is intentively intuited; and an especially pre-eminent case here is the one in which the mode of intuition is precisely the originarily presentive mode. In the perception of the landscape the sense is fulfilled perceptually; in the mode of "itself in person" there is consciousness of the perceived object with its colors, forms, and other determinations (in so far as they "are included in the perception"). Similar pre-eminent cases are found in every act-sphere. Again the situation is one which is two-sided in the sense of a parallelism; it is noetic and noematic. Focusing on the noema we find, fused with the pure sense, the characteristic "in person" (as originary fulfilledness); and the sense, with this characteristic, now functions as the basis for the noematic posited characteristic or, this being the same thing here: the being-characteristic. We find the parallel to this in focusing on the noesis.

But the posited characteristic has as its own a specific rational character, as a distinguishing mark accruing to it essentially, if and only if it is a position on the basis of a fulfilled, originarily presentive sense and not merely on the basis of just any sense.
Here, and in the case of any other kind of rational consciousness, the word "belong" takes on a peculiar signification. For example: Position belongs to any appearing "in person" on the part of a physical thing; it is not just somehow one with the appearing (perhaps even as merely a universal fact—this being out of the question here); it is one with it in a peculiar manner: it is "motivated" by the appearing and again, not just somehow, but "rationally motivated." That is to say, position has its original legitimizing basis in originary givenness. With other modes of givenness legitimizing bases need not be lacking; lacking, however, is the superiority of the original basis which plays its pre-eminent role in the relative estimating of other legitimizing bases.

In just the same manner, the position of the essence of predicatively formed essence-complex given "originarily" in the seeing of essences "belongs" to the position-"material" of the essence or predicatively formed essence-complex, to the "sense" in its mode of givenness. It is rational and as certainty of believing it is an originally motivated position; it has the specific character of an "intellectually seeing" position. If the position is blind, if the verbal significations are effected on the basis of an obscure and confusedly intensive act-substratum, then the rational character belonging to intellectual seeing is necessarily lacking; that character is essentially incompatible with obscure givenness of the predicatively formed affair-complex (if the word givenness is still to be used here) or with such a noematic outfitting of the sense-core. On the other hand, this does not exclude a secondary rational character, as is shown by the example of an imperfect re-presentiating of eidetic cognitions.

Intellectual seeing, evidence of any kind, is thus a wholly distinguishing occurrence; in terms of its "core" it is the unity of a rational position with that which essentially motivates the position—this whole situation being understandable as noetic and also as noematic. The word motivation is particularly suited to the relation between the (noetic) positing and the noematic positum in its mode of fulfilledness. The expression, "evident positum," is, in its noematic signification, immediately understandable.

The double sense of the word evidence, in its application, sometimes to noetic characteristics or to full acts (for example, evidence of

1 Marginal note in Copy A: More correctly: Position belongs to the physical thing-sense in so far as the physical thing-sense appears "in person." The position as the position of this sense is motivated by the appearing "in person."
judging) and sometimes to noematic posita (for example, evident logical judgment, evident predicative proposition), is a case of the universal and necessary double significances of expression relating to moments of the correlation between noesis and noema. Phenomenological demonstration of their source makes these double significances harmless and, indeed, makes it possible to recognize their indispensability.

We should note furthermore that the word fulfillment has another double sense which lies in a quite different dimension. Sometimes it signifies "fulfillment of the intention," as a characteristic which the actual positum takes on by virtue of the particular mode of the sense; sometimes it signifies precisely the peculiarity of this mode itself or the peculiarity of the sense in question, as including a "filling" which motivates rationally.


The pairs of examples used above illustrate a second and third difference. What we usually call evidence and intellectual sight (or intellectual seeing) is a positional, doxic and adequately presentive consciousness which “excludes being otherwise;” the positing is motivated in a quite exceptional manner by the adequate givenness and is, in the highest sense, an act of “reason.” The arithmetical example illustrates that for us. In the example of the landscape we have, it is true, a seeing, but not an evidence in the usual pregnant sense of the word, an “intellectual seeing.” Observing more precisely, we note two differences. In the one example it is a matter of essences; in the other, a matter of something individual; secondly, in the eidetic example the originary givenness is adequate, whereas in the example from the sphere of experience it is inadequate. The two differences, which cross one another under some circumstances, will prove to be significant with respect to the kind of evidence.

2 In Copies A and B including changed to as having within the full core
3 Marginal note in Copies B and C to first lines of par. 1: Terminology contradicts p. 15
4 Marginal note in Copy A to last two lines of par. I: A) Predicatively formed eidetic complex and B) universality? Marginal note in Copy C to last two lines in par. 1: I. Eidetic seeing II. Seeing of something individual.

Highest point of view: immediate evidence: 1) something individual — 2) essence; mediate
With regard to the first difference, it is phenomenologically ob­
servable that, so to speak, the “assertoric” seeing of something individual, for example, the “attentive perceiving” of a physical thing or of an individual affair-complex, differs essentially in its rational character not only from an “apodictic” seeing, from the intellectual seeing of an essence or of a predicatively formed essence-complex; but it also differs from the modification of this intellectual seeing which may come about through mixture of the two, namely in the case where something seen intellectually is applied to something seen assertorically and in any case of knowing the necessity of the being-thus of a posited single particular.

Evidence and intellectual seeing, in the usual pregnant sense, are understood as signifying the same thing: apodictic intellectual seeing. We propose to separate the two in our terminology. We need a more universal term which encompasses in its signification both assertoric seeing and apodictic intellectual seeing. It should be regarded as a phenomenological cognition of the greatest importance that the two belong to one essential genus and that, comprehended more universally, any rational consciousness whatever is a highest genus of positional modalities within which the “seeing” (in the extremely broadened sense) related to originary givenness is precisely a rigidly delimited species. Now in order to name the highest genus one has the choice between extending either the signification of the term “seeing” (as has just been done, but going very much further) or that of the terms “intellectual insight” and “evidence.” It seems best to choose the term evidence for the most universal concept; then, for every rational position characterized by a motivational relation to originariness of givenness, the expression originary evidence would be available. Furthermore, a distinction should be made between assertoric and apodictic evidence; and the term intellectual seeing should be used, as before, to designate this apodicticity. Going still further, one should contrast pure intellectual seeing and impure intellectual seeing (for example, cognition of the necessity pertaining to something factual, the being of which need not itself be evident) and likewise, quite universally, pure and impure evidence.

Evidence: 1) something individual evident as the consequence of the positing [Setzung] of something else individual. 2) Extension of predicatively formed eidetic complexes to given cases.

5 Marginal note in Copy C to first lines of par. 2: 1) assertoric seeing 2) apodictic seeing as the intellectual seeing of the being of a single particular on the basis of an eidetic (or necessary) being.
Yet other differences result if one inquires more deeply — differences in the motivating foundations which affect the evidence-characteristic. For example, the difference between purely formal ("analytic," "logical") and material (synthetic a priori) evidence. Here, however, we must not go beyond the first indications.

§138. Adequate and Inadequate Evidence.

Let us return to the second distinction concerning evidence indicated above, with which the distinction between adequate and inadequate givenness is connected and which, at the same time, provides us with the occasion for describing a distinctive type of "impure" evidence. The positing of the physical thing on the ground of the appearance "itself in person" is, to be sure, a rational positing, but the appearance is always only a one-sided, "imperfect" appearance; intended to as "itself in person," what "properly" appears is not only there, but simply this physical thing itself, the whole in conformity with the total sense, though only one-sidedly intuited and, moreover, multifariously indeterminate. What "properly" appears cannot be separated from the physical thing as, let us say, a physical thing for itself; in the full sense of the physical thing, the sense-correlate of what "properly" appears fashions a non-selfsufficient part which can only have unity and selfsufficiency of sense in a whole which necessarily includes in itself empty components and indeterminate components.

Of essential necessity something physically real, a being with that sense, appears only "inadequately" in a closed appearance. Essentially tied up with this is the fact that no rational positing which rests upon that sort of inadequately presentive appearance can be "ultimately valid," "insurmountable;" and that no rational positing is equivalent in its singularization to the positing simpliciter: "The physical thing is actual;" it is only equivalent to the positing: "it is actual" — assuming that the further course of experience does not bring forth "stronger rational motives" which show the original positing as a positing to be "cancelled out" in the broader context. Accordingly, the positing is only rationally motivated by the appearance (the imperfectly fulfilled perceptual sense) in and for itself, considered in its singularization.

The phenomenology of reason must therefore study the different occurrences which are a priori predelineated in the sphere of the
modes of being which are necessarily only inadequately presentive (transcendences in the sense of realities). It must make clear how consciousness of inadequate givenness, how the one-sided appearing, is related to one and the same determinable $X$ in the continuous progress to always new appearances which are continually being blended with one another; which eidetic possibilities result here; how, on the one hand, a continuation of experience is possible and always rationally motivated by continually available rational positings: precisely the course of experience in which the empty places of the previous appearance are filled out, the indeterminacies are more precisely determined and thus always in the manner of a thoroughgoing harmonious fulfilling with a steadily increasing rational power. On the other hand, it must make clear the contrary possibilities, the cases of fusion or polythetical syntheses of discordancy, the "determination otherwise" of the $X$ always intended to as the same — otherwise than in the correspondingly original sense-bestowal. Moreover, it must show how positional components pertaining to the earlier perceptual flow suffer cancellation together with their sense; how, under circumstances, the whole perception, so to speak, explodes and splits up into "conflicting physical thing-apprehensions," into suppositions concerning physical things; how the positings of these suppositions are annulled and uniquely modified in this annulment; or else how the one positing, remaining unmodified, "conditions" the cancellation of the "counter positing;" and similar processes of the same kind.

To be studied in still more detail are the relevant modifications which the original rational positings undergo such that they incur a positive phenomenological increase with respect to their motivating "force" in the further course of harmonious fulfillment, such that they continually acquire a "weight," always and essentially have a weight, to be sure, but one which differs by degrees. There are, moreover, the other possibilities to be analyzed: how the weight of positings is affected by "counter motives," how, in the case of doubt, they are mutually "held in balance," how a positing in competition with one of "greater" weight is "overcome," "abandoned," etc.

In addition, naturally, it is necessary to subject to a comprehensive eidetic analysis the processes in the sense, as the appertinent position-materials, which are essentially determinative for alterations in the posited characteristics (e.g., the processes of "conflict" or "rivalry" of appearances). For here, as everywhere, in the phenomenological sphere there are neither accidents nor facticities: everything is motivated by essential determination.
In the same manner an inquiry into the essence of all kinds of immediate rational acts is to be carried out in the context of a universal phenomenology of noetic and noematic data.

To every region and category of alleged objects there corresponds phenomenologically not only a fundamental sort of sense, or of positum, but also a fundamental type of originarily presentive consciousness of such senses and, belonging to it, a fundamental type of originarily evidence which is essentially motivated by originarily givenness of such a character.

Every such evidence — understanding the term in our broadened sense — is either adequate evidence, of essential necessity incapable of being further “strengthened” or “weakened,” thus without degrees of weight; or the evidence is inadequate and thus capable of being increased and decreased. Whether or not this or that evidence is possible in a given sphere depends on its generic type. It is therefore a priori prefigured, and it is countersense to demand in one sphere the perfection belonging to the evidence of another sphere (e.g. that of eidetic relationships) which essentially excludes it.

It must still be noted that the original signification of the concepts of “adequate” and “inadequate” related to modes of givenness had to be extended to the essential peculiaritiespertaining to the rational positings themselves which are founded by them precisely by virtue of this nexus — one of those unavoidable equivocations by extension which is harmless as long as one recognizes it as such by being fully aware of the distinction between the original and the derived.

§139. The Interweaving of All Kinds of Reason. Theoretical, Axiological and Practical Truth.

According to what has been explained so far, a positing of no matter what quality has its legitimacy as a positing of its sense when it is rational; the rational characterstic is precisely itself the characteristic of legitimation which “befits” it essentially and, therefore, not as an accidental fact among accidental circumstances pertaining to a factually positing Ego. Correlatively, the positum is also said to be legitimated: it is present in rational consciousness, furnished with its noematic legitimacy-characteristic which, again, essentially belongs to the positum as the noematic position qualified in this or that way, and of this or that sense-material. More precisely stated: there belongs to it a fullness of such a character which, on its side, grounds the rational distinctiveness of the position.
Here the positum has its legitimacy in itself. But it can also be that "something speaks on behalf of the positum," that it can still have a share in reason without "itself" being rational. In order to remain within the doxic sphere, let us recall the relevant connection of the doxic modalities with the protodoxa\(^6\) to which everything refers back. If, on the other hand, we consider the rational characteristics belonging to these modalities, then at the outset the thought thrusts itself to the fore that all of them, no matter how different they may otherwise be with respect to materials and motivational foundations, refer back, so to speak, to a primal rational character belonging to the domain of primal belief, back to the case of originary and ultimately perfect evidence. It is noteworthy that profound concatenations of essences obtain between these two kinds of retroreference.

Just to indicate the following: in itself, something deemed likely can be characterized as rational. If we follow the reference, inherent in it, back to the corresponding primal believing, and if we adopt this believing in the form of a "supposing," then "something speaks for it." It is not the belief itself, simpliciter, which is characterized as rational, although it has a share in reason. We see that further rational-theoretical distinctions and inquiries related to them are needed here. Concatenations of essences are made prominent between the different qualities with the rational characteristics peculiar to them and, more particularly, reciprocal concatenations; and, finally, all lines run back to primal beliefs and their primal reason; that is to say, to primal truth, or to "truth" (in an absolute sense).\(^7\)

Truth is manifestly the correlate of the perfect rational characteristics pertaining to protodoxa, to certainty of belief. The expression, "something posited protodoxically, for instance a predicative proposition, is true," and then the expression, "perfect rational characteristics accrue to the corresponding believing, judging" — are equivalent correlates. Naturally nothing is said about the fact of a mental process and about the one who judges, although it is eidetical-

\(^6\) Author's footnote: Cf §104, p. 215.

\(^7\) In Copy B the last part of sentence changed to read: All doxic truth ultimately leads back to the idea of absolute (adequate) truth, to perfect truth. This truth is the correlate. In Copy C the last part of sentence changed to read: all truth ultimately leads back to the idea of primal truth.

\(^8\) Marginal note in Copy B to "corresponding:" Corresponding believing! = There is an absolute (an adequate) evidence. Adequate truth is not as good an expression: absolute truth. Still one can also accept it and say: adequation consists of the fact that truth is directed toward the existing predicatively formed affair-complex. The "there is" ["es gibt"] = the mathematical "there is."
ly unquestionable that truth can only be actually given in an actual evidential consciousness; and this holds for the truth of the unquestionable itself, the truth of the equivalence just indicated, and so forth. If the protodoxic evidence, that of certainty of belief, is lacking to us, then for its sense-content, "S is p," we say, a doxic modality can be evident — for example, the presumed likelihood, "S ought to be p." This modal evidence is manifestly equivalent to and necessarily connected with a protodoxic evidence of an altered sense, i.e., with the evidence or with the primal truth: "That S is p is likely (probable);" on the other hand, the modal evidence is also connected with the truth: "Something speaks for S being p;" and, again: "Something speaks for Sp being true;" and so forth. With all this eidetic connections are indicated which require phenomenological inquiries into their origin.

But evidence is by no means a mere name for those sorts of rational processes in the sphere of belief (and even less in the sphere of the predicative judgment); it is rather a name for all positional spheres and, in particular, also for the significant rational relationships obtaining between them.

It therefore involves the highly difficult and far-reaching groups of problems of reason in the sphere of emotional and volitional positings as well as their interwovenness with the "theoretical," i.e., doxic, reason. The "theoretical" or "doxological truth," or evidence, has its parallel in the "axiological and practical truths or evidence" whereby the latter "truths" are given expression and cognized in doxological truths, that is to say, in specifically logical (apophantical) ones. It need not be said that to deal with these problems there must be fundamental investigations of the sort which we tried to embark upon above: investigations involving the eidetic relationships which connect the doxic positings with all other kinds of positings, those of the emotions and the will and, again, those which lead all doxic modalities back to the protodoxa. Precisely by such investigations it is made understandable on the basis of ultimate grounds why the certainty of belief and, correspondingly, the doxological and ul-

9 Author's Footnote: A first impulse in this direction was given by Brentano's brilliant work, *Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis* (Leipzig, 1889) [The Origin of Our Knowledge of Right and Wrong, translated by Roderick M. Chisholm and Elizabeth H. Schneewind (New York, 1969)] a work to which I feel gratefully indebted.

10 Author's Footnote: Cognition is, above all, a name for logical truth: designated from the standpoint of the subject, as the correlate of his evidential judging; but it is also a name for every sort of evidential judging itself and, finally, for every doxically rational act.
timately the primal truth play such a dominant role in all of reason—a role which, at the same time, also makes it obvious that, with respect to their solution, the problems of reason in the doxic sphere must take precedence over those of axiological and practical reason.


Further studies are required concerning the problems presented to us by combinations of "coincidence" which (to mention but one distinctive case), in accord with their essence, are to be established between acts of the same sense and positum, but of different rational values. For example, an evidential act and a non-evidential act can coincide, as a consequence of which, in the transition from the latter to the former, the former acquires the characteristic of a validating act, whereas the latter, <the non-evidential act>, acquires the characteristic of an act which is being validated. The positing with intellectual seeing of the one functions as "confirmatory" for the positing without intellectual seeing of the other. The "positum" is "verified" or even "confirmed," the imperfect modes of givenness are converted into perfect ones. How the process looks, and can look, is predelineated by the essence of the kinds of positing in question, or else by the essence of the posita in the particular case in their fulfillment. For every genus of posita the forms of essentially possible verification must be made clear phenomenologically.

If the positing is not non-rational, then motivated possibilities are to be drawn from its essence showing that and how the positing can become converted into an actual rational positing which verifies it. It is to be intellectually seen, in this connection, that not every imperfect evidence prescribes a course of fulfillment which terminates in a corresponding originary evidence, in an evidence of the same sense; on the contrary, such an originary verification, so to speak, is necessarily excluded by certain sorts of evidence. That holds, e.g., for retrospective memory and, in a certain way, for any remembering whatever, and likewise essentially for empathy to which we shall assign, in the <Second> Book, a fundamental kind of evidence (and which we shall investigate there in greater detail). In any case, we have designated very important phenomenological themes.

Yet to be observed is that the motivated possibility, of which we
spoke above, is to be sharply distinguished from empty possibility: it is motivationally determined by that which the positum includes in itself, given such as it is fulfilled. It is an empty possibility that the now unseen underside of this desk here has ten legs instead of four, which is actually the case. In contrast, the number four is a motivated possibility for the determinate perception which I am in the process of effecting. For any perception whatever it is a motivated possibility that, in certain ways, perceptual "circumstances" can change, that "as a consequence" in corresponding modes the perception can change into a series of perceptions of determinate kinds predelineated by the sense of my perception and which fulfills it and confirms its positing.

For the rest, with respect to "empty" or "mere" possibility of validation two further cases are to be distinguished: Either the possibility coincides with actuality, that is to say, such that the intellectual seeing of the possibility eo ipso carries with it consciousness of originary givenness and consciousness of reason; or, however, that is not the case. The latter obtains in the example just used. Actual experience, and not merely a running through in presentation of "possible" perceptions, provides an actual validation of positings bearing upon something real, let us say, validation of the positing of the factual existence of events belonging to Nature. In contrast, in any case of a positing of an essence, or else of a positum pertaining to an essence, the intuitive presentation of its perfect fulfillment is equivalent to the fulfillment itself; just as a priori the intuitive presentation, indeed the mere phantasy, of an eidetic concatenation is "equivalent" to the intellectual seeing of that concatenation, i.e., the one changes into the other by means of a mere alteration of attitude; and the possibility of this reciprocal conversion is an essentially necessary, rather than accidental, one.

11 Author's footnote: This is one of the most essential equivocations of the term "possibility," to which others (the formal-logical possibility, the mathematical-formal non-contradiction) are added. It is of fundamental importance that the possibility, which plays its role in the theory of probabilities, and that accordingly the consciousness of possibility (the being deemed possible), of which we spoke in the theory of doxic modalities as being parallel to the consciousness which deems likely, has motivated possibilities as correlates. A probability is never built out of unmotivated possibilities; only motivated possibilities have "weight," etc.

As we know, all mediate grounding leads back to immediate grounding. With respect to all object-provinces and posittings related to them, the primal source of all legitimacy lies in immediate evidence and, more narrowly delimited, in originary evidence, or in the originary givenness motivating it. But in different ways one can indirectly draw upon this source, deriving from it the rational value of a positing which, in itself, is not an evidence, or if the positing is immediate, confirming and corroborating it.

Let us consider the last case. In an example let us indicate the difficult problems which are involved in the relationship of non-evidential, immediate rational positing to originary evidence (in our sense related to the originality of givenness).

In a certain mode, any clear memory has original, immediate legitimacy: considered in and for itself, it "weighs" something, no matter how much or how little; it has a "weight." But it only has a relative and imperfect legitimacy. With respect to what memory presentiates, a past event, let us say, there is inherent in it a relationship to the actual present. It posits the past event and along with it necessarily posits a horizon, even though in a vague, dark and indeterminate way; made clear and positionally distinct, it must allow of being made explicit in a complex of positionally effected memories which would terminate in actual perceptions, in the actual hic et nunc. This holds for memories of whatever sort in our broadest sense related to all temporal modes.

In such posita, intellectual seeings of essences are unmistakably enounced. They point to interconnections of essences with the validation of which the sense and the kind of verification, of which each memory is capable and "in need," would be clarified. With every advance from memory to memory into the concatenation of memories being made distinct, memory is confirmed. To a certain extent the confirmation is a reciprocal one, the weights of the memories are functionally dependent on one another; each memory in the concatenation\(^{12}\) has a growing force with the amplification of the concatenation — a force greater than they would have in a narrower concatenation or in isolation. If, however, the explication is carried

\(^{12}\) In Copy A this clause changed to read: in the concatenation of memories which has become intuitive
out to the actual now, then something of the light of perception and its evidence shines back upon the whole series.

One can even say: in hiddenness the rationality, the characteristic of legitimacy, of memory springs from the power of perception, effective throughout all confusion and darkness even if the perception is “not in effect.”

In any case, however, it needs such verification so that what properly bears the mediate reflection of perceptual legitimacy may clearly emerge. Memory has its own kind of inadequacy in that what is not remembered can be confused with what is “actually” remembered, or in that different memories transpire and can pass for the unity of one memory; whereas in the unfolding of its horizon being actualized, the relevant series of memories are separated and in such a way that the unitary memory-image “explodes,” becoming dispersed into a plurality of mutually incompatible memorial intuitions: as a result, there would be processes to describe similar to those which we had occasion to indicate for perception (manifestly in a way very much more capable of universalization).

All of this serves as an indication by example of great and important groups of problems pertaining to “confirmation” and “verification” of immediate rational positings (as well as to illustrate the division of rational positings into pure and impure, unmixed and mixed positings); but, above all, here we seize upon one sense in which it is valid to say that all mediate rational positing and, in further consequence, all predicative and conceptual rational cognizing, leads back to evidence. Properly understood, only originary evidence is the source of legitimation “originaliter” and, e.g., the rational positing pertaining to memory and thus to all reproductive acts, even including empathy, is not original and is, in a certain manner, “derived.”

However, there are quite different forms to be drawn from the source of originary givenness.

One such form has already been indicated on occasion: the weakening of rational values in the continual transition from living evidence to non-evidence. But now an essentially different group of cases may be referred to, where a positum is mediately related to immediately evident grounds in a synthetical complex which is evident at every step. As a consequence, there arises a new universal type of rational positings phenomenologically different in rational charac-

13 Author's footnote: Cf. above, §138, pp. 287f.
teristics from immediate evidence. We therefore also have here a kind of derived, "mediate evidence" — the kind usually aimed at exclusively by the expression, <"mediate evidence."> In accord with its essence, this derived characteristic of evidence can only appear in the final member of a concatenation of posings which begins with immediate evidences, goes on in differing forms and in all further steps is borne by evidences; whereby these evidences are in part immediate, in part already derived; in part intellectually seen, in part not, originary or non-originary. As a result, a new field of the phenomenological theory of reason is designated. The task here is to study in noetic and noematic respect the generical as well as the specific eidetic processes pertaining to reason in mediate groundings, validatings of every kind and form and in all positional spheres; to trace back to their phenomenological origins the different "principles" of such validating which, e.g., are of essentially different kinds depending in each case on whether or not it is a matter of objectivities given as immanental or transcendent, adequate or inadequate; and, on this basis, in retrospect of all the phenomenological strata involved, to make these "principles" intelligible.

§142. Rational Positing and Being.

Along with the universal awareness of reason, which is the aim of the groups of investigations indicated — reason in the widest sense extended to all species of posings as well as to the axiological and practical posings — there must be acquired eo ipso the universal clarification of the eidetic correlations combining the idea of true being with the ideas: Truth, Reason, Consciousness.

Accordingly, a generical intellectual sight is soon yielded, namely that not merely "truly existing object" and "object to be rationally posited" are equivalent correlates, but also that "truly existing object" and object to be posited in an originally perfect rational positing are equivalent. The object would not be given to the rational positing imperfectly, merely "one sidedly." The sense underlying it as material for the determinable X would not leave anything "open" with respect to any apprehensionally predesignated sides: no determinableness which would not be established determinateness, no sense which would not be fully determined, delimited. Since the rational positing should be a positing originaliter, it must have its
rational ground in the *originary givenness* in the full sense of what is determined: The X is not only meant in full determinedness, but is given originarily precisely in this determinedness. The equivalence indicated now signifies:

Of essential necessity (in the Apriori of unconditioned eidetic universality), *to every “truly existing” object there corresponds the idea of a possible consciousness* in which the object itself is seized upon originarily and therefore in a *perfectly adequate* way. Conversely, if this possibility is guaranteed, then *eo ipso the object truly exists*.

Particularly significant here is the following: *In the essence of every apprehensional category* (which is the correlate of every object-category) there is determinately predesignated which formations of concrete, perfect or imperfect, apprehensions of objects pertaining to such categories are possible. Moreover, it is essentially predesignated for each imperfect apprehension how it is to be perfected, how its sense is to be completed, fulfilled by intuition, and how the intuition is to be further enriched.

Every object-category (or every region and every category in our narrower, pregnant sense) is a universal essence which of necessity is itself made adequately given. *In its adequate givenness it prescribes an intellectually seen generical rule* for every particular object becoming intended to in multiplicities of concrete mental processes (which mental processes here, naturally, are to be taken not as individual singularities but instead as essences, as ultimate concreta). It prescribes the rule for how an object subordinate to it would be fully determined with respect to sense and mode of givenness, how it would be made adequately given in an originary way; it prescribes by which broken or continually unbroken concatenations of consciousness (the object is given) and which concrete essences are furnished the concatenations. How much is inherent in these brief statements will become comprehensible in the more detailed expositions in the last chapter (from §149 on).

Here a brief indicative example will be sufficient: We know in apodictic evidence that the unseen determinations of a physical thing are, like any physical thing-determinations whatever, necessarily spatial: this yields a law-conforming rule for the possible modes of spatial completion of the unseen sides of the appearing physical thing; a rule which, fully developed, is called pure geometry. Furthermore, physical thing-determinations are temporal and material ones: there belong to them new rules for possible (thus not
arbitrary) sense-completions and, in further consequence, for possible positional intuitions, or appearances. Of which essential contents these can be, under which norms their stuff, their possible noematic (and noetic) apprehensional characteristics, stand, that too is a priori predesignated.

§143. Adequate Physical Thing-Givenness as Idea in the Kantian Sense.

But before beginning with those problems, an addition is required to set aside the illusion of a contradiction with our earlier presentation (p. 286). Of essential necessity there are only given, we said, inadequately appearing (thus also only inadequately perceivable) objects. However, we must not overlook the restrictive addendum which we made. We said: inadequately perceivable in a closed appearance. There are objects — and included here are all transcendent objects, all "realities" comprised by the name Nature or World — which cannot be given in complete determinedness and, likewise, in complete intuitiveness in a closed consciousness.

But perfect givenness is nevertheless predesignated as "Idea" (in the Kantian sense) — as a system which, in its eidetic type, is an absolutely determined system of endless processes of continuous appearings, or as a field of these processes, an a priori determined continuum of appearings with different, but determined, dimensions, and governed throughout by a fixed set of eidetic laws.

This continuum is determined more precisely as infinite\(^\text{14}\) on all sides, consisting of appearances in all its phases of the same determinable X so ordered in its concatenations and so determined with respect to the essential contents that any of its lines yields, in its continuous course, a harmonious concatenation (which itself is to be designated as a unity of mobile appearings) in which the X, given always as one and the same, is more precisely and never "otherwise" continuously-harmoniously determined.

If, now, a closed unity of the course, thus an act only finitely mobile, is inconceivable by virtue of the all-sided infinity of the continuum (that would yield a countersensical finite infinity): the idea of this continuum and the idea of perfect givenness prefigured by the idea of the continuum is then nevertheless presented in intellectual

\(^{14}\) Insertion in Copy A: many-dimensional
seeing — seen intellectually just as precisely as an “idea” can be intellectually seen by its essence designating its own peculiar type of intellectual seeing.

The idea of an infinity motivated in conformity with its essence is not itself an infinity; seeing intellectually that this infinity of necessity cannot be given does not exclude, but rather requires, the intellectually seen givenness of the idea of this infinity.

§144. Actuality and Originary Presentive Consciousness: Concluding Determinations.

It therefore remains as a result that the Eidos, True-Being, is comparatively equivalent to the Eidos, Adequately-Given and To-Be-Evidentially Positable — but that either in the sense of finite givenness or givenness in the form of an idea. In the one case, being is “immanental” being, being as closed mental process or noetic mental process-correlate; in the other case, being is transcendent being, i.e, being, the “transcendence” of which inheres precisely in the infinity of the noematic correlate which it requires as the “material” of being.

When a presentive intuition is adequate and immanental, then, to be sure, it is not sense and object which coalesce but, instead,originarily fulfilled sense and object. The object is precisely that which is seized upon, posited, as the originary It Itself in adequate intuition; it is seen intellectually by virtue of originarity, and by virtue of the sense-completedness and completed originary sense-fulfilledness it is absolutely seen intellectually.

When the presentive intuition is one of something transcendent to it, then something objective cannot become adequately given; only the idea of that something objective can be given, or else of its sense and its “epistemic essence,” and consequently there can be given an a priori rule for law-conforming infinities of inadequate experiences.

How the further course of experiences must proceed certainly cannot be unambiguously determined on the ground of currently effected experiences and of this rule (or of the multiple rule-systems which it includes). To the contrary, infinitely many possibilities remain open, but which are prefigured with respect to their type by the a priori governing rules so very rich in content. The rule-systems of geometry determine with absolute precision all possible forms of
movement which can supplement the observed piece of movement here and now, but it does not distinguish a single actual course of movement of what is actually moving. How can empirical thinking, grounded in experience, be of further help there? How is it possible scientifically to determine physical affairs as unities posited according to experience, yet which include infinitely many significations? How, within the positing of Nature, can the goal of univocal determination be reached — determination in conformity with the idea of the Object belonging to Nature, of the Event belonging to Nature, and so forth (which is fully determined as the idea of something individually unique)? All these questions pertain to a new level of research. They belong to the phenomenology of specifically experiencing reason and, in particular, to the phenomenology of reason peculiar to physics, psychology and the natural sciences as such, which traces back to their phenomenological sources the ontological and noetic rules belonging to experiential science. But this signifies that it searches out and eidetically explores the phenomenological strata, noetic and noematic, in which the content of these rules are embedded.

§ 145. Critical Considerations Concerning the Phenomenology of Evidence.

It is clear from considerations carried out that the phenomenology of reason, noetics in a pregnant sense, which will undertake an intuitive exploration not just of any consciousness, but of consciousness of reason, everywhere presupposes universal phenomenology. It is itself a phenomenological fact that — in the realm of positionality\textsuperscript{15} — positing consciousness is ruled by norms in every genus; the norms are nothing else than eidetic laws which, with respect to their kind and form, are related to noetic-noematic concatenations to be strictly analyzed and described. In that connection, even "non-reason" is naturally everywhere to be regarded as the negative counterpart of reason, just as the phenomenology of evidence includes its counterpart, absurdity.\textsuperscript{16} The universal eidetic theory of evidence with its analyses

\textsuperscript{15} AUTHOR'S FOOTNOTE: In the sphere of phantasy and neutrality all positional processes are carried over as "mirrored" and "powerless;" thus too all processes of reason. Neutral posittings are not to be confirmed, but to be "quasi" confirmed; they are not evidential, but "quasi" evidential; and so forth.

related to the most universal eidetic distinctions fashions a relatively small, though fundamental, piece of the phenomenology of reason. Accordingly, what was briefly maintained at the beginning of this Book\textsuperscript{17} against the inverted interpretation of evidence is confirmed — and the deliberations just carried out are sufficient to see that perfectly.

Evidence is, in fact, not some sort of consciousness-index attached to a judgment (and usually one\textsuperscript{18} speaks of such evidence only in the case of judgment), calling to us like a mystic voice from a better world: Here is the truth; — as though such a voice would have something to say to free spirits like us and would not have to show its title to legitimacy. We no longer need to argue with skepticism, nor take into consideration objections of the old type which cannot overcome the theory of evidence which resorts to indices and feeling: whether an evil genius (the Cartesian fiction) or a fateful change in the factual course of the world could make it happen that just any false judgment would be outfitted with this index, this feeling of intellectual necessity, of the transcendent oughtness; and the like. If one proceeds to the study of the phenomena themselves which belong here, and does so within the limits of the phenomenological reduction, then one recognizes with fullest clarity that here it is a matter of a relevant mode of positing (thus not of anything so insignificant as some sort of attached content, nor of an appendage of whatever sort) which belongs to the eidetically determined constitutions of the essence of the noema (e.g., the mode of original intellectual seenness belonging to the noematic composition of "originarily" presentive seeing of essences). One then further recognizes that once more the eidetic laws rule the relationship of those positing acts which do not have this distinctive constitution to those which do; that, e.g., there is something like consciousness of the "fulfillment of the intention," of justification and confirmation specifically related to posited characteristics, just as there are the corresponding counter characteristics of unjustification, disconfirmation. One further recognizes that the logical principles require a profound pheno-

\textsuperscript{17} Author's Footnote: Cf. above, Part 1, Chapter 2, especially \textsection 21, pp. 39f.

\textsuperscript{18} Marginal note to this sentence in Copy A: Steinmann has misunderstood this, as though I had wished to limit my theory of evidence to judgments.
menological clarification, and that, e.g., the principle of contra-
diction leads us back to concatenations of essences of possible veri-
ification and possible disconfirmation (or rational cancellation). Universally, one acquires the intellectual insight that, above all, it is
a question here, not of accidental facts, but instead of eidetic pro-
cesses which stand in their eidetic context, and that, therefore, what
takes place in the Eidos functions as an absolutely insurmountable
norm for the fact. In this phenomenological chapter one should also
make clear that not every positing mental process (e.g., any mental
judgment-process you please) cannot become evident in the same
manner and, specifically, that not every positing mental process can
become immediately evidential; furthermore, that all manners of
rational positing, all types of immediate or mediate evidence, are
rooted in phenomenological complexes in which the fundamentally
different regions of objects are noetically-noematically distributed.

In particular, it is of concern to study systematically the con-
tinuous unions of identity and the synthetical identifications in every
domain with respect to their phenomenological constitution. Once
one has become acquainted — which is the first step needed — with
the inner structure of intentive mental processes with respect to all
universal structures, the parallelism of these structures, the stratifi-
cation in the noema such as sense, subject of sense, posited character-
istics, fullness: then it is necessary to make fully clear in all cases of
synthetical unions how not just any act-combinations whatever take
place, but rather how combination into the unity of one act takes
place. More particularly, how identifying unions are possible, how
here and there the determinable X is made to coincide, how, in that
case, sense-determinations and their empty places — here that
signifies their moments of indeterminateness — are related; likewise,
how fullnesses, how, therefore, the forms of confirmation, of val-

19 Author’s footnote: Cf. Logische Untersuchungen, II, 6 Unters. §34, pp. 583ff. [Second
dition, II, 2, pp. 111ff.; English translation, pp. 756ff.]. It is to be regretted that W. Wundt
judges otherwise here, as does about phenomenology as a whole. The scientific inquiry,
which does not in the slightest go beyond the sphere of purely intuitional data, he interprets as
"Scholasticism." He designates as a 'chosen formal schema" the distinction between sense-
estowing and sense-fulfilling acts (Kleine Schriften [Shorter Writings], I. <Leipzig,> 1910/11, p.
613), and the results of our analyses, he says, are the "most primitive" "verbal repetitions;"
"Evidence is evidence, abstraction is abstraction." He introduces the conclusion of his critique
with words which I may be permitted to quote: "Husserl's foundation of a new logic, directed
more theoretically than practically, ends in each of its conceptual analyses, in so far as they
possess a positive content, with the assurance that A actually = A, and that it cannot be
otherwise" (ibid., pp. 613-614).
idation, of progressive cognition, at lower and higher levels of consciousness, become clear and are intellectually seen in analysis.

However, these and all parallel studies of reason are carried out in the "transcendental," in the phenomenological attitude. No judgment which occurs there is a natural judgment presupposing the positing of natural actuality as background, and not even where the phenomenology of the consciousness of actuality, of cognition of Nature, of seeing of values related to Nature and intellectual seeing of values is concerned. Everywhere we investigate the fashionings of noeses and noemata, we project a systematic and eidetic morphology, everywhere bring into relief essential necessities and essential possibilities: the latter as necessary possibilities, forms of unions of compatibility which are prescribed in the essences and delimited by laws of essences. Everywhere "object" is the name for eidetic concatenations of consciousness; it appears first of all as noematic X, as the subject of sense pertaining to different essential types of sense and posita. Moreover, it appears as the name, "actual object," and is then the name for certain eidetically considered rational concatenations in which the sense-conforming, unitary X inherent in them receives its rational position.

Similar names for determined, eidetically delimited groups of consciousness-formations "teleologically" belonging together, to be fixed by the inquiry into essences, are the expressions, "possible object," "probable," "dubitable" object; and so forth. The concatenations there are always again other, to be described strictly in their otherness: thus, e.g., it is easily seen intellectually that the possibility of an X determined thus and so is not justified simply by originary givenness of this X in its sense-composition, thus by authentication of actuality, but rather that even merely reproductively founded deeming possible can be reciprocally confirmed in the harmonious coming together; similarly, that doubtfulness is justified in conflicting phenomena between modalized intuitions of certain descriptive sorts; and so forth. As a result, the investigations of the theory of reason are combined which relate to the distinction of materially determinate affairs, values, practical objectivities, and which then investigate the formations produced by consciousness constitutive for them. Phenomenology therefore actually encompasses the whole natural world and all of the ideal worlds which it

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20 Marginal note to this sentence in Copy A; But this is only possibility in the sense of likelihood.
excludes: phenomenology encompasses them as the “world sense” by virtue of the sets of eidetic laws connecting any object-sense and noema whatever with the closed system of noeses, and specifically by virtue of the eidetic concatenations of rational positing the correlate of which is the “actual object” which, thus, on its side, always exhibits the index for the whole determined system of teleologically unifying fashionings of consciousness.
Previously our meditations on the problems of a phenomenology of reason have moved on the heights of universality which did not bring about the essential ramifications of the problems and their connections with formal and regional ontologies. In this respect we must attempt to be more precise; only in that way will the full sense of the phenomenological eidetics of reason and the whole realm of their problems be disclosed to us.

§146. The Most Universal Problems.

Let us return to the sources of the problems of reason and follow them in their ramifications in the most systematic way possible.

Intentionality is the name of the problem encompassed by the whole of phenomenology. The name precisely expresses the fundamental property of consciousness; all phenomenological problems, even the hyletic ones, find a place within it. As a consequence, phenomenology begins with problems of intentionality; but first of all it begins in universality and without drawing into its sphere questions about actual (true) being intended to in consciousness. We leave out of consideration the fact that positing consciousness with a posited characteristic can be designated in the most universal sense as a "meaning" [vermeinen], and as "meaning" it necessarily comes under the rational opposition of validity and invalidity. We only arrived at these problems in the last chapters in retrospect of the chief structures of consciousness which, in the meantime, have become understandable. Because it was a matter of eidetic beginnings, we accordingly carried out the analyses in the greatest possible universality. The systematic way goes from higher to lower universality in all eidetic spheres, even if the analyses tracing them out are attached to
something particular. We spoke of reason and the positing of reason taken universally, of originary and derived, of adequate and inadequate evidence, of intellectually seeing essences and evidence of something; and the like. The descriptions we sketched already presuppose a broad phenomenological basis, a whole series of difficult distinctions which we worked out in the chapters on the most universal structures of consciousness. Without the concepts of sense, positum, fulfilled positum (epistemic essence in the language of the *Logische Untersuchungen*) we do not arrive at all at the radical formulation of any problems of the theory of reason. These concepts presuppose, again, other eidetic differentiations corresponding to them: the differences of positionality and neutrality, those of posited characteristics and their materials, the exclusion of the relevant eidetic modifications which do not enter into the Eidos "positum," such as, e.g., attentional modifications; and so forth. At the same time, in order not to underestimate the range of necessary analyses in the most universal stratum of the theory of reason, of which we speak here, we emphasize that the eidetic descriptions of the last chapters should be accepted as simple beginnings. Just as everywhere else, so here we only follow through on the methodic aim of preparing so much solid ground for each essentially new stratum which should be sketched as a field of phenomenological investigations, such that we can assure ourselves of it, formulate the problems of departure and ground related to it, and freely cast our regard around in the horizon of problems surrounding it.


The universal phenomenology of reason is ramified when we take into account the further structural differences which are determinative for rational characteristics: when we take account of the differentiations with respect to fundamental kinds of posittings, of the difference between positing simpliciter and founded positing, and of the intersecting differences of one membered posittings and synthesizings. The chief problem-groups of reason (problems of evidence) are related to the chief genera of posittings and the position-materials essentially required by them. Standing in first place are, naturally, proto doxa, the doxic modalities with the modalities of being corresponding to them.
In pursuing such goals of the theory of reason one necessarily gains the *rational-theoretical problems of clarifying formal logic* and the parallel disciplines which I have called *formal axiology and theory of practice.*

It is necessary, first of all, to refer to the earlier expositions concerning the theories of the pure forms of posita and, specifically, of *synthetical* posita related to the predicative doxic synthesis as well as to synthetical forms belonging to the doxic modalities, moreover to emotional and conative acts. (Thus, e.g., the forms of preference, of valuing and willing "for the sake of another," the forms of the axiological "and" and the "or"). In these theories of form we speak noematically of synthetical posita with respect to their pure form without raising the question of the validity or non-validity of reason. Therefore they still do not belong to the stratum of the theory of reason.

However, as soon as we raise these questions and, more particularly, for any posita whatever in so far as they are conceived as determined exclusively by the pure forms, we find ourselves in formal logic and in the above mentioned parallel formal disciplines which, in accord with their essence, are built up upon the corresponding theory of forms as their lower level. *Included in the synthetical forms* — which, as forms of posings or posita pertaining to the categories of posita in question, obviously presuppose much but leave it undetermined in its particularity — *are a priori conditions of possible validity which are expressed in the set of eidetic laws which govern the disciplines in question.*

Specifically, the a priori conditions of the possibility of *doxic certainty of reason* — stated noematically, of *possible truth* — are included in the pure forms of *predicative* (analytic) syntheses. The Objective exhibition of the doxic certainty of reason is produced by formal logic in the narrowest sense: the *formal apophantics* (the formal logic of "judgments") which thus has its foundation in the theory of forms of these "judgments."

Something similar holds for the synthesizings and their noematic correlates belonging to the emotional and conative acts, thus for their kinds of synthetical "posita," the systematic theory of forms of which must serve again as the substratum for the structure of the formal theory of validity. Actually implicit precisely in the pure synthetical *forms* of these spheres (as, e.g., in the connections of ends and means)

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1 Author's footnote: Cf. §§133f., pp. 274-278 [Reading with Schuhmann 274 instead of 273 in all printed editions].
are conditions of the possibility of axiological and practical "truth." In that case, by virtue of "Objectivating" which, e.g. is also effected in emotional acts, all axiological and practical rationality as we understand it is converted into doxic rationality and, noematically, into truth, objectively into actuality: we speak of true or actual goals, means, preferences, etc.

Understandably, unique and highly important phenomenological investigations are related to all these complexes. Already the kind of characterization of the formal disciplines just given is phenomenological and presupposes a great deal from our analyses. In pure logic dealt with "dogmatically," the researcher abstractively seizes upon the apophantic forms ("any positum whatever," or "judgment" — categorial, hypothetical, conjunctive, disjunctive judgment, etc.) and fixes axioms of formal truth for them. He knows nothing of analytical synthesis, of noetic-noematic relations of essences, of the inclusion of the essence he has singled out, seized upon and conceptually fixed, in the eidetic complex of pure consciousness; he carries out his research in isolation of what can only be understood fully in this full eidetic context. Only by regress to the sources of intuition in transcendentally purified consciousness does phenomenology make clear to us what is properly implied when, at one time, we speak of formal conditions of the truth and, at other times, of the forms of cognition. Universally, it clarifies for us essences and relations among essences which belong to the concepts of cognition, evidence, truth, being (object, predicatively formed affair-complex, etc.); it teaches us to understand the structure of judgings and judgments, the manner in which the structure of the noema is epistemically determinative, how in that connection the "posita" play their special role and, again, the differing possibility of its epistemic "fullness." It shows which manners of fulfillment are essential conditions for the rational characteristic of evidence, which kinds of evidence are in question in any given case; and so forth. It especially allows us to understand that involved in the case of a priori truths of logic are eidetic connections between the possibility of intuitive fulfillment of the positum (whereby the corresponding predicatively formed affair-complex enters into synthetical intuition) and the pure synthetical form of the positum (of the logically pure form), and that, at the same time, each possibility is the condition for possible validity.

Seen more precisely, phenomenology also shows that two things are to be distinguished here which correspond to the correlation of
noesis and noema. In formal apophantics (e.g., in the syllogistic) we speak of judgments, as noematic posita, and their "formal truth." Throughout, the focus is noematic. On the other hand, in the formal apophantic noetics the focus is noetic; we speak of rationality, correctness of judging; norms of this correctness are enounced and, more particularly, in relation to the forms of posita. For example, one cannot maintain a contradiction as true; whoever judges according to the forms of the premises of valid modes of inference, "must" draw the consequences pertaining to the corresponding forms. In the phenomenological context these parallels are understood at once. The processes which involve the judgings, the noesis, as well as those corresponding to them in the noema, in the apophansis, are investigated precisely in their necessary mutual relation and in the full weave of consciousness.

The same holds, naturally, for the remaining formal disciplines with respect to the parallelism of noetic and noematic regularities.


From those disciplines we are led to turn to the corresponding ontologies. The context is already given phenomenologically by the universally possible turning of one's regard which can be effected within each act whereby the constituents, which one has as objects of one's regard, are reciprocally combined with one another by various eidetic laws. The primary attitude is focused on something objective: the noematic reflection leads to the noematic constituents, the noetic reflection to noetic compositions. From these constituents the disciplines of interest to us here abstractively single out and seize upon pure forms and, more particularly, the formal apophantics seizes upon noematic forms, the parallel noetics, noetic forms. Just as those forms are connected with one another, so both are essentially connected with ontic forms, ontic forms which can be seized upon by turning the regard back to ontic constituents.

Each formal-logical law is to be equivalently converted into a formal ontological law. Instead of judgments, predicatively formed affair-complexes will now be judged about; instead of judgmental members (e.g., nominal significations), objects will be judged about; instead of predicational significations, characteristic marks will be judged about; and so forth. We no longer even speak of truth, of the
validity of judicial posita, but rather of the composition pertaining to a predicatively formed affair-complex, of the being of objects, and the like.

Obviously the phenomenological content of this turn is also to be clarified by regress to the content of the determining concepts.

Moreover, formal ontology extends very far beyond the spheres of such simple conversions pertaining to formal apophantic truths. Great disciplines accrue to it by that "nominalization" of which we spoke before. In plural judging, the plural appears as plural positioning. By the nominalizing turn the object becomes the set, and accordingly the fundamental concept of the theory of sets arises. In this theory, sets are judged about as objects which have their relevant kinds of properties, relations, etc. The same is true for the concepts of relation, number, etc., as fundamental concepts of mathematical disciplines. Again, in the case of the theory of simple forms of posita we have to say that it is not the task of phenomenology to develop these disciplines, thus to cultivate mathematics, syllogistics, etc. Only the axioms and their conceptual composition interest phenomenology as names for phenomenological analyses.

What has been said is transferred to the formal axiology and the theory of practice, as well as to the formal ontologies of values (in a very extended sense of the term value), of goods, which are coordinate to formal axiology and theory of practice as theoretical desiderata — in short, to the whole ontic spheres which are correlates of emotional and conative consciousness.

One will note that in these considerations the concept of "formal ontology" has been extended. The concrete values, the practical objectivities, are subsumed under the formal name, "objects," "anything whatever." From the standpoint of universal analytic ontology, they are therefore materially determined objects; the relevant "formal" ontologies of concrete values and practical objectivities are therefore material disciplines. On the other hand, the analogies, grounded in the parallelism of posited genera (belief, or modalities of belief, concrete

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2Author's footnote: Cf. §119, pp. 247f.

3Insertion in Copy D after this sentence (published by Schuhmann as Appendix 74, ca. 1915): Plural judging refers back to a collecting consciousness, or else to a plural consciousness already prior to predicating. By means of the nominalizing turn, the plural becomes a manifold of objects, and accordingly the fundamental concept of the theory of sets arises. (In the presentation in the text, it seems as though the plural would arise as singular Object pertaining to the judgmental sphere which still was understood here as the sphere of predicative signifying.)
values, willing) and the syntheses and syntactical formations attached to them, have their power and indeed such an efficacious one that Kant directly designated as “analytic” the relation of willing of the end to willing of the means, and thereby certainly confuses analogy with identity. The analytic proper, which belongs to the predicative synthesis of doxa, need not be confused with its formal analogon which is related to the syntheses of emotional and conative positings. Profound and important problems pertaining to the phenomenology of reason are attached to the radical clarification of these analogies and parallels.


After having discussed the problems of the theory of reason set for us by the formal disciplines, we must make the transition to the material and, first of all, the regional, ontologies.

Each objective region is constituted in the manner peculiar to consciousness. An object determined by the regional genus has, as object, in so far as it is actual, its a priori predesignated modes of being perceivable, somehow objectivatable clearly or obscurely, conceivable, demonstrable. We thus return again, in view of what founds rationality, to senses, posita or propositions, epistemic essences; but now not to the simple forms: instead, since we have our eye on the material universality of regional and categorial essences, we return to those posita the determinational content of which is taken in its regional determinateness. Each region here furnishes the clues to an intrinsically self-contained group of investigations.

Let us take, for example, the region, Material Thing, as clue. If we correctly understand what this guide means, then at the same time we seize upon, accordingly, a universal problem which is determinative for a great and relatively self-contained phenomenological discipline: the problem of the universal “constitution” in transcendental consciousness of objectivities pertaining to the region, Physical Thing. More briefly expressed: “the phenomenological constitution of any physical thing whatever.” Along with this we also become acquainted

4 AUTHOR’S FOOTNOTE: Cf. Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten [Metaphysics of Morals] (A 417): “He who wills the end also wills the means in his power necessarily indispensable to achieving the end. This proposition is, in so far as willing is involved, analytic.”
with the methods of investigation coordinate with this guiding problem. Precisely the same holds, then, for each region and for each discipline related to its phenomenological constitution.

What is involved is the following: the idea of the physical thing, to remain with this region, if we speak of it now, is represented in the manner peculiar to consciousness by the conceptual thought, “physical thing,” with a certain noematic composition. To every noema there essentially corresponds an ideally closed group of possible noemata which have their unity by being capable of a synthetical unification by coincidence. If the noema, as here, is a harmonious one, then intuitive and especially originarily presentive noemata are found in the group — noemata in which all other sorts of noemata of the group are fulfilled in the identifying coincidence, drawing from them the confirmation, the fullness of the power of reason in the case of positionality.

We thus proceed from the verbal, perhaps quite obscure, objectivation of the physical thing as we directly have it. In freedom we generate intuitive objectivations of the same any- “physical thing” - whatever and we make the vague sense of the word clear to us. Since a “universal objectivation” is involved, we must proceed by way of example. Let us generate optional intuitions in phantasy of physical things, such as free intuitions of winged horses, white ravens, golden mountains, and the like; they would, in any case, be physical things, and objectivations of them therefore serve as examples just as well as objectivations of the physical things given to actual experience. Effecting ideation on that basis, in intuitive clarity we seize upon the essence, “physical thing,” as the subject of universally delimited noematic determinations.

It must now be noticed (recalling what has already been established earlier\(^5\)) that, in this connection, the essence, “physical thing,” is, to be sure, originarily given, but that this givenness of essential necessity can never be an adequate one. We can make the noema or the physical thing-sense adequately given to us; but the multiple physical thing-senses, even taken in their fullness, do not contain the regional essence, “physical thing,” as an originarily-intuitive composition immanent in them, no more than the multiple senses related to one and the same physical thing contain the individual essence of the physical thing. In other words, regardless of

\(^5\) Author's footnote: Cf. §143, p. 297.
whether it is a question of the essence of a physical thing-individuum or of the regional essence, "any physical thing whatever," there is no case in which a single intuition of a physical thing or a finite, closed continuity or collection of intuitions of physical things would be sufficient to acquire in an adequate manner the desired essence in the whole fullness of its essential determinatenesses. But that suffices for an inadequate seeing of essences; in contrast to an empty seizing upon an essence such as one to be established on the exemplificative substratum of an obscure objectivation, it always has the great advantage of having the essence originally given.

This is true for all levels of eidetic universality, from the essence of an individual all the way up to the region, Physical Thing.

Now, however, it is a generical eidetic insight that each imperfect givenness (each inadequately presentive noema) includes in itself a rule for the ideal possibility of its being perfected. It belongs to the essence of the appearance of the centaur which I now have — a merely "one-sided" appearance presentive of the essence of the centaur — that I can trace out the different sides of the physical thing, that what remains undetermined and open in the first place can be made determinate and intuitive in free phantasy. In the continuation of this always more perfect intuitional, more precisely determining process of phantasy, we are in a wide measure free; indeed, at random we can intuitionally ascribe to the phantasied centaur more precisely determining properties and changes in properties; but we are not completely free provided we ought to progress in the sense of a harmonious course of intuition in which the subject to be determined is identically the same and can always remain harmoniously determinable. We are, e.g., bound by a law-conforming space as a frame prescribed for us by the idea of any possible physical thing whatever. However arbitrarily we may deform what is phantasied, spatial forms are always again converted into spatial forms.

But what does it mean phenomenologically to speak of rule or law? What is implied by the fact that the inadequately given region,
"physical thing," prescribe rules for the course of intuitions — and that signifies, manifestly, as well for possible perceptions?

The answer is: There belong to the essence of such a physical thing-noema, and with absolute evidence, ideal possibilities of "limitlessness in the progression" of harmonious intuitions and, more particularly, according to typically determined predesignated directions (therefore also parallel limitlessnesses in the continuous sequential concatenations of the corresponding noeses). Let us recall here the earlier expositions concerning the acquisition by intellectual seeing of the universal "idea," Any Physical Thing Whatever, which remains valid for each lower level of universality down to the lowest concretion of the individually determined physical thing. Its transcendence is expressed in each limitlessness in the progression of intuitions of it. Always and again the intuitions are to be converted into intuitional continua and the pregiven continua are to be amplified. No perception of the physical thing is definitively closed; there is always room for new perceptions, for determining more precisely the indeterminatenesses, for fulfilling the unfulfilled. With every progression the determinational content of the physical thing-noema, which continually belongs to the same physical thing-X, is enriched. It is an eidetic insight that each perception and multiplicity of perceptions is capable of being amplified; the process is thus an endless one; accordingly, no intuitive seizing upon the physical thing-essence can be so complete that a further perception cannot noematically contribute something new to it.

On the other hand, we still seize upon the "idea," Physical Thing, with evidence and adequately. In the consciousness of the limitlessness of the progression of harmonious intuitions, we seize upon the "idea" in the free process of running-through. We first of all seize upon the unfulfilled idea of the physical thing and this individual physical thing as something which is given "so far," precisely as far as the harmonious intuition "reaches," but thereby remains determinable "in infinitum." The "etc." is an evident and absolutely indispensable moment in the physical thing-noema.

On the basis of the consciousness of this limitlessness as an example, we seize upon, furthermore, the "idea" of determined directions of infinity and, more particularly, for each of the directions

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7 Author's footnote: Cf. Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, the fifth argument about space (A 25) [Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, translated by Norman Kemp Smith (London, 1953), p. 69.]
of the intuitional course which we run through. Again we seize upon the regional "idea" of any physical thing whatever as of something identical which is being maintained in the course determined as of such a type and being manifested in the determinately articulated infinite series of noemata which belong to it.

Like the physical thing, so each property belonging to the eidetic content, and, above all, each constitutive "form," is an idea; and this holds from the regional universality all the way down to the lowest particularity. Explained more precisely:

In its ideal essence, the physical thing is given as res temporalis, in the necessary "form" of time. The intuitive "ideation" (which quite particularly deserves its name as the seeing of the "idea") acquaints us with the physical thing as necessarily enduring, as of necessity endlessly extendable in view of its duration. In "pure intuition" (for this ideation is the phenomenologically clarified concept of Kant's pure intuition) we seize upon the "idea" of temporality and all the essential moments included in it.

The physical thing is, furthermore, according to its idea, res extensa; it is capable, e.g., with respect to space, of infinitely multiple changes in form and, in the case where the shape and alterations in shape are retained as identical, of infinitely multiple alterations of place; it is "moveable" in infinitum. We seize upon the "idea" of space and the ideas included in it.

Finally, the physical thing is a res materialis; it is a substantial unity and as such a unity it is a unity of causalities and, with respect to possibility, of infinitely complex causalities. With these specifically real properties we also encounter ideas. Thus all components of the idea of the physical thing are themselves ideas; each one implies the "and so forth" of "infinite" possibilities.

What we have carried out here is not "theory," "metaphysics." It is a matter of eidetic necessities indefeasibly included in the physical thing-noema and, correlatively, in the consciousness presentive of the physical thing, to be seized upon throughout by intellectual seeing and to be systematically investigated.

§150. Continuation. The Region, Physical Thing, As Transcendental Clue.

After having made understandable to ourselves in the most universal terms the infinities which the intuition of the physical thing as
physical thing (with respect to noesis and noema) includes in itself—or, as we can also say: the idea of the physical thing and the dimensions of infinity which it includes in itself—soon we shall be able to understand too the extent to which the region, Physical Thing, can serve as clue for phenomenological investigations.

Intuiting an individual physical thing, its movements, its approaching and receding, its revolvings, its alterations in form and quality, pursuing in intuition its modes of causal relations, we effect continua of intuitings which coincide thus and so, which join together into a unity-consciousness: the regard is accordingly directed to the identical, to the X of the sense (or of the posited or neutralized positum), to the one and the same itself changing, revolving, etc. The case is the same when we follow after, in free intuition, the infinitely possible modifications with respect to the different fundamental directions in the consciousness of limitless in progression pertaining to this intuitional process. And likewise, again, when we go over to the attitude of ideation and, let us say, make clear the regional idea of the physical thing: thus proceeding in that case like the geometer in the freedom and purity of his geometrical intuition.

But with all of this we do not know anything about the processes of intuition itself and the essence and essential infinities which pertain to intuition; we know nothing about the latter's stuff and noetic moments, nothing about its noematic constituents, about the differentiable and eidetically graspable strata on both sides. What we actually livingly experience (or are conscious of in phantasy modification) we do not see. Therefore a change in attitude is required; the different hyletic, noetic, noematic "reflections" are required (collectively quite correctly named "reflections" since they are deviations of the original "straightforward" direction of the regard to the X). It is these reflections which now open up for us a great field of research, coherent in itself; that is to say, a powerful set of problems subsumed under the idea of the region, Physical Thing.

This, then, raises the question:

How are we to describe systematically the noeses and noemas belonging to the unity of the intuitively objectivating consciousness of the physical thing?

If we confine ourselves to the noematic sphere, then the question is: How do the multiple posited intuitions, the "intuitional posita," look in which an "actual" physical thing becomes given and, in the manner peculiar to intuition, shows its actuality in originaliter "experience"?

In order to abstract from the doxic position, how do the mere —
noematically understood — *appearances* look, appearances which, in themselves, considered purely eidetically, "make appear" one and the same physical thing, the quite determined physical thing at any time, which belongs to this intuition-multiplicity or appearance-multiplicity as a *necessary* correlate? Of essential necessity, phenomenology does not remain with vague talk, with obscure universalities; it demands systematically determined clarification, analysis and description which penetrate into eidetic complexes and down to the ultimate particularizations attainable of those complexes: phenomenology demands exhaustive *work*.

*The regional idea* of the physical thing, its identical X with its determining sense-content, posited as existing, *prescribes rules governing the multiplicities of appearances*. That means: there are no multiplicities whatever which accidentally come together, which already follows from the fact that, in themselves, purely essentially, they have a relationship to the physical thing, the determined physical thing. The idea of the region prescribes a quite determined, determinately ordered, strictly closed series of appearances progressing in infinitum taken as an ideal collectivity — a determined, internal organization of their flows which, in conformity with essence and accessible to investigation, cohere with partial ideas universally designated in the regional idea of the physical thing as its components. It is shown, for example — as a concrete portion of this organization — that the unity of a mere res extensa is conceivable without the unity for which the idea of the res materialis is a norm: although no res materialis is conceivable which would not be a res extensa. It becomes apparent (always in eidetic phenomenological intuition) that each physical thing-appearance necessarily includes in itself a stratum which we call the *physical thing-schema*: it is the spatial shape merely filled with "sensuous" qualities — without any determinateness of "substantiality" and "causality" (*scl.* in inverted commas, understood as noematically modified). Already the relevant idea of a *mere* res extensa is the name for a wealth of phenomenological problems.

There are many affairs which we take as simple facts in phenomenological naiveté: that to "us human beings" a spatial thing always appears in a certain "orientation," e.g., oriented in the visual field of sight with respect to above and below, left and right, near and far; that we can see a physical thing only at a certain "depth," "distance;" that all the changing distances at which it is to be seen are related to an invisible center of all depth-orientations familiar to us as an
ideal limit-point which we “localize” in the head — all these alleged facticities, thus contingencies of intuition of space, which are alien to the “true,” the “objective” space, prove to be eidetic necessities even in the least significant empirical particularities. It is shown, therefore, that something such as a physical thing in space is only intuitable by means of appearances in which it is and must be given in multiple but determined changing “perspective” modes and, accordingly, in changing “orientations” not just for human beings but also for God — as the ideal representative of absolute cognition.

It is now necessary not only to legitimate this as a universal thesis but to follow it through in accord with all single formations. The problem of the “origin of the idea of space,” the profoundest phenomenological sense of which has never been grasped, is reduced to the phenomenological analysis of the essence of all the noematic (and noetic) phenomena in which space is intuitively presented and is “constituted” as the unity of appearances, of descriptive modes of presentation of something spatial.

Accordingly, the problem of constitution clearly signifies nothing else but that the regulated series of appearances necessarily belonging together in the unity of what appears can become intuitively surveyed and seized upon theoretically — in spite of their infinities (unambiguously controllable precisely in the determined “and so forth”) — : that, in their eidetic own peculiarity, they are analyzable and describable; and that the law-conforming production of perfect correlation between what determinately appears as unity and the determinately infinite multiplicities of appearances can become fully seen intellectually and thus all enigmas can be removed.

This holds likewise for the unity inherent in the res extensa (the res temporalis, too), thus also no less for higher unities, the founded ones, which the expression, “material physical thing,” i.e., the substantial-causal physical thing, indicates. All these unities are constituted at the level of experiencing intuition in “multiplicities,” and everywhere the eidetic concatenations of both sides must be illuminated completely in all their strata with respect to sense and sense-fullness, positional functions, etc. Finally, there must emerge from this perfect intellectual seeing of what the idea of the actual physical thing represents in phenomenologically pure consciousness, how it is the absolutely necessary correlate of a structurally investigated and eidetically described noetic-noematic complex.
These investigations are essentially determined by the different levels and strata of physical thing-constitution in the frame of originary experiencing consciousness. Every level, and every stratum in the level, is characterized by the fact that it constitutes an own peculiar unity which, on its side, is a necessary middle member for the full constitution of the physical thing.

If we take, for example, the level of the perceptual physical thing-constitution, the correlate of which is the thing pertaining to the senses furnished with sensuous qualities, then we refer to a single stream of consciousness, to the possible perceptions of a single perceiving Ego-subject. Here we find many sorts of unity-strata: sensuous schemata, the "sight things" of a higher and lower order which must be perfectly exhibited in this order and studied with respect to their noetic-noematic constitution both in isolation and in their interconnectedness. At the highest strata pertaining to this level there is the substantial-causal physical thing, already a reality in the specific sense of the term, but always still constitutively restricted to one experiencing subject and his ideal perceptual multiplicities.

The next higher level is then the intersubjectively identical physical thing — a constitutive unity of a higher order. Its constitution is related to an open plurality in relation to subjects "understanding one another." The intersubjective world is the correlate of intersubjective experience, i.e., experience mediated by "empathy." We are, as a consequence, referred to the multiple unities of things pertaining to the senses which are already individually constituted by the many subjects; in further course we are referred to the corresponding perceptual multiplicities thus belonging to different Ego-subjects and streams of consciousness; above all, however, we are referred to the novel factor of empathy and to the question of how it plays a constitutive role in "Objective" experience and bestows unity on those separated multiplicities.

Moreover, all the investigations must be carried out in the completeness and comprehensiveness required by the essence of the affairs in question. Thus, in conformity with the goals of an introduction, we have, above, fixed our regard on merely a first, a fundamental, system of constituting multiplicities of appearances, that is to say, those in which one and the same physical thing always
harmoniously appears. In limitless progressions with respect to all systematic lines, perceptions become purely coincident, the positing continually undergo confirmation. There is only more precise determination here, never determination otherwise. None of the physical thing-determinations which have been posited by the previous flow of experience (within this inherently-ideally closed system) undergo "cancellation" and "substitution" by other determinations pertaining to the same category of determination which is formally predesignated by the regional essence. There are no disturbances of the harmony and no processes which counterbalance the disturbances, not to mention that "exploding" of the harmony by which the posited physical thing is entirely cancelled. But now these counter cases are no less to be accounted for phenomenologically since they too play or can play their role in the complex of possible constitution of experiential actuality. The pathway of factual as well as ideally possible cognition leads through errors, even at the lowest cognitive level, the level of intuitively seizing upon actuality. Thus the perceptual flows, in which partial ruptures of harmony occur and in which the harmony is to be preserved only by means of "corrections," are to be systematically characterized with respect to the noetic and noematic essential constituents: apprehensional alterations, own specific positional processes, the transvaluation and devaluation of what was apprehended before, e.g., as "semblance," "illusion," transition to a "conflict" unresolved here and there; and so forth. Over against the continuous synthesis of harmony, the syntheses of conflict, of misinterpretations and determination otherwise, and whatever else they may be called, must be given their due: for a phenomenology of "true actuality" the phenomenology of "nullifying illusion" is also quite indispensable.

§152. Extension of the Problem of Transcendental Constitution to Other Regions.

We see at once that what was said here by way of example for the constitution of the material physical thing — and, more particularly, what was said with respect to the constitution in the system of multiplicities of experience prior to all "thinking" — must be extended to all regions of objects with respect to problems and with respect to methods. For "sensuous perceptions" there now enter,
naturally, the kinds of originarily presentive acts essentially coordinate to the regions in question — acts which must be exhibited and investigated beforehand.

Very difficult problems are attached to the interwovenness of different regions. They condition combinations in the constituting fashionings of consciousness. The physical thing is nothing isolated in contrast to the experiencing subject, as has already been noted in the indications above concerning the intersubjective constitution of the “Objective” physical thing-world. Now, however, this experiencing subject is himself constituted in experience as something real, as human being or as brute, just as the intersubjective communities are constituted as communities of humans and other animals.

Although essentially founded in psychical realities which, for their part, are founded in physical realities, these communities prove to be novel objectivities of a higher order. Universally it is shown that there are many sorts of objectivities which defy all psychologistic and naturalistic misinterpretations. Such are all kinds of value-objects and practical objects, all concrete cultural formations which determine our actual life as hard realities, such as the state, the law, custom, the church, and so forth. Objectnesses must be described with respect to fundamental kinds and in their hierarchies just as they become given, and the problems of constitution set and solved for them.

Quite clearly their constitution also leads back to that of something physical in space and to psychical subjects: they are founded precisely in such realities. As the lowest level, finally, material reality grounds all other realities and, as a consequence, the phenomenology of material Nature assuredly acquires a pre-eminent place. But seen without prejudice and phenomenologically led back to their sources, the founded unities are precisely founded and novel; the novel factor, which is constituted with them, can, as eidetic intuition teaches, never become reduced to the mere sum of other realities. Thus in fact each own specifically peculiar type of such actualities carries along with it its own peculiar constitutive phenomenology and therefore a new concrete theory of reason. In every case the task is essentially the same: It is necessary to make cognized with respect to all levels and strata the complete system of fashionings of consciousness which constitute the originary givenness of all such Objectivenesses, and consequently to make understandable the consciousness-equivalent of the kind of “actuality” in question. Also everything which can be truthfully said here in order to preclude the many and obvious misunderstandings involved
in the correlation of being and consciousness (as, e.g., that all actuality is "resolved into the psychical"), can only be said on the basis of the eidetic interrelations of the constitutive groups seized upon in the phenomenological attitude and in the light of intuition.


A discussion of so general a sort which has only been possible up to now cannot evoke an adequate idea of the enormous extent of the investigations recognized and required as possible so far. To that end, at least for the major types of actualities, portions of detailed investigations would be needed; it would, therefore, be necessary to proceed as we did with respect to the set of problems pertaining to the universal structures of consciousness. Meanwhile in the next Book discussion of the controversies which occupy so much of current thought concerning the mutual relationship of the groups of sciences designated by the names of the natural sciences, psychology and the cultural sciences, and especially concerning their relationship to phenomenology, will provide the occasion, at the same time, to draw the problems of constitution into an accessible proximity. But so much should already have been made clear here: that the controversies actually involve serious problems and that provinces of investigations have been opened up concerning everything which is, in the genuine sense, essentially necessary to all sciences with a material content. The "essential and fundamental" is indeed nothing else but what is grouped around the regional ideas according to the basic concepts and basic cognitions, and what finds or must find its systematic unfolding in the corresponding regional ontologies.

What has been said is extended from the sphere of material objects to the sphere of formal objects and to the ontological disciplines appropriate to the latter, therefore to all principles and any sciences whatever based on principles — provided that we suitably broaden the idea of constitution. The frames of constitutive inquiry are accordingly, of course, broadened such that what has been said can encompass the whole of phenomenology.

That will emerge by itself when we add the following supplementary considerations:

In the first place, there are the problems of the constitution of
objects related to the multiplicities of possible \textit{originarily presentive} consciousness. Thus, for example, in the case of physical things, there are the problems related to the totality of possible \textit{experiences}, indeed, perceptions of one and the same physical things. Following upon this is the supplementary consideration of the reproductive sorts of positing consciousness and the explorations of their constitutive rational production or, what amounts to the same thing, their production for intuitive cognition simpliciter; the same is the case for consideration of the obscurely objectivating (but simpliciter) consciousness and the problems of reason and actuality related to it. In short, we move, first of all, in the \textit{mere sphere of objectivation}.

But connected with that are the corresponding investigations which refer to the productions of a \textit{higher} sphere, the so-called \textit{"sphere of the understanding" or of "reason"} in the \textit{narrower} sense of the term, with their explicating, relating and otherwise \textit{"logical"} (also, then, axiological and practical) syntheses; with their \textit{"conceptual"} operations, their statements, their new mediating forms of grounding. Objectivities which were given first of all in \textit{monothetical acts}, let us say, in simple experiences (or conceived as given in the idea), can be made subject to the play of \textit{synthetical operations} and by virtue of them constitute synthetical objectivities of an always higher level — objectivities which contain a number of positings in the unity of the positing as a whole and which contain a number of materials standing as members in the unity of their total material. One can collect, "fashioning" collectiva (sets) of different hierarchical orders (sets of sets); one can "single out" or "abstract" "parts" from "wholes," properties, predicates in their subjects; one can "relate" objects to objects, at will "making" this one into the referential term, the other into the object referred to; and so forth. One can effect such syntheses "actually," "properly," i.e., in \textit{synthetical originarity}; then, in accord with its synthetical form, the synthesized objectivity has the characteristic of being originarily given (e.g., \textit{the characteristic} of the actually given collection, subsumption, relation, etc.), and it has the full characteristic of originarity if the positings have it, thus if the positing act-characteristics are originarily motivated as rational. One can also draw upon free phantasies, relate the originarily given and the quasi-given, or else effect the syntheses exclusively in the form of modification, change the object of consciousness into a "supposed" object, "frame" hypotheses, "draw consequences" from them; or else draw comparisons and distinctions, subject the similar-
ities and differences themselves given in them to synthetical opera­tions combined with all the ideations, eidetic positions and sup­positions; and thus in infinitum.

Moreover, underlying the operations are acts which are partly intuitional, partly non-intuitional, or else quite confused, of lower and higher levels of Objectivation. In the case of obscurity or confusion, one can set out to clarify the synthetically "produced formations," to raise the question of their possibility, of their resolution by means of "synthetical intuition;" or also the question of their "actuality," of their being resolved by means of explicit andoriginarily presentive synthetical acts, or by way of mediate "inferences" or "proofs." Phenomenologically, all of these types of synthesis, in perfect corre­lation with the synthetically "constituted" objectivities in them, are to be submitted to investigation; the different modes of givenness and their signification for "actual being" of such objectivities, or for truly being possible, for actually being probable, are to be clarified; and the same is the case for all questions of reason, truth and actuality. Thus here too we have "problems of constitution."

Now, the logical syntheses are, to be sure, grounded in the lowest positings with simple materials (senses), but in a manner such that the system of eidetic laws pertaining to the levels of synthesis, and specifically the laws of reason — in a very broad, determinately delimited "formal" sphere — are independent of the particular materials of the members of the synthesis. Precisely by this means a universal and formal logic indeed becomes possible, a logic which abstracts from the "material" of logical cognition and thinks it in undetermined, freely variable universality (as "something or other")

As a consequence, the investigations related to constitution are also distinguished into those which, on the one hand, follow the basic formal concepts and take them alone as "clues" to problems of reason, or problems of actuality and of truth; on the other hand, those which, as previously sketched, follow the basic regional concepts and, in first place, the concept of the region itself, and, to be sure, with the question of how something individual in such a region attains to givenness. With the regional categories and the investigations predesignated by them, justice is done to the particular determination which the synthetical form undergoes by virtue of the regional material; and justice is done to the influence which the particular restrictions (such as find expression in the regional axioms) exercise on the regional actuality

Manifestly what has been explained is transferred to all spheres of
acts and objects, therefore also to the objectivities for the constituting of which emotional acts with their specific positings and materials have to be a priori responsible, and in a manner again with respect to form and material particularity, which it is the great, scarcely suspected, let alone adopted, task of the corresponding constitutive phenomenology to clarify.

As a consequence, the intimate relationship of the constitutive phenomenologies to the a priori ontologies and, finally, to all eidetic disciplines, also becomes evident (excepting, here, phenomenology itself). The sequence of levels of formal and material theories of essence prescribes in a certain way the sequence of levels of the constitutive phenomenologies, determines their levels of universality and provides them with "clues" in the ontological and materially eidetic fundamental concepts and principles. By way of example, the fundamental concepts of the ontology of Nature, such as time, space, matter, and their immediate derivatives, are indices to strata of constituting consciousness of material thingness, just as the relevant fundamental principles are indices to connections of essences in and between the strata. The phenomenological clarification pertaining to pure logic makes it understandable, then, that and why also all mediate propositions pertaining to the pure theory of time, of geometry, and thus of all ontological disciplines, are indices to sets of eidetic laws of transcendental consciousness and its constituting multiplicities.

But it must be explicitly noted that in these interrelations between constitutive phenomenologies and the corresponding formal and material ontologies nothing is implied about the grounding of the former by the latter. The phenomenologist does not judge ontologically when he cognizes an ontological concept or principle as an index to constitutive eidetic complexes, when he sees a clue in them for intuitive validations which bear purely within themselves their right and validity. This universal finding will be verified for us much later in more basic expositions which are, in any case, required by virtue of the importance of this situation.

A comprehensive solution to the problems of constitution which equally takes into consideration the noetic and the noematic strata of consciousness would be manifestly equivalent to a complete phenomenology of reason with respect to all its formal and material fashionings and, at the same time, with respect to its non-normal (negatively rational) as well as its normal (positively rational) fashionings. But it must be admitted, furthermore, that so complete
a phenomenology of reason would become coincident with phenomenology taken universally, that a systematic working out of all descriptions of consciousness required by the collective name, constitution of objects, must include in itself all descriptions whatever of consciousness.
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1 Note of Translator: The Index to Proper Names is based on that of Landgrebe, published by Schuhmann, Vol. I, pp. 466-467. Page references are to the first German edition, printed in the margin of this translation.
**Absolute** the logical absolute (primal object) 29; perception of something immanently absolute 81, 85 ff., 93; the absolute of Divine being 111; the transcendentally absolute not the ultimately absolute 163.

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**Note of Translator**: The subject index is based on that of Ludwig Landgrebe, published in the third edition of *Ideen*, 1928. The page numbers refer to the pagination of the first edition printed in the margins of the text. In this connection, see Schuhmann's comments in *Husserliana* III/I, pp. 472f.; Gerda Walther’s autobiography, *Zum Anderen Ufer* (Remagen: Otto Reichl Verlag, 1960), P. 215, gives a brief account of why she believed her subject index, published with the second edition of *Ideen*, was replaced; and Dorion Cairns, * Conversations with Husserl and Fink* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976), p. 66 indicates a different reason why it was replaced.
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I see Ego.

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the Kantian sense as exact essence (ideal limits) 138; adequate determination of the content of the Kantian idea cannot be attained 166f., 312.

Idealism, Phenomenological the world as essentially necessary correlate of absolute consciousness 81f., 95, 142; absolute being of consciousness, intentional being of the world 91ff.; all real unities are unities of sense, presupposing sense-bestowing consciousness not a subjective idealism 106f.; every transcendent unity is constituted in consciousness (concept of phenomenology as constitutive, transcendental phenomenology) 176ff.; the non-existence of what is intended to does not rob consciousness of its sense 183ff.; the object is only possible as the unity of a certain noematic composition 205; every object is an object of consciousness; all actuality is represented in pure consciousness by its corresponding multiplicity of senses and posita 278ff.; all actuality constituted in consciousness 208ff.; to be "true" or "actual" and to be rationally demonstrable are correlates 282; the Eidos, "to be true," and "to be evidentially positable" (to be adequately given) are correlates 298, 321; "object" as the title for the eidetic concatenations pertaining to consciousness 302.

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"In Person" [Leibhaft] for givenness "in person," see Givenness; "in person" as originary fulfilledness 283.

Inadequacy essentially necessary inadequacy of physical thing-perception 80f., 286, 297ff., 310; inadequacy of memory 294ff.; inadequacy of evidence 285ff., 295ff.

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Individuum, Individual individuum as This-here, see This-here; for individuum in common, see Intersubjectivity; individuum as spatiotemporal existent 8f.; contingency of the individuum 8f.; essence of the individuum 9; seizing upon something individual as single particular subsumed under its essence 14; as This-here, the material essence of which is a concretum 29; individuation and phenomenology 140; something individual only assertorically evident 285.

Induction psychological induction and phenomenologically seizing upon essences 159.

Inference mediate inferences in phenomenology 140; mediate inferences and evidence 293ff.

Infinity intellectually seen givenness of the idea of an infinity, not infinity itself, motivated according to its essence 298. 312

Footnote of Landgrebe: This expression is not itself used in the Ideas, although all of its expositions can be designated as "idealistic" in a correspondingly broadly conceived sense. The places are indicated here in which the specific character of phenomenological "idealism" becomes visible.
Initiating Point [Einsatzpunkt] initiating point of positing 253.

Intensity intensity of Data of sensation and phantasy 227; intensity of levels of clarity, see Clarity.

Intentionality, Intentional, Intensive for fulfillment of intention, see Fulfillment.

General: concept of intentionality 64f., 168ff.; intentionality and seizing-upon 64f.; intentionality taken universally and meaning [Meinen] 199; double intentionality of founded acts (see also Act) 66f., 241f.; intentionality not a depicting in consciousness 186 neutralized and unmodified intentionality 233; explicit intentionality as cogito 235f.; positing characteristics belong to the essence of every mental process 242; intentionality of expressing 257ff.

Intentionality and noesis: intentional μορφή and sensuous ἄνη, intentionality as sense-bestowing 172ff., 181; intentional correlates and really inherent components of mental processes 73ff., 181ff., 201ff., 213.

Intentionality and noema: intensive relation of mental processes and intentional correlates 161; every intensive mental process has its sense 185, 188, "intentional essence" as judgment-sense 195f.; noetic and noematic intentionality 212, 216, 265ff. (see also Noesis and Noema).

Intentionality and phenomenology: intentionality as major theme of phenomenology 167f., 170, 303; intentionality in the psychological and the phenomenological points of view 186 (see also Phenomenology and Psychology).

Intersubjectivity (see also Empathy) the natural world related to intersubjectivity 51f.; essential possibility of effecting intersubjective mutual understanding 90; intersubjective mutual understanding on the basis of the connection of consciousness and animate organism 103; intersubjective constitution 279; intersubjective physical thing 317; intersubjective communities as animate communities 318.

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K

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Levels levels of clarity, see Clarity; characteristic appropriate to levels 212 (see also Reiteration).

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Mathesis Universalis mathesis universalis and logic 18, 22; mathesis universalis and phenomenological reduction 112f.
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General: mental process taken universally as the highest genus 25; question about the essence of mental process 60f.; mental processes directed to something immanent and transcendent 68f.; mental process as object in the broadest sense 112; mental processes-essences as concreta 136; mental process taken universally as the theme of phenomenology 140f.; mental process not a mere “complex of contents” 176ff.; mental living [Erleben] as originary consciousness of mental processes and its neutrality modification 225, 229; shadowing of a mental process as a neutralized mental process 233; a determined potentiality predelineated in the essence of every mental process 234; the eidetic structure of the sphere of mental processes as apriori limits 280; all positing mental processes are either originary presentive (“seeing”) or not 282.
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